

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
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THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY

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JANUARY 1914

Number 1

THE FUNCTION OF THE CHURCH IN MODERN SOCIETY

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Signs are not wanting that the attitude of many serious-minded modern men toward the church, as toward religion in general, is beginning to change from one of criticism, or at best of indifference, to one of interested and often of sympathetic reconstruction. We have just come through a period when it has been the fashion everywhere to charge the church with even more than her admittedly lengthy debit account of sins of omission and commission great and small: no editor, scholar, speaker, cartoonist, paragraph-writer, or even up-to-date preacher so blind as to do her reverence, and none so humble as to hesitate to tell her what she must do to save herself from impending shipwreck and abandonment on the sands of time. Says a keen observer writing as recently as 1911:¹

A perusal of current literature in reference to the church reveals how much the rage it has become to censure the blunders of organized religion. There are fashions in magazine articles as well as in dress, and the present vogue is, by any means, to drub the church. Recent essays in which, with force and cleverness, both friends and foes have pointedly remarked upon ecclesiastical failures . . . leave the impression, not only that there are grievous errors to be criticized, but that some people are having rare sport criticizing them.

But there are indications that the tide has recently turned, and that the ecclesiastical ark is beginning to feel the lift of the rising

¹ H. E. Fosdick, "Heckling the Church," *Atlantic Monthly*, December, 1911.

current of religious interest about her. One of the most encouraging evidences of this is the perceptible increase, in certain leading seminaries at least, of the number, and the still more noticeable improvement in the quality, of the young men who within the last ten years have been entering the service of the church as ministers and missionaries. A new spirit of hope and determination and enthusiasm is abroad in religious gatherings and church assemblies, even when and sometimes just when they frankly face their modern difficulties at their worst. Two religious leaders of national repute have recently said that, whereas a few years ago they found and shared in a general feeling of depression about the church's work and future, they were now discovering everywhere signs of new life and faith, and were convinced that not far ahead of us is an era of general revival of spiritual interest.

And this recognition is outside the church as well as in it. One of our most eminent sociologists, in the foreword to his last book, speaks of the situation (in regard to the commercialism which he finds rampant in America) as having in the last five years "decidedly improved, especially the attitude of the church toward commercial evils."¹ It is striking to see how many social workers, realizing the potential influence for social betterment of the 218,147 churches in America, with their membership of 35,000,000, are speaking and writing in book and magazine on the relation of the church to society, and summoning her to her high social calling.² And particularly significant is the fact that one of the most notable and widely read novels of this year,³ by a writer of serious purpose and high standing, deals directly with the function of the church in modern life as its central problem, sets forth this problem as one which thoughtful men are more and more recognizing as fundamental, and offers a solution at once constructive and hopeful.

The causes of this new interest in the church are not far to seek below the surface of modern life. The recognition that "man is incurably religious" is leading to the further insight that so ele-

¹ E. A. Ross, *Changing America*.

² Cf. Graham Taylor, "Church and Community," a department of the *Survey* each month.

³ Winston Churchill, *The Inside of the Cup*.

mental and powerful a human interest must have its permanent organized expression, and that the church will survive and flourish in spite of, and perhaps long after, its critics, because it answers to a deep and ineradicable human need. Even among those who have no interest in the organized church, the sense of interest in, and desire for, those higher and deeper things of the spirit with which the church has to do is perceptibly strengthening. Says a well-known literary and public man who has always kept close to the beating heart of our American life, in connection with the appearance of his last book:¹ "Possibly the most notable change in our national life in the last decade is the deepening of its note. Whereas formerly attention was given largely to things of the surface, of late the mind has been directed more to those things which lie beneath." The heroine of the recent novel just referred to is typical of many of her countrymen in this: that having pursued and won conventional success, she has found it empty, and having followed various ultra-modern views of life, social and spiritual, she has found them unsatisfying; and her longing for a vital religion is finally satisfied only in the liberalized and revitalized Christian church. The spiritual aspiration and longing of the modern world is a reality to which many a straw of casual conversation, many a leaf from current literature, many a title-page of recent books on religion, give inconspicuous but significant evidence.

Still more significantly, the emergence in unexpected places of powerful spiritual impulses, like the passion for social service which is leading so many modern idealists into a new and real type of religious experience,² and the rise of movements as genuinely religious in spirit as some of our newer social and political tendencies, show what great stirrings have begun beneath that surface of the spiritual life of humanity, on which the church has complacently drifted for many generations. In short, we live in days of profound significance and momentous change, when the church, if she will, may regain something of the prestige and influence which she has admittedly lost of late years, and may rise to the new demands of the modern age and answer to its new desires, with an adequacy

¹ Thomas Nelson Page, *The Land of the Spirit*.

² Cf. E. T. Devine, *The Family and Social Work*, chap. i.

which shall give her a part not less indispensable, though possibly less conspicuous, than of old in the shaping of the new age that is to be.

At such a time, and particularly after such a period of theological transition as that through which we have just been passing, it is appropriate to face afresh the question of the function of the church in human society, and to attempt to restate the reasons which justify her support and guarantee her future as a permanent necessity among human beings endowed and organized as we are, and as our children will be after us. Especially is it timely, thus early in the new age into which modern science and industry and the modern social conscience have combined to lead us, to ask what special service the church may render, and what peculiar opportunities and responsibilities confront her, in the characteristic conditions of the age in which we live. Our subject falls naturally, therefore, into two parts: one dealing with the permanent functions of the church in human life, the other with her contemporary tasks in our modern time.

It should be said also that in thus thinking of the church we do not assume any presuppositions, historical or theological, as to what the church is or ought to be, and that we do not use the word itself in any esoteric or technical sense. Questions of history, polity, and doctrine, that have bulked so large in most discussions of this subject, we waive entirely: important as they may be in other connections, they surely yield in urgency to the previous question which is on the lips of so many and in the hearts of more today: Whatever the church's past, what can she do in the living present, and has she any future? What we mean by the church is what the ordinary man means when he asks these questions—a social group formed by the union of individual Christians for common worship and service. Whether this group be an informal company of Christians seeking fellowship with each other and with God through Jesus Christ, or an organized local congregation federated with other such local groups into a denomination, or whether it think of itself as a single national or international organization that is supreme over its local branches, matters not for our present purpose. It does matter, however, that we should remember that we are considering, not the fortunes or

functions of religion in general, but those of the social institution which it has created for its own cultivation. That religion is a permanent element in human nature and life may perhaps fairly be taken for granted among men who think on these things, and is assumed in this article. It is at least conceivable, however, as the theory of some radical Protestants seems to be, and as the practice of very many lukewarm church-members seems to imply, that, while religion may abide, the church has outlived its usefulness. Whether this is actually the case is precisely our question.

I. THE PERMANENT FUNCTIONS OF THE CHURCH IN HUMAN SOCIETY

One of the most universal elements of spiritual experience among normal and honest men everywhere is the deepening realization that in the higher ranges of our lives we human beings are anything but self-sufficient. It is not simply that deeply religious men discover that they are ultimately dependent upon God, and cannot live without him; it is also, and no less, that we all discover that in our moral as well as in our religious lives we are dependent upon, and cannot live without, each other. The economic and intellectual interdependence of mankind—the extent to which we draw not only our living, but our language, habits, and ideas themselves out of the social atmosphere in which we live and move and have our being—is a fact familiar to every modern thinker. But there is need, in our still too individualistic age and country, for continued emphasis on the fact that this interdependence is moral and religious as well. It is only the spiritual genius whose sense of God is keen enough, whose conscience is sensitive enough, whose will is strong enough, to be a hermit or a recluse in his higher life. The prophet may dwell in the desert, and appear among men only to deliver the word of the Lord that has come unto him. But the ordinary man must worship with his fellows and feel the moral support of his friends, if he is to keep his spiritual life sound and strong; and the less of a native genius he be in such matters, the more dependent is he upon such social reinforcement.

This is partly due, no doubt, to the almost tidal ebb and flow of our inner life, to the incalculable but inevitable influence of our spiritual moods upon us. There are certain moments of insight

and exaltation in the life even of the dullest man, when his intuition of religious truth is quick enough, and his sense of moral values keen enough, to make him for the moment at least spiritually independent. But there ensue long periods, constituting in the aggregate overwhelmingly the larger part of his life, when he can keep himself steadily open to the highest influences and amenable to the highest standards of life, only by joining with others whose mood may supplement or overcome his own, and with whom he may co-operate in the creation of that common mood, more powerful than any individual state of mind, which every student of social psychology knows.

An almost equally important factor in the situation is the weakness of the individual will of most men. Aside from those extraordinary men whose steadily masterful genius is largely a native endowment of will-power, and aside from the moments of heroic determination that come to all of us, it remains true that for the vast majority of men the knowledge of duty is far in advance of the practice of it; that some kind of moral support is necessary to hold them even within reach of their best; and that all the inspiration of example and exhortation that others can consciously or unconsciously bring to bear on their hesitant or wavering wills will be none too much to make them the men and women that they know they ought to be.

In view of this social interdependence of all our higher life, the indispensable function of the church as a permanent necessity and support of the spiritual interests of human society becomes evident. As by combining the limited strength or wisdom or capital of many individuals into an army or a council or a corporation, a collective achievement is made possible which no single person could have attempted; and as within such a social group standards of efficiency and attainment are maintained to which many of the weaker would not individually attain alone, so may a group of people with moral aspirations and Christian purposes pool, so to speak, their spiritual capital in a church, and draw on this common spiritual stock for support in times of their personal religious doubt or obscurity, or moral strain. That such spiritual support from the common capital is a reality, let the experience of all who have found help in the

public worship of the church at times of individual need, or who have felt the steadying power of the Christian public opinion of the church at times of moral strain, bear abundant witness.

The number of us who at some time or other are kept from religious "backsliding" or moral lapse by the sustaining power of public opinion is perhaps, if we only knew, larger than we should like to think for the sake of the credit of individual human nature; but at least it shows how powerful and how indispensable are the social sanctions that hold us in our proper places. The human universe, like the solar system and the whole cosmos of which it is a part, is held in place and swung in orderly and dependable orbit by the influence of its individual members on each other; gravitation is in this sense a spiritual as well as a physical force—and in both realms is fundamental and essential. The church, in other words, has as its first permanent function in human life the support of the otherwise morally and religiously insufficient individual (as most of us are) in his higher life. In this sense, social and psychological rather than dogmatic, the church may fairly be called an "ark of salvation" for struggling individual swimmers on the sea of spiritual experience.

A second aspect of the church's function is closely related to this first. Not simply is the moral and religious life of most men supported and stimulated by the common spiritual life of the church; it is very often itself originated as an offspring from that life more or less directly. For it is true of spiritual life as of physical, that it springs from previous life; religious experience is quickened in one soul by and from the experience of others, and moral resolve is fired by the example or exhortation of an inspiring character. Now while it is true that this creative contact of personalities is not seldom a matter of direct personal influence ("personal work" is the traditional phrase) in which the church as such has no share, it is also true that a great many people are not themselves directly in touch with any spiritually quickening personality of this sort, and can come into such life-giving contact only through the church in which such personalities gather and are accessible. And not only so, but the church herself, like any social organization, develops a corporate life of her own that is different from, and stronger than,

the lives of her members individually or even in the aggregate. The "life of the church" is a very real spiritual entity, as every live member of a living church knows. And this common or corporate life is often as potent as any individual influence to beget new life in others. It is no accident that conversions usually take place in churches or as a direct result of church work, and at special times and seasons of spiritual travail of the common soul. Life from life is nature's law; and the corporate as well as the individual spiritual life can bring forth and bear.

Nor is it simply contemporary life that thus has power to reproduce itself. Vital spiritual experience has an astonishing quality of timelessness—it seems never to lose the power to quicken new life from itself. The experience and example of ancient "saints, apostles, prophets, martyrs" have almost as much power of inspiration over us as over their contemporaries and successors—and in many cases quite as much or even more. The "life of the church" thus becomes much more than the aggregate of its component individual lives, more even than the corporate life which all these with each other create. It includes also in a very real sense the timeless experiences of all those who, "having done the will of God, abide forever," and likewise the accumulating or rather enlarging common life of the church of all the ages. This "communion of saints" thus becomes a corporate life wider and deeper and mightier than that of any age or group, and able continually to call forth new life to reproduce and enrich itself.

Abstract and intangible as this argument may perhaps seem, it appears as by no means unreal or invalid when we consider the history and experience of all the "Catholic" churches, and their sheer power to perpetuate themselves *as institutions*, with a minimum of the personal contact of individuals which Protestantism has always magnified. Still more does it so appear when we consider the relation of the church to that greatest but one of all Christian sources and springs of religious experience—the Bible. The Bible as we have it is essentially a church book. Though not written for ecclesiastical purposes, it still remains true that it was collected, transmitted, preserved, and interpreted, *in the church*. In other words, this wonderful self-revelation of original Hebrew and

Christian piety, this unique record of religious experience, has been handed down to us in and through the church, and is a kind of visible transcript of the spiritual life which the church has always possessed and transmitted. And as the Bible has always been, like an overflowing vessel of "living water," "quick and powerful" to call forth Christian experience and stimulate Christian living in the successive generations, so has the church ever been the channel through which has poured down through the ages the inexhaustible stream from which the vessel was originally filled.

Still more evident is this when we consider the relation which the church has always sustained to the most powerful of all sources of Christian life and experience—the person of Jesus Christ. In his presence, in contact with his personality as it stands forth in the Gospels, the essential Christian experience is most steadily and surely produced: there God becomes real and Fatherly and trustworthy, life becomes big with meaning and the promise of immortality, and the kingdom of heaven becomes a present task and a future hope. Now it is *within the church* that his memory, his portrait, his teachings, his spirit, have been kept alive; it is "where two or three are gathered together" in his name, that he is "in the midst." Historically speaking, it was within the church that the sayings of Jesus were first collected and treasured, and his biographies written, and there that through all the centuries since, however inadequately or distortedly at times, he has been "lifted up" to the homage and obedience and imitation of mankind. Surely not least among the age-long services of the church has been this: that it has held up before mankind steadily the most important figure in human history. And this remains in our time a permanent and indispensable function of the church—for our age needs the vision of Christ certainly not less than those that have gone before. And so long as the church, by its preaching and teaching and witness-bearing, thrusts the figure of Christ before the attention of men, not only in the sanctuary, but in the market-place and the school and the home, so long is it meeting the condition on which depends the contemporary fulfilment of his own ancient and oft-verified promise, "I, if I be lifted up, will draw all men unto me."

In other words, the orthodox Catholic doctrine of the church as

the repository and guardian of an authoritative tradition is simply, as dogmas so often are, the theological perversion and intellectual incrustation of a spiritual experience. It is not *tradition* which the church ought to treasure up and transmit, but *life*—spiritual life. She becomes a channel through which the stream of Christian experience pours itself on down through the centuries, enriching itself and quickening new life as it goes. The Bergsonian philosophy, with its vivid and stimulating picture of life as a vital movement thrusting itself forward through real time into ever-new and unforeseen individual manifestations, may help us moderns to make more real to ourselves this conception of the age-long life of the church, and its relation to the individual lives of contemporary Christians who are quickened by, or spring from, it. The second permanent function of the church is thus the transmission from generation to generation of Christian life and experience in all its quickening power, and especially of those life-giving and never-failing spiritual experiences which the church has made accessible to the world in the Bible and in the person of Jesus Christ.

A third aspect of the permanent function of the church in human life appears when we consider the true relation of religion to the common affairs and routine of daily living in the average community. In times past, and in some types of Christianity today, religion has been apparently conceived as an occasional mysterious transaction or ritual act, which takes place at some special revival season or at some central and consecrated place, and by which the Divine is brought down into our human world to be adored and appropriated. It is the descent of God within the reach of man. For all real Protestants, however, religion is no occasional transaction or rare ecstasy, but an ever-renewed experience, attained through prayer and meditation and daily duty-doing and unselfish service, of the presence of the Divine in our hearts and lives in the midst of the affairs of every day. It is "the life of God in the soul of man"—in whose transfiguring light nothing can be secular save what is sinful, and in whose purifying presence nothing worthy can remain common or unclean.

At the same time, however, as we have seen, the average individual requires some social support, some objective and organ-

ized mediation, before he can catch and keep this divine presence within him. And particularly is this true where the pressure of life's daily round and common task is forever tending to conceal or to extinguish the light within. In this regard the church serves as a kind of constant conductor of the divine life and presence into the midst of every community and into the heart of every member. Not simply at some central shrine, but into the midst of every least community where "two or three are gathered together," she brings the common vision of Christ, the common experience of God. No spot on earth where two souls can meet for worship is so isolated, no house is so humble or service so barren or preacher so ill-equipped or poor, as to miss this spiritual blessing if only the seeking be sincere; and by this blessing the common life and labor of these seekers and that community may be lit up with the very presence of God. And this sanctifying and transfiguring ministry of the church is not simply universal, but also constantly recurrent. Were it only once a year or once a month, the fire might languish and die in the long intervals. But once or twice or thrice a week the social bond is renewed, the common aspiration is lifted, the common blessing comes. It is as important that this social mediation of religion should be constantly repeated so as to touch and transfigure the constantly renewed and ever-fresh pulses or periods of time that, as Bergson reminds us, make up life, as that it should touch every least and last locality where men live together.

We may perhaps illustrate this third aspect of the function of the church by the analogy of the production of steam. A ritualistic or revivalistic religion, like the old-fashioned boiler, brings the divine fire down to the outside of the undifferentiated mass of human life, and by the application of its heat there seeks to generate power. But the mass is slow to penetrate and stubborn to transform by any such purely external method. It is the function of the church to serve as the intricate system of channels in the modern tubular boiler, each local church acting as a single tube and all together carrying the divine fire straight to the heart and out through all the ranges of human life, till spiritual power is generated everywhere at once. Only so can the kingdom come in all parts and at all times of our human experience. It is thus the third function of the church

to relate religion vitally to the ordinary life of all sorts and conditions of men, at all times and places of their existence.

A fourth aspect of the function of the church in human life can perhaps be stated more simply and directly than the three thus far considered. It is that a task so vast and intricate as that to which Christianity summons its followers—the bringing-in on earth of God's kingdom and the doing of his will among men—can be adequately attempted, much less accomplished, only by an organized society. All the considerations of efficiency which have led to the modern elaboration of organization in all departments of life require a like measure of organized efficiency on the part of the church if she is to accomplish her task; and in proportion as her task is vaster, more delicate, and more difficult than that of manufacturing and marketing a commercial product, or administering a city or a state, or waging a war, must her organization be not less but more efficient. The necessity of a permanent machinery that shall survive the individual fortunes of short-lived mortals; of a division of labor that shall assign each member to the task that he can best perform; of a central administration that shall eliminate waste and duplication, and bring her full resources to bear on the most important tasks in hand; and of a constant supervision and training that shall increase the efficiency of each worker—these necessities of every undertaking that would accomplish great things through human instrumentality are laid upon the church as well.

But there remains a yet deeper reason why the Christian task can be adequately attempted only by a society; a reason which our High-Church friends have been far quicker to see and appropriate than we still individualistic "sectarians." It is, briefly, that the Christian ideal for human life is a social ideal, the Christian gospel a social gospel; and that therefore that ideal can be realized, that gospel effectively preached, only through a *society*. If it be true, as we certainly think it is, that our present social order is fundamentally un-Christian, and that our Christian task is not finished until it as well as the individuals who compose it be redeemed, and the "environment evangelized" as well as the souls that are constantly exposed to its influence; then, by the same fundamental logic which makes it impossible that a man drowning out of reach of

shore or boat should be rescued by anyone who cannot swim himself, or that an attacking fleet should ever be captured or destroyed by a defending army, it follows that this social task requires a social instrument, a *church*, for its achievement. Just as in any highly organized sport a number of picked-up individuals, however brilliant, can hardly hope to defeat a real "team," so no mere aggregation of individuals, however saintly, can hope to overcome the "kingdoms of this world" and make them "the kingdoms of our Lord and of his Christ." As a means to the establishment of an era of brotherhood and justice and mutual service, we must have a church that is founded on, and characterized by, these same fundamental Christian principles: no other type of church can ever achieve the kingdom, nor can it be achieved without any church at all. The fourth permanent function of the church is therefore a co-operative attempt to realize an essentially social ideal.

It will be observed that these four functions are after all simply various aspects of what is fundamentally a single or at most a two-sided fact—the social nature of all human life, and the correspondingly inevitable social character of all religion and notably of the Christian religion. From this elemental fact follows directly the permanent necessity of the church in human life; and all analyses or elaborations of its functions (of which many more might be made) and all analogies illustrative of its working (of which those above are offered as suggestive merely) are really only recognitions from various approaches of the ultimate fact that "no man liveth to himself," but that "we are all members one of another."

II. SPECIAL FUNCTIONS OF THE CHURCH IN MODERN SOCIETY

While these permanent functions of the church thus inhere in the fundamental characteristics of human nature and life always and everywhere as we know it, and are thus the real basis of the church's abiding destiny, it is also true that in any age there may be special conditions urgently needing just what the church has or ought to have to give, and challenging her to press with special vigor one or another of these functions, or even to add to them others that the needs of the times or the nature of her own ideals demand. That this is notably true of our own time, that the church

is today facing at once a serious crisis and a great opportunity, has become a commonplace. Indeed, there is danger that the very recognition of our peculiar modern situation may lead us to an overemphasis on the differences between our own time and earlier ages, and to an obscuring of the permanent needs of human life which the church, now as always, must meet. The modern man is after all not so different at heart from his ancestors as some very up-to-date thinkers would have us believe. The modern world greatly needs to ponder the dictum of Goethe—"Mankind is forever advancing, but man remains ever the same"—and the modern church, in her eagerness to meet the new needs of mankind, must not cease to minister to the perennial needs of man.

At the same time, there is no doubt that the church is facing in our time a situation, fraught at once with crisis and with opportunity, such as rarely in her history she has had to meet. It has become trite to say that "conditions have changed," so that her traditional methods of doing the very work which we have insisted is her permanent function are no longer effective, and that she must either find new methods or leave her essential task undone. This is unquestionably true. But further it is also true that certain temporary functions which, under the peculiar exigencies of past ages, she then assumed because no one else was doing them, and because they were related to her own ideals, have since been taken over by other agencies created for the purpose, leaving her without the prestige which once these activities brought her. As everybody knows, she has thus handed over education to public schools and private colleges, eleemosynary work very largely to charitable organizations and to the state, and direct social reform to political parties. And yet once more: it is also true that certain characteristic changes in our modern life have deeply affected her work and considerably increased its present difficulty. Modern science, philosophy, and historical scholarship have completely changed men's ideas of the universe and of their own relation to it, and have modified profoundly the form, if not the substance, of all religious teaching. Out of the resulting period of theological transition and religious confusion we have by no means passed. And the increased complexity and high tension of modern life have made it increasingly

difficult for the church to get the ear of men, and to find sufficient opportunities to exercise to any perceptible extent an influence which must be as delicate and subtle as hers.

But these facts, as at least the younger generation of our time are beginning to recognize, constitute a challenge to advance rather than an excuse for retreat. They call for aggressive leadership to discover new methods of doing these perennial tasks in the midst of a new age. They require constructive thinking to restate the ancient truths of Christianity in such new forms as to command even modern attention. And no less do they demand a realignment of our forces: the withdrawal of our energies from certain points of assured victory on humanity's wide battlefield where we are no longer so much needed; the concentration of our forces at certain newly crucial points where the issue is still doubtful; or the seizing of some vantage points where the fighting has hardly yet begun. If there were special opportunities for service in previous ages where the church could win great prestige and strike mighty blows for the advance of the kingdom, by espousing causes and upholding interests which others were leaving to defeat, surely there must be such special opportunities in an age so tossed in transition and torn with conflict as our own. Are there such, and if so, what are they? That is our second great question.

The first great opportunity and challenge offered to the church by distinctly modern conditions grows out of the new industrialism into which the last century has carried us. The development of machinery and of the factory system, the division of labor, the concentration into cities, and, above all, the enormous increase in the volume of our American wealth due to the exploitation of our unrivaled natural resources, have combined to emphasize business standards of success until they have become the accepted standards for the measurement of values of all kinds among us; and commercialism has come in upon us like a flood. The absence of a leisure class and of a landed aristocracy, with their traditions, has favored this process. Prosperity rather than human welfare has become our national ideal, all things material or immaterial are estimated in terms of money value or cost (witness our newspaper headlines which describe everything from building sites to paintings

and opera singers by a figure with a \$ before it), and we tremble to take any great forward step in social progress for fear of its possible effects on business and profits. The rich are our national heroes of success, our aristocracy is one chiefly of wealth, and the eyes of all of us are focused on money-making as the one universally recognized road to recognition—for a man is known among us by the money he has made. A keen observer recently remarked that as a nation we were working all day to make money and then sitting up half the night to spend it—and that this seemed to be all there was to most of our personal lives. Small wonder is it that rich and poor among us have had their standards frightfully externalized, their sense for things unseen and eternal deadened, and their unresponsiveness to spiritual interests greatly increased, by this all-invading commercialism. The marked reaction of the last few years against all this has come none too soon, and may well go much farther before the balance is restored in our national life between material and spiritual interests.

The attention given to things spiritual in our national life is further lessened by the marked speeding-up of the pace of modern living. In some industries the standard pace of labor has, by means of speeding up the machinery, been actually doubled by count in the last few years. The distinguished economist in charge of the recent Pittsburgh Survey reported: "The mass of workers in the steel industry are driven as large numbers of laborers, whether slave or free, have scarcely before in human history been driven." And this speeding up has been felt all through our modern life, in our leisure and our amusements (witness the effects of the automobile) hardly less than in our industries. The result has been to make it increasingly difficult to get the attention of people—particularly the continuous attention. Nor is this to be wondered at when we remember how jaded this pace of modern life must leave nerves and minds and bodies that have been driven all the working-day at this high speed. Busy men, and women too for that matter, are very often too tired in the evening for anything but the lightest reading or the most trivial amusement, and on Sunday for anything but a trip into the country. This increased pace of modern life, instead of

leaving more leisure for higher interests, is thus making it more and more difficult to fasten the attention of busy men on anything serious outside that which occupies their working-hours.

In such a largely commercialized and highly driven life, it is perhaps more than ever in human history an all-important function of the church to witness to the reality and power of things unseen and eternal, and to make the busy modern man, whether capitalist or laborer, realize their supreme importance. She must insist that it profits neither a man nor a nation anything to gain the whole world and lose its own soul; that a man's or a nation's life consisteth not in the abundance of the things which it possesseth; that it is not the will of our Father in Heaven that one of his little ones, whether overworked in cotton mills, or stifled in tenements, or starved in poverty, or corrupted with vice, should perish; that the moral order and an eternal destiny and God are the ultimate and supreme realities of existence. The church must deliver herself from the insidious taint of commercialism, and fight uncompromisingly against the worship and service of Mammon wherever it appears. She must make conscience, both individual and social, vocal and authoritative in the lives and affairs of men and of communities. She must open to driven and distraught souls, out of the possibly gloomy treadmill of their daily life, a window toward heaven. In short, she must recognize it as part of her distinctive modern task, by insisting on the infinite worth of the individual and the eternal values of brotherly human relationships, to "spiritualize democracy"; for if democracy is not spiritualized, it may too easily become merely a vast social machine for greater economic efficiency and greater personal gratification. The social possibilities opening before a truly spiritualized democracy are tremendous; but a commercialized aristocracy and a brutalized proletariat would make up a society that in the long run could produce and exalt little but mediocrity, superficiality, and frivolity. Away from such perils and toward such possibilities of democracy it is the present duty of the church to lead our modern life.

A second special opportunity for the church in our age and nation grows out of the fact that we Americans are as a people

deeply individualistic. It is one of the main secrets of our national strength and achievement that we have been so; and all the conditions of our pioneer history have tended to accentuate this national characteristic. But now that the pioneer stage of our development is largely past, and the industrial era is full upon us, it is absolutely essential, not only for our future attainments, but also for our future salvation as a people, that we should outgrow the individualism of our national youth wherein it was "every man for himself and the devil take the hindermost," and enter into the brotherly co-operation of maturity wherein we shall all recognize and act on the principle that we are all "members one of another." This is, of course, not socialism in the economic or political sense; it is socialism only in the sense of the organic unity of society in which Christianity is fundamentally socialistic, and every developed nation must also be if it is to survive. Now it is surely one of the most hopeful auguries of our national future that this sense of our organic unity, which is at least the first stage of a growing sense of brotherhood, is increasing so rapidly among us; that a social conscience is developing which feels keenly the burden of our national sins and shortcomings and will not rest satisfied till they are overcome; and that a common will is asserting itself which alone can carry us forward as a united democracy on the path of social progress.

But hopeful as are these beginnings, we yet have far to go. The forces of reactionary individualism are still mighty among us, and have on their side, not only the settled social habits and institutions of generations, but also the letter and even sometimes the spirit of our system of laws and our written constitutions. The rapid tendency to class stratification and increased class tension among us as the glaringly unequal distribution of wealth increases at a pace accelerated by our enormously enlarging production of wealth, and the emergence among our increasingly heterogeneous population of strong racial cleavages and antipathies, are centrifugal social forces which must be counteracted and overcome by stronger centripetal forces of social cohesion and brotherhood, if we are to survive as a democracy.

Further, the social agencies which we have so far developed exist

chiefly either for their own self-seeking (as in the case of labor unions, commercial organizations, and fraternal orders) or for some specific piece of social betterment (as with our societies for particular philanthropic and charitable purposes or for special objects of reform). In other words, while we are organizing rapidly into more or less sharply competing groups, each for mutual benefit within itself, and while we are attending admirably to the achievement of specific reforms as the need for them appears, we are leaving the general social sense and conscience among us to develop by itself without definite cultivation. That it does develop as a by-product of these specific social strivings is undoubted; that in these modern days God is causing it to spring forth and grow among us, "we know not how," some of us firmly believe. But is it not also plain that the development of the social sense and conscience in general, the deepening of the realization that we human beings and particularly we American fellow-citizens are really "members one of another," cannot be left to chance, to incidental by-production, or even to a kind Providence, if our social perils are to be averted and our social possibilities as the world's great experiment in democracy are to be realized?

Here, then, is the second and perhaps the supreme opportunity of the church in the peculiar conditions of modern life—to cultivate and sensitize the social conscience. She alone among all our human institutions exists for the specific purpose of making men realize that they are all brothers, children of a common Father in one great human family. Her public worship in itself is or ought to be a tremendous force working for this end: its intercessory prayers for the special needs of "all sorts and conditions of men" must stir in the heart and conscience of every true worshiper, in the most searching and appropriate way that human experience knows, the realization of human brotherhood in common dependence upon God; its sermons, if they be in any true sense prophetic, must arouse the social conscience, and exalt the common weal, and utter forth again the ancient summons of Christianity to individual repentance for the sake of the general good—"Change your life, for God is introducing among men a new order." And all the church's "work and labor of love," ameliorative, redemptive, missionary, tends or

ought to tend to deepen this sense of brotherhood to the ends of the earth. That the church often fails in this divine mission, that her social service is sometimes neutralized by her own too frequent unbrotherliness, is no refutation of her function, but rather an evidence both of its importance and of its difficulties. She is the herald and ambassador—and most of all the ministering servant—of that kingdom of God which is “not meat and drink, but righteousness and peace and joy in the divine Spirit.”

And this leads directly and specifically to the third great opportunity of the church in the modern age—the definite promotion of the common welfare at the next point to be gained. In previous ages the church has not been slow to undertake specific tasks which she saw lay along the pathway toward her spiritual ideals, and which others were not undertaking. Thus in ancient times she undertook the whole work of relieving the poor and caring for the sick and disabled, which in our more advanced stage of social evolution the state has taken over. Thus in the Dark Ages she undertook the preservation of classical literature and the cultivation of science, philosophy, music, and art. Thus in our own land she has been an indispensable pioneer in the providing of education and the establishing of law and order. But now that in the course of social development these specific tasks have been measurably completed, or taken over by other and more appropriate and adequate agencies, it is for her, not to lament over lost prestige or outworn opportunities, but to press forward to meet the new needs of a new age.

That the church has not wholly lost her ancient initiative, that she is not wholly blind to the new situation, let the whole recent development of institutional and neighborhood church work in the neediest part of the cities, of redemptive agencies for down-and-out men and unfortunate women, of activities for social outlook and uplift in the country church—let the whole intricate machinery of such efficient “arms of the church” as the Young Men’s and Young Women’s Christian Associations—be at least partial evidence. Amid the spiritual darkness of Asia and Africa today the church is doing exactly the same pioneering work for civilization and education and the medical relief of human suffering, which she did for

Europe in the Middle Ages and for America in its earlier days. Along these lines, at home and abroad, her distinctive and immediate tasks clearly lie at the present time. It is always hers to undertake promptly such specific tasks as lie in the direction of her ideals and are not otherwise being performed.

When changing conditions, advancing social progress, or the development of more adequate and appropriate social machinery make it advisable for her to change her methods, or to turn over to others any of these temporary functions, she should do so without hesitation or discouragement—and press on to new and unoccupied points of social conflict or conquest. Even if, in the rapidly increasing complexity of our social machinery, she should at any moment find all the special social issues of the hour in the hands of organizations formed for these specific purposes, it would still be her important function to educate public opinion on these same issues, and to rally it in reinforcements that will insure victory at the precise points where the contemporary conflict is hottest. And always, above and beyond these changing tasks of the day, will remain those permanent functions in human life which alone would justify and require her existence. The church, in short, is or ought to be at any moment the most sensitive and responsive part of the body politic—the keenest surface of its conscience to feel the newest social danger, the strong cutting edge of its common will to press through obstacles on to higher social attainments. She is or ought to be a permanently organized force of social minute-men, ready to rush into any unexpected breach in the walls of our civilization and to hold it temporarily against the invading enemies of our human welfare until new defenses can be built; ready, too, to dart ahead and seize any commanding points of social vantage that will facilitate or protect the advance of humanity on its long march to better and higher things.

It is evident that these special duties of the church in modern life are simply concrete applications to contemporary social conditions of the permanent functions of the church in human society which were earlier considered. This recognition raises the question whether it may be possible to summarize the entire discussion in

terms of a comprehensive definition or analogy. The latter is perhaps the wiser quest to follow; since in a subject so vast and vague as this, concrete analogies that are at all accurate are often more illuminating and suggestive than any abstract definitions.

It happens that the course of social evolution has provided us with an analogy in a sphere close enough to be accurate, familiar enough to be illuminating, and practical enough to be suggestive. During the last seven centuries the colleges and universities of the modern world have become, more largely perhaps than any other institutions, the custodians of the higher life and interests of humanity. Within them the flame of pure scholarship and original research is kept alive. They train and develop thousands upon thousands of immature personalities to be worthy members in the "fellowship of educated men"—and this training is their peculiar and permanent function. But in addition they also give a partial or complete technical training for particular callings; they are constantly making new discoveries in applied science, or advancing new principles of social well-being, which are at once put to the service of society in practical life; and they are always centers and rallying-points for patriotism and public spirit. Their multitudes of alumni throughout the world look back each to his Alma Mater with a loyalty and affectionate devotion which has few if any counterparts in human life, for each man recognizes how incalculable is his debt. The alumni of each college, or of all the colleges together, are, however, only a part of that great "fellowship of educated men" of all ages and races, who are bound together by common intellectual interests, ideals, and purposes into an invisible and unorganized but most real society. But though the colleges do not train all these truly educated men, they are incomparably the best and surest schools in which students may qualify themselves to enter this timeless fellowship.

What the college is to the intellectual life of the world, that the church is or ought to be to its moral and religious life. She has always kept the flame of social altruism and of spiritual devotion burning bright. Under her molding and inspiring influence pass thousands upon thousands of immature souls, to be shaped into Christian men and women—and this is her peculiar and permanent

function. That so many of these are women and children is to a far-seeing eye a sign not of her weakness but of her glory and her opportunity—for these are the molders and the members of the coming generation. But while it is the chief and central “business of the church to make Christians,” she may and ought at the same time to enlist and train and organize workers for particular social tasks, to serve society in all possible practical ways, and to take the lead in all spiritual and social advance. Her members and beneficiaries owe her a loyalty and devotion commensurate with the spiritual blessings she has conferred upon them and upon their fellows. But all the members of these visible churches are only a part of that great fellowship of spiritually and socially minded men of all the generations, who in their relations with each other and with God their Father constitute the invisible but most real kingdom of heaven. He who would qualify himself for entrance into that kingdom can best do so within the fellowship of the church. For she is the spiritual Alma Mater of humanity, training men on earth for the eternal fellowship of the kingdom here and hereafter.

THE HITTITES

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There can be no doubt that it was their interest in the Bible, their desire "thus to confirm the scattered references to the Hittites in sacred history,"¹ that led scholars in the past to devote so much time and energy to the exploration of the lands of the Hittites and to the copying and decipherment of their inscriptions. While no Hittite monument ever aroused the intense enthusiasm which followed George Smith's discovery in 1872 of the Babylonian account of the Deluge and led to redoubled efforts to bring to light the ancient civilizations which lay buried under the mounds of Mesopotamia, still the interest in the "sons of Heth" has been perennial. In passing judgment upon the work of the older scholars, many of whose conclusions have proved to be unwarranted, we must not forget that their sources were much more limited than ours and that they were often blinded by their zeal for the cause in whose defense their efforts were put forth. Today we are no longer defending the Bible but trying to understand it. The task which the student of the Old Testament sets himself is to trace the cultural and religious development of the Hebrew people in Canaan, bearing in mind all the while that they must have been influenced by their physical and social environments, the same as any other people. It is of the greatest importance that he be acquainted with the history of the civilizations with which the Hebrews came in contact, namely, the Egyptian on the Nile, the Babylonian-Assyrian on the Euphrates and Tigris, the Hittite in Asia Minor, and the Minoan in the Aegean. Little wonder then that the many problems of Hittite history which still await solution are being vigorously attacked from every side.

As early as the year 1736, Otter found hieroglyphic inscriptions at Ivriz, which lies across the Taurus range from Tarsus.

¹ Wright, *The Empire of the Hittites*, p. vii.

In 1812, the famous traveler Burckhardt found an inscription at Hama (Hamath) on the Orontes, and some years later, in 1834, Texier discovered some sculptures and inscriptions at Boghaz-Keui in northern Asia Minor.¹ About all that could then be said about these inscriptions was that the hieroglyphs in which they were written were not Egyptian. In his *Unexplored Syria*, Burton published the inscription found by Burckhardt at Hama, together with similar ones from the same neighborhood. This was in 1872. In the same year Dr. W. Wright secured all of the Hama inscriptions for the museum at Constantinople. From this time until the present day new monuments have been coming to light in increasing numbers in Syria and Asia Minor. If the distribution of their monumental remains gives any certain indication of the extent of the territory occupied (more or less permanently) by the Hittites (and this seems to be a reasonably safe assumption) the boundaries of the Hittite lands are roughly these:

Our southerly frontier reaches to Hamath on the Orontes. Eastward our boundary is the Euphrates, flowing past Malatia, Samsat, and Jerablus. Westward the monuments follow the inner edge of Taurus as far as the Kara Dag, with not a single site under the southern slope of these mountains. In the north we have no clear boundary. Eyuk and Boghaz-Keui are found in the middle of the circuit of the Halys, with no places nearer than those which lie in the valley of that river. Across the river a single line of monuments, including Giaour-Kalesi, Yarre, Doghanlu, and Bey-Keui, seems to lead on towards the Lydian coast, to where Sipylus and Kara-Bel are found between Sardis and Smyrna.²

In other words, the Taurus ranges, with the Zagros spur running off to the Persian Gulf, formed the boundary between the Semites on the one hand, and the Hittites and other non-Semitic peoples of western Asia on the other; and, although it has been crossed temporarily by tribes from either side, this boundary even today separates the Semite from the non-Semite.

¹ Cf. Jensen in Hilprecht, *Explorations in Bible Lands*, pp. 755 f.

² Garstang, *The Land of the Hittites*, p. 84. Herodotus (II, 106) saw two figures which he was told were statues of Sesostris, the one on the road from Sardis to Smyrna, the other on the road between Ephesus and Phoea. These were probably the Hittite monuments which were rediscovered, the one by Renouard in 1839, the other by Beddoe in 1856; cf. Jensen, *loc. cit.*

This brings us to the question of race. The older scholars were largely influenced in their conclusions as to the "nationality" of the Hittites by the biblical genealogy of the tenth chapter of Genesis, where Heth is declared to have been the grandson of Ham, and by the language which their decipherment of the hieroglyphs led them to believe the Hittites spoke. So, for example, Wright, in his *The Empire of the Hittites* (1884), concluded that the Hittites were a non-Semitic people, and, in view of the biblical genealogy, that they were Hamitic in origin.¹ Conder, on the other hand, in his *Altaic Hieroglyphs* (1887) and *The Hittites and Their Language* (1898), proved to his own satisfaction that the Hittites were a Mongol tribe, and that their language was clearly Mongolian and not Aryan or Semitic. Hommel connected them "with the Scythians, and the first appearance of the Iranians in history,"² while Jensen found in them the ancestors of the modern Armenians and regarded their inscriptions as "the most ancient monuments of our Indogermanic speech."³ Still others connected them with the Pelasgi⁴ or the "White Syrians" of Strabo.⁵ Without enumerating any more of the hypotheses put forth by scholars in the past—hypotheses reared upon the most insecure foundations—we may conclude this part of our discussion with a word on the theory of the racial affinity of the Hittites which has found favor with the anthropologists of today.⁶

In prehistoric times, a brown-skinned, dolichocephalic race of men occupied the whole Mediterranean basin, spreading to Britain on the west and India on the east. This is the "Brown" or "Mediterranean" race of the anthropologists. North of the regions occupied by this race there stretches a series of mountain ranges, beginning with the Pamirs in the east, continued by the Armenian Mountains and the Taurus ranges in Asia Minor, taken

¹ Pp. 86 f.

² Cf. Ball, *Light from the East*, p. 140.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 793.

⁴ Cf. Ripley, *The Races of Europe*, pp. 448 f.

⁵ Cf. Tomkins, *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, XVIII, 227.

⁶ Cf. Ripley, *op. cit.*; Sergi, *The Mediterranean Race*; G. Elliot Smith, *The Ancient Egyptians*; von Luschan, *Archiv für Anthropologie*, XIX.

up in Europe by the Balkans, and ending with the Alps and Pyrenees to the west. Into these mountains there pushed, probably from the east (the highlands of the Pamirs) and still before the dawn of history, a heavily bearded, brachycephalic race, known to anthropologists as the "Armenoid" or "Alpine" peoples. Just as the earliest Egyptians were a pure "Mediterranean" people, so it seems probable that the Hittites were predominantly "Armenoid." We know that the "Semite" of historical times was a mixture of the two. The anthropologist determines the race to which a people belongs on somatological, not on linguistic grounds.

Working without any Rosetta stone, scholars arrived at the most widely divergent results in their attempts at deciphering the hieroglyphs of the Hittite monuments. Some of these have already been noticed. Professor Sayce, who has worked most industriously upon this problem for many years, has offered a number of decipherments,¹ but, while many of his conclusions will probably stand the test of future discoveries, his translations cannot yet be used in the reconstruction of the history of the Hittites.

The problem has been simplified considerably by recent discoveries. Among the Amarna Letters there were found two documents written in the language of Arzawa,² and one in the language of Mitanni.³ Like the rest of the Amarna Letters, they were written in the syllabic cuneiform script of the Babylonians, and consequently it was comparatively easy to determine the structure of the languages in which they were written even if no final translation was possible. As early as 1903, Professor Sayce recognized the probable identity of the language of the Arzawa letters and the non-Semitic, and evidently Hittite, language of some fragments of cuneiform tablets which Chantre had found at Boghaz-Keui in northern Asia Minor.⁴ This conclusion has been confirmed by Professor Winckler's epoch-making discovery of the capital of the Hittite state on this site.⁵ Here there came

¹ In the different volumes of the *Proceedings of the Society for Biblical Archaeology* (abbreviated *PSBA*); cf. in particular, XXXIX (1907), 207 f.

² See below, p. 42. ³ See below, p. 37. ⁴ *PSBA*, XXV (1903), 144.

⁵ Preliminary report by Winckler in *Mitteilungen der Deutschen Orient-Gesellschaft*, No. 35 (1907); hereafter abbreviated *MDOG*.

to light a large number of documents written in the cuneiform script but partly in the Hittite, partly in the Babylonian language, containing the royal archives of a dynasty of Hittite kings. So far only a preliminary report on these documents has appeared, but when they are published in full, the Hittite language will undoubtedly soon be as familiar to scholars as are the Egyptian and Babylonian, and the decipherment of the hieroglyphs will soon be accomplished. Furthermore, the determination of the linguistic group to which the Hittite dialects belong should then be a simple matter. Indeed, if the Mitannian and Hittite dialects are related, as there is every reason for supposing them to be, the problem has already been solved, for Professor Bork, by his study of the letter mentioned above, has shown that the language of Mitanni was an ancient representative of the linguistic family known as the Caucasian.¹

The Boghaz-Keui documents have also cleared up another problem. It had long been recognized that many of the non-Semitic personal names found in the Amarna Letters and in the Assyrian inscriptions were clearly Aryan, and it was because they made these names the starting-point of their investigations that a number of scholars reached the conclusion that the Hittite language was Indo-European. We are now able to account for the presence of these names. It seems that a group of Aryans succeeded in uniting a number of Hittite peoples into the state known to us through a long period of history as Mitanni, probably in much the same way as the Turks have since built up kingdoms in the same region. As we shall see below, this state was organized under its dynasty of Aryan kings some generations before the northern Hittites were united into the kingdom of Hatti with its capital at Boghaz-Keui. As guardians of the treaty whereby the Mitannian state under Mattiuwaza became subject to Subbiluliuma of Hatti, there are mentioned among others the Indo-European deities Mithra, Varuna, Indra, and Nasatya.²

¹ *Die Mitannisprache*, in *Mitteilungen der Vorderasiatischen Gesellschaft*, 14 (1909), 1 f. Modern representatives are the Georgian, Circassian, Lezghian, etc., dialects. Bork's work discusses the previous attempts at decipherment of the Hittite and Mitannian languages.

² *MDOG*, No. 35, p. 51.

Any adequate discussion of the art and religion of the Hittites would require much more space than is at our disposal; we must, therefore, pass these by and proceed at once to sketch the history of the Hittite peoples.

Although, as we shall see presently, we have indirect evidence of their presence in western Asia at a much earlier date, the Hittites first emerge into the history of the Near East in the latter half of the twentieth pre-Christian century. In a chronicle concerned with events in early Babylonian history,¹ which was found in the famous library of Assurbanipal of Assyria, we read this brief and tantalizing statement: "In the reign of Shamsi-ditana the Hittites [came] against the land of Akkad (Babylonia)." Shamsi-ditana was the last king of the First (Amorite) Dynasty of Babylon, which had reached its zenith in the reign of Hammurabi, the sixth and greatest of a line of eleven kings. The date of this dynasty has recently been definitely established on astronomical grounds,² so that we are now able to assign the exact date, 1956-1926 B.C., to Shamsi-ditana.

Confirmation of this invasion of Babylonia by the Hittites seems to be contained in an oracle (also from the Nineveh library) to which Professor Sayce has called attention.³ It reads: "To the land of the Hittites, I (Marduk) have gone; the Hittites I question; the throne of my divinity I have set up therein; twenty-four years therein shall the sons of Babylon [remain]." And, although we are anticipating somewhat, we may call attention at this point to another document which has received a new interpretation in the light of the chronicle quoted. The Cassite king Agum II (Kakrime), who reigned *ca.* 1650 B.C., like Cyrus and other conquerors, showed great zeal for the temples and cults of the lands which he held in subjugation. In his inscription, which refers to the restoration and endowment of Esagila, the Marduk temple of Babylon, Agum tells of his bringing back to Babylon from the land of Hani the statues of Marduk and his consort Sarpanit.⁴

¹ King, *Chronicles concerning Early Babylonian Kings*, II, 22.

² Kugler, *Sternkunde*, II, 2, Heft 1.

³ Sayce, *Expository Times*, XIX (1908), 379.

⁴ Schrader, *Keilinschriftliche Bibliothek*, III, 1, 134 f.

Hani is probably a shortened form of Hanigalbat,¹ another name for Mitanni.

It has been conjectured that the Hittite incursion in the time of Shamsi-ditana brought about the fall of the declining Amorite dynasty and paved the way for the invasion of the Cassites, another mountain people from the east, who established a dynasty at Babylon a century and a half later (1761 B.C.). The similarity between the personal names of the Cassites and those of the Hittite-Mitannians, as well as the identity of some of their deities, has been pointed out by a number of scholars,² but any attempt to draw conclusions as to their racial or political affinities must at the present time be regarded as premature. The fact that it was the Cassites and not the Hittites who established themselves in northern Babylonia would indicate that the invasion by the latter was for plunder rather than for the conquest of new territory. It is evident that there was a considerable shifting of peoples in the Near East during these centuries (twentieth to eighteenth B.C.), but the course of events is as yet obscure. From the personal names occurring in documents from Dilbat³ in northern Babylonia, and dating from the time of the First Dynasty of Babylon (2225-1926 B.C.), it is clear that a Hittite-Mitannian element was gradually and no doubt peaceably invading Babylonia long before some powerful chieftain led his followers thither in the time of Shamsi-ditana. The building inscriptions from Ashur, the old capital of Assyria, mention Ushpia and Kikia⁴ as the earliest rulers of that city, the former as founder of the temple of Ashur, the latter as builder of the city-wall. The form of the names of these kings has suggested to Professor Ungnad⁵ the possibility that Ashur was founded by Mitannians. Now the fifth of the known rulers of Ashur, Ilu-shuma by name, was a contemporary of Sumu-abum, the first king of the First Dynasty of Babylon. The date of Sumu-abum is 2225-2212 B.C. Ushpia and Kikia must have lived

¹ For references cf. Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums*, I, 2, § 463.

² See the literature cited in Clay, *Personal Names of the Cassite Period*, p. 28.

³ Ungnad, *Beiträge zur Assyriologie*, VI, 5, 1 f.

⁴ See Luckenbill, *American Journal of Semitic Languages*, XXVIII (1912), 154.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 13.

at least a century earlier. Indeed it is not improbable that before the arrival of the Semitic Assyrians (possibly Amorites), the whole of Subartu, which is the old name for the region later known as Assyria, was occupied—from time immemorial—by Hittite-Mitannian tribes.

In resuming the discussion of the events of the period following the Hittite invasion of Babylonia, we take up first of all the inscription of Shamshi-Adad of Assyria. Professor Eduard Meyer has assigned the approximate date of 1600 B.C. to this ruler, but the writer,¹ on linguistic and other grounds, has suggested an earlier date. Shamshi-Adad is the first of the rulers of Assyria known to have used the title of king. His predecessors styled themselves *patesi*. The inscription² opens with the words: "Shamshi-Adad, king of the universe [*šar KISH*], builder of the temple of Ashur, who devotes his energies to the land between the Tigris and the Euphrates" (Col. I, 1-8). After this short introduction, Shamshi-Adad goes on to relate the story of the rebuilding of the temple of Enlil; tells of his fixing standard prices for the city of Ashur; and continues: "At that time, the tribute of the kings of Tukrish and the king of the Upper Country, I received in my city Ashur. A great name and a memorial stela I set up in the country of Laban on the shore of the great sea (the Mediterranean)" (Col. IV, 4-18).

Professor Streck³ has proposed to identify Tukrish with Tigrish, an Armenian city mentioned in a letter from the Sargonid (late Assyrian) period, and it probably would not be regarded as too daring to see in the "king of the Upper Country" some Hittite-Mitannian chieftain. It is significant that Shamshi-Adad has nothing to say of conflicts between himself and the Cassites with whom his successors waged a chronic warfare, but that all of his campaigns were conducted against the peoples to the north and west of Assyria. The fact that he regarded himself as the guardian of the territory between the Tigris and the Euphrates seems to point to a date when the Babylonian dynasty was exhausted or overthrown but when the Cassites had not yet succeeded in establishing themselves in the land.

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 157, n. 17.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 167 f.

³ *Zeitschrift für Assyriologie*, XX, 460.

We may note in passing that the Hyksos domination of Egypt, which falls between 1788-1580 B.C., even if it does not represent an actual invasion by the Hittites themselves as was suggested years ago by Dr. Wright and others, was probably the result of pressure brought to bear upon Egypt's subject states in Syria by Hittite peoples who were encroaching upon their northern frontier. But in spite of statements to the contrary, none of the Hyksos names has yet been definitely identified as Hittite (or Mitannian).

Our earliest references to the Hittites in the Egyptian records occur in the annals of the Syrian campaigns of Thutmose III (1501-1447 B.C.), which accomplished the final overthrow of the Hyksos power and the recovery of Syria to Egypt. That the Hittites were probably known to the Egyptians at an earlier date (2000 B.C.) has been shown on linguistic grounds by Professor W. Max Müller.¹

In the annals of his eighth and sixteenth campaigns² Thutmose speaks of receiving the tribute of Heta the Great, and on the tomb of his treasurer, Menheperreseneb,³ there is depicted a scene in which this official of the Pharaoh is receiving the tribute of Asia and Africa. Two lines of Asiatics bring forward vessels of silver and gold. Among them is the chief of Heta. The superscription, most of which has unfortunately been lost, contains the acclamations of the Asiatics: "Thou hast overthrown the lands of Mitanni; thou hast hacked up their cities, their chiefs are in caves." This line seems to show that Heta the Great, which lay in the interior of Asia Minor, although it was known to the Egyptians of Thutmose's day, and even sent presents (for this is probably all we are to understand by the word "tribute") to the victorious Pharaoh, had not yet become a political factor in Syria, but that it was the other branch of the Hittite peoples, the Mitannians, with whom Thutmose and his immediate successors came in direct contact in Naharin (northern Syria). This is borne out by the trend of subsequent events and seems to be confirmed by Thutmose's "Hymn of Victory."⁴ In this there is no reference to

¹ *Orientalistische Literatur-Zeitung* (hereafter *OLZ*), No. 10 (1909), 427 f.

² Breasted, *Ancient Records* (hereafter *BAR*), II, §§ 485 and 525.

³ *Ibid.*, §§ 772 f.

⁴ *Ibid.*, §§ 655 f., 659.

Heta, but only to the lands of Mitanni—after references to Keftiyew (probably Crete) and Cyprus.

The seventeen Asiatic campaigns of Thutmose brought Syria once more under the complete control of the Pharaoh. Tribute from the subject provinces now flowed in a steady stream into the treasuries of Egypt. The Egyptian empire had reached its zenith. And yet, on the death of Thutmose, his son Amenhotep II was compelled to put down a serious rebellion involving the whole of Naharin and the north-Phoenician coast cities. We may be sure that it was the Mitannian princes who instigated the revolt. Indeed Rib-Addi (see below) of Byblos reminds a later Pharaoh (probably Amenhotep IV) of these days: "Formerly the king of Mitanni was the enemy of your fathers but your fathers did not abandon my fathers to their fate" (Kn. 109:5 f.). Amenhotep seems to have been able to crush the rebels in one great campaign (1447 B.C.),¹ and in commemoration of his victory erected a stela in Naharin as his predecessors had done before him. In a building inscription from Karnak he tells us how the "chiefs of Mitanni came to him, their tribute upon their backs, to beseech his majesty that there may be given them his sweet breath of life."² We may be sure that most of this is vain boasting and that, while some Mitannian chiefs may have sent their gifts, it is not likely that the Mitannians or the Hittites ever regarded the Egyptian Pharaoh as their overlord. Indeed it is quite probable, in view of the evidence of the Amarna Letters, that the Pharaoh *exchanged* gifts with these princes, hoping thereby to keep them from encroaching upon the territory of his subjects in Syria and from fomenting rebellion among them. In fact Thutmose IV, the next Pharaoh after Amenhotep II, although he found it necessary to conduct a campaign against Naharin,³ saw the futility of waging an eternal warfare against his northern neighbors and so, as it would seem, in order to have a friendly buffer state between his dominions in Syria and Heta (Hatti), now rising to dangerous prominence in central Asia Minor, negotiated a matrimonial alliance with Artatama, the Mitannian king, of whom we shall learn more presently.


¹ *Ibid.*, §§ 780 f.

² *Ibid.*, § 804.

³ *Ibid.*, §§ 816 f.

Artatama's daughter became the mother of the next Pharaoh, Amenhotep III.

We now enter upon a period in the history of the Near East in which diplomacy took the place of the endless succession of campaigns which had hitherto been the rule and when the powers seem to have been content to try to maintain the *status quo*. Our principal source of information for the events of the period is the rich mass of diplomatic literature known as the Amarna Letters.¹ Part of these letters form the correspondence between the Pharaohs Amenhotep III and Amenhotep IV and their "brothers," the kings of Babylonia, Assyria, Mitanni, Arzawa, Alashia (Cyprus), and Hatti, but the bulk of them are letters to the Egyptian court from the Syrian vassal princes. In 1907 our sources were considerably augmented by the preliminary report² of Professor Winckler on the royal archives which he had discovered at Boghaz-Keui. This village, which lies east of the Halys in central Asia Minor, occupies the site of the classical Pteria (Herodotus, I, 76), the more ancient Hatti, the capital of the Hittite state. From the Boghaz-Keui documents Professor Winckler was able to reconstruct a dynasty of Mitannian kings who ruled contemporaneously with the Pharaohs of the Eighteenth Dynasty from ca. 1450-1350 B.C. Their names follow.



We have already called attention to the fact that these names are clearly Iranian and show the presence of an Aryan ruling class in Mitanni. How much earlier the Aryans may have pushed into Asia Minor we cannot tell. However, it has not been possible up

¹ We shall quote from Knudtzon, *Die el-Amarna Tafeln*, using the numbering of this edition (Kn. 25:6 = Knudtzon, No. 25, line 6).

² See n. 5, p. 27.

to the present time to identify as Aryan any of the "Mitannian" names found in the Babylonian documents (from Dilbat, etc.; see above) of earlier date than the Amarna period.

Saushshatar was probably a contemporary of Amenhotep II (1448-1420 B.C.). That he was an energetic ruler we may infer from a document of Mattiwaza which records the fact that he carried off from Ashur a "door of gold and silver" and set it up in the palace of the city of Waraganni. Perhaps this was one of the "doors of cedar, covered with gold and silver" which Shamshi-Adad placed in the entrance to the temple of Enlil at Ashur.¹ Mattiwaza adds that Shutarna restored it to Ashur, together with other valuables.

Whether the Mitannian kings actually held Assyria as a vassal state from Saushshatar's day until after the death of Tushratta, as a number of scholars hold, is still to be proved.²

We have already called attention to the fact that the daughter of Artatama, the successor of Saushshatar, became the wife of Thutmose IV (1421-1413 B.C.). Our evidence for this is found in a letter of Tushratta to Amenhotep IV, which also gives some interesting details of the Pharaoh's wooing. "At the time when . . . the father of Amenhotep III (Thutmose IV) sent to Artatama, my grandfather, and asked him for the daughter [of my grandfather, the sister of my father], he sent five times, six times, but he would not give her. A seventh time he sent to my grandfather and then he was constrained to give her" (Kn. 29:16 f.). The meaning of this is evident. Thutmose thought it advisable to have an ally in Asia in the person of a father-in-law. Artatama knew this, but he had also heard wonderful stories of the gold of Egypt which was said to be as plentiful as the dust of the streets. Hence it required seven embassies from the Pharaoh to persuade the Mitannian king to give up his daughter.

Artatama was succeeded by Shutarna, of whom we know little except that he became the father-in-law of Amenhotep III, his sister's son. According to Tushratta, who is again our source of information, Amenhotep's wooing was not quite so long drawn

¹ See *MDOG*, No. 35, p. 38, and *AJSL*, XXVIII, 169 (Col. II, 16-19).

² See references in *AJSL*, XXVIII, 160.

out as that of his father. It required but six embassies to obtain Shutarna's consent (Kn. 29:18 f.).

Tushratta is the best known of the kings of Mitanni. The Amarna documents contain seven of his letters to Amenhotep III, one to the widow of that Pharaoh, and three to Amenhotep IV.¹ He came to the throne at an early age, but the regent, Tuhi (Kn. 17:11 f.), "had done something not good in that he killed the ruler of the country, Artashumara" (evidently an older brother of Tushratta), and prevented Tushratta from writing to the Pharaoh at an earlier date. Once he was his own master, however, he hastened to open correspondence with the Egyptian king in order to re-establish friendly relations between Egypt and Mitanni. He informed the Pharaoh that he had overthrown the Hittites who had invaded his territory, and was sending him part of the spoils as a gift. This was the beginning of a brisk correspondence between the two rulers.

Through his ambassador Mane, Amenhotep sued for the hand of Tushratta's daughter (Kn. 19:16 f.). Tushratta readily gave his consent but held back the girl. He was making the *karashk* of his grandfather and needed much gold. Amenhotep understood the meaning of this and made a better offer, but even this was not satisfactory. Tushratta is unable to understand why the Pharaoh should be so stingy. He is exceedingly polite but firm. Finally the Pharaoh made a satisfactory offer and Tadu-Hepa was sent to Egypt together with many good wishes and a large number of costly presents for her future husband. One of the gifts was a splendid rosary which Tushratta hoped might adorn the neck of the Pharaoh for a hundred thousand years (Kn. 21:33 f.). In spite of this pious hope, however, Amenhotep III died soon after these negotiations came to an end. A hieratic note written on another of the Mitannian's letters (Kn. 23) shows that it reached Egypt in the thirty-sixth year of Amenhotep, that is, at the very end of his reign. The letter accompanied the statue of Ishtar of Nineveh to Egypt. The very plausible inference has been drawn that the Pharaoh was suffering from what proved to be his last illness and that Tushratta sent him a statue of the goddess

¹ Besides list of presents, Kn. 17-29.

whose healing virtues he held in high esteem. Incidentally we learn that the same statue had once before been sent to Egypt, in the time of Shutarna.

Although requests for gold seem to be the principal burden of the messages of Tushratta, there is one letter (Kn. 24) whose theme is different. Like the rest of the Amarna Letters it is written in the cuneiform script, but unlike them in the Mitannian language, and it has formed the basis of the valuable study of this dialect by Professor Bork.¹ Although it contains numerous passages which are yet obscure, the letter seems to be taken up chiefly with negotiations concerning two cities, Harwuhe and Mashrianni, the former of which, together with the surrounding territory, was to belong to the Pharaoh, the latter to Tushratta. In other words, it forms part of the correspondence carried on between the two rulers with reference to the demarkation of the boundary between their domains.


On the death of Amenhotep III, Tushratta sent a letter to Tiy (Kn. 26), the queen-mother, who wielded great influence over the young Pharaoh, complaining that neither she nor the new ruler had sent him any presents as Amenhotep III used to do. He expressed the hope that she would use her influence toward maintaining fraternal relations between the rulers of the two nations. A letter to Amenhotep IV (Kn. 27) expresses similar sentiments. We need not go into the details of a long correspondence (Kn. 28-29) about some presents which the late Pharaoh had promised Tushratta but had failed to deliver before his death. Amenhotep IV had undertaken to carry out the promise of his father but when the gifts reached Tushratta he found them of inferior quality and protested vigorously. The death of Tushratta brought the unfinished negotiations to an end. Of much greater interest to us is a matter mentioned incidentally in one of these letters (Kn. 29:173 f), which gives us an insight into the diplomatic relations existing between the two countries.

Two Mitannians, Arteshupa and Asali, who had committed some crime in Egypt, had been brought before their lady, evidently Tadu-Hepa, in Egypt, and later the matter came before Tushratta

¹ See n. 2, p. 27.

himself. Finally the criminals were deported to a border city but for some reason escaped with a light punishment and were not put to death as the Pharaoh had hoped they would be. Amenhotep expressed his dissatisfaction with the mildness of the punishment inflicted, but Tushratta merely replied that he had not in the first place indicated the nature of the penalty he thought should be imposed.

While the letters of Tushratta thus deal almost exclusively with his personal affairs, such as the amount of gold he needs for the completion of his grandfather's *karashk*, or the value of the presents he is willing to receive for, and give with, his daughter, there are a few indications in them of the troubled state of affairs in the world of international politics. We recall the reference to his defeat of the Hittites. On the other hand, in the correspondence carried on between the princes of the subject states in Syria and the Egyptian court, we are able to trace the rapid decline of Egyptian authority in Asia and the rise to prominence of the northern Hittite state. The Boghaz-Keui documents supplement the Amarna Letters in every way. Indeed it was not until these archives came to light that we discovered that the Hittite encroachment upon Egyptian territory in Syria was part of the program of conquest of a strong dynasty of Hittite kings who had established themselves east of the Halys in central Asia Minor. The documents contain the royal archives of a line of seven kings extending over five generations (from *ca.* 1400-1250 B.C.).



The founder of the dynasty seems to have been Subbiluliuma, who had a long and glorious reign. His father, Hattusil, who is

called king of Kussar, was probably the ruler of one of the many petty city-states of the Hittites.¹ As we have already seen, the Mitannians with their dynasty of Aryan kings had been the Hittite (in the larger sense) *Grossmacht* until they were forced to become the vassals of Hatti by Subbiluliuma. We owe our knowledge of the events leading up to their fall to the introductory paragraphs of the treaty Subbiluliuma drew up with Mattiuwaza, the subject Mitannian king.²

It seems that Subbiluliuma had maintained peaceful relations (by treaty) with Artatama of Mitanni, but that Tushratta, on becoming ruler of that country, "rose up in rebellion against the Great King." The real meaning of this will become clear presently. Subbiluliuma marched against him, plundered the lands on the left bank of the Euphrates, and took possession of the whole Niblani mountain region. Tushratta defied him a second time, threatening to lay waste the Hittite king's territory on the right bank of the river. Subbiluliuma was not slow in taking up the challenge. He crossed the Euphrates and devastated the land of Isuwa. Tushratta marched forth, but no battle was fought. Incidentally an interesting bit of history comes to light in connection with the account of these operations.

In the time of Hattusil, the father of Subbiluliuma, the inhabitants of certain Hittite cities rebelled against the king, and Subbiluliuma was sent against them. Those who escaped his hand fled to Isuwa, evidently Mitannian territory, where they lived as clients. When Subbiluliuma invaded this region in response to the challenge of Tushratta, he seized those Hittite refugees, punished them, and sent them back to Hatti, his capital (Boghaz-Keui).

It was probably at this time, in the early stages of the warfare between the two kings, that Tushratta succeeded in checking one of the advances of the Hittites into his territory. We may be sure that Subbiluliuma, like the Egyptian Pharaohs and the Babylonian and Assyrian kings, did not believe that the record of any reverses he may have met would make interesting reading, so he

¹ *MDOG*, No. 35, pp. 17 f.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 32 f., and *OLZ* (1910), 289 f.

passed them over in silence. At any rate we know that his next operations were directed against another quarter.¹ He crossed the Euphrates and laid waste northern Syria from the river to Aleppo and beyond. At N1,² the inhabitants of the city and the surrounding country rose up against Takua their king. They were led by Akit-Teshub, the brother of Takua. Subbiluliuma intervened, put down the revolt, and handed over the government of the city to Akia, king of Arahti. But the *marianu*,³ Aryan nobles or "barons," who evidently formed the military ruling class here as well as in Mitanni, soon had Arahti in their own hands, and Subbiluliuma was compelled to interfere again. He now thought it advisable to take the leaders, Akia, who must have gone over to the rebellious *marianu*, and Akit-Teshub, along with him to Hatti. At the same time he deported the people of Katna⁴ to his capital—for what transgression we do not know.

Subbiluliuma now moved upon Nuhashshe.⁵ Sarrupsi, the king, who had on a former occasion asked the aid of the Hittite king against Tushratta—an act which has always been regarded in the East as recognition of overlordship—was now in rebellion. But on the approach of Subbiluliuma he fled and one of his servants was placed on his throne.

From Nuhashshe, Subbiluliuma advanced upon Abina,⁶ which may have belonged to the "lands of Nuhashshe." On the way he was compelled to make a detour against Kinza (Kadesh on the Orontes) which he had not planned to attack until Sutatarra and his son Aitakama came out to meet him with their troops. These he drove back into their city and continued his march toward Abina, besieging a few more cities on the way. Ariwana, king of Abina, bravely marched forth to meet the Hittite king but suffered defeat at his hands and was taken, together with his nobles, to Hatti. On the return journey, the Hittite king stopped

¹ *MDOG*, No. 35, pp. 34 f.

² Location not certain; but probably on the Euphrates, below Karkamish, where the river bends toward the southeast.

³ Evidently the Vedic *marya*, "man," hero, cf. Winckler, *OLZ* (1910), 291.

⁴ Location uncertain; but probably near Hamath on the Orontes.

⁵ Probably near Aleppo.

⁶ Written Abi and Ube in the Amarna Letters. The biblical Hobab.

at Kinza and took with him from there Sutatarra, Aitakama, and the *mariannu*. We shall hear more about Aitakama presently.

Subbiluliuma sums up the account of this extensive campaign by declaring that he was compelled to lay waste all of these countries "in one year" on account of the "insubordination of Tushratta." Another passage makes clear what he meant by Tushratta's insubordination.¹

It appears that Tushratta's claim to the throne was contested by his brother Artatama, who had the backing of the Harri (Aryan) element of the population and acknowledged the overlordship of the Hittite king. This fact explains the anxiety of Tushratta to maintain friendly relations with Egypt. Tushratta's position cannot have been an enviable one. When he finally met his death through a plot of his son and his servants, Sutatarra, the son of Artatama, was proclaimed king of Mitanni; but Mattiuwaza claimed his father's throne. Subbiluliuma watched with great interest the civil war which ensued. For some reason Sutatarra, whose father had acknowledged the Great King as his overlord, received no aid from that quarter but was compelled to look elsewhere for assistance. He gave back to Ashur the door of gold and silver (see above) which Saushshatar had taken from there years before, and squandered the "palace and the houses of the Harri" (that is, their property) in his efforts to gain the support of Assyria and Alshe. Finally he and the "barons" made an attempt to assassinate Mattiuwaza, who now fled to the Hittite king. Subbiluliuma regarded this as the opportune moment for intervention, and consequently "the god Teshub decided in favor of Mattiuwaza." Subbiluliuma "took Mattiuwaza by the hand" and placed him upon the throne of his father; of course, as his vassal. Rib-Addi of Byblos seems to refer to this final overthrow of Mitanni as an independent state (Kn. 75:35 f.). "May the king, my lord [the Pharaoh], know that the king of Hatti has conquered all the lands which belonged to the king of Mitanni [written Mitta] even (?) the king of Naharin [written Nahma]." Mattiuwaza received for his wife the daughter of the Hittite king with the proviso that he was to give up his other wives; that

¹ Winckler, *OLZ* (1910), 294, and *MDOG*, No. 35, p. 36.

Subbiluliuma's daughter alone should be queen and that her son should succeed to the throne.

There is an obscure passage¹ which relates the adventures of a group of Harri people, who, as we saw above, fared ill at the hands of Sutatarra. It reads: "But Akit-Teshub escaped with two hundred chariots and betook himself to Babylonia. The king of Babylonia seized upon the two hundred chariots which Akit-Teshib had with him, together with their charioteers, and pursued Akit-Teshub and his barons with the intention of putting them to death. With the exception of Mattiwaza, the son of Tushratta, the king, he killed (?) them. Him (Mattiwaza) I (Subbiluliuma) rescued from his hand." From which it would seem that Mattiwaza had fled to the Babylonian king before seeking refuge with Subbiluliuma.

According to the preliminary report of Professor Winckler,² the land of Arzawa, well known from the Amarna Letters, is frequently mentioned in the Boghaz-Keui documents, always as closely related to Hatti. But that it was nevertheless an independent state seems probable from the fact that Tarhundaraba, king of Arzawa, carried on a correspondence with Amenhotep III (Kn. 31-33). Tarhundaraba was probably a contemporary of Subbiluliuma. The preliminary study of the Boghaz-Keui archives has also brought out the fact that the Hatti and Arzawa dialects are closely related if not identical. But the location of Arzawa is yet to be definitely established.

On the accession of Amenhotep IV to the throne, Subbiluliuma sent him a letter (Kn. 41) urging the continuance of the brotherly relations which had obtained between him and Amenhotep III, but the Pharaoh does not seem to have cared to have anything to do with him. Indeed it must have been evident to him that most of the disturbances in Syria were due to the Hittite king's agents.

It is at this point that we may conveniently take up the discussion of the effects of the Hittite aggression upon the domains of the Pharaoh. For the most part our sources will be the letters from the Syrian vassals to the court in Egypt. As aforesaid, these

¹ *Ibid.* (OLZ), 294.

² *MDOG*, No. 35, pp. 40 f.

letters form the bulk of the Amarna documents. But in using them we must not at any time lose sight of the fact that it is exceedingly difficult for us to determine the chronological order in which they should be arranged. However, scholars have given this matter a large amount of attention and we may approach the subject with some confidence.

In order to furnish a setting for the events described in detail in the following paragraphs, it may be well to give in a very few words a general picture of the shifting of peoples which took place during the Amarna period.

At the same time that the Hittites were encroaching upon the northern portions of Syria and stirring up sedition among the subjects of the Pharaoh, there were steadily advancing into the fertile regions of Syria and Palestine groups of nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes from the desert and steppeland to the eastward, attaching themselves to any local dynast who could pay them well, or to any free-lance who could guarantee them booty, and, in general, creating havoc wherever they went. This movement was one of a number of waves of Semitic migration which have from time to time in the course of the centuries overflowed the borders of Arabia, "the cradle of the Semites," carrying hordes of hungry beduin down into the fertile river valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates or spreading them over the rich coast plains along the Mediterranean. Here they have settled down as Babylonians, Assyrians, Canaanites, Hebrews, Arameans, etc. The wave which we find rolling over Syria-Palestine in the Amarna period brought the Arameans into Syria, and the Hebrews, with their cousins the Ammonites, Moabites, and Edomites, into their later homes. In the Letters these nomadic tribes meet us as Sutu or Habiri.¹ We assume with most scholars that the Hebrews of a later day were part of the Habiri.

Going back again for a moment to Subbiluliuma: we recall that he found it necessary, in view of the "insubordination" of Tushratta, to conduct a campaign into Syria, in the course of which Ni, Nuhashshe, Katna, Kinza, Abina, and some other cities suffered

¹ The identity of the SA-GAZ and Habiri of the Amarna Letters, long regarded as probable, seems raised beyond doubt by the Boghaz-Keui documents. Winckler, *MDOG*, No. 35, p. 25.

severely. Sutatarna and his son Aitakama of Kinza (Kadesh on the Orontes) were defeated and carried captive to Hatti. But it is evident from the Amarna Letters that Aitakama found favor in the eyes of the Hittite king, for we find him back at Kinza looking after his own and the Hittite's interests.

Akizzi of Katna, whose inhabitants, we remember, Subbiluliuma had deported to Hatti, wrote a number of letters (Kn. 52-55) to Amenhotep III asking for immediate aid from Egypt to save him from Aitugama (Aitakama), who had, in company with the Hittite king, come out against him and was "seeking his head." The Pharaoh is also informed that Aitakama, assisted by Teuwatti of Lapana and Arzauiia of Ruhizzi, is devastating the land of Ube¹ with fire and sword; that the kings of Nuhashshe, Nî, Zinzar, and Tunanat² are still loyal to the Pharaoh, but that, unless troops arrive from Egypt at once, Aitakama will gain possession of the whole country. Amenhotep evidently paid no attention to Akizzi, and things went from bad to worse. When Akizzi was writing his final letter, Aziru of Amurru was taking captive the inhabitants of Katna, while the Hittite king had already carried off the ancient sun-god of the city.

And so Akizzi, like many another Syrian prince who tried to remain loyal to his overlord, found Egypt a broken reed. Whether he followed the example of others and went over to the Hittite as Aitakama kept urging him to do, or went under in the struggle, we have no means of telling.

Nor is Akizzi our only witness to the activities of Aitakama and his Hittite backer. His account of the devastation of Ube is confirmed by Namiawaza, ruler of one of its cities or possibly of the whole district (Kn. 194-97). Furthermore, three governors, Bieri of Hashabu, Ildaya of Hazi, and another whose own name and that of his city have been lost—all of them located in Amki (the Beka, Coele Syria)—complain in similar letters to the Pharaoh (Kn. 174-76) that Aitakama has joined the troops of Hatti and is burning the cities of the king. Again, Ilirabih of Byblos (Gubla, modern Gebail) warns the Pharaoh that Aziru has sent his troops to help Aitakama and is laying waste Amki (Kn. 140:24 f.).

¹ Cf. n. 6, p. 40.

² All cities of northern Syria.

From these and other letters it is clear that Aitakama was an out-and-out pro-Hittite and a worthy successor of "that wretched foe of Kadesh," whom Thutmose III succeeded in overthrowing only after seventeen campaigns. Still he had the face to write to the Pharaoh (Kn. 189), protesting his loyalty and insisting that Namiawaza "had made him bad before the king" and was burning his cities, beginning with Kadesh. But the Egyptian king was probably at no time deceived by Aitakama's protestations of loyalty. In fact in a letter to Aziru he reproves him severely for having dealings with "the man of Kadesh (Aitakama)."

An even worse enemy, in the end, of the Pharaoh's interests than Aitakama was Aziru of Amurru, who has already been mentioned a number of times. However, before taking up the account of his doings, we must say a word about his father, Abd-Ashirta.

According to Abd-Ashirta's own letters to the Pharaoh (Kn. 60-65), he was the "servant of his king, a dog of his house," and guarded the whole land of Amurru for his lord. But when we turn to the letters of Rib-Addi of Byblos, Abd-Ashirta is pictured as the arch-enemy of the Pharaoh's loyal subjects. It used to be assumed, in view of this discrepancy, that in addition to being a traitor Abd-Ashirta was a consummate liar. But a new and certainly more charitable interpretation¹ has of late been gaining ground among scholars. It is now believed that Abd-Ashirta started out as a loyal and faithful servant of the Egyptian king; that he was appointed governor of the large district of Amurru, whose principal city was Sumur; that he really defended Amurru and Sumur from the enemies of the king, and that it was only after he had been hard pressed by the Habiri and Hittites and had looked in vain to the Pharaoh for help, that he made terms with the enemy and became the terror of all northern Syria. His letters are, according to this interpretation, to be placed before those of Rib-Addi in point of time, and to be regarded as expressing perfectly genuine sentiments of loyalty to his king.

Once turned enemy, Abd-Ashirta certainly seems to have entered with whole-hearted zeal upon the task of spreading discord among the Pharaoh's subjects. Rib-Addi's early letters

¹ Cf. Weber in Knudtzon, *Die el-Amarna Tafeln*, pp. 1128 f.

(Kn. 69-95) are almost exclusively devoted to the misdeeds of the prince of Amurru. "Who is Abd-Ashirta, the slave, the dog, that he should take to himself the land of the king?" (Kn. 71:16 f.). "Who is Abd-Ashirta, etc.? The king of Mitanni and the king of Kashshi (the Cassites-Babylonians) is he in that he is attempting to seize all the lands of the king" (Kn. 76:9 f.). And so Rib-Addi goes on, reporting the capture of one city after another. He finds his own situation in Byblos like that of "a bird in a cage." Letter after letter is dispatched to Egypt but little attention seems to have been paid them. In one of them he insists on some sort of a reply: "Send me an answer, or I will make a treaty with Abd-Ashirta as Yapa-Addi and Zimrida (of Sidon) have done (Kn. 83:23 f.) Furthermore, does it seem good to my lord the king that all of his lands have joined themselves to Abd-Ashirta, the dog?" (Kn. 84:6 f.). After years of anxiety and futile efforts to rouse the Pharaoh, Rib-Addi was finally permitted to see a ray of hope dawning on a nearer horizon. "Abd-Ashirta is sick, who knows but he may die" (Kn. 95:41 f.), he joyfully writes the Pharaoh. But it was no illness which removed the sheich of Amurru from the scene. A letter from a citizen of Byblos (Kn. 101:29 f.) shows that he met a violent death, probably at the hands of some dissatisfied mercenaries. His removal may have improved the situation of Byblos and other cities for a time, but we soon begin to hear of the crimes of the "sons of Abd-Ashirta," of Aziru in particular. The cities which the father had captured or persuaded to throw off their allegiance to Egypt had probably for the most part fallen again into the hands of parties friendly to the Pharaoh, but the sons of Abd-Ashirta gained them back one by one. "Formerly," says Rib-Addi (Kn. 109:44 f.), "at the sight of an Egyptian the kings of Kinahhi (Canaan) fled before him, but now, behold the sons of Abd-Ashirta strike terror into the Egyptians." "Who are the sons of Abd-Ashirta that they take the land of the king? The king of Mitanni are they, the king of the Cassites, and the king of Hatti" (Kn. 116:67 f.). "I have heard about the Hatti people that they are burning all the lands with fire. I have written repeatedly, but have received no reply. All of the king's lands are being captured by the enemy, and yet

the king holds back. Behold now they are bringing on soldiers from the Hatti lands to take Byblos" (Kn. 126:51 f.).

Rib-Addi's situation grew most desperate. The people of the city as well as the members of his own family urged him to make terms with the sons of Abd-Ashirta, but this he refused to do. He went to Beirut for help, and on his return found the gates of his city closed against him. The people had risen in revolt led by his brother, who was in favor of going over to Aziru (Kn. 137-38).

Rib-Addi was probably one of a few whose blind loyalty to the Pharaoh—who seems to have been painfully slow in grasping the seriousness of the situation—kept them faithful to the end. His reward? Loss of city, exile, and, probably, a dagger-thrust.

On the other hand, Aziru, who like his father was ever on the alert to drive the best bargain, and was now on the side of the Hittite, now making his peace with the Pharaoh, had a much easier, if at times more exciting, career.

The loss of Byblos seems to have roused the Pharaoh to action. The situation required desperate measures. So negotiations were opened with Aziru, who had by some untoward stroke of fortune been forced out of Amurru (Kn. 156). Perhaps it was Aziru who began the correspondence. He wrote to the Pharaoh (Kn. 157), complaining that he had been prevented from showing his loyalty earlier by the nobles of Byblos. Furthermore the Hittite king was pressing him hard. The Pharaoh reinstated him as ruler of Amurru and ordered him to rebuild Sumur which he had destroyed during his struggle with Rib-Addi. He was given a year to show the Pharaoh that he was acting in good faith. But for some reason Aziru was unwilling or unable to carry out the king's orders with reference to Sumur. He offered as excuse the hostility of the kings of Nuhashshe (Kn. 160:20 f.). The Pharaoh becomes impatient and among other things wants an explanation of his reported dealings with the man of Kadesh (Aitakama) (Kn. 162:22 f.). "Why," says the Pharaoh, "have you entertained (?) the messengers of the Hittite king? My messengers you have not entertained" (Kn. 161:47 f.). Aziru is ordered to appear at the court in person or send his son (Kn. 162:47 f.). This he is not yet ready to do, and he informs the Pharaoh that he is needed in Amurru

because the Hittite king has arrived in Nuhashshe and may invade his territory at any moment. He is very anxious to look upon the "beautiful countenance" of the king (Kn. 165:6 f.), but circumstances prevent him from doing so. Finally he was unable to put the matter off any longer, and went to Egypt. We learn of this through a letter of one of his sons to an Egyptian official (Kn. 169), who asserts that the kings of Nuhashshe have accused him of selling his father to the Egyptian king for gold (ll. 17 f.), while the Sutu (Beduin) say, "Aziru will never return from Egypt" (ll. 25 f.). Before the discovery of the Boghaz-Keui letters it was assumed that it was improbable that Aziru should have fared well at the hands of the Egyptian king and that the predictions of the Sutu had probably come true. But we now know differently. Hattusil of Hatti writes: "At the time of Subbiluliuma my grandfather, Aziru king [of Amurru] went over to Egypt (?), but later threw himself at the feet of my grandfather Subbiluliuma. My grandfather pardoned him. He made a treaty with him, fixing the boundaries of Amurru as they had been under his fathers, and gave it (Amurru) to him."² From this record it is evident that Aziru had escaped from Egypt with or without the consent of the Pharaoh. We know from the inscriptions of Ramses II that Subbiluliuma entered into treaty relations³ with some king of the Eighteenth Dynasty, possibly with Amenhotep IV himself. The treaty must have fixed the boundary between the two nations, but where this ran we do not know. It is not impossible that Aziru's restoration to Amurru may have been one of the articles of the treaty. The dynasty of Amorite kings henceforth ran parallel with that of Hatti, and remained, in spite of occasional friction, subject to it.

After the death of Subbiluliuma, his son Arandas ruled for a short time and was followed by his brother Mursil.³ Although a number of documents dating from Mursil's time were found at Boghaz-Keui, our main source for the events of his own and his successors' reigns are the inscriptions of the Pharaohs of the Nineteenth Dynasty.

² *MDOG*, No. 35, p. 43.

³ *BAR*, III, § 377.

³ *MDOG*, No. 35, pp. 18 f.

In Egypt the monotheistic sun-cult of Amenhotep IV (Ikhnaton) had been overthrown and with it the Eighteenth Dynasty. The kings of the new dynasty were again worshipers of Amon, who gave them abundant success in war as he had given to Thutmose III and his successors. Haremhab seems to have maintained peaceful relations with the Hittites, but with Seti I began anew the struggle for the mastery in Syria. During the fierce struggles of the Amarna period the last vestige of Egyptian authority in Syria had disappeared and it was the task of the Nineteenth Dynasty to regain what the last kings of the Eighteenth had lost.

Seti's campaigns¹ were taken up with the pacification of the Shasu-beduin (evidently the Habiri of the Amarna Letters) of southern Palestine and the restoration of Egyptian authority in the cities along the Phoenician coast. Cities northward of Simyra (Sumur) and Ullaza are mentioned. But he does not seem to have come into direct conflict with the Hittites: this was reserved for Ramses II. The Hittites maintained Kadesh on the Orontes as their southern outpost and their king Mutallu,² who had succeeded his father Mursil, entered into a treaty with Seti.

On account of the limited space at our disposal, we must omit details in our discussion of the struggle between Ramses II and the Hittites.³

Like Thutmose III, Ramses' first move was to secure the harbors on the Syrian coast. Meanwhile Mutallu was gathering an enormous army, probably no less than 20,000 men, including "all the old enemies of Egypt, the kings of Naharin, Arwad, Karkamish, Kode, Kadesh, Nuges, Ugarit, and Aleppo," together with mercenaries from Asia Minor, Lydians, Mysians, Cilicians, and Dardanians. Ramses collected an army of similar proportions from all parts of his empire and in April of his fifth year (1288 B.C.) set out for Syria. The two armies met outside of Kadesh, where a terrible battle was fought. Both sides suffered severe losses, the Egyptians more than the Hittites, and the chief glory of Ramses was that he succeeded in extricating himself from a very dangerous situation. In spite of the numerous inscriptions reciting,

¹ *BAR*, III, §§ 83 f.

² *Ibid.*, § 377.

³ *Ibid.*, §§ 294 f.

and reliefs depicting, the Pharaoh's mighty deeds of arms, which are found on the walls of the temples at Abu-Simbel, Thebes, Luxor, Abydos, etc., there is no mention of the capture of Kadesh. Indeed it is quite evident that the Hittites had fought the Pharaoh to a standstill. But after three more years of fighting, he seems to have had better success. He conquered Naharin as far as Tunip, and captured some cities in the Orontes valley. But while he may have driven the Hittites back from northern Syria temporarily, it is not probable that he held this region for any length of time.

After some fifteen years of warfare, the Hittite king Mutallu died and was succeeded by his brother Hattusil II, who entered into a lasting treaty with the Pharaoh.¹ The caption of this treaty follows: "The treaty which the great chief of Heta, Hattusil, the valiant, the son of Mursil, the great chief of Heta, the valiant, the grandson of Subbiluliuma, the great chief of Heta, the valiant, made, upon a silver tablet for Ramses II, the great ruler of Egypt, the valiant, the son of Seti I, etc., the good treaty of peace and brotherhood, setting peace between them forever." After recalling the former warfare between the two countries, the treaty states that there shall be no hostilities between them forever. The former treaties between Subbiluliuma, Mutallu, and the Pharaohs are reaffirmed, and a defensive alliance is entered into. Provision is made for the extradition of political fugitives from either country. After some more articles covering points of minor importance, the gods of Egypt and Hatti are called upon as witnesses to the compact. A copy of this treaty in the Hittite language, but written in the cuneiform, was found at Boghaz-Keui.

It has been regarded as very remarkable that the boundary between the two countries does not seem to have been fixed by the treaty. Perhaps it had been fixed in the treaties of Subbiluliuma and Mutallu, and since these were reaffirmed, there was no occasion for taking up the matter again. But since we know nothing more about these former treaties than that they existed, we are not in a position to say how much of Egypt's ancient Syrian domain fell to Ramses. Thirteen years after the signing of the treaty the

¹ *BAR*, III, §§ 370 f.

Hittite king (probably Dudhalia) visited Egypt to celebrate the marriage of his oldest daughter to the Egyptian king.¹ The good relations between Hatti and Egypt were maintained throughout the long reign of Ramses, indeed it seems that the Pharaoh received a second daughter of the Hittite king in marriage.²

A document from Boghaz-Keui, dating from the reign of Dudhalia, the son of Hattusil II, throws some interesting light upon the situation in Amurru in Mursil's day. "When Mursil . . . became king, the people of Amurru . . . became vassals of the king of Egypt. . . ."³ Evidently during the struggle between Ramses and the Hittites the Amorites sided with the Pharaoh, but when he was not able to maintain himself in Syria, they went back to Hatti (as is evident from the rest of the document), and one Shabili was set up as their king.⁴ From Hattusil's account of the relations existing between Hatti and Amurru⁵ we learn many more details but these cannot yet be definitely harmonized with references found in other documents. However, if we understand the preliminary report of Professor Winckler correctly, the history of Amurru after Subbiluliuma's day runs somewhat as follows. After the death of Aziru, Temen-Teshub and later Abbi-Teshub were kings of Amurru. The treaty of Subbiluliuma remained in force. This was in the time of Mursil. When Mutallu came to the throne in Hatti, he deposed Put-Achi, who had succeeded Abbi-Teshub, evidently because of his relations with Egypt (see above), and placed another (probably Shabili) on the throne. Thereupon Hattusil persuaded his brother Mutallu to hand over Put-Achi to him. He kept him in honorable confinement in the city of Haggamissa, and later, on his accession to the throne, restored him as ruler of Amurru. To cement the friendly relations

¹ *Ibid.*, §§ 410 f.

² *Ibid.*, §§ 427 f., and Breasted, *A History of Egypt*, p. 440.

³ *MDOG*, No. 35, p. 45.

⁴ *Ibid.* Amurru seems to have been a general term for the regions west of Babylonia from earliest times, just as later the term Hatti-land was used for the whole of Syria-Palestine. In the Amarna period it was evidently restricted to the region about Damascus. Any more definite delimitation does not seem possible. The term "Amorite" in the Old Testament seems just as indefinite.

⁵ *MDOG*, No. 35, p. 43.

between the two countries, he gave his daughter Gashuliawi to Put-Achi, while his son Nerigga-Shams married the latter's daughter. Of course, Amurru remained a vassal state.

Hattusil also maintained brotherly relations, by treaty and marriage, with the Cassite kings of Babylonia.¹ On the death of one of these, Kadashman-Turgu, his son had difficulty in gaining the throne and Hattusil wrote the Babylonians a letter threatening to invade their country if they refused to recognize the son of his "brother" (Kadashman-Turgu) as their king. On the other hand, if they did submit to the rule of Kadashman-Turgu's son and any enemy threatened their country, they had only to call upon him and he would come to their aid at once. The Babylonian minister regarded this letter as an attempt on the part of the Hittite king to interfere in the internal affairs of his country, and told him so. "Babylonia is an ally (brother) of Hatti, but not its vassal." The matter was amicably adjusted, the son of Kadashman-Turgu recognized as king of Babylonia, and friendly relations were once more established. The subject of much of the correspondence between the two kings was the incursions of the beduin (Ahلامي-Arameans). The Assyrians also seemed to interfere with the embassies sent from one country to another. Another section² of the correspondence is concerned with a demand made by the Babylonian king for damages, because some of his tradespeople had been murdered on their way through Amurru. The Hittite king replies that the deed had not been committed on Hittite soil, but that the murderers would be handed over for punishment to the relatives of those who had met their death. Even more interesting is Hattusil's reply to the Babylonian king when he complained that Banti-shinni "was raising disturbances in his land." From other documents we know that Banti-shinni was the Hittite form of the name of Put-Achi. Now Banti-shinni had had a claim of thirty talents of silver against the Babylonians which he did not seem to be able to collect by ordinary means so he began a series of reprisals. Hence the letter of the Babylonian king. Hattusil informs his brother that his vassal Banti-shinni shall be tried

¹ *MDOG*, No. 35, pp. 22 f.

² *Ibid.*, p. 24.

"before the god," and that he himself will see to the carrying-out of the punishment if he is found guilty, for, says he, "if he injures my brother does he not also injure me?"

The queen-mother, Putu-Hepa, reigned as co-regent with Dudhalia, the son of Hattusil. We possess a number of documents from his reign, one of which is an edict regulating the internal affairs of the kingdom, another a copy of a treaty with the king of Aleppo.¹

The reigns of Hattusil and his son mark the decline of the Hittite state. The conquests of the Assyrians under Shalmaneser I (*ca.* 1290 B.C.) and his son Tukulti-Ninib (*ca.* 1260 B.C.) must have weakened or brought an end to the Hittite control in many regions. Shalmaneser came into deadly conflict with the Hittites in Musri. The Assyrian says: "At that time the whole land of Musri I brought in submission to the feet of Ashur my lord I advanced against the land of Hanigalbat. . . . Shattuara, king of Hani (vars. read Hanigalbat), the army of the Hittites and Arameans (Ahlami) with him, I surrounded. . . . I fought a battle and accomplished their defeat. . . . I devastated their lands; 14,400 of them I overthrew and took as living captives. Nine of his strongholds, his capital city, I captured. One hundred and eighty of his cities to *tells* and ruins I overturned. . . . At that time from the city of Taidi to the city of Irridi, the whole Kashiari mountain region, to the city of Eluhāt, the stronghold of Sudi, the stronghold of Haran as far as Karkamish on the bank of the Euphrates, I captured their cities."²

Shattuara, who is not mentioned in the Boghaz-Keui documents—so far as the preliminary report shows—was evidently one of the successors of the dynasty of Saushshatar of Mitanni, whose last kings were the vassals of the kings of Hatti. This inference is based upon the fact that the name Shattuara is clearly Aryan and that Hani or Hanigalbat is but another designation for Mitanni. It would seem as if Mitanni once more held the primacy among the Hittite kingdoms. Although aided by the Arameans, Shattuara was no match for the Assyrian, who boasts that his conquests

¹ *MDOG*, pp. 27 f.

² *AJSL*, XXVIII, 189.

extended "from the border of the land of Uruadri (evidently Urartu-Armenia) to the land of Kutmuhi (Commagene)." In addition to rivaling the deeds of his father in these regions, Tukulti-Ninib succeeded in capturing Babylon.

Arnuanta, son of Dudhalia, is the last king of the dynasty founded by Subbiluliuma whose name has come down to us.¹ Two fragments of edicts and a large land register are the only documents from his reign which have come to light. The latter is interesting because of the three seals attached to it. The first of these contains the name of Arnuanta, the second those of "the lady Tawashi" (the queen-mother?) and "the lady Munidan, the Great Queen." On the third stood the name of the daughter of Dudhalia, but it has been lost.

The final overthrow of the Hittite dynasty was not, however, accomplished by the Assyrians, although they had done much to break its power, but by another migration of peoples. Once more the Egyptian records come to our aid.²

For centuries, perhaps, the Indo-European tribes had been crossing from Europe into Asia by way of the Balkan peninsula, but it was not until the time of Ramses III (1198-1167 B.C.) that they became a menace to the Hittite state and even to Egypt. Along the coast in vessels and across the plains in heavy two-wheeled carts, carrying their wives and children with them, they came. "Lo, the northern countries," says Ramses, "which are in their isles, are restless in their limbs, they infest the ways of the harbor-mouths."³ They invaded Syria. "The countries . . . the northerners in their isles were disturbed. . . . No one stood before their hands, from Heta (Hatti), Kode, Karkamish, Arwad, Alasa (Cyprus), they were wasted. They set up a camp in one place in Amor (Amurru). They desolated his people and his land like that which is not. They came with fire prepared before them, forward to Egypt. Their main support was Peleset (the later Philistines), Thekel, Shekelesh, Denyen (Danaans, Greeks), and Weshesh."⁴ Ramses succeeded in turning these northerners back

¹ *MDOG*, No. 35, pp. 28 f.

² *Ibid.*, § 75.

³ *BAR*, IV, §§ 59 f.

⁴ *Ibid.*, § 64.

from Egypt, but they had already swept the Hittite empire from its position of supremacy in northern Asia Minor. While petty Hittite states still lingered on in different parts of this region and Syria for centuries, they were never again united under one strong line of kings such as the dynasties of Saushshatar and Subbiluliuma had been. After the redistribution of the "northerners" and the peoples they displaced, the Mushki seem to have taken the most prominent position in Asia Minor. Tiglath-Pileser (*ca.* 1100 B.C.),¹ at the beginning of his reign, met an army of 20,000 men of the land of Mushki, led by five kings. They had advanced as far south as Kummuh (Commagene). After defeating them, the Assyrian king was compelled to meet the forces of the Kurte who came to the aid of Kummuh. The names of their leaders, Kili-Teshub and Kali-Teshub, are Hittite. The same is true of the name of Shadi-Teshub, the son of Hattu-shar, the king of Urratinash, another district plundered by Tiglath-Pileser. While he succeeded in traversing and harassing the lands to the west of Assyria as far as the Mediterranean, Tiglath-Pileser always found coalitions of Hittite and other kings, as high as twenty and thirty in number, waiting to dispute his progress. He did not succeed in establishing a permanent hold upon the kingdoms of the West. The policy of incorporating the conquered states as provinces of the empire, whereby the later Assyrian kings succeeded in blotting out every vestige of independence, was not yet adopted. "For something like a century and a half, until about 950 B.C., some semblance of Assyrian authority may still be traced on the near side of the Euphrates, but in view of the history of these times it may be said that during the tenth century B.C., until the revival of Assyrian invasions (about 850 B.C.), the Hittite states of Syria were free, and their works illustrate to us their latent vitality and the revival of their traditions."² The gradual withdrawal of both Assyrians and Mushki "was marked by a cycle of Hittite works which proved how deep-rooted was their civilization. . . . At Boghaz-Keui a new palace, unadorned, however, with sculptures, sprang up

¹ King, *Annals of the Kings of Assyria*, pp. 35 f.

² Garstang, *The Land of the Hittites*, p. 371.

on the site of that of the Great Kings, which was now completely ruined. It is possible that the great walls of the citadel as they are now seen were the product of this age."¹ The sculptures and inscriptions found in the neighborhood of Tyana point to a considerable kingdom in the region later occupied by the Hilakku (Cilicians). Eastward of this the Assyrians found a fairly large state which they called Tabal. Other little kingdoms were Milid, Gurgum (around the modern Marash), Yaudi, Samalla, Hamath on the Orontes, and Karkamish. The boundaries of these kingdoms were shifting continually. Besides, the Arameans were gradually gaining the upper hand in many of them.

Beginning in 885 B.C., the armies of Ashurnasirpal and his son Shalmaneser visited the Westland year after year. At first some of the Hittite kings sent tribute, but later Karkamish, Bit-Adini, Gurgum, Samalla, Kue, and Hattina formed a league to check the aggression of the Assyrians. While Shalmaneser's army was away in Armenia, they crossed the frontier and invaded the Assyrian territory. After considerable fighting the league was broken up, and henceforth, although there were occasional uprisings, the almost yearly campaigns of the Assyrian kings kept the western states from forming any dangerous leagues. The prestige lost through the indecisive battle of Karkar (854 B.C.), at which Ahab of Israel and the kings of Hamath and a number of other Hittite states fought on the side of the king of Damascus, was regained by subsequent successes. In 838 and 837, the kings of Tabal paid tribute, while in 835, Shalmaneser claims to have received the tribute of the whole Hatti-land (the Westland in general). But the West was not yet conquered.

Another period of Assyrian decline followed the reign of Shalmaneser, and a century later, when the revival came under Tiglath-Pileser, the Hittite states were paying tribute to the king of Armenia. In 743, Tiglath-Pileser met the armies of Sarduaris of Armenia, and his Hittite allies from Agusi, Gurgum, Kummuh, and Milid, and routed them with great slaughter. After some more fighting they submitted to the Assyrian yoke. In 732 B.C.,

¹ Garstang, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

the fall of Damascus made opposition in the West hopeless. However, in 718, Midas of Phrygia induced Pisiris of Karkamish to revolt, but on the approach of Sargon, Midas fled and Karkamish was made an Assyrian province. One after another the western states lost their independence and were incorporated into the empire. In 709, Gurgum, the last of the little kingdoms to maintain some sort of independence, was made a province. Finally the Cimmerian invasions of the seventh century blotted out the last vestiges of the Hittite states. Croesus of Lydia took Pteria (Boghaz-Keui) in the middle of the sixth century, and after the conquest by Cyrus, the Hittite lands came under the sway of Persia.

There remains to be said a final word about some of the Old Testament passages in which the Hittites are mentioned.

The Hittites were known in Palestine in the time of the kingdom of David and Solomon. This is evident from the presence of Hittite "soldiers of fortune," Ahimelech and Uriah, in the Israelite army (I Sam. 26:6; II Sam. 11:3 f.; 23:39). Toi, king of Hamath, whose name is identical with that of the vizier of Tushratta (Tuhi; see above, p. 36) and who was probably the descendant of one of the old lines of Hittite kings of northern Syria, is said to have sent his son to David with gifts, "to salute and bless him, because he had fought against Hadadezer and smitten him: for Hadadezer had wars with Toi" (II Sam. 8:9 f.). Among the many foreign women whom Solomon loved were women of the Hittites (I Kings 11:1). Solomon's merchants seem to have carried on a brisk trade in horses which they brought from Musri (a Hittite state in Asia Minor; see p. 53, above) and sold to the kings of the Hittites (evidently of such states as Hamath) and the kings of Syria (I Kings 10:28 f.).¹

That Hittite or Mitannian leaders had carved out petty kingdoms for themselves all over Syria and Palestine (after Egypt had lost control in these regions) is evident from the Amarna Letters. We think at once of Abdi-Hepa of Jerusalem whose name bewrayeth him. The memory of these days is preserved in the traditions

¹ Read Musri instead of Misraim, and cf. II Kings 7:6, where the same correction is to be made.

which make the father of the faithful the contemporary of the sons of Heth who lived at Hebron. Furthermore in almost every one of the twenty-two passages¹ in the Old Testament where the pre-Israelite inhabitants of Canaan are enumerated, the Hittites (along with the Amorites and Canaanites) are given a prominent position. Well might Ezekiel in reproaching Jerusalem say: "Thy birth and thy nativity is of the land of the Canaanite: the Amorite was thy father, and thy mother was a Hittite (16:3, 45)."

¹ Deut. 7:1; Jos. 3:10; 24:11; Gen. 15:18, 20; Exod. 3:8, 17; 23:23, 28; 33:2; Deut. 20:17; Jos. 9:1; 11:3; 12:8; Judg. 3:5; Neh. 9:8; Exod. 13:5; Ezra 9:1; I Kings 9:20; II Chron. 8:7; Exod. 23:28; Gen. 13:7; 34:30; cf. Böhl, *Kanaaner und Hebräer*, pp. 63 f.

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH

II. רוּחַ, נֶפֶשׁ, AND בָּשָׂר IN THE OLD TESTAMENT

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It would be highly desirable, if it were also practicable, to show the development of the meaning of the three Hebrew words named above chronologically and genetically, and to this end to exhibit in succession the usage of the several great periods of Old Testament literature. But aside from the fact that such an exhibit would demand more space than can be given to it here, the problem itself is complicated by several facts which place a solution of it worthy of the attention of scholars beyond the powers of the present writer. For example, in the oldest extant literature it is evident that we have not the beginnings of Hebrew usage, but a stage of development in which it is already difficult to distinguish primitive from derived meanings, and in the later stages there are many questions of relative antiquity of different portions of the Old Testament, and of the interpretation of obscure passages which still further obscure the solution. On the other hand, the broad facts respecting relationship of meanings seem to be fairly clear, and wholly to ignore genetic relationships is to risk a resulting degree of misrepresentation of relations of meanings which might affect unfavorably our judgment even respecting the New Testament usage. The following analyses, accordingly, are an endeavor to represent the usage of the Old Testament as a whole, rather than by successive periods, but with the various meanings so arranged as to avoid any serious misrepresentation of genetic relations.

I. רוּחַ

I. *Wind*.—This was apparently the earliest meaning of רוּחַ. It occurs in all periods of the literature.

1. *Prophie*.—

Ps. 1:4: לֹא-כֵן הָרְשָׁעִים כִּי אִם-כַּפֹּץ אֲשֶׁר-תִּדְּפֶנּוּ רוּחַ:

The wicked are not so; But are like the chaff which the wind driveth away.

Other examples of רִיחַ meaning "wind" are found in II Sam. 22:11; II Kings 3:17; Job 8:2; Ps. 18:11, 43; 83:14; 103:16; 104:3, 4; 147:18; Isa. 7:2; 17:13; 27:8; 32:2; 41:16; 57:13; 64:5; Jer. 2:24; 10:13; 13:24; 18:17; 51:16; Ezek. 5:2, 10; Dan. 2:35; Hos. 4:19; Zech. 5:9; 6:5; Jon. 1:4; 4:8.

It is sometimes spoken of as proceeding from God, yet not in such way as to change the meaning of the word.

Hos. 13:15: בּוֹא קָדִים רוּחַ יְהוָה מִמִּדְבָּר עֲלֶיהָ

An east wind shall come, the wind of the Lord coming up from the wilderness.

See other examples in Gen. 8:1; Exod. 10:13, 19; 14:21; 15:10 (?); Num. 11:31; Ps. 107:25; 135:7; Isa. 40:7; Am. 4:13.

Sometimes the writer has in mind the destructive force of the wind, but this also involves no change of meaning.

I Kings 19:11: וַתֵּהִי יְהוָה עֲבִיר רוּחַ גְּדוֹלָה וַחֲזָק מִפָּרֶק הָרִים וַיִּשָּׁבֶר סֻלְעִים לִפְנֵי יְהוָה

And behold, the Lord passed by, and a great and strong wind rent the mountains, and brake in pieces the rocks before the Lord.

See other examples in Ps. 11:6; 55:9; 148:8; Isa. 11:15; Jer. 4:11, 12; 22:22; 51:1; Ezek. 1:4; 17:10; 27:26.

Because of its illusiveness, רִיחַ, meaning "wind," perhaps sometimes breath, is the symbol of nothingness, emptiness, vanity.

Isa. 41:29: הֵן כָּלֶם אֲנִי אֶפֶס מַעֲשֵׂיהֶם רוּחַ וְתַהוֹ נִכְבִּיהֶם:

Behold all of them, their works are vanity and nought: their molten images are wind and confusion.

See also Job 7:7; 15:2; 16:3; 30:15 (perhaps, however, to be taken literally); Ps. 78:39; Prov. 11:29; Isa. 26:18; Jer. 5:13; Hos. 12:2.

2. By metonymy it is used for the points of the compass, or, in general, for direction in space.

Jer. 52:23: וַיְהִי הָרַמְלִים תִּשְׁעִים וְשִׁשָּׁה רוּחֹה

And there were ninety-six pomegranates on the sides.

See also I Chron. 9:24; Jer. 49:32, 36; Ezek. 5:10, 12; 17:21; 42:16, 20; Dan. 8:8; 11:4.

II. *Spirit*.—One might naturally conjecture that רִיחַ denoting spirit was a later development from its use to denote the breath,

and that its application to the spirit of God was an outgrowth of its use with reference to the spirit of man. Unless, however, the order of development of meanings was widely different from the order of appearance in extant literature, or the judgment of modern scholars as to the order of the literature is wide of the mark, the meaning "spirit" came before "breath," and the application to God earlier than to man.

1. Spirit of God. From the conception of the wind as controlled by, or proceeding from, God and operative in nature, apparently arose the conception of the spirit of God, signifying the unseen but powerful influence or influences by which God affected or controlled men. The change of English translation from "wind" to "spirit" doubtless somewhat exaggerates the change of meaning in the mind of Hebrew writer or speaker. It was still for them the **רוּחַ אֱלֹהִים**, only operative in a different sphere.

a) The spirit of God is spoken of as operating in ways more or less analogous to those in which the wind might operate; yet in almost all the instances it is man who is affected thereby.

II Kings 2:16: **פֶּן־נִשְׁאַר רוּחַ יְהוָה וַיִּשְׁלַכְהוּ בְּאֶחָד הַהָרִים אוֹ בְּאַחַת הַגִּבְעוֹת**

Lest peradventure the spirit of the Lord hath taken him up, and cast him upon some mountain, or into some valley.

For other examples see Gen. 1:2; I Kings 18:12; Ezek. 2:2; 3:12, 14, 24; 8:3; 11:1, 24; 43:5 [cf. below under b)].

In Isa. 31:3 **רוּחַ** is used qualitatively with special reference to its powerfulness in contrast with the flesh as weak:

וּמִצְרִיִּם אָדָם וְלֹא־אֵל וְסוּסֵיהֶם בָּשָׂר וְלֹא רוּחַ

The Egyptians are men and not God, and their horses flesh and not spirit.

While the term does not refer specifically to the spirit of God, the idea of power associated with it is probably derived from the use of **רוּחַ** in reference to the divine spirit. Cf. II Kings 2:16; Judg. 14:6. This generic or qualitative use of **רוּחַ** to express the idea of power is quite isolated and at the opposite pole of development from **רוּחַ** as the symbol of weakness or emptiness derived from the more primitive use of **רוּחַ** meaning wind. In Job 26:13 also **רוּחַ** is apparently used by metonymy for power.

b) The spirit of God (אֱלֹהִים or יְהוָה) is spoken of as operating upon or within men, producing various psychical and physico-psychical effects, such as physical strength, courage, prophetic frenzy, a prophetic message. The range of usage is very wide, from those in which the effect is purely physical to those in which the spirit is represented as giving to the prophet his message.

Judg. 3:10: וַתָּבוֹא רוּחַ יְהוָה עָלָיו וַיִּשְׁפֹּט אֶת-יִשְׂרָאֵל

And the spirit of the Lord came upon him, and he judged Israel.

Isa. 61:1: רוּחַ אֲדֹנָי יְהוָה עָלַי יָעַן מָשַׁח יְהוָה אֹתִי לְבַשֹּׁר עֲנִיִּים שְׁלַחַנִי לְחַבֵּשׁ לְנִשְׁבְּרֵי-לֵב לְקַרְא לְשִׁבְיָם דְּרוּר וּלְאִסְמִירִים פִּקְדֹנֵיהֶם

The spirit of the Lord God is upon me; because the Lord hath anointed me to preach good tidings unto the meek; he hath sent me to bind up the broken-hearted, to proclaim liberty to the captives, and the opening of the prison to them that are bound.

Other examples of רוּחַ used in similar way are found in Gen. 41:38; Exod. 31:3; 35:31; Num. 11:17, 25, 29; 24:2; 27:18(?); Judg. 6:34; 11:29; 13:25; 14:6; 14:19; 15:14; I Sam. 10:6, 10; 11:6; 16:14a; 19:20, 23; II Sam. 23:2; I Chron. 12:19; II Chron. 15:1; 20:14; 24:20; Job 32:8 (by *implication* the spirit of Jehovah); Ps. 106:33; Ezek. 1:12, 20, 21; 11:5a; 37:1 [cf. the examples from Ezek. under a), as illustrating the close relationship of the two usages]; Hos. 9:7; Mic. 2:7; 3:8.

Volz¹ interprets the expression "evil spirit from [or of] God," in I Sam. 16:14b; 16:15, 16, 23a, b; 18:10; 19:9; and Judg. 9:23, "God sent a spirit of evil between Abimelech and the men of Shechem," as referring to a demon, which originally had nothing to do with Yahweh, the phrases "from God," "of God," etc., being the product of a subsequent desire to make every extraordinary phenomenon subordinate to God. The expression as it stands would not in that case exactly reflect the thought of any period, but would be the result of the blending of ideas due to different periods and not wholly assimilated. For the purposes of the present paper it is not essential to determine the accuracy of this judgment.

¹ Volz, *Der Geist Gottes*, Tübingen, 1910, pp. 4 ff.

It is probable in any case that the idea of a demonic spirit arose in the Hebrew mind within the Old Testament period (see 3 below) and that within that period the conception of the supremacy of God prevailed to such an extent that Hebrew writers did not shrink from designating the source from which evil came as a spirit of God. Whether in the latter case those who framed or those who read such passages as Judg. 9:23; I Sam. 16:14-23 had in mind the spirit of God, and understood the epithet "evil" as describing simply the result of the divine action, or conceived that the evil spirits (demonic) were God's in the sense that they were ultimately under divine control, is not wholly clear. The decision of the question depends mainly upon the date at which the idea of the demonic spirit became current in Israel.

The question also arises, though on different grounds, whether in Exod. 28:3; Deut. 34:9 the expression "spirit of wisdom" refers to the spirit of God, called a spirit of wisdom because of the effect produced, or to the spirit of man, to which God imparts wisdom, or is simply a pleonastic phrase for wisdom. See also Isa. 28:6, "spirit of judgment." These passages are in themselves capable of either interpretation. But such passages as Gen. 41:38 (cf. vs. 39); Mic. 3:8, in which similar results are ascribed to the spirit of God, expressly so called, favor the first interpretation. This probably applies also to Num. 27:18 and Zech. 12:10. In II Kings 2:9, 15 the conception may be that the very spirit of Elijah was to come upon Elisha, but vs. 16 again suggests a reference to the spirit of God. So in Num. 11:17, 25, 26, the spirit (with the article) that is upon Moses, though not defined as the spirit either of Moses or of God, is put upon the young men by God, and is most probably thought of as the spirit of God. But both here and in II Kings 2:9, the conception is quantitative rather than purely individual; and all the other passages are perhaps somewhat influenced in thought and expression by the fact of the quantitative idea of the spirit.

c) Under the influence of an increasingly ethical conception of God, the spirit of God, called also the spirit of holiness, is spoken of as operative in the life of the community of the chosen people and of individuals, guiding, instructing, redeeming, ethically purifying.

Isa. 44:3: אֶצֶק רוּחִי עַל-זֶרְעֶךָ וּבְרִכָּתִי עַל-צִאצְאֶיךָ:

I will pour my spirit upon thy seed, and my blessing upon thine offspring.

Ps. 51:11 (13): אַל-תִּשְׁלִיכֵנִי מִלִּפְנֵיךָ יְיָ וְרוּחַ קֹדֶשְׁךָ אַל-תִּקַּח מִמֶּנִּי

Cast me not away from thy presence; And take not thy holy spirit from me.

For other examples see Neh. 9:20, 30; 39:29; Isa. 11:2; 42:1; 48:16; 59:21; 63:10, 11, 14; Ps. 139:7; 143:10; Hag. 2:5; Zech. 4:6; 12:10; Joel 3:12 (2:28, 29).

The line of demarkation between this class and that which immediately precedes manifestly cannot be sharply drawn, many cases being on the border line.

d) Rarely, and probably in part under the influence of the conception of רִיחַ as the breath of life, the spirit of God is spoken of as the source of physical life. Here, also, as under b) the spirit is sometimes, at least, thought of quantitatively. Cf. II, 2, d).

Job 33:4: רִיחַ-אֵל עָשָׂתָנִי וְנִשְׁמַת שְׁדֵי הָאֱלֹהִים:

The spirit of God hath made me, And the breath of the Almighty giveth me life.

See also Gen. 6:3; Job 27:3; 34:14; Ps. 104:30.

As against the view of Wendt, *Fleisch und Geist*, pp. 19-22, that the wind, which forms the basis for the idea of the Spirit, is conceived of by the Hebrews as immaterial, Gunkel, *Wirkungen des Heiligen Geistes*, pp. 48 f., holds that the Hebrews thought of both wind and spirit as material, but as an extremely refined air-like substance. The possibility that spirit was a substance, but immaterial, is ignored by both of them; probably with reason in view of the lack of evidence that the Hebrews ever thought of immaterial substance. As between Wendt and Gunkel, the latter seems correct. Beyond this and the fact that the Hebrews denied to spirit the *ordinary* attributes of matter, it is difficult to go with certainty.

2. The spirit of man.

a) As the seat of, or as identical with (the latter apparently the earlier of the two ideas) strength, courage, anger, distress, or the like [cf. examples under 1, b) above].

Judg. 8:3: אַז רָפְתָּהּ רוּחָם מֵעָלָיו בְּדִבְרֵי הַדָּבָר הַהוּא

Then their anger was abated toward him, when he had said that.

Job 7:11: אֲדַבְרָה בְּצַר רוּחִי

I will speak in the anguish of my spirit.

Prov. 18:14: רוּחַ אִישׁ יִכְלֹכֶל מִחֲלָהוּ וְרוּחַ נִכְאָה מִי יִשְׁאַנֶּה

The spirit of man will sustain his infirmity; but a broken spirit who can bear?

See other examples as found in Gen. 26:35; 41:8; 45:27; Exod. 6:9; 35:21; Num. 27:18 (?); Deut. 2:30; Judg. 8:3; 15:19; Josh. 2:11; 5:1; I Sam. 1:15, 30:12; I Kings 10:5; 21:5; Job 6:4; 15:13; 21:4; 32:18; I Chron. 5:26; II Chron. 9:4; 21:16; 36:22; Ezra 1:1, 5; Job 6:4; 15:13; 21:4; 32:18; Ps. 32:2; 76:13; 77:4; 142:4; 143:4, 7; Prov. 14:29; 15:4, 13; 16:18, 19, 32; 17:22; 29:11, 23; Isa. 19:3, 14; 38:16; 54:6; 61:3; 65:14; Jer. 51:11; Ezek. 3:14b; 21:7; Dan. 2:1, 3; 5:20; 7:15; Zech. 6:8.

b) With kindred meaning but with special reference to the moral and religious life, the seat of humility and other good qualities.

Isa. 57:15: מְרוֹם וְקָדוֹשׁ אֲשׁוּכֹן וְאַחֲדֵפָא וְשִׁפְלֵי-רוּחַ לְרִחְיוֹת רֹחַ שְׁפִלִים וְלִרְחִיחוֹ לֵב קְדָפָאִים

I dwell in the high and holy place, with him also that is of a contrite and humble spirit, to revive the spirit of the humble, and to revive the heart of the contrite ones.

Other examples of this use of רוּחַ are found in Ps. 34:19; 51:12, 19; Hag. 1:14; Ps. 78:8; Prov. 11:13; Isa. 26:9; 57:16; 66:2; Ezek. 11:19; 18:31; 36:26.

c) Rarely, and only in late writers, רוּחַ is used of the seat of mentality.

Job 20:3: מוֹסֵר כְּלִמְתִּי אֲשַׁמֶּעַ וְרוּחַ מִבִּינָתִי יַעֲנֵנִי

I have heard the reproof which putteth me to shame, And the spirit of my understanding answereth me.

See also I Chron. 28:12; Isa. 29:24; Ezek. 11:5b; 20:32.

Mal. 2:15b (see also 16): נִשְׁמְרוּתְכֶם בְּרוּחֵיכֶם probably belongs here, the meaning being, "Be on your guard in [or with] your minds, and deal not thou treacherously with the wife of thy

youth." Wellhausen and Nowack suggest the possibility that **בְּרוּיֶיְכֶם** means "on peril of your lives" (BDB, *s.v.*); this is possible for the preposition but a difficult if not impossible meaning for the noun. Smith (*Int. Crit. Com.*) takes **רוּחַ** in the sense, character, purpose, or will, which is, however, neither strictly suitable to the context, nor a well-authenticated usage of the word, the passages cited scarcely vouching for it. The more general meaning "spirit," as the seat of emotion and will, is less open to objection. The sentence in that case would mean, "Guard yourselves in [the sphere of] your spirits, i.e., against those feelings which might lead one of you to deal treacherously with the wife of his youth."

d) With approximation to the sense of **נַפֶּשׁ**, **רוּחַ** denotes the spirit of man as the seat or cause of life, often with accompanying reference to God as its source. Cf. II, 1, d).

Num. 16:22: **אֵל אֱלֹהֵי הָרוּחוֹת לְכָל בָּשָׂר**

O God, the God of the spirits of all flesh.

Zech. 12:1: **נְאֻם־יְהוָה נֹטָה שָׁמַיִם וְיִסַּד אֶרֶץ וַיֵּצֵר רוּחַ־אָדָם בְּקִרְבּוֹ**

Thus saith the Lord, which stretcheth forth the heavens, and layeth the foundations of the earth, and formeth the spirit of man within him.

See also Num. 27:16; Job 10:12; 12:10; 17:1; Ps. 31:5; Isa. 42:5; Ezek. 10:17 (?).

The passages in Eccl. (3:19, 21; 12:7), which must doubtless be taken all together, are peculiar in that the term **רוּחַ** is applied to the lower animals along with man, while at the same time God is represented as its source. The conception seems to be that there proceeds from God **רוּחַ**, quantitatively not individually thought of, which is the source and cause of life for both man and beast, and that at death this **רוּחַ** returns from both man and beast to the source from which it came. Cf. II, 1, d), above, and III, 1, below. There is possibly to be discerned here an influence of the idea expressed by Epicharmus: *συνεκρίθη καὶ διεκρίθη ἀπὸ ἡλθεν, ὅθεν ἦλθεν, πάλιν, γὰρ μὲν εἰς γὰρ, πνεῦμα δ' ἄνω*. See *Am. Jour. Theol.*, October, 1913, p. 569.

3. The idea of a demon, a personal spirit neither human nor divine, which was undoubtedly current in the ancient world,

and is unquestionably found in late Jewish writings, is nowhere in the Old Testament expressed with that clearness which it acquires later. It is probable, however, that it is present in such passages as II Kings, chap. 19; Zech. 13:2; Job 4:15.

Job 4:15: רִיחַ עַל-פְּנֵי יְהוָה תִּסְמַר שְׂעִירַת בָּשָׂר

A spirit passed before my face and the hair of my flesh stood up.

It is perhaps also to be found in I Kings 22:21-23 and the parallel passage, II Chron. 18:20-22, in which Zedekiah describes the spirit by which Zedekiah and others have spoken as a lying spirit sent forth from God. But in view of the highly dramatic character of the passage it may be doubted whether the language is not simply a dramatic way of saying that Zedekiah is lying. The answer depends in this case, as in those mentioned under 2, *a*), mainly on the period at which the idea of the demon can be shown to have been current in Israel. The same considerations apply to Num. 5:14, 30, with its reference to a spirit of jealousy; to Hos. 4:12; 5:4, spirit of whoredom; Mic. 2:11, spirit of falsehood; Isa. 19:14, spirit of perverseness; Isa. 29:10, spirit of deep sleep.

III. *Breath*, which is the sign of life, and the cessation of which is death.—

1. *Proprie*.—The breath. Instances of this meaning are found first in the exilic period, and Ezek. 37:5-14 suggests a close connection between the older meanings, "wind" and "spirit," and the apparently later meaning, "breath."

Ezek. 37:9, 10: וַיֹּאמֶר אֵלַי הִנֵּבֵא אֶל־הָרוּחַ הִנֵּבֵא בֶן־אָדָם וְאָמַרְתָּ אֶל־הָרוּחַ כֹּה־אָמַר אֲדֹנָי יְהוָה מֵאַרְבַּע רִיחֹת בָּאִי הָרוּחַ וּפָחִי בִּדְרוֹגִים הָאֵלֶּה יִחְיֶי: וְהִנֵּבֵאתִי פֶּאֶשׁ צִוְנִי וְתָבוּא בָדָם הָרוּחַ וַיִּחְיֶי וַיַּעֲמֵדוּ עַל־רַגְלֵיהֶם חֵל גָּדוֹל מְאֹד מְאֹד:

Then said he unto me, Prophesy unto the wind, prophesy, son of man, and say to the wind, thus saith the Lord God: Come from the four winds, O breath, and breathe upon these slain, that they may live. So I prophesied as he commanded me, and the breath came into them, and they stood upon their feet, an exceeding great army.

See also Gen. 6:17; 7:15, 22; Job 9:18; 15:30; 19:17; Ps. 104:29; 135:17; 146:4; Jer. 10:14; 14:6 (?); 51:17; Lam. 4:20; Hab. 2:19.

In all of these instances, except those in Job, the breath is definitely thought of as the breath of life. On Eccl. 3:19, 20; 12:7, see 2, *d*), above.

2. As the symbol of anger or of power; of man (Isa. 25:4; 33:11 [?]); of the Messiah (Isa. 11:4); but usually of God (Exod. 15:8; II Sam. 22:16; Job 4:9; Ps. 18:15; 33:6; Isa. 30:28; 59:19; Ps. 33:6; Job 4:9); sometimes apparently with a blending of the idea of wind.

Isa. 11:4: וְהִכּוּ אֶרֶץ בְּשִׁבְט פִּי וּבְרִיחַ שִׁפְתָּיו יַמִּית רָשָׁע:

He shall smite the earth with the rod of his mouth, and with the breath of his lips shall he slay the wicked.

Whether by רִיחַ מְשַׁפֵּט and רִיחַ בָּעַר in Isa. 4:4 the prophet means the breath of God as the expression of his anger, or the spirit of God with an idea similar to that expressed by רִיחַ קָדֵשׁ in Ps. 51:11, is not easy to decide. In any case the expression might easily be taken in the latter sense in later times.

II. נֶפֶשׁ

The order of development of meanings is difficult to determine. The idea commonly held formerly that the fundamental idea is breath is now generally given up, there being no certain or probable instance of the use of the word in that sense. (On Job 41:21 [13], Prov. 27:9, Isa. 13:20, see BDB,¹ *s.v. ad fin.*) The following analysis, though based on repeated personal study of all the Old Testament passages, is largely influenced by BDB, especially in respect to I, and the order of arrangement.

I. *Soul*, that entity which, residing in a living being, makes it alive, and the departure of which is death—sometimes distinguished from בָּשָׂר, flesh.—

I Kings 17:21: וַיִּתְמַד עַל-הַיֶּלֶד שְׁלֹשׁ פְּעָמִים וַיִּקְרָא אֶל-יְהוָה וַיֹּאמֶר יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵי תַשָּׁבֵטָּה נַפְשׁ-הַיֶּלֶד הַזֶּה עָל-קִרְבִּי:

And he stretched himself upon the child three times, and called unto the Lord, and said, O Lord my God, I pray thee let this child's soul come into him again.

¹ Brown, Driver, and Briggs, *Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old Testament*, Boston, 1906.

See other examples in Gen. 35:18; I Kings 17:21, 22; Job 11:20; 31:39; 33:18, 22, 28, 30; Ps. 16:10; 30:4; 31:10; 49:16; 86:13; 89:49; 131:2; Prov. 11:17; 23:14; Isa. 10:18; 38:17; Jer. 15:9; Lam. 3:20; cf. also Job 14:22; 30:16; Ps. 42:5, 7 which BDB assign to this class.

The soul, as a living entity, is sometimes said to be in the blood or even identified with it, and on this is based a prohibition of the eating of blood.

Lev. 17:14b: דָּם כָּל-בָּשָׂר לֹא תֹאכְלוּ כִּי נַפְשׁ כָּל-בָּשָׂר דָּמָהּ

Ye shall eat the blood of no manner of flesh: for the life of all flesh is the blood thereof.

See also Gen. 9:4, 5; Deut. 12:23a, b.

II. *Soul*, the seat of appetite, emotion, and the like, with no implication of a separate entity, or of the possibility of separate existence.—

1. The seat of physical appetites, health, and vigor.

Deut. 12:20: כִּי-יִרְחֹב יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ אֶת-גְּבֻלְךָ פֶּאֶשֶׁר דִּבֶּר-
לְךָ וְאָמַרְתָּ אֲכַלְהָ בָשָׂר כִּי-תֹאמַר נַפְשִׁי לֹאכֹל בָּשָׂר בְּכָל-אֶרֶץ נַפְשִׁי
תֹאכַל בָּשָׂר:

When the Lord thy God shall enlarge thy border, as he hath promised thee, and thou shalt say, I will eat flesh, because thy soul desireth to eat flesh; thou mayest eat flesh after all the desire of thy soul.

For other examples see Num. 11:6; 21:5; Deut. 12:15, 21; 23:25; Job 33:20; Ps. 78:18; 106:15; 107:5, 9, 18; Prov. 6:30; 10:3; 13:25; 16:24, 26; 23:2; 25:25; 27:7 *bis*; Eccl. 2:24; 4:8; 6:2, 7; Isa. 29:8a, b; 32:6; 55:2;¹ 56:11; 58:11;² Jer. 31:14;³ 50:19;⁴ Lam. 1:11, 19; Ezek. 7:19; Hos. 9:4; Mic. 7:1.

2. The seat of emotion of all kinds—desire, courage, hope, fear, love, hate, sorrow, discouragement, vengeance, or, by metonymy, the emotions themselves, frequently but by no means constantly as the seat of religious experience.

Job 30:25: אִם-לֹא בִכִּיתִי לְקֹשְׁתֵי-יָוִם עָנְמָה נַפְשִׁי לְאַבְיוֹן

Did not I weep for him that was in trouble? Was not my soul grieved for the needy?

¹ But the whole expression is used figuratively for a religious experience.

Ps. 86:4: שִׂמְחָה נַפְשִׁי עֲבָדְךָ כִּי־אֱלֹהֶיךָ אֲדֹנָי נַפְשִׁי אֲשָׂא:

Rejoice the soul of thy servant, for unto thee O Lord do I lift up my soul.

Cant. 1:7: הַגִּידָה לִּי שָׂאֲהֶבָה נַפְשִׁי אֵיכָה חָרָעָה:

Tell me, O thou whom my soul loveth, where thou feedest thy flock.

Isa. 61:10: שׂוֹשׁ אֲשִׁישׁ בִּיהוָה חֲגִל נַפְשִׁי בָּאלֹהֵי

I will rejoice greatly in the Lord; my soul shall be joyful in my God.

See other examples in Gen. 23:8; 34:3, 8; 42:22; Exod. 15:9; 23:9; Lev. 23:27, 32; 26:11, 15, 16, 30, 43; Num. 21:4; 29:7; Deut. 14:26 *bis*; 18:6; 21:14; 24:15; 28:65; Josh. 23:11; Judg. 5:21; 10:16; 16:16; 18:25; Ruth 4:15 (?); I Sam. 1:10, 15; 2:16, 33; 18:1b, c; 20:4; 22:2; 23:20; 30:6; II Sam. 3:21; 5:8; 17:8; I Kings 11:37; II Kings 4:27; 9:15; Job 3:20; 6:11; 7:11; 10:1 *bis*; 14:22; 16:4a, b; 18:4; 19:2; 21:25; 23:13; 24:12; 27:2; 30:16, 25; 41:13, 21;¹ Ps. 6:4; 10:3; 11:5; 19:8; 23:3; 25:13; 27:12; 31:8; 33:20; 34:3; 35:9, 12, 13, 25; 41:3, 5; 42:2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 12; 43:5; 44:26; 57:7; 62:2, 6; 63:1, 6, 9; 69:11; 77:3; 84:3; 86:4 *bis*; 88:4; 94:19; 103:1, 2, 22; 104:1, 35; 105:22; 107:26; 116:7; 119:20, 25, 28, 81; 123:4; 130:5, 6; 138:3; 143:6, 8, 11, 12; 146:1; Prov. 6:16; 13:2, 4 *bis*, 19; 14:10; 19:18; 21:10, 23; 25:13; 28:25; 29:17; 31:6; Eccl. 6:3, 9; 7:28; Cant. 1:7; 3:1, 2, 3, 4; 5:6; 6:12; Isa. 1:14; 3:20 (?); 5:14; 15:4; 19:10; 26:8, 9; 38:15; 42:1; 53:11; 58:3, 5, 10 *bis*; 61:10; 66:3; Jer. 2:24; 4:31; 5:9, 29; 6:8; 9:8; 12:7; 13:17; 14:19; 15:1; 22:27; 31:12, 25 *bis*; 34:16; 44:14; Lam. 1:16; 2:12; 3:17, 20, 51; Ezek. 16:27; 23:17, 18 *bis*, 22, 28; 24:21, 25; 25:6, 15; 27:31; 36:5; Hos. 4:8; Micah 7:3; Hab. 2:5; Zech. 11:8 *bis*.

3. The seat of will and moral action, especially when joined with לִבָּב, but occasionally alone; not of course sharply distinguished from the preceding class.

Deut. 30:2: וּשְׁבֹתָ עַד־יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ וְשָׁמַעְתָּ בְּקוֹלִי כָּל־אֲשֶׁר־
אֲנִי מִצְוֶה הַיּוֹם אֹתָהּ וּבִגְיָהּ בְּכָל־לִבְבְּךָ וּבְכָל־נַפְשְׁךָ:

And shalt return unto the Lord thy God, and shalt obey his voice according to all that I command thee this day, thou and thy children, with all thine heart and with all thy soul.

¹ Briggs, *Jour. Bib. Lit.*, XVI (1897), p. 30.

See other examples in Gen. 49:6; Deut. 4:29; 6:5; 10:12; 11:13, 18; 13:4; 26:16; 30:6, 10; Josh. 22:5; I Kings 2:4; 8:48; II Kings 23:3, 25; I Chron. 22:19; 28:9; II Chron. 6:38; 15:12; 34:31, Job 6:7; 7:15; Ps. 24:4; 25:1; 119:129, 167; Jer. 32:41; Ezek. 4:14; Mic. 6:7; Hab. 2:4.

Here also instead of under 2 might be classified Ps. 27:12; 41:2; 105:22; Deut. 23:25; Josh. 23:11.

4. Rarely of the seat of mentality.

Esth. 4:13: אֶל-תִּדְמִי בְנַפְשְׁךָ לְהַמְלִיךָ בֵּית-הַמֶּלֶךְ

Think not in thy soul that thou shalt escape in the king's house.

See other examples in Deut. 49:15; Josh. 23:14; I Sam. 2:35; Esth. 4:13; Ps. 13:3; 35:3; 139:14; Prov. 2:10; 19:2; 23:7; 24:14; 27:9; Jer. 42:20. But in most cases the meaning may be more general, "self"; it is doubtful, moreover, whether in any case the Hebrew mind made the distinction indicated by the subdivisions under the main division II.

III. *Life*, that element or characteristic which distinguishes a living being from inanimate objects.—

Job 2:4: עוֹר בְּעַד-עוֹר וְכָל אֲשֶׁר לְאִישׁ יִתֶּן בְּעַד נַפְשׁוֹ

Skin for skin, yea all that a man hath, will he give for his life.

Jer. 51:6: נָסוּ מִחוּץ בָּבֶל וּמִלְטוּ אִישׁ נַפְשׁוֹ

Flee out of the midst of Babylon, and save every man his life.

See other examples in Gen. 9:4, 5a, b; 19:17; 19:19; 32:31; 44:30a, b; Exod. 4:19; 21:23, 30; 30:12, 15, 16; Lev. 24:18b, c; Num. 17:3; 25:31; 31:50; Deut. 13:7; 19:21; 24:6; Josh. 2:13, 14; 9:24; Judg. 5:18; 9:17; 12:3; 18:25a, b; I Sam. 18:16, 3; 19:5, 11; 21:1, 17; 22:23a, b; 23:15; 24:12; 25:19a, b, c; I Sam. 26:21, 24a, b; 28:9, 21; II Sam. 1:9; 4:8, 9; 14:7, 14; 16:11; 18:13; 19:6a, b, c, d; 23:17; perhaps also Lev. 17:11b; I Kings 1:12a, b; 1:29; 2:23; 3:11; 19:2a, b; 19:3, 4a, b, 10, 14; 20:31, 32, 39a, b, 42a, b; II Kings 1:13a, b, 14; 7:7; 10:24a, b; I Chron. 11:19a, b; II Chron. 1:11; Esth. 7:3, 7; 8:11; 9:16; Job 2:4, 6; 12:10; 13:14; 27:3, 8; 31:30; Ps. 6:5; 7:6; 17:9; 22:21; 25:20; 26:9; 31:14; 33:19; 34:23; 35:4, 17; 38:13; 40:15; 49:9; 54:5, 6; 55:19; 56:7, 14; 59:4;

63:10; 66:9; 69:2, 19; 70:3; 71:10, 13, 23; 72:13, 14; 74:19; 78:50; 86:2, 14; 94:21; 97:10; 116:4, 8; 119:109; 120:2; 121:7; 124:4, 5; 143:3; Prov. 1:18, 19; 3:22; 6:26; 7:23; 11:30(?); 14:25(?); 12:10; 13:3, 8; 16:17; 19:8, 16; 20:2; 22:23; 24:12(?); 29:10, 24; Isa. 43:4; 44:20; 53:10, 12; Jer. 2:34; 4:10, 30; 11:21; 19:7a, b; 20:13; 21:7, 9; 22:25; 26:19; 34:20, 21; 38:2, 16a, b; 39:18; 40:14, 15; 44:30a, b; 45:5; 46:26; 48:6; 49:37; 51:6, 45; Lam. 2:19; 5:9; Ezek. 3:19, 21; 13:18a, b, 20a, b, c; 14:14, 20; 16:5; 17:17; 22:25, 27; 32:10; 33:5, 9; Amos 2:14, 15; Jon. 1:14; 2:6, 8; 4:3.

In various idiomatic phrases, such as "my life shall live," "as thy life liveth," "to smite a life," or "to stay a life," "the life dies," נֶפֶשׁ seems, despite the unusual character of the expression, to retain the meaning "life."

Gen. 12:13: אֲמַרְנָא אֶחָדָה אִתָּךְ לְמַעַן יֵיטֵב לִי בְעֵבְרִיָּה וְהָיִיתִי לְנֶפֶשׁ בְּגִלְלָהּ:

Say, I pray thee, thou art my sister: that it may be well with me and that I may live because of thee.

Lev. 24:17: וְאִישׁ כִּי יַכֶּה אֶת־נֶפֶשׁ אָדָם מוֹת יָמוּת:

And he that smiteth any man to death shall surely be put to death.

See other examples in Gen. 19:20; 37:21; Lev. 24:18a; Num. 23:10; 31:19; 35:11, 15, 30; Deut. 19:6, 11; 22:26; 27:25; Josh. 20:3, 9; Judg. 16:30; I Sam. 1:26; 17:55; 20:3; 25:26; II Sam. 11:11; 14:19; II Kings 2:2, 4, 6, 30; Job 31:39; 36:14; Ps. 22:30; 119:75; Isa. 55:3; Jer. 38:17, 20; Ezek. 13:18c, 19a, b; 18:27; Jon. 4:8(?).

IV. A *living being*, a being that possesses life, as distinguished from an inanimate object:

1. In the phrase נֶפֶשׁ חַיָּה as a general term for any being that has animal life, whether man or beast.

Gen. 1:24: וַיֹּאמֶר אֱלֹהִים וְיוֹצֵא הָאָרֶץ נֶפֶשׁ חַיָּה:

And God said, let the earth bring forth the living creature after its kind.

See also Gen. 1:20, 21, 30; 2:7, 19; 9:10, 12, 15, 16; Lev. 11:10, 46a; Ezek. 47:9.

Occasionally נֶפֶשׁ without חַיָּה is used in this inclusive sense. So Lev. 10:46b; Num. 31:28.

2. Much more frequently נֶפֶשׁ without the addition of חַיָּה is applied to man only:

a) Meaning person, individual man.

Lev. 17:12: **עַל-כֵּן אָמַרְתִּי לְבְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל כָּל-נֶפֶשׁ מִכֶּם לֹא-תֹאכַל דָּם**

Therefore I said unto the children of Israel, no soul of you shall eat blood.

See other examples in Gen. 14:21; 17:14; 36:6; Exod. 12:15, 16, 19; 31:14; Lev. 2:1; 4:2, 27; 5:1, 2, 4, 15, 17, 21; 7:18, 20a, b, 21a, b, 25, 27a, b; 17:10, 15; 18:29; 19:8; 20:6a, b; 22:3, 6, 11; 23:29, 30a, b; 27:2; Num. 5:6; 9:13; 15:27, 28, 30a, b, 31; 19:13b, 18, 20, 22; Deut. 24:7; Josh. 10:28, 30, 32, 35, 37a, b, 39; 11:11; I Sam. 22:22; II Kings 12:5; Prov. 11:25; 19:15; 28:17; Isa. 49:7; Jer. 43:6; Lam. 3:25; Ezek. 18:4a, b, c, d, 20; 27:13; 33:6.

b) In enumerations.

Exod. 1:5: **וַיְדַוּ כָּל-נֶפֶשׁ יִצְחָק יִרְדְּ-יַעֲקֹב שִׁבְעִים נֶפֶשׁ**

And all the souls that came out of the loins of Jacob were seventy souls.

Other examples occur in Gen. 46:15, 18, 22, 25, 26a, b, 27a, b; Exod. 12:4; 16:16; Num. 31:35a, b, 40a, b, 46; Deut. 10:22; I Chron. 5:21; Jer. 52:29, 30a, b.

c) With pronominal suffix it has the force of a reflexive or personal pronoun.

Ps. 11:1: **אֵיךְ תֹאמַרְוּ לְנַפְשִׁי נִדְוֹ דְרָכְכֶם צִפּוֹר:**

How say ye to my soul, Flee as a bird to your mountain?

See other examples in Gen. 27:4, 19, 25, 31; Lev. 11:43, 44; 16:29, 31; 20:25; Num. 30:3, 5a, b, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12; Job 9:21(?); 32:2; Ps. 3:3; 7:3; 17:13; 35:7; 49:19; 57:2, 5; 66:16; 88:15; 94:17; 105:18; 109:20, 31; 120:6; 141:8; 142:5, 8; Prov. 11:17; 18:7; 22:25; Isa. 3:9; 46:2; 47:14; 51:23; Jer. 3:11; 6:16; 17:21; 18:20; 37:9; 44:7; 51:14; Lam. 3:24, 58; Amos 6:8 (of Jehovah); Hab. 2:10.

In a few passages it stands for the self as the whole complex of opportunities and possibilities that belong to a man while he lives (Prov. 6:32; 8:36; 15:32; cf. 15:32; 22:25).

d) Occasionally (in Lev., Num., and Hag., only) it is used of a person once living, but now dead.

Num. 5:2: וְכֹל טָמֵא לְנֶפֶשׁ:

Whosoever is unclean by the dead.

So also in Lev. 19:28; 21:1, 11; 22:4; Num. 6:6, 11; 9:6, 7, 10; 19:11, 13a; Hag. 2:13.

The occurrence of this usage compared with the use of נֶפֶשׁ חַיָּה to denote a living creature suggests the possibility that נֶפֶשׁ alone properly means a creature (it could hardly be person) whether alive or dead. But the whole body of facts (note, e.g., the rarity of its use of the dead, and the limited number of instances of נֶפֶשׁ חַיָּה compared with the large number of cases in which נֶפֶשׁ alone expresses the idea of life) seems best accounted for by the supposition that נֶפֶשׁ חַיָּה when it occurs is pleonastic and that the use of נֶפֶשׁ in reference to a dead body is an offshoot from its use to signify person [IV, 2, a)]. Cf. the use of the English word "person" (the Latin *persona* originally meaning a mask covering the body) to denote the body as in the phrase "exposure of the person"; or the use of the word "soul" to mean a person, as in the expression "a thousand souls perished."

III. בָּשָׂר

Whatever the primitive Semitic sense of this term (see Gesenius-Buhl, which on the basis of the Arabic regards "skin" as the original meaning and assigns this to Ps. 102:6), the meaning which, with the possible exception of Ps. 102:6, is basal to all others in the Old Testament is clearly "flesh." Usage is as follows:

I. *Flesh*, the soft, muscular portions of a body living or once living; used both of man and beast.—

Job 2:5: אֵלֶם שְׁלַח־נָא יָדְךָ וְגַע אֶל־עַצְמוֹ וְאֶל־בָּשָׂרוֹ אִם־לֹא אֶל־פָּנֶיךָ יִבְרַכְךָ

But put forth thine hand now, and touch his bone and his flesh, and he will renounce thee to thy face.

Isa. 22:13: הֲרֹג בָּקָר וְשֹׁחֵט צֹאן אֲכַל בָּשָׂר וְשָׁתוּת יַיִן

Slaying oxen and killing sheep, eating flesh and drinking wine.

See other examples in Gen. 2:21, 23a, b (?); 9:4; 17:11, 13, 14, 23, 24, 25; 40:19; 41:2, 3, 4, 18, 19 (of animals); Exod. 4:7;

12:8, 46; 16:3, 8, 12; 21:28; 22:30, 31 (?); 28:42; 29:14, 31, 32, 34; Lev. 4:11; 6:20 (27); 7:15, 17, 18, 19 *bis*, 20, 21; 8:17, 31, 32; 9:11; 11:8, 11; 12:3; 13:10, 14, 15*a*, *b*, 16; 15:2, 3*a*, *b*, 7, 19; 16:27; 18:18; 26:29*a*, *b*; Num. 11:4, 13, 18*a*, *b*, 21, 33; 12:12; 19:5; Deut. 12:15, 20*a*, *b*, *c*, 23, 27*a*, *b*; 14:8; 16:4; 28:53, 55; 32:42; Judg. 6:19, 20, 21*a*, *b*; 8:7; I Sam. 2:13, 15*a*, *b*; 17:44; I Kings 17:6*a*, *b*; 19:21; II Kings 5:10, 14*a*, *b*; 9:36; Job 2:5; 6:12; 10:11; 13:14 (?); 14:22; 19:20, 26; 31:31; 33:21, 25; 41:15 (23); Ps. 27:2; 38:4, 8; 50:13; 79:2; 102:6; 109:24; Prov. 5:11(?); 23:20; Eccles. 4:5; Isa. 44:16, 19; 49:26; 65:4; 66:17; Jer. 7:21; 11:15; 19:9*a*, *b*, *c*; Lam. 3:4; Ezek. 4:14; 11:3, 7, 11, 19; 16:26(?); 23:20*a*, *b*; 24:10; 32:5; 36:26*b*; 37:6, 8; 39:17, 18; 40:43; 44:7, 9; Dan. 1:15; 10:3; Hos. 8:13; Mic. 3:3; Hag. 2:12; Zech. 11:9, 16; 14:12.

In Gen. 17:11 ff. it is used (in its proper sense) in the expression בֶּשֶׂר עֵרְלָה, "flesh of the foreskin" (cf. also Exod. 28:42). According to Gesenius-Buhl and BDB in Lev. 15:2, 3, 7, the term itself denotes the male organ, and in Lev. 15:19, the female organ; but it is not clear that there is here any strict metonymy, but rather perhaps only the use of a general term when a specific might have been used. In Ezek. 16:26; 23:20; 44:7, 9, it is even less certain that the term is specific.

II. By synecdoche for the *body*.—

I Kings 21:27: וַיִּהְיֶה כְּשִׁלְעֵ אַחָאב אֶחָד־הַבָּרִים הָאֵלֶּה וַיִּקְרַע בְּגָדָיו וַיִּשְׁמֵשֶׁק עַל־בְּשָׁרוֹ וַיֵּצֹא

And it came to pass, when Ahab heard those words, that he rent his clothes, and put sackcloth upon his flesh, and fasted.

Prov. 14:30: חַיִּי בְּשָׂרִים לֵב מִרְפָּא וּרְקֹב עֲצָמוֹת קִנְאָה:

A sound heart is the life of the flesh, but envy is the rottenness of the bones.

See other examples in Exod. 30:32; Lev. 6:3 (10); 13:2, 3*a*, *b*, 4, 11, 13, 18, 24, 38, 39, 43; 14:9; 15:13, 16; 16:4, 24, 26, 28; 17:16; 19:28; 21:5; 22:6; Num. 8:7; 19:7, 8; II Kings 4:34; 6:30; Neh. 5:5*a*, *b*; Job. 4:15; 7:5; 21:6(?); Ps. 16:9; 119:120; Prov. 4:22; Eccles. 2:3; 5:5; 11:10; 12:12; Isa. 17:4; Ezek. 10:12; 11:19*a*; 36:26*a*.

In poetic passages בָּשָׂר is coupled with נֶפֶשׁ or לֵב or both to denote the whole person even when the things affirmed are strictly true only of the inner man (Ps. 63:2 (1); 84:3).

Somewhat similarly the expression מִנֶּפֶשׁ וְיָד בָּשָׂר is used to denote the totality of a thing which strictly speaking has neither flesh nor soul (Isa. 10:18).

III. By metonymy for one's *kindred*, the basis of this usage being doubtless in the fact that it is the body which is primarily thought of as produced and producing by natural generation; most commonly coupled with עֵצָם, bone.—

Gen. 29:14: וַיֹּאמֶר לוֹ לָבָן אֵן עֲצָמִי וּבָשָׂרִי אִתָּהּ

And Laban said to him, Surely thou art my bone and my flesh.

See also Gen. 37:27; Lev. 18:6; 25:49; Judg. 9:2; II Sam. 5:1; 19:13, 14; I Chron. 11:1; Isa. 9:19; 58:7.

IV. By further synecdoche, בָּשָׂר denotes a *corporeal living creature*; sometimes with reference to men only, sometimes of men and beasts.—

1. Of men and beasts in common.

Gen. 7:21: וַיָּמָוֶת כָּל-בָּשָׂר הָרֹמֵשׁ עַל-הָאָרֶץ בְּעוֹן וּבְבִרְיָהּ: וְכָל הָאָדָם וּבְחַיָּה

And all flesh died that moved upon the earth, both fowl and cattle and beast and every man.

See other examples in Gen. 6:17, 19; 7:16, 21; 8:17; 9:11, 15a, b, 16, 17; Lev. 17:11, 14a, b, c; Num. 18:15; Job 34:15; Ps. 136:25; Jer. 32:27.

2. Of men only.

Isa. 40:5: וְנִגְלָה כְּבוֹד יְהוָה וְרָאוּ כָל-בָּשָׂר יַחְדָּו

And the glory of the Lord shall be revealed, and all flesh shall see it together.

Joel 3:1 (2:28): אֲשַׁפּוּן אֶת-רוּחִי עַל-כָּל-בָּשָׂר וְנִבְאוּ בְנֵיכֶם וּבָנוֹתֵיכֶם

And I will pour out my spirit upon all flesh, and your sons and your daughters shall prophesy.

Other examples are found in Gen. 2:24; 6:12, 13; Num. 16:22; 27:16; Deut. 5:26; Job 12:10; 19:22; Isa. 40:6; 49:26b; 66:16;

Jer. 12:12; 25:31; 45:5; Ezek. 21:4 (20:48); 21:9 (4), 10 (5); Zech. 2:17 (13).

3. Sometimes, especially in predicate, with emphasis on the frailty which is characteristic of the corporeal being in contrast with spirit or God as powerful.

Ps. 78:39: וַיִּזְכֹּר כִּי-בָשָׂר הָיְתָה רוּחָהּ הוֹפֵחַ וְלֹא יָשׁוּב׃

And he remembered that they were but flesh, a wind that passeth away and cometh not again.

See also Gen. 6:3; II Chron. 32:8; Job 10:4; Ps. 56:5; Isa. 31:3; Jer. 17:5.

IV. SUMMARY AND COMPARISON

Respecting the three terms in the Old Testament, it is to be noted that רוּחַ, beginning undoubtedly as a term of physical or dynamic meaning, denoting wind, was already early in the literary period a religious term in the sense that it was used in connection with the idea of God to denote the invisible power by which he operated in the world, or for God himself as operative, but not for a hypostasis distinct from God. Relatively late it became a religious term in the sense also that it signified the power of God working to produce ethical and religious effects in men. As applied to men, probably under the influence of the thought that it was the spirit of the god that produced extraordinary effects in men, such as strength, courage, anger, ecstatic frenzy, etc., it denoted the seat of all such emotions and experiences, and then advanced to denote the seat of the ethical and religious in general. Its use with reference to the breath is probably relatively late and subsequent in general to the previously named uses.

נֶפֶשׁ, on the other hand, was from the earliest period of the literature preserved in the Old Testament a psychological and vital term, denoting the soul, or life, as that in a living, corporeal being which constitutes him living as distinguished from the inanimate, and then the being himself as living. Its use with reference to God is very rare and probably a conscious anthropomorphism.

As used to denote a corporeal living being, the נֶפֶשׁ is, of course, hypostatized; and this is also the case in respect to some of the instances in which it denotes the soul, since this is supposed to

depart from the body and exist apart from it. The latter usage may also be very early and certainly persists very late. But in the majority of cases, the נֶפֶשׁ (meaning life or soul) is not a hypostasis, but a quality or characteristic of a living being. As the seat of appetite, emotion, mentality, and moral and religious experience, the usage of נֶפֶשׁ is closely parallel to that of רִיחַ. But while נֶפֶשׁ is often used for life, רִיחַ is only rarely so used and then chiefly with reference to God as the source of life.

בָּשָׂר is fundamentally and prevailingly a physical term. Its only departure from this physical sense is in its employment by metonymy for kindred and for a corporeal living being. At the latter point, it becomes a synonym of נֶפֶשׁ, the one extending its psychical sense to include the physical and the other its physical to include the psychical. It never acquires a mental, moral, or religious sense. Its nearest approach to such meaning—and this still very remote—is its use with the suggestion of weakness and frailty.

Broadly speaking, therefore, רִיחַ is physical-religious-psychical; נֶפֶשׁ is psychical-vital; בָּשָׂר is physical.

But an instructive parallel may also be drawn between the usage of each of the three Hebrew terms and the corresponding Greek words, viz., between רִיחַ and πνεῦμα; between נֶפֶשׁ and ψυχή; between בָּשָׂר and σὰρξ.

The fundamental meaning of רִיחַ and πνεῦμα is the same, viz., wind. The first extant instances of this meaning of πνεῦμα date from the fifth century B.C. רִיחַ appears in this sense in the oldest Old Testament literature, and is therefore at least as old as the eighth century B.C. But in the same period also we find רִיחַ meaning spirit, and used of the spirit of God. The application to the demonic spirit may perhaps be the earliest, but the application to the spirit of God seems to arise out of its use meaning wind, rather than from the idea of the demon, and the use to denote the spirit of man is apparently later than with reference to the spirit of God. Both these latter ideas retain a quantitative feeling, even after the terms have come to be used personally and individually. The meaning "breath" is apparently the latest of all to appear.

The development of the usage of *πνεῦμα* is somewhat different. From the primitive meaning "wind" arises the meaning "breath," and from this in a purely physical sense come the meanings "breath of life," "life." On this basis apparently is developed the conception of a soul-stuff, out of which individual souls come and to which they return. At the close of the classical period there is the suggestion of an extension of this idea by which *πνεῦμα* becomes the basis of all existence. In the post-classical period we shall see this developing into the conception of divine spirit, *πνεῦμα θεῶν*, at first at least quantitatively thought of. But of the deification of the *πνεῦμα* there are no discoverable traces in the classical period.

Alike, therefore, in the starting-point and in the general range of usage there is a large measure of parallelism between the Hebrew and Greek terms, רִיחַ and *πνεῦμα*. But the order in which meanings are developed is not the same, and the Hebrews were far in advance of the Greeks in developing the idea of the divine spirit.

נֶפֶשׁ apparently begins with the notion of a living being resident in a living animal or man—the ghost, so to speak, within an embodied living being. The earliest extant usage of *ψυχή* is to denote the shade of a once-living being, the ghost that escapes from the body when it dies. From these kindred starting-points both the Hebrew and the Greek terms develop with no marked difference in order, the meanings "life," that quality or element of a living being which constitutes it living, and "soul" as the seat of various emotions, capacities, etc. The Hebrew writers ascribe a נֶפֶשׁ only to man and the lower animals (except as it is by anthropomorphism used of God), and this is also the use of *ψυχή* in most of the Greek writers, but Plato believes in a *ψυχή* of the universe, and Aristotle ascribes *ψυχή* (in a limited sense of the term) to plants. As to the capacity of the soul for existence apart from the body and after death, both Hebrew and Greek writers differ among themselves. Some of the Psalms affirm it, some seem to deny, Ecclesiastes is skeptical. So Homer and the tragic poets presuppose a shadowy existence after death; Socrates is agnostic about the future of the soul; Xenophon is hopeful; Plato affirms; and Aristotle denies.

Both בָּשָׂר and *σὰρξ* are primarily physical terms, both pass from the meaning "flesh" in the strict sense to the more general meaning

"body." The Hebrew term is used by metonymy to denote one's kindred, and as a general term for man and animals, or for humanity as such. Neither term has any ethical significance. Plato regards the body as a drag upon the soul, conceiving that the latter can achieve its full freedom and highest development only when freed from the former, but he apparently never uses *σῶμα* in this connection, and does not ascribe to the *σῶμα* a distinctly ethical significance. Of any corrupting power of either body or flesh to drag down the soul there is no trace in the Old Testament. The *בָּשָׂר* is sometimes spoken of as weak, but never as a power for evil.

THE IDEA OF PRE-EXISTENCE IN THE FOURTH GOSPEL

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There are various utterances that are put in the mouth of Jesus in the Fourth Gospel, that convey the idea of pre-existence as an integral part of his self-consciousness. These may be thus classified: (1) the various passages where he speaks of himself as "coming down from heaven" (3:13; 3:31; 6:33; 6:38); (2) "Before Abraham was, I am" (8:58); (3) "And now, O Father, glorify thou me with the glory which I had with thee, before the world was" (17:4, 5); (4) "Thou lovedst me before the foundation of the world" (17:24).

1. Are we to regard these utterances as the creation of the thought of the evangelist? Or are they to be regarded, if not necessarily verbally accurate, yet as expressing a real aspect of the consciousness of Jesus?¹ On the former hypothesis, they are to be connected with the thought of the Prologue, and in them the evangelist applies to the person of Jesus the dogmatic conception of his person with which, it is supposed, he starts out to write his Gospel. Jesus is represented as speaking in the person of the *Logos* incarnate. Before his incarnate existence, he lived in glory with the Father, and brings with him into the world the memory of that pre-temporal existence. If that interpretation holds, we have no other alternative than to regard the consciousness of Jesus in this respect of pre-existence, in the Fourth Gospel, as entirely the creation of the evangelist under the influence of the *Logos* theology. It may, however, seriously be questioned, whether, supposing that these utterances are thus regarded as springing from the thought of the Prologue, such an expression of the consciousness

¹ It may be noted that the conception of Jesus as chosen by a pre-temporal act of God for his mission on earth is not peculiarly Johannine, e.g., Matt. 3:17; 12:18, where the tenses of ἡρέτισα, and εὐδόκησα are adapted, in order to emphasize pre-temporal existence.

of pre-existence does not go considerably beyond the conception of the Prologue itself. The Prologue certainly identifies Jesus with the pre-existing Logos. But the Logos, at least in vss. 1-13 of the Prologue, is not personified in the sense that it is regarded as having a separate existence in relation to God. The word was *πρὸς τὸν θεόν*, but it is immediately added that the Logos was *θεός*. Here there appears that tendency that is apparent in the Hebrew thought regarding both the Word and Wisdom, to give what amounts to no more than a poetical quasi-personification to them. The tendency sprang from a certain unwillingness to bring the Holy God into immediate contact with the world and with men. This tendency existed side by side with another form of thought that represents God as directly fashioning and forming the world and men. The two tendencies are represented in the two accounts of creation in Genesis. In chap. 1, God's Spirit broods on the face of the deep. He speaks, and creation comes into being. In chap. 2, on the other hand, we have a much more anthropomorphic conception of God. "Instead of lifting God far above man and nature, this writer revels "in the most exquisite anthropomorphisms; he does not shrink from speaking of God as walking in the garden in the cool of the day, or making experiments for the welfare of his first creature (2:18 ff.), or arriving at a knowledge of man's sin by a searching examination" (Skinner, *Genesis*, p. 51). The reaction from this anthropomorphic point of view is responsible for the idea that God in his work of creation must employ an intermediary, and in this case the intermediary is the Word of God. However far this reaction proceeded in the direction of really personifying the agencies employed, in subsequent thought, e.g., in the post-canonical books, and in the Targums, there can be little doubt that in the canonical Scripture itself we have no more than quasi-personification. And it seems to me that the fourth evangelist in his statement in 1:1, that the "*Logos* was God," is really only saving himself from a denial of monotheism.¹ The Prologue certainly identifies Jesus with the Logos, but the identification sounds much more like an attempt to state semi-philosophically, with Greek readers and popular Greek thought in view, a conclu-

¹ Cf. Abelson, *The Immanence of God in Rabbinical Literature*, p. 161.

sion to which the evangelist had come through reflection on the life and consciousness of Jesus, rather than like an attempt to give a dogmatic interpretation to his person, which will also exercise a molding influence upon his version of Jesus' life and words. I believe that the only way to understand the Fourth Gospel is to regard the Prologue as a preface, written after the rest of the Gospel was written, and intended to commend it to the Greek world.

On the other hand, if the conception of pre-existence in the Gospel itself goes in definiteness beyond the thought of the Prologue, it certainly lags behind it in scope. In the Prologue, the Logos is the agency through which the world was created. It is clear that the Prologue is written with Gen., chap. 1, in view. It describes the New Creation, the coming into existence of the *κόσμος*. And it is not the conception of the creative activity of the Logos that determines the evangelist's conception of the person of Jesus, but vice versa. He reflects upon the miracles and the words and the life, and in the product of his reflection he sees an identification of the "Word" of Jewish religious thought, corresponding to the Logos of current Greek philosophy, with the life of which he speaks. It is impossible to assert that this creative activity of the Logos dominates the presentation of such a miracle as the Cana miracle, or the feeding of the five thousand, or the walking on the water, or the raising of Lazarus. Rather these suggested, and were not suggested by, the universal creative activity. So far as the idea of pre-existence is concerned, the pre-existence that is asserted of Jesus is the pre-existence of one who is more than Messiah, and yet not the pre-existence of a divine Logos, by which the worlds were made. In every case where pre-existence is asserted of Jesus, it is the pre-existence of the "Son," upon whom descended, "rested," the Spirit of Messiah in its completeness, and the "Son" is not merely the Messiah or Christ. The object of the Gospel is to prove that Jesus is the Christ. In this respect the thought of the pre-existent activity in the Gospel itself is less wide in scope than in the Prologue.

2. If, then, we are not to regard the pre-existence utterances of Jesus in the Gospel as really the product of the Logos conception in the Prologue, it is necessary to keep the other side of the question in view. In what sense is pre-existence regarded as an integral

part of the consciousness of Jesus in this Gospel? I shall proceed to examine at some length one passage that I shall treat as typical of the thought of pre-existence generally, viz., 8:58.

In order to understand this passage, it is necessary to go as far back as 5:51, in order to catch the drift of the whole. There Jesus is represented as saying, "If a man keep my word [*λόγος*], he shall not see death for ever." We note that the use of *λόγος* in the Gospel is distinct from that in the Prologue in certain important aspects. In the Gospel it seems to be used in a certain technical sense. In our Lord's use of Ps. 82, (8:35), *ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ* is the equipment necessary in order that the Rulers, of whom the psalm speaks, may worthily perform their office. They are those "to whom the word of the Lord came." Yet they did not keep that word, because they judged unrighteously. In consequence, "they shall die like men, and fall like one of the demons" (5:7). In the Gospel, the *λόγος* is the intimate relationship between Jesus and the Father, which he not only had conferred upon him, but realized perfectly in his words and works. He is therefore able to mediate it perfectly to men. He gives this relationship to men, and if they keep it, they also shall live forever: "Because I live, ye shall live also" (14:19).² In answer to this claim to mediate eternal life, the Jews assert that this must be presumption on his part or madness. If Jesus possesses this Logos himself, he must necessarily possess that which it confers, viz., life forever, and must have lived forever. He must also be greater than Abraham or the prophets. Jesus, in reply, accepts the inference, and says that this glory is not presumptuously claimed by him, but has been given him by the Father. This assurance is brought to him by his own knowledge of God, i.e., his own self-consciousness, that perfect correspondence with God, which is the realization of the Logos of God which he has kept (vs. 55). Then he goes on to claim that he is greater than Abraham, who "exulted," *ἵνα ἴδῃ τὴν ἡμέραν τὴν ἐμὴν, καὶ εἶδεν καὶ ἐχάρη* (vs. 56). The Jews emphasize the absurdity of this statement on the part of one who is "not yet

² Reading *שְׂרִימ* instead of *שְׂרִימ*.

² The conferring of the Logos-relationship on Jesus is the ground of his *υἱότης*, but that relationship as conferred upon men is described as the state of being *τέκνα*.

fifty years old," i.e., who has not yet attained to perfect manhood. The reference is to the idea that Messiah was to appear suddenly and mysteriously as a full-grown man. The reference is not meant to bring into prominence so much the question of age, as the question of his claim to Messiahship. Evidently the reading *ἑώρακας* has been substituted for the other *ἑώρακέν σε* (Nestle, *Textual Criticism*, 289), because the emphasis was thought to lie upon the fact that Jesus was not old enough to have seen Abraham. The absurdity to the Jews consists in the notion that Abraham is said to have seen one like the speaker, who had not yet attained to that perfection of manhood, associated with the Messiah. Jesus replies to this in the enigmatic words, *πρὶν Ἀβρὰμ γένεσθαι ἐγὼ εἰμὶ*. The words imply existence before Abraham, but in what sense has yet to be determined.

Two questions emerge: (1) What is the significance of the saying that Abraham "exulted to see my day"? (2) The significance of *ἐγὼ εἰμὶ*. Is bare existence predicated? or is there an ellipsis after *εἰμὶ*? Let us take these questions in order.

(1) What is meant by "my day"? We may understand the passage as meaning that Abraham exulted to see, in spiritual prevision, the day of Jesus' appearance upon earth. It is difficult to find the source of the idea directly in the Old Testament narrative. In Gen., chap. 21, a son is promised to Abraham, and through that son a posterity in which all nations of the earth "shall bless themselves."¹ Abraham is represented as "laughing" when the birth of Isaac is promised, and the exulting of Abraham in the Johannine passage is usually applied directly to this laughter. Loisy, *Le Quatrième Évangile*, p. 581, regards the event referred to in 8:56 as a prophetic vision connected with the birth of Isaac, "soit prise en elle-même, soit complétée en quelque façon, comme figure, par la scène du sacrifice" (Gen. 22:1-18). Apart from the difficulty that nothing is said of a vision to Abraham at this stage, except in so far as the promise and its acceptance is such, another objection to this view is that the "laughter" in Genesis is ambiguously² regarded. Sarah is represented as laughing out of incredulity in 18:12 ff., and out of

¹ I.e., invoke for themselves a blessing similar to that of the Hebrew people.

² This is due of course to the presence of different sources.

joy in 21:6; while Abraham is represented as laughing also in 17:17, but only incredulously, as vs. 18 shows. He is not represented at all as laughing joyously unless such laughter is implied in 21:6, where Sarah says, "Everyone will laugh with me." Even here a probable alternative translation is proposed. Instead of "with me" it is proposed to translate "at me." It is therefore difficult to suppose that ἡγαλλιάσατο refers to the meaning of the name Isaac. In addition, it may be suggested that the mood described in "exulted" denotes a somewhat stronger emotion than merely joyful laughter. Also the laughter spoken of in Gen. 21:6 is not in the text connected with any messianic expectation, but is simply the joy of the barren woman who is promised a child, granting that her laughter is interpreted as joyous.

At this point we meet with a phenomenon which, as will be seen, is elsewhere characteristic of the Fourth Gospel, viz., that its thought more than once seems to imply a subsequent tradition imposed upon the thought of the Old Testament canonical books. Here, evidently some form of the Genesis tradition is before the evangelist, in which Abraham's laughter is interpreted as ἀγαλλίασις, in view of the coming of Messiah. Philo (*De mutatione nominum*, 29 f.) compares the "laughing" of Abraham to the "laughing" of the day in anticipation of the early dawn: and playing on the meaning of the name of Isaac, who was not yet born, he declares that Abraham "so to speak, laughed before laughter existed, as the soul, through hope, rejoices before joy, and delights before delight." He interprets Abraham's falling on his face (Gen. 17:17) as "an act of adoration and an excess of divine ecstasy."¹

In the Book of Jubilees (135-105 B.C. [Charles]), frequent mention is made of Abraham's "rejoicing" or "being glad," in connection with the revelations made to him. This book consists largely of a revision and retelling of Genesis, and in it everything is removed that could shock the feelings of the Pharisees. We may here give some quotations from the book. "We [the angels] went our way and announced to Sara what we had said to him [Abraham], and they both had very great joy. And he built here an altar to God, who had delivered him, and who had made him to rejoice in the

¹ Cf. Abbott, *Johannine Grammar*, 2097, 2688-89.

land where he had been a stranger" (16:19, 20). The book represents Abraham as instituting the Feast of Tabernacles at this time. "He offered praise, and rejoiced, and named the name of this Feast a Feast of God, the Joy of the Good pleasure of the most High God." Again, on his deathbed, Isaac is represented as sending to him by the hand of Jacob a thank-offering, and after he has partaken of it Abraham offers prayer. "I thank thee humbly, My God, that thou hast allowed me to see this day . . . My God, may thy goodness and thy peace be upon thy servant, and upon the seed of his sons that he may be to thee a chosen people, and an heritage out of all the peoples of the earth from now on, and unto all the days of the races of the earth to all eternity" (22:7-9).

It is clear that we have here traces of a later tradition in which Abraham's laughter is represented without offense as implying joy in believing, and not incredulity. The thought in 8:56 is evidently based on some such tradition. The idea is that Abraham exults in the days of his flesh, with the result that he sees the day of the Messiah.

We have still further to explain τὴν ἡμέραν τὴν ἐμήν. A Valentinian quotation of 8:56 from Clement of Alexandria (973) is given by Abbott (*Johannine Grammar*, 2689, o), which stops at τ. ἡμέρ. τ. ἐμήν, and continues, τὴν ἐν σαρκὶ παρουσίαν. ὅθεν ἀναστὰς ὁ κύριος εἰηγγέλισατο τοὺς δικαίους τοὺς ἐν τῇ ἀναπαύσει καὶ μετέστησεν αὐτοῖς. . . . The reference is apparently to Abraham in Hades waiting to be liberated by the Savior. Also in an eschatological passage in Jub. 23:30-31, it is said: "Then will God save his servants, and they will be exalted, and shall behold deep peace, and will drive away their enemies, and the righteous will behold and give thanks, and rejoice to all eternity in joy. . . . And their bones will rest in the earth, and their spirit will have much joy, and they will know that it is God who holds judgment, and exercises grace upon hundreds and thousands, and upon all who love him."

We may therefore regard the vision of "my day" as also a vision given to Abraham in his after-existence. This is the reference in εἶδεν. A great probability that this thought underlies the passage consists in the fact that the continued existence of Abraham, not

in Sheol, but in Paradise, is a part of the argument all through the passage. In John 8:53, the Jews speak of Abraham as one who is "dead." It is also to be borne in mind that the argument begins with the statement *θάνατον οὐ μὴ θεωρήσῃ εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα* (vs. 51); and that it is necessary for Jesus to uphold this assertion all through the encounter. Jesus does not let fall entirely the idea of the continued existence of Abraham elsewhere than in Sheol, which is the same thing as death. It is a step that leads up to the assertion of his own pre-existence. Abraham is in his place in Paradise, because he has seen this day, which even in the days of his flesh he saw in spiritual pre-vision ("rejoiced to see": *ἵνα* must have a future significance).

We have at least two passages from the Testaments of the XII Patriarchs, which, if they do not directly suggest the conception in 8:56, at least betray the existence of a similar class of ideas in the apocalyptic literature. In Test. Benj. 10:5, it is said that Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob left as an inheritance to their descendants that they should keep the commandments of God, until the *ἀποκάλυψις* of the salvation of God. The passage reads in Charles's Greek version: *ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα δέδωκαν ἡμῖν εἰς κληρονομίαν εἰπόντες. φυλάξατε τὰς ἐντολάς τοῦ θεοῦ ἕως ὅτου ἀποκάλυψις κύριος τὸ σωτήριον αὐτοῦ πᾶσι τοῖς ἔθνεσιν, καὶ τοτὲ ὄψεσθε Ἐνῶχ καὶ Σήθ, καὶ Ἀβραὰμ καὶ Ἰσαὰκ καὶ Ἰακώβ ἀνασταμένους ἐν δεξιῶν αὐτοῦ ἐν ἀγαλλιάσει.* There is also a passage in Test. Lev. 18:14: *τοτὲ ἀγαλλιάσεται Ἀβρ'' καὶ Ἰσ'' καὶ Ἰακ'', κἀγὼ χαρήσομαι, καὶ πάντες οἱ ἄγιοι ἐνδύσονται εὐφροσύνην.*

These passages clearly betray the existence of a pre-Christian conception that in the day when Messiah shall appear, the patriarchs will arise from Sheol,¹ and will exult (*ἀγαλλιᾶσθαι*). The Messiah is the Priest-King, as he is conceived all through the Testaments. In view of the fact that in the sayings of Jesus, the Synoptic Gospels lay these Testaments so frequently under contribution (*vide* Charles, Test. XII Patr., Introd., pp. lxxviii ff.), and the assured position that has now been established, that the work is in the main pre-Christian, with certain Christian interpolations, it is not rash to suppose that the thought of 8:56 has a connection with

¹ Cf. Test. Jud. 25, 1: *καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἀναστήσεται Ἀ. καὶ Ἰσ. καὶ Ἰακ. εἰς ζωὴν.*

the ideas in that book. It is also very remarkable to note how many of the undoubted interpolations by a Christian hand are either from the Fourth Gospel, or bear a distinctly Johannine impress (e.g., Test. Lev. 10:2; 14:2; 17:2; 24:4; Test. Dan. 5:13; Test. Jos. 19:11; Test. Benj. 10:9). This at least indicates that the interpolators were sensitive to certain affinities already existing between the thought of the Testaments and the Fourth Gospel, in whatever form it lay before them.

The expression ἀγαλλιάομαι is used only in one other Johannine passage (vs. 35). It is a remarkable fact that, in the New Testament, the word is used with only one exception (Acts 16:34) of the emotion appropriate to the realization of the Messianic kingdom (Matt. 5:12; Luke 1:47; Acts 2:26; I Pet. 1:6, 8; 4:13; Rev. Rev. 19:7). It is used both of the exultation of Jesus after the resurrection, and of the exultation of believers in view of the Parousia. The noun ἀγαλλίασις is used in a similar connection (Luke 1:14, 44; Acts 2:46; Heb. 1:9; Jude vs. 24). This special use of the word is well exemplified in John 5:35. In this passage it is evidently implied that for a time the "Jews" were willing to regard the Baptist as Messiah. When the true Messiah comes, they do not show that exultation, although Jesus has a "witness greater than John." That witness is both the works of Jesus, and the presence of the Father in him. That presence is seen both in Jesus' words, which are the Father's voice, and in the bodily form of Jesus. "Ye have neither heard his voice at any time, nor seen his shape." Jesus they did not "receive"—a more or less technical term for the human attitude toward the kingdom,¹ here toward the Messiah himself—(vs. 43). The source of this exultation is the gift of eternal life (vs. 40). According to the Jewish tradition expressed in Test. XII Patr., the patriarchs become partakers of this life. They arise at the coming of Messiah in exultation. It is also interesting and suggestive to note that the word "glory" is connected with this experience in the context of vs. 35. δόξα is the glory conferred on Messiah by God, which is the occasion of true exultation: "Ye seek not the glory that cometh παρὰ τοῦ μόνου." The "Only One" is here not God but Jesus, the only

¹ Dalman, *Words of Jesus*, pp. 1246 f.

begotten, the only *υἱός*. He confers this glory upon those who believe in him (17:22).

In this use of *δόξα*, we may find a suggestion as to the use of *ἡμέρα*. The "day" of Jesus seems to be his appearance upon earth, regarded as a manifestation of the eternal glory, manifested in his works and words, and culminating in the final glory of the Cross, his *ὑψωσις*, when the kingdom is inaugurated. The Godward side of this manifestation is *δόξα*.

To return to the *ἀγαλλίασις* of the Patriarchs in Test. XII Patr., it is said, in another passage (Test. Lev. 18:2 ff.),¹ to take place in connection with the moment when the old priesthood has failed, and God will raise up a new Priest. The historic reference in the passage is to the rise of the Maccabean King-Priesthood. The kingdom is a messianic kingdom upon earth "for a multitude of days." The text of the passage is in many places obscure. In vs. 3, the words *ἐν ἡλίῳ ἡμέρα* are very difficult, and as Charles suggests, some form of text, yielding a translation like, "as the sun the day" is required. In any case the coming of the new Priest-King is spoken of as the shining of a light. His *ἄστρον* arises in heaven, and the conception evidently is that its light shines upon the figure of Messiah upon earth, and this light is given by him to the earth. In the words *οὗτος ἀναλάμψει*, Messiah is spoken of as himself the star. *ἡμέρα* is, however, throughout used in the plural in its natural sense.

¹ We may quote the passage in full, as it is regarded by Charles as on the whole free from Christian interpolation, and displays several remarkable affinities with the Johannine thought:

καὶ τότε ἔγερει κύριος ἱερέα καινόν,
 ᾧ πάντες οἱ λόγοι κυρίου ἀποκαλυφθήσονται,
 καὶ αὐτὸς ποιήσει κρίσιν ἀληθείας ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ἐν πληθείᾳ ἡμερῶν.
 καὶ ἀπατελεῖ ἄστρον αὐτοῦ ἐν οὐρανῷ ὡς βασιλείᾳ
 φωτίζων φῶς γνωσέως ἐν ἡλίῳ ἡμέρα,
 καὶ μεγαλυνθήσεται ἐν τῇ οἰκουμένῃ,
 οὗτος ἀναλάμψει ὡς ὁ ἥλιος ἐν τῇ γῇ,
 καὶ ἔξαρεί πᾶν σκότος ἐκ τῆς ὑπ' οὐρανὸν
 καὶ ἔσται εἰρήνη ἐν πάσῃ τῇ γῇ.
 οἱ οὐρανοὶ ἀγαλλιάσονται ἐν ταῖς ἡμέραις αὐτοῦ,
 καὶ ἡ γῆ χαρήσεται
 καὶ αἱ νεφέλαι εὐφρανθήσονται.

There must, however, be some special non-natural significance in the use of *ἡμέρα* in the singular in John 8:56. The whole expression, *τὴν ἡμέραν τὴν ἐμὴν* is very remarkable. It must mean more than merely the duration of the earthly life of Jesus. The emphasis seems to be not on duration, but on the idea of "light." Num. 24:17 identifies the "star" with Messiah himself, and the name of the false Messiah, Bar Cochba, is "Son of the star." In Rev. 2:28; 22:16, Christ is called "the Morning Star," and Light is of course a favorite conception, not only in Jewish messianic literature, but especially in the Fourth Gospel itself, to denote the spiritual illumination accompanying the revelation of Messiah.¹

The question then arises whether *ἡμέρα* is not equivalent to the shining of the light and the star, which are spoken of as connected with the Messianic age and sometimes identified with Messiah himself. There is also, of course, bound up with the word in this connection, a certain idea of a preordained moment, such as "hour" has in the Fourth Gospel. We are also reminded of the words, "The day of the Lord is darkness and not light" (Amos vs. 18). Jesus also speaks of "that day" in 14:20; 16:23,26, the day when Christ shall be more fully revealed to his disciples. In this latter expression the "last day" is evidently not meant, and the reference can only be to the day of exaltation, the inauguration of the kingdom in power, in the Cross and Resurrection and Ascension, and the Coming of the Spirit, moments which are always viewed by the evangelist as one great moment. The implication is that the "day" spoken of in the foregoing passages fully dawned when Jesus was crucified. It may therefore be said that "my day" is more than merely the period of earthly life granted to Jesus, but the day that proceeds from him even now, as destined to be the Exalted King upon the cross. It is the light that comes into the world by him and through him, and is finally realized in the gift of the Spirit. That "day" is apparent throughout the earthly life, as

¹ Cf. John 1:9 with Test. Lev. 14:4, where, however, the resemblance is one chiefly of language, and there is no messianic reference in the latter passage. II Pet. 1:19 may also be cited, if we take *φωσφόρος*, "daystar," as meaning Christ, and referring to the Second Advent. (See my discussion of the passage in *Expos. Gk. Test.*, V, 131 f.)

the glimpses of his glory revealed to men in his works. In that case, "my day" would practically be a synonym for "the hour," "glory," "the light," and in general, as in the Fourth Gospel, the kingdom.

It is also remarkable that in Luke 17:24 the expression occurs, "So shall also the Son of Man be in his day."¹ The day that is denoted here is evidently the day of final judgment. Yet in a previous verse (22) we read, "The days will come when ye shall desire to see one of the days of the Son of Man, and ye shall not see it." With great probability, it is suggested (by Hahn) that *μὴν τῶν ἡμερῶν* in this verse ought really to be rendered "the first of the days of the Son of Man," on the analogy of Matt. 28:1 and Mark 16:2. The days of tribulation before the Second Advent are evidently meant by the evangelist. It may also be pointed out that the alternation of singular and plural in the expression, "days" and "day" of the Son of Man, and especially the utterance in vs. 22, which has been translated above as "the first of the days of the Son of Man," seems to point to the idea of a lengthened period after the Advent, when the Son of Man shall exercise his power on earth. It is also remarkable that the coming of the kingdom and the "day" or "days" of the Son of Man are distinguished. The kingdom is here already, but the Second Advent is still future and an object of desire. This is a consideration that will be found extremely suggestive in the consideration of the idea of the kingdom in the Fourth Gospel.

The Fourth Evangelist has a habit of applying to the whole moment of the Cross and Resurrection and Ascension of Jesus language that the synoptists apply to the Second Advent. Is this expression, "my day," in 8:56, an instance of this? And may it not be taken ultimately to refer to the sacrifice of Jesus, which was also his exaltation or *ὑψωσις*? Origen connects a rejoicing of Abraham with the moment of offering up his son (Lomm. 6:279). At the same time he says that Abraham was not one of those "who desired to see in vain" the day of the Lord. Evidently the conception is that the object of the exultation was not fully before the mind of Abraham, but that the exultation was given him in order that, in

¹ Omitted by Westcott-Hort.

accordance with the divine decree, he might receive as a reward the vision of the Lord. I have adopted the interpretation given by Abbott (*Johannine Grammar*, 2689) to the thought of Origen. It seems to me to interpret well the sense of 8:56. The day of Jesus dawns on the world at the very beginning of the ministry. The shadow of the cross is apparent at Cana. Also, the day would really be the day of the crucifixion, corresponding to the idea that Abraham exulted at the sacrifice of his son, a type of the death of Jesus. Further, in accordance with Johannine thought, the "day," equally with the "glory" of Jesus, would be conceived as dawning even during the earthly life.

It is also noticeable that in the Old Testament ἀγαλλιάσθαι is the word specially employed to denote the experience of deliverance from death or Sheol. The Psalmist in Ps. 16:9 ff. speaks of the confident hope that he will not be condemned to the shadowy and ghostly and featureless existence of Sheol, while all the time his body is corrupting. The personality is conceived as disappearing with the body, and from this he is delivered, for even his "flesh shall rest in hope." His tongue "exults" (LXX) within the present life, and he also projects the experience forward in the after-life, as though exultation and hope were possible to those in Sheol. Abraham is not dead, and never was dead in the sense that he shared the gloomy joyless existence of Sheol. God delivered him from it. "God is not a God of the dead, but of the living" (Luke 20:38).

In this way, there is intertwined with the whole argument of the passage the question of the possibility of life after death; or rather of a conscious life for such as Abraham. The reply of Jesus is an extension of the words in 11:25, 26. Abraham's risen life is dependent upon his hope in the Messiah. There is no denial of this truth on the part of the opponents. What they deny is that the seeing by Abraham of such as Jesus, "not yet fifty years old," and therefore lacking one of the essential qualities of Messiah, that he should be a fully developed man when he appears, is possible. "Hath Abraham seen thee?" In other words, Abraham has not had the fulfilment of his hope, was not alive, and Jesus cannot be Messiah. Jesus replies to the notion of his own inferiority to Abraham by

asserting his existence before Abraham: "Before Abraham was, I am."

(2) As regards this assertion of pre-existence, there is undoubtedly, on the analogy of 4:26, an ellipsis after *ἐγὼ εἰμι*. The metaphysical notion of timeless, absolute existence is quite out of place here. There is no application of the thought of the Prologue. We may compare 1:30, where the Baptist speaks of one who "was before me." The real translation seems to be, "After me cometh a man, which is become [*γέγονεν*] before me; for he was before me" (Abbott, *Johannine Grammar*, 1896ff.). To show how the thought of the Prologue is not the basis of the thought in the Gospel, we may compare the substitution of *ἄνθρωπος* for *ἄνθρω* in 1:15, a word unsuitable to the semi-philosophical nature of the Prologue. There the evangelist is appealing to his Greek readers by identifying Jesus with the Logos.

In order to investigate the question as to the nature of the pre-existence attributed to Jesus here, we must go back to the chapters in the Similitudes of Enoch, which speak of the Son of Man as pre-existent. In 46:1, 2, the Son of Man is seen as one who is "with God," hidden and kept by him in his presence. "The angel showed me all the hidden things, concerning that Son of Man, who he was, and whence he was, and why he went with the Head of Days." He is hidden before his manifestation on earth. In 61:7, it is said, "The Son of Man was hidden before him, and the Most High preserved him in the presence of his might, and revealed him to the elect." In 48:3 it is said that "Before the sun and the signs were created, before the stars of the heaven were made, his name was named before the Lord of Spirits." Does this mean only an ideal pre-existence? Dalman (*Words of Jesus*, p. 131) admits that in En. 46:62 a personal existence of the Messiah, celestial but not premundane, is taught. He also finds the same doctrine in 39:6 f. Charles, however, holds that in this latter passage (vss. 4-12) we have only a vision of the future messianic kingdom, and that details are not to be pressed. "In this, as in visions frequently, there is no exact observance of the unities of time and place." He goes on to point out that the passage at one time seems to imply that the history of the world is closed, and

the final judgment already passed, because "the Messiah is surrounded by all his righteous and elect ones"; and at another time, inasmuch as the righteous angels and the holy "in their mansions" are represented as praying and interceding for the children of men (39:5), the passage seems to imply that the final judgment is not yet come. Charles is therefore inclined to doubt whether the locality indicated by the vision is in heaven at all. It may be urged, however, that to say that in the vision Messiah is regarded as "surrounded by all his righteous and elect ones" is to go beyond what is expressed. Vs. 6 reads "And in that place mine eyes saw the elect one of righteousness, and of faith, and how righteousness shall prevail in his days, and the righteous and elect shall be without number before him for ever and ever." The completed account and gathering of the righteous is to take place in the future, and, in vs. 7, Enoch sees not "all the righteous and elect before him," but "All the righteous and elect [that are at present] before him, are beautifully resplendent as lights of fire," etc. These "righteous and elect," in so far as they consist of men, may be regarded as those saints who have died, and live the heavenly life with Messiah until the day when the kingdom appears upon the earth. It was certainly an accepted belief, in New Testament times, that a state of happiness or torment was allotted to departed souls preliminary to the general resurrection at the last day (Luke 16:22 ff.). Here in En. 39:4 "mansions" are spoken of as already allotted to those righteous who had died before the days of Messiah's appearance on earth. And whether the privilege is reserved for eminent men of God only, or for all righteous, the patriarchs at least are represented as in a state of conscious existence. There, presumably, they exult at the appearance of the messianic Priest-King (Test. XXX Patr. Lev. 18:14). They live, though not yet the life of the consummated kingdom. That resurrection is reserved until Messiah's kingdom and Messiah are revealed on earth.¹ We may also compare I Ezz. 14:9, "tu enim recipieris ab hominibus et converteris residuum cum filio meo et cum similibus tuis usquequo finiantur tempora."²

¹ Test. XII Patr. Jude 25:1, where the resurrection is to a renewed life on the present earth.

² Cf. Stanton, *Jewish and Christian Messiah*, p. 173.

On this interpretation it may be urged that there is nothing inconsistent in the vision in En. 39:6, 7, and it may be regarded (against Charles and with Dalman) as a passage ranking with En., chap. 46 and 62:7 as teaching a personal existence of Messiah.

This existence, however, Dalman contends is not premundane. He regards En. 48:6 as an interpolation. "He has been chosen and hidden before him, before the creation of the world, and for evermore." Dalman further contends that the statements as to pre-existence in the Similitudes of Enoch (and also II Ezr.) do not presuppose any human birth of Messiah. He is to make his appearance on earth as a fully developed personality. And he goes on to say that Judaism "has never known anything of a pre-existence peculiar to the Messiah antecedent to his birth as a human being." Dalman also stoutly denies any idea of pre-existence in Jewish thought. He opposes the idea of Baldensperger (*Das Selbstbewusstsein Jesu*, 2d ed., p. 85) that, from the date of the appearance of the Similitudes of Enoch, the heavenly pre-existence of Messiah "came to be a dogma in apocalyptic circles."

This controversy, in which Dalman, Baldensperger, and Harnack are the protagonists, has a value for our purpose, inasmuch as the various modifications that are introduced into the views of each of these by the position of the others, will, I think, lead to a notion of pre-existence that will enable us to interpret John 8:56, and the other passages mentioned, in which pre-existence is asserted of the Messiah in the Fourth Gospel.

Harnack has drawn up a distinction (*History of Dogma*, pp. 318 ff.) between the Jewish and Hellenic conceptions of pre-existence. In this he has done a great service to the interpretation of New Testament thought on the matter. The main points in the Jewish conception, as he says, are (1) that the pre-existing thing in Jewish thought exists beforehand with God in the same way as it appears on earth, "with all the material attributes belonging to its essence"; (2) its manifestation on earth is merely a transition from concealment to publicity (*φανερόω*). There is no *assumptio naturae novae*. (3) The old Jewish theory of pre-existence is founded on the religious idea of the omniscience and omnipotence of God, "that God to whom the events of history do not come as

a surprise, but who guides their course." The primary idea is not to ennoble the creature but to exalt and bring to light the wisdom and the power of God.

In the Greek conception, on the other hand, (1) the idea is independent of the idea of God, and is based on the conception of the distinction between spirit and matter. The spirit is eternal, and the flesh is perishable; (2) if these spiritual beings are to appear in this finite world they cannot simply become visible, for they have no visible form. "They must really rather assume flesh, whether they throw it about them as a garment covering or really make it their own by a process of transformation or mixture"; (3) the material appearance is therefore regarded as something inadequate; (4) the objects in question themselves are meant to be ennobled, and not God.

As regards the Jewish conception there can be no doubt that it is essentially unphilosophical or rather unmetaphysical, inasmuch as it is the actual thing or person as manifested that pre-exists. At the same time Harnack goes on to attribute to Jewish thought a conception which, he holds, brings it into closer approximation to Hellenic, viz., the idea of the original in heaven, and the copy appearing on earth. This cannot be very sharply distinguished from the former idea of "manifestation." Harnack deduces this from the statements about the Tabernacle and its furniture, which are existent in heaven and are shown to Moses in the Mount (Exod. 25:9; 26:30; 28:8; Num. 8:4). And we also find that Harnack elevates this idea into a general philosophical conception as belonging to Jewish thought when he says that, among the ancient Jews, as among all the Semitic nations, "everything of real value that from time to time appears on earth has its existence in heaven." In other words, it exists with God, i.e., God possesses a knowledge of it; and for that reason it has a real being. As will be seen later, this must be regarded with Dalman as an un-Jewish, or at least un-Palestinian conception, and has no real place in Jewish thought. Where it occurs, it must be regarded as the result of the Hellenic spirit.

Harnack allows the influence of the Hellenic spirit on the older notion of pre-existence in the Jewish literature belonging to the

times of the Maccabees, and the following decades. The influence is seen (1) in the application for the first time of the idea of pre-existence to persons. Passages can be cited in the apocalyptic writings of this period, ascribing pre-existence to Moses, the patriarchs, etc. Passages from Enoch have already been cited as to the pre-existence of the Son of Man. The passage about Moses from Assumpt. Mos. c. 1 is, however, necessarily late, and the assertions about the pre-existence of the Temple, the Law, Jerusalem, are also found, only in later rabbinic and apocalyptic writings. Amid all these the notion of the pre-existence of a personal Messiah stands out as much the earliest form of the idea. The Greek influence is also seen (2) in the fact that the old distinction of original and copy is now interpreted as meaning that the copy is inferior and more imperfect. In the present aeon of the transient it cannot be equivalent to the original, and the time must be looked forward to when the original itself will make its appearance. This is illustrated in the New Testament by the conceptions of the earthly and heavenly Jerusalems, a heavenly and an earthly temple.

All this leads Harnack to contend that out of these general conditions of thought there sprang the earliest Jewish speculations about a personal Messiah. In the messianic ideas, however, themselves, Harnack can find no trace of Hellenic thought (*op. cit.*, p. 322). He holds that most Jews conceived Messiah as a man, and transferred to him, in obedience to prevailing conceptions, the idea of preterrestrial existence with God. This position of Harnack's requires to be traversed. The Hellenic influence cannot be denied, but in this essay the contention is that the idea of the pre-existence of Messiah is the earliest form in which the pre-existence conception appears in Jewish thought, and that out of it sprang the other applications of pre-existence to the Temple, the Law, the Holy City.

Baldensperger (*op. cit.*, p. 89, n. 1) accepts in the main Harnack's argument, but introduces into it a very important and valuable modification. He holds that the desire to glorify God is not the real motive in the idea of pre-existence. Instead of that he significantly, and with a deeper insight into Jewish thought, substitutes the

motive of "the deep necessity for assurance of salvation." The acceptance of this motive has the great advantage that it enables Baldensperger to explain the idea of the personal pre-existence of Messiah without having recourse to the influence of Hellenic thought. Baldensperger, however, has complicated the position by asserting that at the basis of the belief in a pre-existent Messiah there lies the belief in the pre-existence of individual souls, at least in the form that each individual soul is in the hand of God. He cites Ps. 139:15 in illustration. This psalm, however, only refers to prenatal existence.¹ The idea of Messiah's pre-existence is not subsequent to, but long prior to, the idea of the pre-existence of souls. The eternal pre-existence of all souls is not definitely taught until the Platonic idea of pre-existence of souls found its way into Jewish thought in Egypt. We find it in the *Secrets of Enoch* 23:5; *Wisdom of Solomon* 8:19; Philo *De Somn.* i. 22; *De Gigant.* 3 (cf. Charles, *Secrets of Enoch*, note, 23:5). All these instances are due to the influence of Platonic thought. Dalman is right in saying that "the conception of Messiah's pre-existence is quite distinct from the later Jewish doctrine of the pre-existence of the souls of all men" (*Words of Jesus*, p. 131). This conception of Messiah's pre-existence may thus be regarded as springing essentially from "the deep necessity for the assurance of personal salvation." The first clear utterance of the idea of the pre-existence of Messiah is found in Dan., chap. 7, which undoubtedly implies it. It is true that the Son of Man is there a human figure representing the chosen kingdom, the saints of the Most High, but one cannot resist the impression in this chapter that the writer is there applying to the community language that had previously been used of the real figure of the Son of Man. It will be noted that the vision is followed by an interpretation, in which the figure of the Son of Man is interpreted of the nation. It is quite possible that underlying the thought in Dan. 7:13 there is an earlier tradition about a Son of Man, "a heavenly personality parallel to the figure of Messiah, who returns with divine powers of restoring life at the end of history."² Paul's language about "the man from heaven" would

¹ Cf. Jer. 1:5; Schulz, *Old Testament Theology*, II, 251 ff.

² Moffatt, *Theology of the Gospels*, pp. 158-59; cf. Gressmann, *Ursprung der Israelitisch-jüdischen Eschatologie*, pp. 360 f.

point to some tradition of this kind. The expression in Daniel, "one like unto a Son of Man," would indicate that the writer knew that in applying the notion to the chosen nation he is taking a novel step. That same tradition would therefore appear again on the surface in the older sense in the Similitudes of Enoch. The dates now usually assigned to Daniel and to the Similitudes of Enoch would render this idea not improbable. The Similitudes may not have been written more than 50 years after Daniel. Daniel may be dated about 170 B.C., and the Similitudes in the first half of the first century B.C. It is specially noticeable, in connection with this hypothesis, that in Daniel God is the Judge, probably because it would be impossible to ascribe this function to the saints of the Most High, and that in Enoch what is probably the older form of the tradition appears, in which the Son of Man is Judge. It is also not improbable that some such form of the tradition is adumbrated in Mic. 5:2: "Out of thee shall one come forth unto me that is to be ruler in Israel; whose goings forth are from of old, from everlasting."

This conception, then, that the real motive in the idea of the pre-existence of Messiah is the necessity for the assurance of salvation, would gradually, as the times became more distressful, lead on to the idea of the pre-existence of "the throne of glory," the Law, the Temple, Repentance; but the idea of Messiah pre-existence must be regarded as arising prior to and independently of the idea as applied to these. In this connection we may revert for a moment to the use that is made by Harnack and others of the passages in Exodus which speak of the patterns shown to Moses in the Mount. It is impossible to think that an abstract conception existed early in Jewish thought, to the effect that everything of value pre-exists in heaven. The interpretation of this idea that God possesses a knowledge of the thing, and for that reason it has a real being, which is given by Harnack, must, with Dalman, be stoutly condemned as an entirely un-Jewish, or at all events un-Palestinian, conception (Dalman, *op. cit.*, p. 299). Abstract theories of this description are nowhere in Judaism productive of religious beliefs, except where they have blended with and modified, under Hellenic influence, the former concrete representations. The

notion of pre-existence in general must have a practical and not a theoretical origin, and that practical origin has been most clearly stated by Baldensperger as the necessity for the assurance of salvation. Dalman rightly explains the models of the tabernacle and its furniture, shown to Moses in the Mount, as meaning no more than "that the oral instruction given to Moses, being insufficient to guide him with precision, was supplemented by the exhibition of models" (*op. cit.*, p. 299). These passages about the models simply mean that a house of God is not to be constructed to please human fancies, but according to exact divine prescription.

This criticism of Dalman's is, however, but a stage on the way toward a complete denial of the presence of a doctrine of pre-existence in Jewish thought proper. He says that even the idea of the pre-existence of Messiah is to be interpreted as he interprets the supposed pre-existence of the model of the tabernacle in Exodus. His pre-existence is simply existence prior to a certain event, viz., his appearance on earth. The meaning is that he comes from God and not from men. He denies any such idea as the premundane existence of Messiah in pre-Christian thought. He admits a personal and real existence of Messiah, prior to his appearance on earth. It is a necessary presupposition of his miraculous super-human appearance. "For all these ideas of pre-existence, earthly and heavenly, a potent stimulus lay in the cherished hope that the redemption was imminent, or might at any rate come at any moment. In that case, of course, the Messiah was already in existence; the only question was where. The divine providence comes here into consideration because it is due to it that all things have been so well ordered that the divine scheme of the world should realize itself without impediment" (*op. cit.*, p. 302).

What then about the statements as to pre-existence of Messiah in rabbinic literature and in apocalyptic? Dalman lays emphasis on the fact that only the name of Messiah is said to be pre-existent. The Messiah had to appear as a full-grown developed man, and the opinion generally was that until his manifestation he should remain unknown upon the earth. The pre-existence of the name only of Messiah he interprets as meaning ideal pre-existence. Dalman ought to apply the same criticism to his own conception as he

applies to Baldensperger and Harnack's conception of the existence of original and copy. Both are really un-Jewish. This is also to misinterpret the significance of "the name" in Jewish thought. For all practical purposes the name is identical with the thing or person. Moreover, in the post-Christian rabbinic literature, alongside the conception of the pre-existence of the name of Messiah, there actually exists a belief in his real pre-existence in a premundane form. Edersheim (*Life and Times of Jesus Christ*, I, 175) quotes from the Talmud the sentence which declares that from the time of Judah's marriage, "God busied himself with creating the light of the Messiah," and points out that it is significantly added, "Before the first oppressor [Pharaoh] was born, the final Deliverer [Messiah, the Son of David] was already born." Edersheim also refers to the well-known comment of Yalkut on Isa., chap. 60, which states that the light of Messiah was hidden beneath the throne of his glory for the Messiah and his age. That this form of existence is not ideal is shown by the other story in the Talmud, that Messiah had actually been born in the royal palace at Bethlehem, bore the name Menahem ("Comforter"), was discovered by one R. Judan, but had been carried away by a storm.

Now, even although these doctrines are late and post-Christian, it is impossible to believe that they were influenced by Christian thought. So far as can be seen, the influence of Christian thought upon Jewish messianic beliefs acted in the opposite direction, and led to strong emphasis on the human side.¹

The matter, however, of a premundane existence for Messiah in pre-Christian thought is really settled by the assigning of a pre-Christian date to the Similitudes of Enoch. The passage, En. 48:2, 3, 6, 7a, says that not only the name of Messiah was named "before the sun and the signs were created, before the stars of the heaven were made." It also asserts that "He has been chosen and hidden before the (Lord of Spirits) before the creation of the world and for evermore." There are passages in 4 Ezr. 12:32 and 13:26

¹ Cf. Schürer, *The Jewish People in the Time of Jesus Christ*, II, ii, 162. He quotes the famous saying in Justin, *Trypho* c. 49, We all expect that the Christ will be born as a man from among men. Also a Talmudic passage, Jer. Taanith 2:1: "Rabbi Abbahu saith: If a man says to thee—I am God, he lies; I am the Son of Man, he will at last repent it; I ascend to heaven, if he said it he will not prove it."

which speak of Messiah as kept. "He whom the Most High hath kept a great season" (13:26), "whom the Most High hath kept unto the end of days" (12:32). The Enoch passages show that the idea of a real pre-existence of Messiah, in the sense of a pre-mundane existence, had a place in apocalyptic thought. It has, of course, to be remembered that the whole conception of the Son of Man in Enoch is unique in Jewish literature, but against this has to be set the fact that there exist so many similarities of thought and expression in the books of the New Testament (see Charles ed., p. 43). These, widespread as they are amongst the various New Testament writings, would seem to point not only to literary dependence, but also to the existence of a milieu of apocalyptic thought in New Testament times, which itself comes to expression in Enoch. Out of nearly 100 parallels adduced by Charles from the book with the thought of the New Testament, more than half of these are taken from the Similitudes. Moreover, the titles, "Christ," or "the Anointed One"; "the Righteous One"; "the Elect One"; appear in Enoch for the first time in apocalyptic literature as applied to the expected Messiah, as against their application in previous literature to actual historic individuals. Also, the title Son of Man is found in Enoch for the first time, as a definite title. We are therefore, in the Similitudes, in the presence of a powerful trend of Jewish thought which probably exercised an influence on the mind of our Lord himself. There can be no doubt that the pre-mundane existence of the Messiah is meant in 8:56; and it is stated still more explicitly in 17:5, 24. In the latter verse the exact phrasing of Enoch is reproduced.

The pre-existence of Messiah is hinted at in Dan. 7:13, 14. The kingdom is conferred upon the Son of Man, and is an everlasting kingdom, without beginning, and without end. The Son of Man comes from the darkness where he is hidden. The four beasts in this vision come up from the great sea, but it is not stated whence the "One like unto a Son of Man" comes. Evidently he is represented as coming from some region in heaven where he is hidden. It is notable that this pre-existence, only hinted at in Daniel, is taken for granted in Enoch (cf. Schulz, *op. cit.*, II, 446).

The four passages quoted from the Fourth Gospel at the beginning of this chapter I propose to take as expressing on the part of Jesus, this consciousness of Messianic pre-existence. They are not to be regarded as implying a recollection of a former eternal existence, but, if they are to be regarded as uttering an authentic thought in the consciousness of Jesus, and not as creations of the evangelist's own thought, they must in some way be brought into line with other apocalyptic utterances in the Synoptic Gospels. This can be done only on one interpretation of them. The position adopted by the present writer with regard to the use by Jesus of apocalyptic imagery is that he used it in moments of special exaltation as a form of self-expression. It is so in these passages. These moments of tense feeling are found in the Fourth Gospel, equally with the Synoptics. We have an instance in what we have attempted to prove is an apocalyptic utterance in 2:19; Jesus speaks in 7:19 with such passionate insight into the murderous purposes of his opponents that they said *δαίμονιον ἔχεις* (cf. 8:48). We may compare 7:37 (*ἐκραξεν*); 7:46; 12:22-36; 18:6 (cf. J. Weiss, *Die Predigt Jesu vom Reiche Gottes*, p. 54, n. 1). At such moments of intense feeling, when his vocation burned and gleamed before him, he made use of the language of current messianic thought.

In 6:62, "Son of Man" is object of *θεωρῆτε*, and subject of *ἦν τὸ πρότερον*. "Son of Man" is here no ideal conception. He is a real individual, with whom Jesus identifies himself. Moreover, the "glory" spoken of in 17:5 is a glory possessed *realiter*, before the world was. *παρὰ σαοτῶ* of the former clause in this passage must be equivalent to *παρὰ σοι* of the second. Similarly, 17:24 can be interpreted only of One who conceives himself as really pre-existent, the object of the love of God. So Jesus in the Fourth Gospel is the "Son of Man," "who has come down from heaven."

This conception of the pre-existence of the Son of Man has much more right to be regarded as the dogmatic conception that governs the thought of the Gospel than the Logos-conception of the Prologue. It is essentially an apocalyptic conception. The evangelist, interpreting the messianic consciousness of Jesus himself, moves with freedom amid the apocalyptic ideas that his Master chose as forms of self-expression. Instead of doing, as the syn-

optists do often, simply renarrating his apocalyptic utterances, and sometimes heightening the apocalyptic imagery (cf. Streeter, in *Oxford Studies in Synoptic Gospels*), the Fourth Evangelist interprets the thoughts of Jesus in these matters. He enables us to understand that he was not bound by the details of apocalyptic thought. He represents him as appropriating and making more definite the notion of pre-existence that is hinted at in Daniel.¹ He also represents him as appropriating and making still more definite other conceptions suggested in the vision of Daniel. The appearance of Jesus upon earth is really parallel to the appearance of the Son of Man from where he has been hidden from all eternity, in Daniel. His earthly life is a progress "to the Father": "I go to the Father." In Daniel, the One like unto a Son of Man comes to the Ancient of Days, "and they brought him near before him." Thereupon "dominion and glory, and a kingdom are conferred upon him."

¹ The real source of Jesus' freedom in regard to apocalyptic thought is found in his consciousness of a unique relationship to the Father, and the place occupied by the cross in his thought, on the lines of the Suffering Servant idea. I do not regard the ellipsis after *ἐγὼ ἐλμι* in *ἐγὼ ἐλμι* of 8:58 as fully supplied by *Χριστός*. The expression *ἐγὼ ἐλμι* is perhaps consciously and deliberately an ellipsis, on the ground that the Fourth Evangelist does not identify Jesus solely with the Messiah. In the Fourth Gospel Jesus seems to avoid at any time verbally identifying himself with the Messiah, perhaps in order that his consciousness of his sonship and the messianic consciousness might not appear merely to coincide. The former absorbs the latter.

CRITICAL NOTES

A SOURCE-BOOK OF JUDAISM IN NEW TESTAMENT TIMES¹

When the Bible is regarded only as a book of authoritative revelation concerning religious practice or belief, the chief interest men will have in non-canonical Jewish or Christian books is that they be recognized as such and excluded from the canon. Books so excluded will always be neglected, and were in early times in danger of being lost altogether. When Protestantism denied authority to the Apocrypha, that is to the books and parts of books of the Catholic Vulgate which were not in the Jewish canon of the Old Testament, these books inevitably fell out of popular use, though they were recommended at first as useful books to read. Even the Revised Version of the Apocrypha (1895) has failed, certainly in our own country, to bring them again to public attention. But when the Bible is used as a collection of historical sources, and the effort is made to understand the history of Israel's religious and moral development from the beginning to the rise of Christianity, and to understand Christianity itself in the light of its historical sources and environment, then the significance of canonicity fades away. The historian wants all the literary products and records of the period he is studying; and the historian of the rise of Christianity has a peculiar interest in the events and movements in Judaism just before and during the lives of Jesus and the first disciples. He turns first of all to the Apocrypha as likely to contain the Jewish books which, after the canon, had the greatest popularity and were probably most representative of current opinion. The Apocrypha as a collection is ultimately due to the fact that the Greek Old Testament of Hellenistic Jews contained a number of additional books of similar character to those of the third part of the Hebrew canon, the Hagiographa, books, that is, of history, story, poetry, and wisdom. The presence of these additional books in the Septuagint indicates that the exact limits of the canon were not yet rigidly fixed in Palestine in New Testament times;

¹ *The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament*. In English with Introductions and Critical and Explanatory Notes to the Several Books. Edited in conjunction with many scholars, by R. H. Charles, D.Litt., D.D. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1913. 2 vols. £3 3s. net (\$19.25).

and since most of the books of our Apocrypha were written in Hebrew, there is every reason to suppose that they were known and valued in Palestine as well as in Egypt. But the Apocrypha was not a fixed collection. Manuscripts of the Septuagint and other Greek texts contain some other books besides those which, through the Latin, happen to compose our Apocrypha. The Latin contained one important book (II Esdras) which is not extant in Greek. Other Christian churches, Syrian, Ethiopic, Coptic, Armenian, preserved still other Jewish books, chiefly of an apocalyptical and legendary character, and of pseudonymous form. In early Christian lists the names of many such books are given. To them the title *apocrypha*, "hidden books," originally and properly belonged. They were books concerning mysteries, perhaps primarily the esoteric books of secret sects. The canonical Hagiographa, however, contains one such, the Book of Daniel (165 B.C.), which may be regarded as starting, or as newly starting, the production of apocalyptical writings. The two or three centuries with which we are dealing were prolific in writings of this kind, and a high value was put upon them in certain circles (cf. II Esdras 14:44-47). Many disappeared altogether. Of those named in Christian lists several are not otherwise known. From some, early Christian writers give citations. Some have survived, whether because they were most used and valued, or through the chance preservation and discovery of a single manuscript.

In regard to writings of this sort, which make up the larger part of the second volume, the Pseudepigrapha, of the edition before us, scholarly opinions differ as to composition, date, place, and the vital question whether they represent the ruling type of Judaism, or belong to special sects, Essenic or other, or narrow and peculiar circles. The latter is the opinion of many Jewish scholars, who maintain that the best sources for a knowledge of Judaism proper even in New Testament times are to be found in the Talmud and other Hebrew and Aramaic writings of the rabbis, although as writings they date from about 200 A.D. down to the early Middle Ages. This rabbinical literature in fact records traditions that reach far back. It has, moreover, the undoubted right to be regarded as the product and record of the prevailing character and movement of the Jewish religion in the post-exilic, and especially in the post-Maccabean, period. The student of Judaism in New Testament times cannot safely neglect this literature, however discouraging he may find the reading of it, and however hard it may be to distinguish in it the early and the late, and especially to get behind the effects of

the end of the temple and of the political independence of Judaism (70-135 A.D.). The volumes before us contain one small though important bit of this literature, one of the sixty-three books of the Mishna, the *Pirke Aboth*, or Sayings of the Fathers. The Mishna (200 A.D.) is a systematic arrangement, exposition, and elaboration of the Pentateuchal laws. It must be regarded as the result of the principal work of the principal Jewish teachers for many generations. We know the names of the most important scribes whose work it is (the *Tanaim*), and from this and other sources we know something about their teachings and personalities. There can be no doubt that the reading of the Mishna and of proper selections—especially of haggadic material—from the Talmud, the Targums, and the Midrashim, including the earliest Jewish prayers and liturgies, is an indispensable means of learning to think and feel as the Jews of Palestine, and especially as the scribes and Pharisees of Judea, did in the time of Jesus and Paul.

But Hellenistic Judaism belongs also to the historical background and environment, if not directly of Jesus, yet of Paul and the New Testament; and for Hellenistic Judaism our available sources are many and extensive. Some, of course, are included in the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha, for the Septuagint was the sacred book of Hellenistic Judaism. But apart from this we possess, entire or in fragments, historical, philosophical, apologetic, and poetic works of Egyptian Jews, and above all most of the many works of Philo of Alexandria (about 20 B.C.—40 A.D.), who has his large place in the history both of the Jewish religion and of Greek philosophy. Then there is Josephus (about 37-105 A.D.), the historian on whom we depend for our knowledge of the course of events amid which Christianity arose. His significance for the student of New Testament times can be briefly indicated in the words of Hausrath: "Our task is to see the circumstances described by Josephus with the eyes of the Evangelists, and from their experiences to complete them; and also to read the narratives of the Gospels in connection with the historical circumstances described by Josephus." In order to complete even so brief a sketch of our sources for Judaism in New Testament times it is necessary to add three remarks. In the first place the Old Testament, and pre-eminently the Pentateuch, was the authoritative canon of all Jews in this period. Judaism was the religion of a book. It was divided into many sects, but all acknowledged the same Torah, the same revealed will of God. The Mishna was the result of the study of the Pentateuch by Judean rabbis. Philo's two principal works were an allegorical commentary on a part of the Pen-

tateuch, and a systematic treatment of the Mosaic laws. Josephus not only retells the sacred history, but attempts to set forth the law in systematic form. Paul and others must adjust the new gospel to the same sacred text. The second remark is that the New Testament itself is the most important source of the Judaism of its own time, and though it receives much light from other sources, it gives still more than it receives. John the Baptist, Jesus, Paul, and the authors of Hebrews, the Fourth Gospel, and the Revelation, witness to Judaism both by what they receive and approve, and by what they reject and oppose.

The third remark is that the relations between Christians and Jews during the first two centuries, but especially until the Bar Cochba movement (132-135 A.D.), continued to be close. In the region of apocryphal literature it has to be recognized that the line between Jewish and Christian authorship is hard to draw. There are in the volumes before us Jewish books in Christian revisions. Perhaps the New Testament Apocalypse can be so described. There can be no doubt that much can be learned about Judaism from the Christian Apocrypha contained in Vols. VIII and IX of the Ante-Nicene Fathers. The Didache may contain a Jewish book, the Two Ways, and witness to another region of close contact between Christians and Jews. The influence of Greek mystery cults upon Christianity may have been mediated through Judaism. The question whether a Jewish Gnosticism prepared the way for the Christian is indeed obscure. The fact that the Odes of Solomon impress many scholars as Jewish originals indicates at least the difficulty of the question how far Judaism was then developing mystical sects. Professor Moore has recently shown that the official closing of the Jewish canon was due to the attraction which the Gospels and perhaps other Christian books exerted even in rabbinical circles in the second century. Harnack has just set forth freshly the importance of Justin's Dialogue with Trypho (= R. Tarphon?), as a source for Judaism early in the second century.¹

It is in the light of this general survey of the historical sources of Judaism in New Testament times that we can best give its right place to the collection before us. Here we have the chief surviving Jewish *apocrypha*, in the wider sense of that word; that is, the books of our own "Apocrypha" and other books extant in Greek or other versions, which Christians valued and kept after Jews had let them go;

¹ The close relationship between Judaism and Christianity has been comprehensively treated by Hoennicke in his *Das Judenchristentum im ersten und zweiten Jahrhundert* (1908).

books, for the most part, which stood at least some chance, in some circles, because of age, popularity, or express claim, of gaining a place among the sacred Scriptures of Judaism and then of Christianity. There are, however, a few books to which neither this description nor the title Apocrypha or Pseudepigrapha can properly be applied. Since these volumes will not be at everyone's hand I give below their contents, rearranging the books in approximately chronological order, and indicating the distinction between books believed by the editors to have been written in Hebrew or Aramaic, and those written in Greek, a distinction which is important though in some cases uncertain.

The first and the last word of the reviewer of these significant volumes ought to be one of praise and gratitude, and the principal word between might well be one of exhortation to ministers and other students of the Bible to get and use this collection. We have here together, in English translation on the basis of a critical text, with sufficient and reliable introductions and explanatory notes, the books to which the student of the New Testament turns first, after the Old Testament, in his effort to understand the Judaism out of which Christianity came.

For the English text of the Apocrypha we are told that "in a few cases the Revised Version has been adopted and emendations suggested in the notes." We are left to discover for ourselves that the R.V. is followed in I Esdras, Judith, and Baruch (except for poetic arrangement); that it is altered only very occasionally in Wisdom; that it is more thoroughly revised in I and II Maccabees, Prayer of Manasses, and Additions to Esther; that Tobit is a rendering of the Sinaitic text, in place of the Vatican and Alexandrian which R.V. follows; and that Sirach has a wholly new version, based on the Hebrew so far as it is extant. Canon Charles, the general editor, contributes condensations—the complete text, with abridged introductions and notes—of his well-known editions of Jubilees, Martyrdom of Isaiah (the Jewish part of the Ascension of Isaiah), I and II Enoch, Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, Assumption of Moses, and the Syriac Apocalypse of Baruch. In the case of II Enoch the translation from the Slavonic by Morfill, who died in 1909, is replaced by a new version by Mr. Forbes. A line in explanation of this would have been welcome. Dr. Charles also edits the Fragments of a Zadokite Work, separately printed in 1912. Mr. G. H. Box's IV Ezra is a condensation of his admirable edition, *The Ezra-Apocalypse*, 1912. The Story of Ahikar is a reprint from the edition of 1898, in convenient parallel columns, of the translations from Syriac, Arabic, and Armenian, and adds the recently discovered

HEBREW OR ARAMAEAN ORIGINALS				GREEK ORIGINALS		
	Title	Date	Editor	Title	Date	Editor
Before 200 B.C.	Story of Abihkar.....	500	Harris, Lewis, Conybeare			
	Ep. of Jeremy.....	before 300	C. J. Ball			
	Tobit.....	350-170	D. C. Simpson			
200-100 B.C.	Sirach.....	180-175	G. H. Box and W. O. E. Oesterley	Aristeas.....	130-70	H. T. Andrews
	Enoch.....	before 170 to 64	Charles	Sibylline Oracles (Jewish parts).....	?	H. C. O. Lanchester
	Judith.....	150	A. E. Cowley	II Maccabees.....	125-50	J. Moffatt
	Bel and Dragon.....	136	T. W. Davies	III Maccabees.....	about 100	C. W. Emmet
	I Maccabees.....	125-100	Oesterley			
	Jubilees.....	100-105	Charles			
	Testaments of XII Patriarchs.....	before 100	Charles			
100-1 B.C.	I Esdras.....	?	S. A. Cook			
	Susanna.....	95-80	D. M. Kay	Wisdom of Solomon.....	50-10	S. Holmes
	Psalms of Solomon.....	63-48	G. B. Gray	IV Maccabees.....	63 B.C.—38 A.D.	R. B. Townshend
	Prayer of Azariah and Song of Three.....	?	W. H. Bennett	II Enoch (Secrets).....	30 B.C.—70 A.D.	Charles and N. Forbes
1-100 A.D.	Fragments of Zadokite Work.....	18 B.C.—70 A.D.	Charles	Add. Esther.....	?	J. A. F. Gregg
	Assumption of Moses.....	7-29	Charles	I Baruch 4 ⁵ -5 ⁶	78	O. C. Whitehouse
	Martyrdom of Isaiah.....	?	Charles	Books of Adam and Eve.....	?	L. S. A. Wells
	I Baruch 1 ¹ -4 ¹	78	O. C. Whitehouse	III Baruch (Greek Apocalypse).....	?	H. M. Hughes
100-200 A.D.	II Baruch.....	after 70 (about 100)	Charles	Prayer of Manasses.....	?	H. E. Ryle
	(Syriac Apocalypse).....	about 100 (before 132)	Box			
	IV Ezra (I Esdras, chap. 3-14).....					
	Pirke Aboth.....	200	R. T. Herford			

Aramaic text, of about 400 B.C., which pushes the date of the book back two or three hundred years, and indicates, probably, non-Jewish authorship. Other books in the volume of Pseudepigrapha and all the Apocrypha proper are edited freshly for this work.

For twenty years past the student in this field has been in ever-increasing and quite incalculable debt to Dr. Charles—now Canon of Westminster—the general editor of these volumes. One can have only sincere and grateful admiration for his untiring industry and amazing productivity in this obscure and difficult region of research. There is an intellectual and spiritual energy behind such labors that is our wonder and despair.

It is natural to compare this collection with the two volumes of Kautzsch's similar German work (1900), after which this is patterned. "On a smaller scale than the present work and embracing fewer books of this literature"; "the best work that has hitherto appeared on this literature as a whole, but many parts of it are already antiquated": these are Canon Charles's characterizations of it. The new work is not quite so uniform in its scale and manner of treatment as the old, and not quite so consistently adapted to a definite use. Kautzsch aimed to make the results of criticism accessible to the general reader. The work of Charles is adapted to that purpose so far as it is an abridgment of more elaborate editions; but the treatment as a whole is more technical. Simpson's elaborate textual apparatus for the Book of Tobit belongs to an edition of the Sinaitic Greek text, not to a translation of it, and is useful only to the student with the Greek text before him. Box and Oesterley's Sirach could well have appeared as a separate volume, and a condensation of it in the present work. It occupies more than a third of the first volume, and is the most important contribution which these volumes make to the scholar's equipment, worthily filling an empty place in English literature since the discovery of the Hebrew texts. In this case the separate commentary by Oesterley (*Cambridge Bible*, 1912) is the shorter and more popular treatment.

If the intention was to make this literature more accessible to the average minister and student of the Bible, it should if possible have been more briefly and simply edited, and less sumptuously printed. For I must venture to descend to the homely subject of price, because this, more than the somewhat technical treatment, will, I fear, set bounds to its usefulness. Kautzsch costs 19 marks, and can be had by those who have an interest in it. Canon Charles tells us that "the greater part of these books [the Pseudepigrapha] have hitherto been

accessible only in expensive editions." In fact the seven volumes by Charles already mentioned, together with the separate printing of his *Fragments of a Zadokite Work*, Box's *Ezra-Apocalypse*, Ryle and James's *Psalms of the Pharisees*, Taylor's *Sayings of the Fathers*, eleven volumes in all, are listed at \$35.80. The cost of the present work is, in England, £3 3s., and in America—because of the urgent preference of our government that we buy instead of this an equal weight, thirteen pounds, of American-made books—\$19.25. Special students who have the separate editions must have this also; since, although it is made up in part of condensations of these, it contains also many wholly new and important editions. But I fear that it will seem out of the reach of the majority of those who would be interested to possess it. Would it not have been a feasible plan to have continued the publication of separate editions, in which, owing chiefly to Dr. Charles, English literature is already so far advanced; and in such a general collection as this to aim to reach a wider circle and encourage a more general reading of this literature? Such an edition, with briefer introductions and notes, cheaper paper, and smaller type, might have made room, within smaller compass, for a still more complete collection of texts, something more nearly approaching the ideal of a source-book of Judaism in the New Testament period.

It will I fear seem ungracious and useless now that this great work is before us to express the wish that it might have been in some respects different. But perhaps it may help rather than hinder the right use of the book as it is, to point out its limitations. It is of course inadvertently that the preface prefixed to each volume states that "Volume II contains all the remaining extant non-canonical Jewish books [in addition to the Apocrypha of Volume I] written between 200 B.C. and 100 A.D., with possibly one or two exceptions." This not only leaves no place for the two most voluminous Jewish writers of antiquity, Philo and Josephus, but it unfortunately gives the impression that we have here all the documents that are to be taken into account in the study of Judaism in New Testament times. How very far this is from being the case is evident from the survey of the literary records of Judaism with which this article begins. One need only read Schürer's discussion of sources in Volume I of his *History of the Jewish People in the Time of Jesus Christ*, and of Palestinian and Hellenistic Jewish literature in Volume V, to realize how much more the student has to reckon with.

Dr. Charles's selection is in fact nearly the same as that of Kautzsch. The two first volumes contain the same fifteen books. The second volume of Charles, the Pseudepigrapha, contains seventeen books,

four more than that of Kautzsch; but of the four only one is a pseud-epigraph, the *Secrets of Enoch*. The *Story of Ahikar* dates as early as 500 B.C. and is rather "the oldest extant book of world-literature" (Eduard Meyer) than a book of Judaism. The *Fragments of a Zadokite Work* is a newly discovered Hebrew document of which we are glad to have an edition by Dr. Charles, but its date and significance remain as yet quite uncertain. The *Pirke Aboth* is a tractate of the Mishna, which is the fundamental text of the Talmud and the primary document of rabbinical Judaism. It is right to include it in a source-book of Judaism, but its inclusion opens the door into a large place. These three books, in fact, might well belong to a third volume of selections from Hebrew and Aramaic sources.

But is the collection of Pseudepigrapha proper complete? If Pseudo-Aristeas is included, why not Pseudo-Hecataeus (fragments) and Pseudo-Phocylides? With the *Wisdom of Solomon* and *IV Maccabees*, why not also the fragments of the early Hellenistic Jewish historians, apologists, poets, and philosophers? A translation of the texts printed by W. N. Stearns, *Fragments from Grecian Jewish Writers*, would occupy only a few pages, and their importance is not to be questioned.

It is natural that Charles should be partial to the apocalyptical and legendary literature to which he has devoted his life. He says that in the centuries immediately preceding and following the Christian era, the apocalypses "almost alone represented the advance of the higher theology in Judaism, which culminated in Christianity"; and speaks of "their immeasurable value as being practically the only historical memorials of the religious development of Judaism from 200 B.C. to 100 A.D., and particularly of the development of that side of Judaism to which, historically, Christendom in large measure owes its existence." Now there are some, Dr. James Drummond for example, who esteem very highly the religious significance of Philo. Others, especially Jewish scholars, emphasize the ethical and spiritual elements in the teachings of the rabbis. Charles finds that "the ethical element is the fundamental element in the chief books of this [apocalyptical] literature," and that the ethical element present also in Talmudic literature "somehow lacks the fire and inspiration that distinguish it in the Pseudepigrapha." In fact, ethical and spiritual religion is to be found in apocalypses like *Enoch* and *Ezra*, in Philo, and in the haggada of the rabbis, and in all three it is burdened and perverted by other things; in the apocalypses by curious speculations about the mysteries of heaven and earth and

of the future; in Philo by ingenious searchings after hidden meanings in every letter of Scripture; in the rabbinical literature by the anxious effort to hedge about every minute precept of the law with additional protective restrictions. In all three, ethical and spiritual religion was hampered and confined by the belief in the inviolable canon of Holy Scripture and in the chosen and peculiar people, Israel. Christianity received spiritual and ethical instruction and impulse from all sides, and inherited in a measure, with all its freedom, all these sorts of burdens and restrictions. Whether those of the apocalyptic type, or those of allegorism, or those of literalism and externality, were the more dangerous and harmful is a question of impression.

Important as the apocalyptical element in the New Testament is and indispensable as are the Jewish apocalypses for a historical understanding of this element, I cannot, for myself, assent to the opinion that the Book of Enoch is the most important Jewish book written between 200 B.C. and 100 A.D., because by its spiritualizing of the messianic hope it made the rise of Christianity possible.¹ The line that reaches from prophecy to Christianity does not run so straight through Daniel and Enoch. It is true that Christians early appropriated and developed the apocalyptical ideas of Judaism; but the Judaism to which Jesus attached himself was that of John the Baptist; and John was not an apocalypticist, but, as his contemporaries saw, a prophet of a far more ancient and a very different type, the type of Elijah, the type of Amos. That, in part, foreign influences, especially Persian, diverted Jewish prophecy into apocalyptical lines, and that Christianity was in part a revival of the native Jewish prophetic spirit, seems at least to state a part of the truth. But if it is a mistake to make one's historical approach to Christianity exclusively along the line of the apocalypse, it is equally a mistake to suppose that the apocalyptical stream is, in the year 70, or 100, or 135, wholly diverted from Judaism into Christianity. Perhaps Charles does not mean to leave that impression. Akiba and his associates were both legalistic rabbis and apocalypticists; and the Talmud contains evidence that apocalyptical ideas were current through the centuries between the New Testament age and the revival of Hebrew apocalyptical writing in the Middle Ages. The apocalypse did not create Christianity, nor did the desertion of it change Judaism into a purely legalistic religion. But it is of course true that the influence, for better and for worse, of the Jewish apocalypse upon primitive Christianity was deep-going and far-reaching. The possibility of such an

¹ Charles, *Book of Enoch*, 2d ed., pp. vi, cviii.

interpretation of Jesus and of Paul as Schweitzer's is proof enough of the importance of a constant study of this literature.

Returning to the work before us, even if we regard it as meant especially to gather up the literature of the apocalypse, and enable the student to trace all the lines of connection it contains between Judaism and Christianity, we may still express the wish for somewhat more than is given. Schürer could safely have been followed to the extent of including the Apocalypse of Abraham, the Paralipomena Jeremiae (Rest of the Words of Baruch), the fragments of lost works preserved in citations by the church Fathers, the Pseudo-Philonic *Liber antiquitatum biblicarum*, which is one of the "one or two" omissions which Charles explains as due to the lack as yet of a critical edition of the text.

The student of apocalyptic literature needs in fact to make his beginning long before the Books of Daniel and Enoch, and to continue his studies, in Jewish and Christian books alike, well down into the Christian era. There are two contrasts that we are especially interested to understand. One is that between the national hope of Israel, which even at its highest belongs to this world, and the cosmic eschatology of the apocalypse proper, centering in the contrast between this world and the world to come, supernaturalistic and other-worldly in character, dualistic in its foundation. Was the first always the popular, the second the exceptional or the theological form of the hope? Was the first native to Israel, and the second the effect of foreign influences? For the study of this problem the volumes before us furnish the most important documents, and many illuminating discussions. Compare, for example, the national hope of Sirach 36:1-17, or Psalms of Solomon, chap. 17, with the eschatology of Enoch, chaps. 37-71, or Assumption of Moses, chap. 10. Or compare the reaction of Jewish faith upon the destruction of Jerusalem in Baruch in the Apocrypha, with that of the Apocalypses of Ezra and Baruch. The other contrast that we need to trace and explain is that within the apocalyptic literature itself between the cosmic and historic eschatology that centers in a world-catastrophe and the world-renewal, and the eschatology that is concerned with the fortunes of individual souls, good and bad, after death, that is, with detailed accounts of the various rewards of heaven and punishments of hell. The apocalypses here printed, like the New Testament Apocalypse, are almost entirely of the former type. The Apocalypse of Peter, which early rivaled that of John in popularity, is the earliest Christian representative of the second sort. There are

indeed beginnings in Enoch (e.g., chaps. 22, 27, 102-4), and especially in IV Ezra, chap. 7. It would have been worth while, if possible, to include further materials bearing on the question of the sources, whether Jewish or heathen, whether oriental or Greek, of this later development of the apocalypse, which culminates for us in Dante. The Apocalypses of Elijah and Zechariah (Steindorff, 1899), and some eschatological sayings of the Talmud are important in this direction, and make it at least probable that Jewish apocalyptists had already received (from Greek Orphic cults, or from a common oriental source?) impulses in this new direction.

The ideal source-book of Judaism in the time of Christ might well extend its apocalyptical materials somewhat and then add a third volume of selections from rabbinical literature, and—how can we help adding?—a fourth, of selections from Philo and Josephus. But whatever criticism seems to be involved in these suggestions concerns what the volumes do not rather than what they do contain, and would not have been called for if it had not been for the unfortunate remark about “all the remaining extant non-canonical Jewish books,” and if the information needed to correct it had been given; if, instead of an argument for the greater value of the pseudepigraphic literature as compared with the rabbinic, the Introduction had contained a complete review, however summary, of all the known literary products of Judaism during this period, those extant and those known only by title or citation, beginning with the latest parts of the Old Testament and including all the rabbinical writings which may contain traditions from the first two Christian centuries; so that the place and relative importance of the books here given would have been clear.

For what these volumes offer we may well be grateful and proud, for they constitute a notable achievement of English scholarship. Our space quite prohibits the effort to describe in detail the treatment of each of the thirty or more books and the work of each of the twenty-eight contributors. That the work is not all of equal excellence is inevitable, but it is careful and thorough work throughout. The introductions include discussions of the theological and ethical teachings of the books, and of their influence. An elaborate index helps the student to trace out special subjects, though it cannot of course take the place of the consecutive reading of the books themselves. Questions of date and place cannot always—indeed in this literature cannot often—be answered with certainty. Literary analysis can easily proceed too fast and too confidently. We know that both stories and

apocalypses are subject to constant changes with change of place and time and circumstance. But necessary as analysis sometimes is, it is well to remember that some one or some circle put the book together as it lies before us, and that it was used about as it is by many generations of people who did not notice or did not mind the inconsistencies between its different parts. Perhaps the books as they are represent the average Jew, whom we want to know, better than any of their component parts.

Certainly these books are good and useful to read, as Jerome and Luther agree in affirming of the Apocrypha proper, good not only for "furtherance of the knowledge of the history," but also "for example of life and instruction of manners." It is an illuminating and fascinating occupation to compare the wisdom of Jesus ben Sira with the Old Testament proverbial literature on the one side, and with the wisdom of Jesus of Nazareth on the other; to study the interaction of Hebrew and Greek ethics and religion (of which we are ourselves the product) in the Wisdom of Solomon, and to compare the place of "Wisdom" in his religion with that of Christ and the Spirit in the religion of Paul; to compare with Paul's sense of sin and experience of the law that of the Ezra apocalypticist; to find the narrowness of Pharisaism in the Book of Jubilees, and its ideals and hopes amid trials in the Psalms of Solomon, and its joy in the law in Baruch or Aboth; to read in the Book of Enoch of the pre-existent Son of Man who is to judge the world; to trace in Enoch and Wisdom the beginnings of belief in the immortality of the spirit, in distinction from the more native Jewish idea of resurrection; above all to look for the sense of God and the heart of religion beneath varying and strange forms of expression, and to realize—perhaps to our surprise—how much depth of religious feeling and beauty and power of language is to be found in books to which the unfortunate and in part unfitting names *apocrypha* and *pseudepigrapha* have given the reputation of falsity and worthlessness. It is surely not too much to say that the student of the Old and New Testaments is in duty bound to acquaint himself with this extra-canonical literature, and that it is indispensable to the proper pursuit of his task. For the texts themselves, in English form, and for the study of their place and meaning, these two volumes must for a long while maintain their place as the standard edition.

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THE DEUTERONOMIC TITHE

The purpose of this discussion is to raise problems, rather than to solve them. Certain phases of the Hebrew law regarding the tithe have received little or no attention; and the hope that, when attention is called to them, others may be able to lighten our darkness is, perhaps, sufficient justification for this paper.

The Old Testament references to the tithe are few in number and somewhat indefinite in character. The oldest law on the subject is that of Deuteronomy (12:6, 17; 14:22 f., 28 f.; 26:12 f.). The only other legislation is in P, viz., Num. 18:21-26 and Lev. 27:30-33. The legislation of J (Exod., chap. 34) and of E (Exod., chaps. 20-23) contains no allusion to it. Yet that there was payment of tithes prior to the requirements of the Deuteronomic law is practically certain. The story of Jacob at Bethel (Gen. 28:22=E) seems to testify clearly to the custom of paying tithes at the shrine there in early times. This conclusion is strengthened by Amos 4:4, which testifies to the custom as practiced at both Bethel and Gilgal in the eighth century B.C. The antiquity of tithing in Israel is also supported by Gen. 14:20, which records that Abraham paid tithes of his booty to Melchizedek, priest-king of Salem. But this support is a slender one in the present state of opinion regarding the date and character of this chapter. In view of these slight data and of the fact that tithing was a widely spread custom in the ancient world,¹ it is safe to conclude that a tithe was paid at the various local shrines in Israel long prior to the Deuteronomic reformation.

The new thing in Deuteronomy is the transfer of the offering of the tithe from the local shrines to the central sanctuary at Jerusalem. The tithe is to be taken of "all the increase of thy seed that cometh forth of the field year by year," viz., "thy corn, thy new wine, and thine oil." This, together with "the firstlings of thy herd and thy flock," is to be eaten "before Yahweh thy God in the place where he shall choose to

¹ It is known to have existed in Babylonia (under the New Empire), Persia, Greece, Rome, Carthage, Lydia, Syria, China, Morocco, among the Sabaeans, and among Mohammedans generally. See C. H. W. Johns, *Assyrian Deeds and Documents*, II (1901), 179 f. and *Babylonian and Assyrian Laws, Contracts and Letters* (1904), pp. xi, 205 f., on the question as to the practice of tithing in Old Babylonia and Assyria. That tithing was practiced in Egypt is practically certain (cf. Gen. 41:34), though in the inscriptions thus far translated I have been able to find only one distinct reference to it. In the Harris Papyrus, Plate 57 l. 8 (see Breasted, *Ancient Records*, IV, § 354) the king declares that he has not taken a tithe of the temple slaves for his own use, as former rulers had done. The careful measurements of fields recorded seem also to have been made for purposes of taxation or tithing.

establish his name," by the offerer and his family, his slaves, and the Levites of his village. Every third year these same Levites, together with the widows and orphans, are to receive the whole of the year's tithe for their support.

Now, questions arise. If a community was expected to take its tithe to Jerusalem and eat it all, as well as the firstlings of flocks and herds, at a single feast, how relatively small the crops must have been! If the community could eat one-tenth of the year's produce at a single feast, how could they subsist for the remainder of the year on the remaining nine-tenths of the crop? It might be supposed that the term "tithe" here was a conventional one, and, like the number forty, not to be taken literally.¹ But any reduction of this sort, it must be borne in mind, is at the expense of the support of the Levites and the poor, whose triennial "tithe" was one of their main sources of supplies. Then again, the later law in Lev. 27:30 ff. includes the tithe of the flocks and herds and expressly provides that they shall be counted fairly and taken as they come, viz., "all the tithe of the herd and the flock, all which passeth under the rod, the tenth shall be holy to Yahweh." This shows that the numerical significance of "tithe" persisted down to the end of the legislative process.

The problem is accentuated by the fact that according to I Sam. 8:15, 17 (cf. I Sam. 17:25; Amos 7:1) the king demanded a tithe of the flocks and of the produce of the fields; while according to I Kings 4:7 ff., 22 f. the land was organized into twelve districts, each one of which was responsible for a month's support of the royal establishment.² Was the poor farmer, consequently, at least twice mulcted, and to a total of one-fifth or more of all that he raised? This is not impossible; but the spirit and attitude of the Deuteronomic law toward the poor is quite the contrary of this. Was there then a conflict between the secular and the religious on this point and are the Deuteronomic law on the one hand, and I Sam 8:15, 17 on the other, a protest against the imposition of a royal tithe and a filing of a prior and exclusive claim for the tithe on Yahweh's behalf?³

Still another complication of the problem is at hand in the institution

¹ My colleague, Dr. D. D. Luckenbill, calls my attention to the fact that the Assyrian *ešru*, *ešretî*, was probably used in this inexact way, in that at times it seems to be practically equivalent to the term "tax" and to carry no precise arithmetical connotation.

² According to Aristotle's *Oecon.* 1345b and 1352b, the sovereigns of Babylonia and Persia were in part supported by tithes; see Driver, *Deuteronomy*, p. 169.

³ So Holzinger on Num. 18:21 ff.

of the fallow year. On any interpretation of this custom, it involved an average annual loss to the farmer and the country of one-seventh of the products of the soil. This, added to the royal tithe and the sacred tithe, makes a total of a little more than one-third of the crops each year, besides the sacred firstlings of the flocks and herds and the royal tithe of the flocks. Furthermore, if the fallow year involved the withdrawal of all land from cultivation each seventh year, as is commonly supposed, what became of the tithe for that year? Should not the law have taken some account of such a break in the regular procedure? And how could the populace live for two successive years upon the product of one year, especially if one-tenth of that product had been already eaten up at the start, and that within a day or two? This latter phase of the economic problem—certainly a most acute one—is disposed of if we conceive of the fallow year as operating upon a different basis. It seems necessary to conclude that various sections of a man's farm lay fallow in rotation, so that each year a new piece, approximately one-seventh of his whole area, was withdrawn from cultivation, while the previous year's fallow was restored to tillage.¹ There is nothing in the law of the Covenant Code (Exod. 23:10 ff.) that militates against this view and in the Deuteronomic Code no mention is made of the fallow year, which is sure proof that no change from the Covenant Code had yet been made. Thus the burden would be evenly distributed throughout the years, instead of coming with crushing weight in a single year. The fact that the closely related law regarding the release of slaves every seventh year (Exod. 21:2 ff.) evidently contemplates a continuous six-year period of service for each and every slave, no matter at what time his servitude began, lends strong support to this interpretation of the fallow year.

The question still remains whether the peasant farmer could possibly carry a tax of one-third of his crops every year, in addition to the rent due the landlord, and other religious and social obligations. Even if we eliminate the royal tithe, as suggested above, by treating the sacred tithe as having displaced it, the tax will still amount to nearly one-fourth, not counting the firstlings of the flocks and herds. Nor was the yield of Palestine's acreage so unusually heavy as to make such a tax rate easier upon the farmer there than elsewhere.

¹ Cf. C. H. W. Johns, *Assyrian Doomsday Book* (1901), pp. 19 f.; where it is pointed out that around Harran in Mesopotamia in many cases less than half of the land was under tillage at any one time and that in some cases fields lay fallow every alternate year.

Consideration of these facts together with the question with which we started (viz., how could the tithe possibly be eaten at a feast of short duration?) forces us to ask whether or not the tithe was a bona-fide tenth of all the products of the soil. It is held by several scholars¹ that it was not, but that the Deuteronomic law simply applied the name tithe to the old offering of the first fruits. In support of this it may be urged that in Deut. 12:6, 11, 17; 14:23, and 15:19 f. first fruits are not mentioned, but the tithe occupies the place in conjunction with firstlings that would naturally be given to first fruits if they were to be offered in addition to the tithe. This would also explain the silence of the earlier legislation upon the subject of tithes, in that the first fruits there mentioned are the equivalent of the later tithe. In Deut. 26:2 ff., however, an offering of first fruits is distinctly provided for. This does away with the possibility of equating tithe and first fruits, unless we may suppose that this offering of first fruits was merely a symbolical survival of the old practice, which itself had been swallowed up in the tithe. The phraseology of this regulation regarding the first fruits differs from that of Exod. 23:19, exactly in this respect, that the latter seems to call for the presentation of all the first fruits to Yahweh while the former requires only a small basketful. A more serious obstacle, however, to the identification of the tithe with the first fruits is the fact that in Deut. 18:4 the first fruits are listed among the things given for the support of the priests, the Levites. The only way to overcome this difficulty is by the radical step of eliminating 18:4 as a later addition. But there is no ground for such a treatment of the verse aside from the fact that it is in conflict with 14:22 ff., if the latter is to be interpreted as identifying tithe and first fruits. It seems the part of sober interpretation and criticism to abandon the identification of tithe and first fruits rather than to excise 18:4 simply in order to maintain it.

There is certainly no basis for the suggestion that the tithe was merely a tenth of the first fruits.² The objections to the identification of tithe and first fruits all hold good here. Furthermore, if such had been the intention of the law, it surely would have been indicated in some way; but there is not the slightest hint to that effect. It has also been suggested that the whole tithe was not brought to the sanctuary and eaten before Yahweh, but only a certain proportion of it.³ But the

¹ E.g., W. Nowack, *Archäologie*, p. 257; G. F. Moore, *Encyclopædia Biblica*, article "Tithes"; Holzinger, on Num. 18:21 ff.; C. Steuernagel, on Deut. 14:22 ff.

² As proposed by I. Benzinger, *Encyclopædia Biblica*, article "Taxation" (§ 9 f.).

³ So Dillmann on Deut. 14:28 ff.

mere fact that in Deut. 26:12 the word "all" appears in connection with the tithe of the third year is hardly sufficient to support the contention that in the other two years all the tithe was not brought to the shrine. Nor does it seem possible to suppose that the tithe was not intended to apply to all the products of the soil, for in Deut. 14:22 the injunction applies to "all the increase of thy seed which comes forth of the field year by year"; and in vs. 23, "grain, wine, and oil" are specifically mentioned.

The charity tithe of the third year also raises questions. This is provided for in Deut. 14:28 f. and 26:12 f., which prescribe that "all the tithe of thine increase in that year" (viz., "the third year, the year of tithing") shall be brought forth and deposited "within thy gates" as a source of supply for the hungry Levites, sojourners, fatherless, and widows of the town, "who shall come, and shall eat, and be satisfied." The manner and time of eating are not specified, so that we do not know whether a single great feast for the Levites and the poor in each town was contemplated, or a series of meals at suitable times under public auspices, or a doling-out to such as were in need upon their application from time to time to the proper authorities. It seems, on the whole, more likely that it was administered as a sort of poor-rate or poor-fund for the alleviation of cases of need as they might arise than that it was consumed in reckless feasting. This seems so especially from the fact that emphasis is laid on the requirement that the Levite has no lot nor inheritance with the rest of Israel. The triennial tithe is intended as a partial compensation to him for that lack.

If the triennial tithe was a poor-fund and if it was identical in scope and quantity with the tithe of the other two years,¹ it will be seen that any interpretation which involves a diminution of the regular tithe entails a corresponding diminution of the amount available for charity toward the poor and the Levite. The Levite, to be sure, was not wholly dependent upon the triennial tithe. He had his portion in the annual tithe and he received portions of all sacrificial animals (Deut. 18:1, 3, 4), together with the first fruits of grain, wine, oil, and wool. He also seems to have had some private property, real estate or personal (Deut. 18:8). The poor were by no means so well cared for by the law. They were largely left to the generosity of the well-to-do, the only legal allotments to them being a share in the great annual feasts (Deut. 16:11, 14), the forgotten sheaf (24:19), the gleanings of the olive and

¹ So, e.g., Driver, *Deuteronomy*, *ad loc.*; Benzinger, *Encyclopedia Biblica*, article "Taxation"; G. F. Moore, *Encyclopedia Biblica*, article "Tithes."

fruit trees (24:20), and the untilled crop of the fallow fields (Exod. 23:10). The triennial tithe of 14:29 and 26:12 was probably, therefore, one of their chief means of subsistence.

If the triennial tithe was simply the ordinary annual tithe devoted to a specific purpose one year in every three, how is the fact of such a special application of the third year's tithe to be accounted for? Why was the tithe not so used every year? If the triennial tithe constituted any large proportion of the maintenance of the Levite and the poor, it is difficult to understand how they were sustained during the two years in which they received no such tithe. Such periodic and spasmodic charity would be almost worse than none at all; for it would but tend to demoralize by interrupting the habits of industry and thrift developed during the lean years. It is an impracticable supposition that the triennial tithe was stored up and made to cover the needs of the entire three years. If the tithe were abundant enough for such a procedure, it would but intensify the difficulty we recognized at the start, in that the amount to be eaten at the annual feast in the other two years would be appallingly large. Furthermore, facilities for storage were probably not good enough to insure the conservation in good condition of so much produce for so long a time. Still further, we wonder at what point the series of triennial cycles was started out. Of course, if the sabbatical year in which land was to lie fallow came regularly throughout the land every seventh year, the "third year" would naturally be counted from the sabbatical year. But such a sabbatical year seems practically out of the question.

Such difficulties as these compel us to question. After all, would a practical legislation ever contemplate such anomalies as the foregoing? Are we not bound to suppose that the triennial tithe was not administered in any such way as we have thus far considered? Driver well says that the expression "year of tithing" in Deut. 26:12 "seems to authorize the inference that some ancient custom, connected with the payment of the tithe, must have led to every third year being called *κατ' ἐξοχήν*, the tithe-year." Benzinger declares¹ that "by the 'third year' we are to understand not a fixed date holding good for the whole country, but a relative one, falling differently in different places or with different families, yet always in such a way that every year some portion of the Israelite nation was paying its 'tithe of the third year' for the poor and similar objects." This suggestion may well be in the right direction, for it does away with the impracticable character of the legislation and makes of

¹ *Encyclopedia Biblica*, article "Taxation" (§10).

it an intelligible and useful institution. Possibly this "year of tithing" is to be connected in some way with the custom of fallowing the land. If one-seventh of the fields lay untilled every year, perhaps the "third year" was counted from the fallow year. In this way, each piece of fallow land would pay a special tithe in the third year after it came back into tillage. Thus one-seventh of the land would always be paying the third-year tithe and the spasmodic and periodic character of the charity would be done away with. This would certainly be a tithe sharply distinguished from the annual tithe and there would be no insuperable difficulty in the way of regarding it even as a second tithe¹ upon the portions of the land to which it applied. The reason for the selection of the third year in such a usage, it must be granted, does not appear; but to this objection all proposed explanations so far lie open. Later laws and customs support some such understanding of the third-year tithe as this in at least two respects. In the first place, the importance attached to the tithe as one of the main sources of support for the priesthood is more easily understood as a development from previously existing practice than as the sheer invention of fertile imaginations; cf. Mal. 3:8-10; Neh. 10:37 ff.; 12:44; 13:5 ff.; Num. 18:21 ff.; Lev. 27:30 ff.; 2 Chron. 31:5 ff. The third-year tithe, if so administered as to constitute a steady and constant source of supply, would furnish just the sort of starting-point required. The law which disposed of a part of the steadily flowing stream of tithes to the advantage of the priesthood was later made to include all of it. In the second place, the same consideration holds true of the later interpretation of the third-year tithe as a second tithe in addition to the general tithe levied annually; so, e.g., Tobit 1:7 f.; Josephus, *Antiq.*, IV, viii, 22; and Jerusalem Targum on Deut. 26:12 f.; and the Greek rendering of the same passage. It is quite true that the language of Deuteronomy does not specify this as a second tithe. But it must be considered that the Deuteronomist was probably not introducing anything new here, but dealing with facts wholly familiar to those for whom he was legislating. Thus the terms he used may well have carried a significance that escapes us because of our lack of that knowledge of the entire situation which was possessed by the Deuteronomist's contemporaries.

On this interpretation of the third-year tithe, the burden upon the farming population would be heavy, but not unbearable. One-tenth of

¹ As LXX translates it in Deut. 26:12, viz., τὸ δεύτερον ἐπιδικάτον, which rendering, however, is probably due to a misreading of תרני as תרני. Yet the rendering shows how this tithe was understood in the age when the Greek rendering of the Pentateuch was made.

the produce of six-sevenths of a farmer's land was given as general tithe each year; one-seventh of his land lay idle annually; and one-tenth of one-seventh of his land, or of one-sixth of his land under tillage, was tithed a second time each year. The sum total of this taxation would amount to a trifle more than the produce of one-fourth of his total acreage. To this must be added, however, the required offering of the firstlings of the flocks and herds, the annual contribution toward the support of the royal court (see p. 120), and, in the case of the peasant farmer, the annual rent.

This suggestion as to the range of the third-year tithe is not put forth as a definitive solution, but merely as a provocation to thought and investigation. The whole legislation regarding the tithe is beset with problems. The extravagant and impracticable character of the tithing requirements of the Priestly Code and the Chronicler has long been recognized and the impossibility of reconciling them with the Deuteronomic law has been freely acknowledged. But the uncertainty and obscurity of the Deuteronomic legislation itself has not been brought as fully to light as is desirable, if we are to make any progress in the accurate interpretation of that legislation. Such a study as this cannot but bring to our attention afresh the fact that Deuteronomy is not primarily a lawbook, but a collection of sermonic addresses. We ought, therefore, not to insist too strongly upon obtaining from Deuteronomy strict, definite, and explicit statements of law and fact. We go to preachers not for legislation but for inspiration.

It is also more than probable that the actual practice of the people in general and of the temple staff in particular was not solely guided by so incomplete and ambiguous a set of laws as that of the Deuteronomic Code. The custom of the ages as it had come down to the days of Josiah was more rigid and more specifically defined and was not likely to have been wholly set aside and abandoned upon the appearance of the Deuteronomic law. This custom had doubtless also formulated itself in laws and much of this old legislation is probably incorporated, with more or less modification, in the legislation of P.

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ST. LUKE'S VERSION OF THE DEATH OF JUDAS

In the *American Journal of Theology* for July, 1900, I discussed in some detail the two variant accounts of the death of Judas in the Gospels, with the object of finding out what was the historical nucleus of the divergent traditions, supposing, that is, that a sensible historical nucleus could be detected, after we had removed those strata of the tradition which could be identified as a folk-lore deposit. The immediate motive of the inquiry was the discovery, which I had made, that in the story of Ahikar, one of the most widely diffused of popular tales in both Greek and Semitic circles, the villain of the piece disappears from public view in a manner which is identical with that assigned to Judas in the Acts of the Apostles, when we have introduced one slight and necessary correction to the current text: for just as in the story of Ahikar, his treacherous son, Nadan, after his villainies have returned upon his own head, swells up like a bag and bursts, so in the Acts, when we correct the text so as to read, "And he swelled up and burst asunder," etc., we have a perfect parallel between the fate of the traitor of the New Testament and him of the Old Testament Apocrypha (using the word Apocrypha in a somewhat wider sense than would be allowed by the Council of Trent or the Thirty-Nine Articles). The reason for the correction lay in the supposition that it got rid of the unintelligible *πρηγὴς ἐγένετο* ("He fell flat" or "He fell headlong"), by a substitution of another expression, *πρησθεὶς*, of which traces could be found in the oldest of the outlying eastern versions. Moreover, when the correction was made (and it should be noted that it is not fair to describe it as a conjectural emendation), we could see the reason for the development of a number of striking legends concerning the death of the traitor, dating from the time of Papias and therefore almost coeval with the Acts, according to which Judas continued in the world a bloated and hateful form, who met his death at last by being crushed by a carriage which he could not pass, or some similar explanation. The emendation "he swelled up" was the co-ordinating link between the story of Ahikar in pre-Christian times and the stories told by Papias and others in later Christian days. It was the co-ordinating factor in a mass of disconnected folk-lore.

Assuming the text to be thus restored to its original form by the substitution of *πρησθεὶς* for *πρηγὴς ἐγένετο*, it was natural to examine what meaning was originally intended by the substituted expression. In what sense did Judas "fall flat" or "fall headlong"? It was easy to see that the early Christian Fathers had tried to harmonize the new

expression with an account given in Matthew, according to which Judas did not "swell up and burst," but simply "hanged himself"; it is a variant tradition invented to get rid of the objectionable details in the original story, and an exact parallel can be found to it in the *Aḥikar* tradition where the sensitiveness of later editors obscured the force of the original melodrama. Harmonization, however, seldom retains its hold finally upon the reflecting mind; suspicion is aroused, and becomes matured into critical examination; the harmonized stories fall apart, and the duality of the tradition is once more disclosed.

When the alternative *πρηγής* had become established and its natural interpretation had become current in ecclesiastical circles, it was suggested by me that the words "falling prone" gave rise to a parallel with the crawling serpent in the first chapters of Genesis, and a number of legendary statements were collected, which identified Judas with a snake, and sometimes with a snake that burst asunder. This part of the argument was not as forcible or as clear as the first part, but it was not altogether deficient in the power of co-ordinating traditions which were known to have existed in various quarters.

The net result of the inquiry was to confirm suspicions, already current in many quarters, as to the historicity of the suicide of Judas.

At this point I left the matter, and I do not know of any serious contribution to the Judas problem, until quite recent times, when the whole question of the text in the Acts, and its interpretation, was reopened by Dr. Chase, the present bishop of Ely, in an article in the *Journal of Theological Studies* for January, 1912.

The article is headed, "On *πρηγής γενόμενος* in Acts 1:18." Its object is to show that there is no need to emend the passage as suggested by myself and others on the faith of the outlying versions or other considerations: for the word *πρηγής* does not mean, is this connection, the equivalent of the Latin *pronus*, but is itself a medical term denoting a disease, and implying a bodily state of *inflammation* or *turgescence*. The suggestion is a brilliant one; it removes the necessity for emendation of the text (which otherwise would seem to be demanded, for as Dr. Chase says, "How woefully feeble is the expression *πρηγής γενόμενος*, *having become prone!*"); and it gives us the prospect of finding St. Luke's hand in one more passage which had been suspected of interpolation.

On this hypothesis, the connection with the story of Papias concerning the death of Judas could, if required, be made directly from the text of the Acts: for *πρησθείς* and *πρηγής γενόμενος* are now to be regarded as strictly synonymous phrases.

Dr. Chase bases his interpretation, by which, as Harnack says, he has added a new word to the lexicon of the New Testament Greek, on the fact that the two verbs, *πίμπρημι*, "to burn," and *πρήθω*, "to swell out by blowing," coincide in the forms of their aorists *ἔπρησα* and *ἐπρήσθην*, and appear to have also coalesced in meaning. In medical language *πίμπρημι*, is used of swelling caused by inflammation, and Dr. Chase suggests that *πρηγής* is connected with the same root.

The question arises at once whether the word can be found in any of the medical writers in the sense required; and here the confirmation desired appears to be absent, for Dr. Chase admits that "in a cursory search, I have not discovered any instance of the adjective *πρηγής* in medical writers in the sense of 'swollen,' 'inflamed.'" This is a serious defect, but it is compensated for in several directions: first of all, by the demonstration that *πρηγής γενόμενος* is in St. Luke's manner, and we might almost say in his medical manner. The best instance by way of parallel is *γενόμενος σκωληκόβρωτος* in Acts 12:23; in the next place, it is noted that in Wisd. 4:19, the expression *ρήξει αὐτοὺς ἀφώνους πρηγείς* is rendered in the Old Latin (and in the Armenian) by "disrumpet illos, *inflatos* sine voce." Such is, in the briefest statement, the hypothesis of Dr. Chase for the explanation of the perplexing expression in the first chapter of the Acts.

As we have intimated above, the argument has convinced Professor Harnack, who, in an article in *Theologische Literaturzeitung* for April 13, 1912, expresses his adherence to Dr. Chase's views and points out the important conclusions that follow from them: "Chase hat sich der Dienst erworben, ein neues griechisches Wort entdeckt zu haben—durch dieselbe Methode, nach der ein unsichtbarer Planet entdeckt worden ist."

Harnack concludes by saying that the account of Judas' death in the Acts is apparently an excerpt, which is based upon a previously existing legend. The legend was quite independent of the Matthean story, but may very well have been the underlying material for the Papias narrative. Dr. Preuschen took an opposite view to Professor Harnack; perhaps because he was not so thoroughly convinced of the Lukanity of the Acts.

In his recently published commentary on the Acts, he suggests that the Armenian version involves an original *πρησθείς* and not *πρηγής*; that there is no ground for translating *πρηγής* in the sense of "swollen up"; that in *Sap. Sal.* 4:17 we ought to translate the word "headlong," and regard the old Latin *inflatos* as under the influence of the Acts.

He even suggests that *πρηθείς* may have been the original word in this passage also!

My own opinion inclines strongly to the belief that Dr. Chase's explanation is the correct one. I do not in the least regard this as a contradiction of my theory that the whole incident is a folk-lore method of getting rid of the villain of the piece. The parallel with *Ahikar* stands just as clear as before, except that we have to allow for some modification of the already existing legend by Luke, in writing the matter up from a medical point of view. He has replaced fact to some extent by symptoms; but the result of the disease is the same.

Now let us point out one important matter that stands to some extent in connection with this incident incorporated by Luke.

It has been assumed (and it is part of a larger question) that the language of the incident in Acts is both medical and Lukan; it is medical and, therefore, Lukan; or, if we regard the Lukan authorship as sufficiently established, it is Lukan, and so probably medical. One of the forms of speech which occur in the argument is the Lukan use of *γενόμενος* in describing medical symptoms. Dr. Chase gives illustrations from Hippocrates, which may, perhaps, furnish a key to the style, but are not really necessary.

Now one of the most striking instances of the kind referred to, after *πρηθῆς γενόμενος* and *γενόμενος σκωληκόβρωτος*, is the expression in Luke 22:43, *γενόμενος ἐν ἀγωνίᾳ*. If this is a medical term (and the whole passage has a medical look), then it is Lukan. In that case, we may dismiss the idea that the verses Luke 22:43, 44 are not genuine. They respond to the test for Lukanity which we have acquired, in such a way as to preclude doubt. They are included in double brackets by Westcott and Hort, as containing "important matter apparently derived from extraneous sources." We have, however, seen that they do not answer to the description of being extraneous. So the question is raised as to whether it is possible that the verses have been excised for dogmatic reasons. Can we identify a school of religious thought to which the words would have been obnoxious? and can we identify the source from which the omission was derived by those MSS which do not contain the verses? The answer to the first question is obvious; the verses as they stand are fatal to the position taken up by the Doketists. While they stand in the text, the Doketist position is scripturally untenable: for how would it be possible to regard, with the Doketists, the sufferings of Christ as an illusion, in the face of the agony and bloody sweat? Now Doketism is one of the oldest of heresies, and, while it lasted, one of the most active. It has left its mark on the Christian records, as for instance

in the fabricated Gospel of Peter, where our Lord appears "as not having any pain," and in the legends which describe how he escaped the cross and allowed someone else to be crucified in his stead (perhaps as his double). There is, therefore, no difficulty in divining what a Docketist would do with St. Luke and his testimony.

The other question relates to the MSS by whose testimony the omission is commonly justified. Leaving on one side those which merely suggest obelization, the group, upon which attention must be fixed, contains BRT and is supported by the Egyptian versions and some stray and scattered evidence. It is evidently an Alexandrian omission, and not a Western non-interpolation. The evidence is exactly described in the margin of the later Syriac in the words, "This section of the gospels is not found among the Alexandrians"; the value of the testimony being increased by the fact that the version in question was corrected at a convent a few miles outside Alexandria. It is Alexandrian Docketism (to bring our two lines of inquiry together) that is responsible for the omission. The Logos of the schools banished the suffering Christ of the Scriptures.

It would be easy to enlarge on this theme, by discussing the necessary Docketist elements in Alexandrian theology; but probably enough has been said. In view of the Lukanity of the verses, it will not be longer possible to maintain, with Dr. Hort, that there are no traces of heretical depravation of the Scriptures, nor, *inter alia*, that the text of Codex B is strictly neutral.

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THE FREER GOSPELS¹

Luke 10:1 add *και* before *ἐτέρους* | omit *δύο*¹ | omit *δύο*³ 2 *ουν* for *δὲ*¹ | tr. to *εκβαλη εργατας* 3 add *εγω* before *ἀποστειλω* 4 *μηδε* for *μη*² | *ασπασασθαι* for *ἀσπᾶσθη* 5 *οικειαν εισερχησθαι* for *εἰσελθῃτε οἰκίαν* 6 tr. to *η εκει* | *επαναπανσηται* for *ἐπαναπαῆσεται* 7 *εσθιοντες* for *ἔσθοντες* | omit *και πινοντες* | add *εστιν* after *αὐτοῦ* 8 *δεχονται* for *δέχωνται* 10 *εισερχησθαι* for *εἰσελθῃτε* | *πλατιους* for *πλατείας* 11 *υμιν* first written for *ἡμῖν*: changed to *ημιν* by 1st hand | omit *ὑμῶν* 1st hand, supplied above by 2d hand | add *ημων* after *ποδας* | add *εφ υμας* after *ἡγγικεν* 13 *ουα* for *Οὐαί*¹ | *χορεζειν* for *Χοραζειν* | *βηθσαι*-

¹ A collation with the text of Westcott and Hort, begun in the July number and continued in October.

δαν for Βηθσαΐδα | omit εἰ | σιδονεῖ for Σιδῶνι | ἐγενοντο for ἐγενήθησαν |
 καθημεναι for καθημενοι 14 σιδονι for Σιδῶνι 15 καπερναουμ' for
 Καφαρναούμ | η for μή | add του before ούρανοῦ | ὑψωθείσα for ὑψω-
 θήσῃ | omit τοῦ | καταβιβασθῇ for καταβήσῃ 16 αποστειλοντα for
 ἀποστείλαντά 17 omit δύο | ω for τῷ 19 omit τοῦ before πατεῖν |
 omit την before δύναμιν 20 πᾶν (πνευμα) for πνεύματα | εγγραφῇ
 for ἐγγέγραπται 21 ο ἰησους for τῷ ἁγίῳ | tr. to ἐγενετο εὐδοκεια
 22 add και στραφεις προς τους μαθητας ειπεν before Πάντα | γινωσκει
 for γινώσκει | εαν for ἂν | βουλεται for βούληται 23 καθ' for κατ'
 24 ουχ for οὐκ¹ | ειδον for εἶδαν 25 add και before λέγων 26 αναγι-
 γνωσκεις for ἀναγινώσκεις 27 add της before καρδίας | ἐξ ὅλης της
 ψυχης for ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ ψυχῇ | ἐξ ὅλης της ἰσχυος for ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ ἰσχύϊ | ἐξ
 ὅλης της διανοιας for ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ 29 δικαιουν for δικαιοῦσαι 30 add
 δε after ὑπολαβὼν | ἱεριχω for Ἱερειχώ | add τυγχάνοντα after ἡμιθανῇ
 31 συνκυριαν for συγκυρίαν | καταβαινων for κατέβαινεν 32 omit δέ | add
 γενομενος after Δευέτης 33 σαμαριτης for Σαμαρείτης | add αυτον after
 ἰδὼν 35 add ἐξελθων after αἰριον | add αυτω after εἶπεν 36 add ουν
 after τίς 37 ουν for δὲ αὐτῷ 38 ἐγενετο δε εν for Ἐν δέ | add και before
 αὐτὸς 38 τον οικον αυτης for τὴν οἰκίαν 39 ταυτη for τῇδε | παρα-
 καθεισασα for παρακαθεσθεῖσα | παρα for πρὸς | ἰησου for κυρίου
 40 ἐγκατελιψεν for κατέλειπεν | ειπε for εἶπὼν 41 ἰησους for κύριος |
 ενος for ὀλίγων | omit ἡ ἐνός 42 μαρια for Μαρίας | δε for γὰρ | add
 απ before αὐτῆς

11:2 προσευχεσθαι for προσεύχησθε | add ημων ο εν τοις ουρανοις
 after Πάτερ | add γενηθητω το θελημα σου ως εν ουρανω και επι γης
 after βασιλεία σου 4 οφιλομεν first written for ἀφίομεν: changed by
 1st hand to αφειομεν | add αλλα ρυσαι ημας απο του ποτηρου after
 πειρασμόν 5 ερει for εἶπη 7 εστιν for εἰσίν 8 αυτου φιλος for φίλον
 αὐτοῦ | δωση for δώσει 9 ανυχθησεται for ἀνοιγήσεται 10 ευρισκει |
 ανηχθησεται for ἀνοιγήσεται 11 tr. to ο υἱος αιτησει | add αρτον μη
 λιθον επιδωσει αυτω η και before ἰχθύν | tr. to επιδωσει αυτω 12 αν αι-
 τηση for αἰτήσῃ | μη επιδωση for ἐπιδώσει 14 add και αυτο ην before
 κωφόν 15 ειπον for εἶπαν | βεελζεβουλ' for Βεεζεβοῦλ | εκβαλλειν for
 ἐκβάλλει 16 tr. to παρ αυτου εξητουν εξ ουρανου 17 μερισθεισα for
 διαμερισθεῖσα 18 εμερισθη for διεμερίσθη | βεελζεβουλ' for Βεεζεβοῦλ |
 εκβαλλει for ἐκβάλλειν με 19 omit εἰ δὲ ἐγὼ ἐν Βεεζεβοῦλ ἐκβάλλω
 τὰ δαιμόνια | εκβαλουσιν for ἐκβάλλουσιν | tr. to κριται ὑμων 20 omit

ἐγὼ 22 add ο before ἰσχυρότερος | νεικησει for νίκηση 24 add δε after Ὅταν | add αναπαυσιν after εὕρισκον | omit τότε 25 omit σχολάζοντα 26 tr. to επτα ετερα πνευματα πονηροτερα εαυτου 27 tr. to γυνη φωνη 29 omit γενεά² | επιζητει for ζητει | add του προφητου after Ἰωνᾶ 30 omit ὁ before Ἰωνᾶς | tr. to σημειον τοις νινευειταις 31 σολομωντος for Σολομώντος¹ 33 add δε after Οὐδεὶς | φεγγος for φῶς 37 add τις after Φαρισαῖος | αριστησει for ἀριστήση 38 ειδων for ἰδὼν 40 ουχ' for οὐχ | κα for καὶ 42 omit δὲ | αφιεναι for παρῆναι 44 add γραμματεῖς καὶ φαρισαῖοι ὑποκριται after ὑμῖν | omit τὰ before μνημεῖα | omit οἱ² 48 μαρτυρεῖτε for μάρτυρές ἐστε | add αυτων τα μνημα after οἰκοδομεῖτε 49 omit καὶ before ἐξ | αποκτενουσιν 1st hand: αποκτεινουσιν 2d | εκδιωξουσιν for καὶ διώξουσιν 50 ἐκχυννομενον for ἐκκεχυμένον 51 add του before αἵματος twice 53 λεγοντος δε αυτου ταυτα προς αυτους for Κάκειθεν ἐξελθόντος αὐτοῦ 54 add ζητουντες before θηρεῦσαι | add ἵνα κατηγορησουσιν (ω supplied above -ου- by 2d hand) αυτου after στόματος αὐτοῦ

12:1 tr. to των φαρισαιων ητις εστιν υποκρισεις 2 συνεκαλυμμενον for συγκεκαλυμμένον 4 αποκτεινοντων for ἀποκτεινόντων 5 βαλιν for ἐμβαλεῖν 6 πωλεται for πωλοῦνται | tr. to δυο ασσαριων 7 add ουν after μὴ 8 ομολογηση for ὁμολογήσει 11 προσφερωσιν for εἰσφέρωσιν | μεριμνατε for μεριμνήσητε | απολογησεσθαι for ἀπολογήσησθε 13 tr. to αυτω εκ του οχλου 14 δικαστην for κριτήν 15 αυτων for αὐτοῦ | αυτων for αὐτῶ 16 ηυφορησεν for εὐφόρησεν 17 εαυτω for αὐτῶ | συναξαι 1st hand for συνάξω: ω supplied above -αι by 2d hand 18 omit μου¹ | τα γεννηματα μου for τὸν σῖτον 19 συ for Ψυχὴ 20 απαιτουσιν for αἰτοῦσιν 21 εν εαυτω for αὐτῶ 22 tr. to ὑμιν λεγω | omit ὑμῶν 23 omit γὰρ 25 tr. to προσθῆναι επι την ηλικειαν αυτου | add ενα after πῆχυν 26 ουτε for οὐδὲ 28 tr. to τον χορτον σημερον εν αγρω οντα | αμφιεννυσιν for ἀμφιάζει 29 η for καὶ² | μετεωριζεται for μετεωρίζεσθε 30 omit τοῦ κόσμου 1st hand: supplied by 2d hand in margin | επιζητει for ἐπιζητούσιν 31 του θεου for αὐτοῦ | omit ταῦτα 32 ηυδοκησεν for εὐδόκησεν 33 ευγίζει for ἐγγίζει 36 αυτων for ἐαυτῶν 38 omit κἂν ἐν τῇ δευτέρῃ | και εαν for κἂν² | add οι δουλοι before ἐκεῖνοι 39 διορυγηται for διορυχθῆναι 40 add ουν after ὑμεῖς 41 add αυτω after δὲ 42 ειπεν δε for καὶ εἶπεν | δουναι for τοῦ διδόναι 44 omit οτι | αυτω for αὐτοῦ 46 γινωσκει for γινώσκει | omit τῶν 47 αυτου¹ 1st hand: ε added

above α by 2d hand | omit ἡ ποιήσας 48 ολεια for ὀλίγας | add το before πολύ.³ 50 omit δτου: οπου supplied for it by 2d hand 52 tr. to οικω ἐνι 53 διαμερισθῆσεται for διαμερισθήσονται | θυγατρι for θυγατέρα | omit καὶ θυγάτηρ ἐπὶ τὴν μητέρα | add αὐτης after πειθεράν 54 εἰδῆται for ἴδῃτε | add τὴν before νεφελὴν | απο for ἐπὶ | omit δι 55 ἐρχεται for ἔσται 56 tr. to δε καιρον | ου δοκιμάζεται for οὐκ οἶδατε δοκιμάζειν 58 παραδω for παραδώσει | βαλη for βαλεῖ 59 add ου after ἔως

13:1 πιλατος for Πειλᾶτος 2 ο ιησους for εἶπεν αὐτοῖς | τοιαυτα for ταῦτα 3 ωσαυτως for ὁμοίως 4 add και before ὁκτώ | omit τοὺς¹ | add εν before Ἱερουσαλήμ 5 μετανοεῖτε for μετανοήσητε | ομοιως for ὡσαύτως 7 omit ἀφ' οὗ 8 tr. to ει δε μηγε εις το μελλον 11 add ην before γυνή 14 omit δι after ὁχλῷ 15 ουν for δέ | ὑποκριτα for Ὑποκριταί | εν for τῷ | πατνης for φάτνης | απαγαγων for ἀπάγων 18 δε for οὖν 19 add μεγα after δένδρον 20 omit Καὶ 21 ενεκρυψεν for ἐκρυψεν | αυτηνρουσατα for ἀλεύρου σάτα | ζυμωθη for οὗ ἐζυμώθη | ολη for ὅλον 22 πορίας for πορείαν | ἱερουσαλημ' for Ἱεροσόλυμα 24 πυλης for θύρας | omit λέγω ὑμῖν | ουκ' for οὐκ 25 add κυριε after Κύριε 26 ἀρξῆσθαι for ἀρξέσθε 27 λεγω for λέγων | add ὑμας after οἶδα | add της before ἀδικίας 29 omit ἀπό² 31 ταυτη τη ημερα for αὐτῇ τη ὥρᾳ | προσηλθον for προσήλθαν | tr. to σε θελει 32 επιτελω for ἀποτελῶ 33 δε for δεῖ 34 ορνιξ for ὄρνις 35 add οτι before οὐ | add αν ηξει (1st hand: ηξει perhaps first written) οτε after ἔως

14:3 αυτους for τοὺς | add ει before Ἐξεστιν | θεραπευειν for θεραπειῶσαι | omit ἡ οὗ 5 add αποκριθεις ο ιησους after καὶ¹ | tr. to ειπεν προς αυτους | add τη before ἡμέρᾳ 6 add αυτω after ἀνταποκριθῆναι 10 ειπη for ἐρεῖ | omit πάντων 12 tr. to σε αντικαλεσωσιν | tr. to σοι ανταποδομα 13 αλλα for ἀλλ' | tr. to ποιης δοχην 15 ὅς for ὅστις | αριστον for ἄρτον 16, εποιησεν for ἐποίει 17 add παντα after ἐστιν 18 tr. to παραιτισθαι παντες | ἐξελθειν και for ἐξελθὼν 21 εαυτου for αὐτοῦ¹ 22 ως for δ 23 tr. to ο οικος μου 24 γευσηται for γείσεται 26 αυτου for ἑαυτοῦ¹ | δε for τε | tr. to εαυτου ψυχην | tr. to μου μαθητης ειναι 27 add και before ὅστις 28 add ο before θέλων | οκοδομησαι for οἰκοδομησαι 29 ενπεζειν for ἐμπαίζειν 30 ουκ' for οὐκ 31 tr. to συνβαλιν ετερω βασιλει | βουλευεται for βουλεύσεται | απαντησαι for ὑπαντῆσαι 32 add τα before πρὸς 33 omit οὖν | αυτου for ἑαυτοῦ | tr. to μου ειναι 34 omit οὖν | αλα for ἄλας twice | omit και

15:1 omit πάντες 2 omit τε 3 omit τὴν 4, 7 ᾗ for ἐνέηκοντα ἐννέα twice 5 εαυτου for αὐτοῦ 7 tr. to εσται ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ 8 οτου for οὗ 9 συναλείπεται for συναλείϛ | add τας before γείτονας 10 tr. to χαρά γίνεταί 11 εσχεν for εἶχεν 12 και for ὁ δὲ 13 ἀπαντα for πάντα 14 ἰσχυρος for ἰσχυρά 16 add γεμισαὶ τὴν κοιλίαν και before χορτασθῆναι | απο for ἐκ 17 εἶπεν for ἔφη | μισθίου for μίσθιοι | περισσεουσιν for περισσεύονται | omit ὧδε 19 omit ποιήσόν με ὥς ἓνα τῶν μισθίων σου 20 ἐπεσεν for ἐπέπεσεν 21 tr. to αὐτῷ ο υἱος | add και before οὐκέτι | omit ποιήσόν με ὥς ἓνα τῶν μισθίων σου 22 omit Ταχὺ | add αὐτῷ after δότε 23 ἐνεγκαντες for φέρετε 24 omit ἦν ἀπολωλώς και εὐρέθη 26 omit ἀν 27 omit ὅτι 28 οὐν for δὲ 29 omit αὐτοῦ | tr. to σου ἐντολὴν 30 μωσχον τον σιτευτον (2d hand τισ above -τευ-) for σιτευτὸν μόσχον 32 ἀνέζησεν for ἐξήσεν | omit και before εὐρέθη

16:1 add αὐτου (2d hand εαυτου) after μαθητᾶς 3 omit ἐν | αὐτῷ for ἑαυτῷ 4 omit ἐκ | αὐτων for ἑαυτῶν 5 χρεωστων for χρεοφιλετῶν 6 βαδους for βάτους | και εἶπεν for ὁ δὲ εἶπεν αὐτῷ | το γραμμα for τὰ γράμματα 7 add και before λέγει | το γραμμα for τὰ γράμματα 9 καγω for καὶ ἐγὼ | tr. to ποιησατε εαυτοῖς (ε- a correction by 1st hand) | ἐκλείπεται for ἐκλίπη 12 ὑμετερον for ἡμέτερον | tr. to ὑμῖν δώσει 14 add και before οἱ | omit και before ἐξεμνηστῆριζον 15 βδέλυγμα for βδέλυγμα 16 εως for μέχρι 17 παρελθειν for πεσεῖν 18 add πας before δ 20 add ἦν after τις | add ος before ἐβέβλητο 21 add των ψυχων after ἀπὸ | ἀπελιχαν for ἐπέλειχον 22 add του before Ἀβραάμ 23 add τον before Ἀβραάμ 25 add συ after ἀπέλαβες 26 ἐπι for ἐν | tr. to ὑμῶν και ἡμῶν | omit ἔθεν | add οἱ before ἐκείθεν 27 omit οὐν 29 add αὐτῷ ο before Ἀβραάμ | μωσεα for Μωυσέα 31 ουδε for οὐδ' | ἀπελθῆ for ἀναστῆ | πιστευουσιν for πεισθήσονται

17:1 omit αὐτοῦ | tr. to μὴ ελθειν τὰ σκάνδαλα | ου (ε add 4th [?] hand) δε for πλὴν οὐαί 2 ονικος for μυλικός | ἐριπτε for ἐρριπται | tr. to ἐνα των μικρων τουτων 3 add δε after ἐάν 4 add της ἡμερας before ἐπιστρέψῃ | omit πρὸς σέ 5 εἶπον for εἶπαν 6 σινηπεως for σινάπεως 7 omit αὐτῷ 8 διπνωσω for δειπνήσω 9 tr. to χάριν εχει | add ἐκείνῳ after δούλῳ | add ου δοκῶ after διαταχθέντα 10 omit ὅτι | add οτι before δ | οφειλομεν for ὀφείλομεν 11 add αὐτον after πορεύεσθαι | διερχεται for διήρχετο | μεσου for μέσον 12 add αὐτῷ after ἀπήνητησαν | ἐστησαν for ἀνέστησαν | πορρω for πόρρωθεν 16 σαμαριτης for Σαμα-

ρείτης 17 add οὔτοι after δεκα 20 add ποτε before πότε: later dotted for deletion 21 και ἰδου for ἡ 22 ουχ for οὐκ 23 ὡδε ἰδου εκει for ἐκεῖ ἡ Ἰδου ὡδε 24 add εν τη ημερα αυτου after ἀνθρώπου 27 ἐξεγαμίζοντο for ἐγαμίζοντο | απαντας for πάντας 28 και ως for καθώς 29 λωθ' for Λώτ | tr. to θειον και πυρ | απαντας for πάντας 30 ταυτα for τὰ αὐτὰ 31 εστιν for ἔσται | add τω before ἀγρῶ 32 λωθ' for Λώτ 33 σωσαι for περιποιήσασθαι | απολεση for ἀπολέσει twice | και ος εαν for ὅς δ' ἂν | add αυτην before ζωογονήσει 34 αυτη for ταύτη | tr. to δυο εσονται | omit δ' | add και αποκριθεντες λεγον after ἀφελήσεται: later dotted for deletion 35 tr. to δυο εσονται | omit ἡ | και η for ἡ δέ 37 omit και' | συναχθησονται οι αετοι for οἱ ἀετοὶ ἐπισυναχθήσονται

18:1 add και before παραβολήν | εκκακειν for ἐγκακεῖν 2 ανθρωπους for ἀνθρωπον 4 tr. to δε ταυτα | και ανθρωπον ουκ for οὐδὲ ἀνθρωπον 5 omit μοι | ὑποκταξη for ὑπωπιάξη 7 ποιησει for ποιήση | προς αυτον for αὐτῷ | μακριθυμων for μακροθυμεῖ 9 omit και' 10 add ο before εἰς 11 tr. to προς εαυτον ταυτα | προσευχεται for προσηύχετο 12 αποδεκατω for ἀποδεκατέω 13 και ο for ὁ δέ | ηδυνατο for ἤθελεν | tr. to εις τον ουρανον επаре | add εις before τὸ | αυτου for ἐαυτοῦ 14 η εκεινος for παρ' ἐκείνων 15 επετιμησαν for ἐπετίμων 16 προσκαλεσαμενος for προσεκάλεσατο | ειπεν for λέγων | εμε for με (1st hand, over an erasure?) 21 εφυλαξαμην for ἐφύλαξα | add μου after νεότητος 22 add ταυτα after δέ | ουρανw for τοῖς οὐρανοῖς 23 εγενετο for ἐγενήθη 24 add περιλυπον γενομενον after Ἰησοῦς | add εισελευσονται before εἰς | omit εἰσπορεύονται 25 τρυμαλιας ραφιδος for τρήματος βελόνης 26 ειπον for εἶπαν | ακουοντες for ἀκούσαντες 27 omit τῷ 28 omit δ | αφηκαμεν παντα και for ἀφέντες τὰ ἴδια 29 tr. to ὑμιν λεγω | tr. to γονεις η αδελφους η γυναικα | ενεκεν for εἵνεκεν 30 ου for οὐχί | απολαβη for λάβη 31 ἱεροσολυμα for Ἱερουσαλήμ 32 ενπεχθησεται for ἐμπαιχθήσεται | ενπτυσθησεται for ἐμπτυσθήσεται 33 αποκτινουσιν for ἀποκτενοῦσιν 35 ἱεριχω for Ἱερειχῶ | προσετων for ἐπαιτῶν 40 add ο before Ἰησοῦς | ενγι-σαντος for ἐγγίσαντος 41 add λεγων before Τί 42 omit αὐτῷ 43 ηκολουθησεν for ἡκολούθει: later corrected by 1st hand to ηκολουθει

19:1 εισελθων 1st hand: changed by 2d hand to εξελθων | ἱεριχω for Ἱερειχῶ 2 ουτος ην for καὶ αὐτὸς 4 προσδραμων for προδραμῶν | omit εἰς τὸ | συκομωραιαν for συκομορέαν | ειδη for ἰδη 5 add ειδεν αυτον και before εἶπεν | ζαχχαιε for Ζακχαῖε 8 ζαχχαιος for Ζακχαῖος | το ημισυ for τὰ ἡμίσιά | tr. to των ὑπαρχοντων μου | tr. to διδωμι τοις

πτωχοις 11 tr. to αυτον ειναι ἱερουσαλημ' | tr. to η βασιλεια του θεου
 μελλει 12 ην ευγενης και for εὐγενῆς 13 πραγματευεσθαι for πραγμα-
 τεύσασθαι 15 omit αὐτῷ | εδωκεν for δεδώκει | γνω for γνωῖ | add τις
 before τί | επραγματευσατο for διεπραγματεύσαντο 16 προσειργασατο
 δεκα for δέκα προσηργάσατο 17 ευ for Εὐγε 18 tr. to κυριε η μυα σου
 19 γεινου επανω for ἐπάνω γίνου 20 omit ὁ 21 tr. to ει αυστηρος
 21 εσπειρες for ἔσπειρας 22 add δε after λέγει 23 μου το αργυριον
 1st hand: changed by same hand to το αργυριον μου | και εγω for
 κάγῳ | add τω before τόκῳ | tr. to επραξα αυτο 25 omit και εἶπαν
 αὐτῷ Κύριε, ἔχει δέκα μνᾶς 26 add γαρ after λέγω | add απ αυτου
 after ἀρθήσεται 27 εκεινους for τούτους | omit αὐτούς 28 -ρευετο of
 ἐπορεύετο probably 1st hand, but over an erasure 29 βηθανιαν for
 Βηθανιά | ελεωνα for Ἐλαιῶν 30 αυτου ειπων for λέγων | omit και
 31 add αυτω after ἐρεῖτε 32 ευραν for εὔρον 33, 34 ειπον for εἶπαν
 twice 35 εαυτων for αὐτῶν 37 ελεων for Ἐλαιῶν | ηρξατο for
 ἤρξαντο | απανταν for ἅπαν 38 omit ὁ βασιλεὺς | tr. to ειρηνη εν ουρανῳ
 39 φαρισαιοι for τῶν Φαρισαίων | ειπον for εἶπαν 40 add αυτοις after
 εἶπεν | κεκραξονται for κράξουσιν 42 και συ καιγε εν τη ημερα σου
 ταυτη for ἐν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ταύτῃ και σὺ | add σου after εἰρήνην | απ for ἀπὸ
 43 περιβαλουσιν for παρεμβαλοῦσιν | omit και συνέχουσιν σε 44 εν σοι
 λιθον επι λιθῳ for λίθον ἐπὶ λίθον ἐν σοί 45 add εν αυτω και ἀγορά-
 ζοντας after πωλοῦντας 46 οτι ο οικος μου οικος προσευχης εστιν for
 Καὶ ἔσται ὁ οἶκός μου οἶκος προσευχῆς 48 ποιησουσιν for ποιήσωσιν |
 εξεκρεματο for ἐξεκρέμετο

20:1 add εκεινων after ἡμερῶν | add αυτω after ἐπέστησαν: later
 dotted by 1st hand for deletion | ἱερεις for ἀρχιερεῖς 2 ειπον for
 εἶπαν | tr. to προς αυτον λεγοντες | ειπε for Εἰπὼν 5 συνελογιζοντο for
 συνελογίσαντο 6 ανθρωπου for ἀνθρώπων | πας ο λαος for ὁ λαὸς ἅπας
 9 add τις after Ἄνθρωπος | εξεδoto for ἐξέδετο 10 add εν before
 καιρῷ | δωσιν for δώσουσιν | διραντες αυτον εξαπεστιλαν αυτον for ἐξα-
 πέστειλαν αὐτὸν δείραντες 11 tr. to πεμψαι ετερον 12 tr. to πεμψαι
 τριτον 13 add ἴδοντες after τούτον 14 διελογιζοντες for διελογί-
 ζοντο | εαυτους for ἀλλήλους 16 -τους και δω- 1st hand, over an
 erasure | ειπον for εἶπαν 18 πεσειτε for πέση 19 οχλον for λαόν |
 tr. to την παραβολην ταυτην ειπεν 20 ὑποχωρησαντες for παρα-
 τηρήσαντες | εις το for ὥστε 21 add οἶδαμεν before Διδάσκαλε,
 οἶδαμεν 22 ημιν for ἡμᾶς 23 add τι με πειραζεται after αὐτούς

24 αποκριθεντες ειπον for οί δὲ εἶπαν 25 αυτοις for πρὸς αὐτοὺς |
tr. to αποδοτε τοιουν 26 αυτου for του² | εἰωπησαν 1st hand for
ἐσίγησαν: changed by 2d hand to εἰσησαν 27 αντιλεγοντες for
λέγοντες 28 αποθανη for ἧ | ἐξαναστησει for ἐξανάστηση 30 και
ελαβεν ο δευτερος την γυναικα και ουτος απεθανεν ατεκνος for καὶ ὁ
δεύτερος 31 add και before οὐ 32 ὕστερα δε παντων απεθανεν και η
γυνη for ὕστερον καὶ ἡ γυνὴ ἀπέθανεν 33 εν τη ουν αναστασι for ἡ
γυνὴ οὖν ἐν τῇ ἀναστάσει 34 add αποκριθεις before εἶπεν | εκγαμι-
ζονται for γαμίσκονται 35 των 1st hand for τῆς ἐκ: changed by 2d
hand to της εκ | εκγαμίζονται for γαμίζονται 36 ουτε for οὐδὲ | μελ-
λουσιν for ἐτι δύνανται | add του before θεοῦ 37 εδηλωσεν for ἐμήνυσεν |
add τον before θεόν² | omit καὶ θεόν Ἰακώβ 38 add ο before θεός |
αυτου ουτοι for αὐτῷ ζῶσιν 39 ειπον for εἶπαν 40 δε for γὰρ 41 tr.
to ὕιον δαυειδ' ειναι 42 και αυτος for αὐτός γὰρ | add των before
Ψαλμῶν | add ο before Κύριος 44 tr. to κυριον αυτον | tr. to υἱος
αυτου 45 add αυτου after μαθηταῖς

21:1 tr. to τα δωρα αυτων εις το γαζοφυλακιον 2 τινα και for δέ
τινα | tr. to δυο λεπτα 3 tr. to η πτωχη αυτη | πλιω for πλεῖον
4 απαντες for πάντες | add του θεου after δῶρα | απαντα for πάντα
5 αναθεμασιν for ἀναθήμασιν | κεκοσμητο 1st hand for κεκόσμηται:
changed by 2d hand to κεκοσμητε 6 λίθος first written λιθον: then
corrected by 1st hand | λιθον for λίθῳ | omit ὧδε 7 μελλει for μέλλη
8 add οτι after λέγοντες | add ουν after μή² 10 επι for ἐπ' 11 tr. to
κατα τοπους και | tr. to λιμοι και λοιμοι | tr. to σημα απ ουρανου
12 omit τὰς² | αγομενους for ἀπαγομένους 13 add δε after ἀποβήσεται
14 εις τας καρδιας for ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις 15 αντιπειν ουδε αντιστηναι for
ἀντιστῆναι ἢ ἀντειπεῖν | παντες for ἅπαντες 16 συγγενεων for συγγε-
νῶν 19 κτησασθαι for κτήσεσθε 20 ειδηται for ἴδητε | γινωσκεται for
γνώτε 21 omit οἱ³ 23 add δε after οὐαί | omit ταῖς² | add εν before
τῷ 24 μαχαιραις for μαχαίρης | tr. to παντα τα εθνη | omit οὐ | omit
και εσονται 25 εσται for ἔσονται 25 η ως ηχουσης for ἡχοῦς | σαλους
for σάλου 26 οικουμενης for οἰκουμένη 28 ανακαλυψατε for ἀνακύψατε
30 απ αυτων for ἀφ' ἐαυτῶν 31 ειδηται for ἴδητε 33 παρελευσεται
1st hand for παρελεύσονται¹: corrected to παρελείσονται by 2d hand
34 κραιπαλη for κρεπάλη | tr. to εφνιδιος εφ υμας επιστη | omit ἡ 1st
hand: supplied by 2d 35 γαρ επελευσεται for ἐπεισελεύσεται γὰρ |

tr. to της γης πασης 36 ουν for δὲ | κατισχυσατε for κατισχύσητε | tr. to παντα ταυτα | omit τὰ 37 omit ἐξερχόμενος | ελεων for Ἐλαιῶν

22:4 add τοις before στρατηγοῖς | tr. to αυτον παραδω αυτοις
 6 tr. to αυτοις ατερ οχλου 7 add εν before ἡ 9 ειπον for ειπαν
 10 ου for εις ἡν 12 αναγιων first written for ἀνάγαιον: changed by 1st hand to αναγειον 13 ειρηκεν for ειρήκει 14 add δωδεκα before ἀπόστολοι
 15 omit με 16 add ουκεντι before οὐ | εξ αυτου for αὐτό 17 add το before ποτήριον | εαντοις for εις ἑαυτούς 18 add στι before οὐ μὴ | omit ἀπὸ τοῦ before γενήματος | του for οὐ 1st hand: changed to στου by 2d hand 20 tr. to ωσαυτως και το ποτηριον | ετι for αἵματι | εχχυννομενον for ἐκχυννόμενον 22 και ο μεν υἱος for οτι ὁ υἱὸς μὲν | tr. to πορευεται κατα το ωρισμενον 23 ηρξατο for αὐτοὶ ἤρξαντο | αυτους for ἑαυτούς 25 εξουσιαζουσιν for οἱ ἐξουσιάζοντες 26 γενεσθω for γινέσθω
 27 omit δὲ | tr. to ειμει εν μεσω ὑμων 30 εσθειηται for ἐσθητε | καθησεσθαι for καθήσθε | tr. to κρινοντες τας δωδεκα φυλας 31 add ειπεν δε ο κυριος before Σίμωνι 32 εκλειπη for ἐκλίπη | στηριξον for στήρισον
 33 omit ἐτοιμός 34 μη φωνηση for φωνήσει | πριν η for ἕως | omit με | μη ειδεναι με for εἶδέναι 35 ειπον for ειπαν 36 ουν for δὲ | omit δ' | omit τὸ 37 πληρωθηναι 1st hand for τελεσθῆναι: τελεσ added above πληρ by 2d hand | ελογισθην for ἐλογίσθη 38 ειπον for ειπαν | και for Κύριε 39 εις 1st hand, over an erasure of τω | ελεων for Ἐλαιῶν
 42 παρενεγκειν for παρένεγκε | tr. to το ποτηριον τουτο 43, 44 omit ὥφθη δὲ αὐτῷ ἄγγελος ἀπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἐνισχύων αὐτόν. καὶ γενόμενος ἐν ἀγωνίᾳ ἐκτενέστερον προσήνευχε· καὶ ἐγένετο ὁ ἰδρῶς αὐτοῦ ὥσει θρόμβοι αἵματος καταβαίνοντες ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν. 45 tr. to αυτους κοιμωμενους 47 αυτου for αὐτούς 48 ο δε ιησους for Ἰησοῦς δὲ 49 ειπον αυτω for ειπαν | επιταξομεν for εἰ πατάξομεν | μαχαιρα for μαχαίρη
 50 tr. to τον δουλον του αρχιερεως | tr. to αυτου το ους 51 εασατε for Ἐατε 52 add ο before Ἰησοῦς | ἐξεληλυθατε for ἐξήλθατε 53 add η before αὕτη 54 συνλαβοντες for συλλαβόντες | συνηγαγον αυτον for εἰσήγαγον | τον οικον for την οἰκίαν 55 αψαντων for περιαψάντων | add αυτων after συνκαθισάντων | εν μεσω for μέσος 57 add αυτον after ἡρνήσατο | tr. to γυναι ουκ οίδα αυτον 58 ειπεν for ἔφη 59 διασθησας for διαστάσης 61 λογου for ῥήματος | omit σημερον 62 add ο πετρος after ἔξω 63 τον ιησουν for αὐτόν 64 add ετυκτον αυτου το προσωπον και before ἐπηρώτων | add αυτον after ἐπηρώτων 66 ανηγαγον for

ἀπήγαγον | εαυτων for αὐτῶν 67 εἶπε for εἶπὼν 68 add καὶ before ἐρωτήσω | add μοι ἡ ἀπολυσθῆται after ἀποκριθῆτε 69 omit δὲ 70 εἶπον for εἶπαν | οὐν for δὲ 71 εἶπον for εἶπαν | tr. to *χρειαν εχομεν μαρτυριας* 23:2 *ευρομεν* for *εὔραμεν* | omit *ἡμῶν* | tr. to *καισαρι φορους* | omit καὶ before λέγοντα 3 *επηρωτησεν* for *ἡρώτησεν* | *αυτος* for *ὁ δὲ ἀποκριθεις αὐτῷ* 5 omit καὶ 6 add *γαλιλαιαν* after *ἀκούσας* 7 -λυ- of *Ἱεροσολύμοις* by 1st hand over an erasure (of *λυ*?) 8 *θελων ἐξ ικανου χρονου* for *ἐξ ικανῶν χρόνων θέλων* | add *πολλα* after *ἀκούειν* 9 *αυτον* first written for *αὐτῷ*: changed by 1st hand to *αυτω* 11 *ἐξουθενήσας* for *ἐξουθενήσας* | omit *ὁ* | *ενπεξας* for *ἐμπαίξας* | add *αυτον* after *περιβαλὼν* | omit *τῷ* 12 tr. to *πειλατος καὶ ὁ ηρωδης*: *ο* before *ηρωδης* omitted then supplied by 1st hand | *εαυτους* for *αὐτοὺς* 14 *ουδεν* for *οὐθέν* 15 *ανεπεμψα γαρ ὑμας προς αυτον* for *ἀνέπεμψεν γὰρ αὐτόν πρὸς ἡμᾶς* 17 add *αναγκην δε ειχεν απολνειν αυτοις κατα εορτην ενα* 18 *ανεκραξαν* for *ἀνέκραγον* | οὐν for δὲ 19 *βεβλημενος εις την φυλακην* for *βληθείς ἐν τῇ φυλακῇ* 20 οὐν for δὲ | omit *αὐτοῖς* 21 *σταυρωσον* for *Σταύρου σταύρου* | *αυτον* 1st hand over an erasure (of *σταυ*?) 23 add *καὶ των αρχιερων* after *αὐτῶν* 24 *Ο δε* for *καὶ* 25 *εν τη φυλακη* for *εἰς φυλακὴν* 26 *σιμωνος τινος κυρηναιου ερχομενου* for *Σίμωνά τινα Κυρηναῖον ἐρχόμενον* 27 add *καὶ* after *αἱ* 28 add *ο* before *Ἰησοῦς* 29 omit *αἱ* 30 *εθηλασαν* for *ἔθρεψαν* 31 add *τω* before *ὕγρῳ* 32 tr. to *δυο κακουργοι* 33 *απηλθον* for *ἤλθαν* | *τον* for *δν* 34 omit *ὁ δὲ Ἰησοῦς* *ἔλεγεν* *Πάτερ, ἄφες αὐτοῖς, οὐ γὰρ οἶδασιν τί ποιοῦσιν* | -ου of *αὐτοῦ* 1st hand, over an erasure (of -ων?) 35 add *εν οἱς* before *καλ* 36 *εστηκει* for *ἰστήκει* | add *συν αυτοις* after *ἄρχοντες* 36 *ενεπεζον* for *ἐνέπαιξαν* | *προσευχομενοι* for *προσερχόμενοι* | add *καὶ* before *ὁξος* 38 add *γεγραμμενη* after *ἐπιγραφῇ* | add *γραμμασιν ελληνικοις καὶ ρωμαϊκοις καὶ εβραϊκοις* after *αὐτῷ* | *ουτος εστιν ο βασιλευς των ἰουδαιων* for *Ο ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣ ΤΩΝ ΙΟΥΔΑΙΩΝ ΟΥΤΟΣ* 39 add *λεγων* after *αὐτόν* | *ει* for *Οὐχί* | *καὶ αυτον* for *σεαυτον* 40 *επετειμα* for *ἐπιτιμῶν* | *λεγων* for *ἔφη* | *εσμεν* for *εἰ* 42 add *τω* before *Ἰησοῦ* | add *κυριε* after *μου* | *εν τη βασιλεια* for *εἰς τὴν βασιλείαν* 43 add *ο ιησους* after *αὐτῷ* | tr. to *λεγω σοι* | *σ* of *σήμερον* 1st hand over an erasure (of *τ*?) 44 *ην δε* for *Καὶ ἦν ἡδη* 45 *καὶ εσκοτισθη ο ηλιος* for *τοῦ ἡλίου ἐκλείποντος* | *καὶ εσχισθη* for *ἐσχίσθη* δὲ 47 *εκατονταρχος* for *ἐκατοντάρχης* | *εδόξασεν* for *ἐδόξαζεν* 48 *θεωρουντες* for *θεωρήσαντες* | add *αυτων* after *τύποντες* 49 *αυτου* for *αὐτῷ* | omit *ἀπὸ* | *συνακο-*

λουθησασαι for συνακολουθοῦσαι 51 αριμαθίας for Ἀριμαθαίας | add
 και after δς | add και αυτος after προσεδέχετο 53 tr. to αυτο ενευλιξεν |
 αυτο for αὐτόν | ουδεπω for οὐπω 54 παρασκευη for παρασκευῆς | omit
 και² | επιφανισκεν for ἐπέφωσκεν 55 omit αἱ | tr. to αυτω εκ της γαλιλαιας
 24:1 βαθεος for βαθέως | tr. to ηλθον (for ἦλθαν) επι το μνημα | add
 και τινες συν αυταις after ἀρώματα 3 και εισελθουσαι for εἰσελθοῦσαι δὲ
 4 διαπορισθαι for ἀπορεῖσθαι | αισθησειςιν αστραπτουσais for ἐσθῆτι
 ἀστραπτούση 5 ενφοβων for ἐμφόβων | το προσωπον for τὰ πρόσωπα |
 ειπον for εἶπαν 6 ανεστη for ἡγέρθη 7 tr. to οτι δει τον υἱον του
 ανθρωπου 10 omit ἦσαν δὲ | ἰωαννα for Ἰωάννα 11 αυτων for ταῦτα
 12 εαυτον for αὐτόν 13 tr. to ησαν πορευομενοι εν αυτη τη ημερα
 14 add περι παντων 1st hand after ὠμίλουν: later dotted for deletion
 15 add ο before Ἰησοῦς 17 εσται for ἐστάθησαν 18 add ο before εἰς |
 ὠ ονομα for ὄνοματι 19 ειπον for εἶπαν | ναζωραιου for Ναζαρηνοῦ
 20 tr. to αυτον παρεδωκαν 21 συμπασιν for καὶ σὺν πᾶσιν | add σημερον
 after ἀγει 22 ορθειναι 1st hand for ὀρθιναί: 2d hand ορθρειναι
 23 ηλθον for ἦλθαν 24 απηλθον for ἀπῆλθαν | add και after καθὼς | ουχ
 for οὐκ 27 διερμηνευειν for διερμήνευσεν | αυτου for ἐαυτοῦ 28 προσε-
 ποιειτο for προσεποιήσατο | πορρωτερω for πορρώτερον 29 εσπερας for
 ἐσπέραν | omit ἤδη 30 κατακεισθαι for κατακλιθῆναι | omit λαβὼν τὸν ἄρτον
 32 ειπον for εἶπαν | add εν ημιν after ἦν | add και before ὥς² 33 ὑψε-
 στρεψαν for ὑπέστρεψαν | συνηθροισμενους for ἡθροισμένους 34 omit
 δυτως 1st hand: supplied by 2d above και 35 το for τὰ 36 αυτοις ο
 ιησους for αὐτοῖς | add εγω ειμει μη φοβεισθαι before Εἰρήνη 37 φοβη-
 θεντες for πτοηθέντες | ενφοβοι for ἔμφοβοι 38 ταις καρδιαις for τῇ
 καρδίᾳ 39 ειδετε for ἴδετε | omit μου² | tr. to αυτος εγω ειμει | omit με |
 με for ἐμὲ 40 επεδειξεν for ἔδειξεν 41 τη for τῆς 44 αυτοις for πρὸς
 αὐτοῖς | omit μου | omit τοῖς 46 add και ουτως εδει after γέγραπται
 47 και for εἰς¹ | αρξαμενον for ἀρξάμενοι 48 add δε εσται after ὑμεῖς
 49 tr. to εγω ἴδον | αποστελλω for ἐξαποστέλλω | add ἱερουσαλημ' after
 πόλει | tr. to δυναμιν ἐξ υψους 50 add εξω before ἕως | omit πρὸς:
 2d hand supplied εις before Βηθανίαν | βηθανιας 1st hand, βηθανιαν
 2d | omit αὐτοῦ | ηυλογησεν for εὐλόγησεν 53 add αιουντες και before
 εὐλογοῦντες

ευαγγελιον

κατα λουκαν

ευαγγελιον κατα μαρκον

Mark 1:1 add ὕἱον θεου after Χριστοῦ 2 ως for Καθὼς | τοῖς προφη-
 tais for τῷ Ἑσαίᾳ τῷ προφήτῃ | add ἐγὼ after Ἰδοὺ 3 ποιεῖται for
 ποιεῖτε | after αὐτοῦ add πασα φαραγὲ πληρωθησεται και παν ορος και
 βουνος ταπινωθησεται και εσται παντα τα σκολια εις ευθειαν και η
 τραχεια εις πεδιον κα' οφθησεται η δοξα κυριου και οψεται πασα σαρξ το
 σωτηριον του θεου οτι κυριος ελαλησεν φωνη λεγοντος βοησον και ειπα τι
 βοησω οτι πασα σαρξ χορτος και πασα η δοξα αυτης ως ανθος χορτου
 εξηρανθη ο χορτος και το ανθος εξεπεσεν το δε ρημα κυριου μενει εις τον
 αιωνα 4 add και before ἐγένετο | ἰωαννης for Ἰωάννης | omit ὁ | add και
 before κηρύσσω 5 tr. to και εβαπτίζοντο παντες | tr. to εν τῷ ἰορδανῇ
 (omit ποταμῷ) ὑπ' αυτου 6 ην δε ἰωαννης for καὶ ἦν ὁ Ἰωάννης | ην αισθιων
 for εσθων 7 του υποδηματος for τῶν υποδημάτων 8 add μεν after
 ἐγὼ | add εν before ὕδατι | βαπτιση for βαπτίσει | add εν before πνεύματι
 9 εγενετο δε for ΚΑΙ ΕΓΕΝΕΤΟ | add και before ἦλθεν | ναζαρεθ for
 Ναζαρετ | tr. to ὑπο ἰωαννου εις τον ἰορδανην 10 ευθως for εἰθὺς |
 καταβαινον απο του ουρανου ωσει περιστεραν for ὡς περιστερὰν κατα-
 βαῖνον | και μενον επ αυτον for εἰς αὐτόν 11 του ουρανου for τῶν
 οὐρανῶν | ω for σοί | ηυδοκησα for εὐδόκησα 13 add εκει after ἦν | μ for
 τεσσεράκοντα 14 μετα δε for Καὶ μετὰ | omit ὁ before Ἰησοῦς | add της
 βασιλειας after εὐαγγελιον 15 των ουρανων for τοῦ θεοῦ 16 περιπατων
 δε for Καὶ παράγων | ἶδεν for εἶδεν | αυτου for Σίμωνος | add αμφιβλησ-
 τρον after ἀμφιβάλλοντας | αλεις for ἀλειεῖς 17 omit ὁ | αλεις for
 ἀλειεῖς 18 ευθως for εἰθὺς 20 omit εἰθὺς | add ευθως before ἀφέντες |
 tr. to μετα των μισθων εν τῷ πλοιῷ | ηκολουθησαν αυτω for ἀπῆλθον
 ὀπίσω αὐτοῦ 21 ευθως for εἰθὺς 23 omit εἰθὺς 24 συ for σοί | tr. to
 ημας απολεσαι | add ωδε after ἀπολέσαι 25 και ειπεν for ὁ Ἰησοῦς
 λέγων | εκ του ανθρωπου πνευμα ακαθαρτον for ἐξ αὐτοῦ 26 και εξηλθεν
 το πνευμα σπαραξαν αυτον και ανεκραγεν φωνη μεγαλη και απηλθεν απ
 αυτου for και σπαράξαν αὐτόν τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἀκάθαρτον καὶ φωνήσαν
 φωνῇ μεγάλῃ ἐξῆλθεν ἐξ αὐτοῦ 27 εθαυμαζον παντες και συνεζητουν
 προς εαυτους λεγοντες for ἐθαμβήθησαν ἅπαντες ὥστε συζητεῖν αὐτοὺς
 λέγοντας | τις η διδαχη η κενη αυτη η εξουσιαστικη αυτου και οτι for
 τί ἐστιν τοῦτο; διδαχὴ καινή κατ' ἐξουσίαν και 28 omit εἰθὺς 29 εξελ-
 θων δε εκ της συναγωγης ηλθεν for Καὶ εἰθὺς ἐκ τῆς συναγωγῆς ἐξελθόν-
 τες ἦλθαν | add και ἰακωβου after Ἰακώβου 30 tr. to κατεκειτο δε η
 πενθερα σιμωνος | omit εἰθὺς 31 εκτινας την χειρα και επιλαβομενος

ηγειρεν αυτην for ηγειρεν αυτην κρατήσας τῆς χειρός | αυτω for αυτοῖς
 32 εδυ for ἔδυσεν | omit καὶ τοὺς δαιμονιζομένους 33 η πολεις ολη
 συνηγμενη ην προς τας θυρας for ην ὅλη ἡ πόλις ἐπισυνηγμένη πρὸς τὴν
 θύραν 34 add απ αυτων after ἐξέβαλεν 35 omit πρωι | omit λιαν | omit
 ἐξῆλθεν καὶ | και εκει for κάκει 36 κατεδιωξαν for κατεδίωξεν 37 λεγοντες
 for καὶ εἶρον αὐτὸν καὶ λέγουσιν | omit ὅτι | tr. to ζητουσιν σε παντες
 38 omit ἀλλαχού | κηρυσσιν for ἵνα καὶ ἐκεῖ κηρύξω | εληλιθα for ἐξῆλθον
 39 ην for ἦλθεν | omit καὶ τὰ δαιμόνια ἐκβάλλων 40 omit γονυπετών |
 omit αὐτῷ ὅτι | add κυριε before Ἐάν 41 ο δε ιησους for καί | tr. to
 ηψατο αυτου | λεγων for καὶ λέγει αὐτῷ 42 ευθews for εἵθυς | omit καὶ
 ἐκαθερίσθη 43 omit καὶ ἐμβριμησάμενος αὐτῷ εἵθυς ἐξέβαλεν αὐτόν
 44 omit μηδεν | δειξον εαυτον for σεαυτὸν δεῖξον | καθαρισιου for καθαρισμοῦ |
 ο for δ 45 omit πολλὰ | omit αὐτὸν | αλλ for ἀλλὰ

2:1 παλιν ερχεται for εἰσελθὼν πάλιν | omit δι' ἡμερῶν | add και
 before ἡκούσθη 2 omit μηδὲ τὰ πρὸς τὴν θύραν | προς αυτους for αυτοῖς
 3 add ἴδου ανδρες before ἔρχονται | προς αυτον βασταζοντες εν κρεβαττω
 for φέροντες πρὸς αὐτόν | omit αἰρόμενον ὑπὸ τεσσάρων 4 προσελθειν
 for προσενέγκαι | απο του οχλου for διὰ τὸν ὄχλον | omit ἐξορύξαντες |
 εις ον for ὅπου 5 ἴδων δε for καὶ ἰδὼν | αφewνται for ἀφίενται 7 add
 λεγοντες before τί | ουτως for οὕτω | βλασφημιας for βλασφημεί |
 αφειναι for ἀφίεναι 8 omit εἵθυς | omit αὐτοῦ | omit οὕτως | omit ἐν
 εαυτοῖς | omit ταῦτα 9 add γαρ after τί | omit τῷ παραλυτικῷ | αφew
 νται for Ἀφίενται | εγειρε for Ἐγείρου | omit καὶ ἄρον τὸν κράβαττόν
 σου 10 omit ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς 11 omit Σοὶ λέγω | add και before ἄρον
 12 ο δε εγερωεις for καὶ ἡγέρθη | omit εἵθυς | add αυτου after ἄρας |
 εμπροσθεν παντων απηλθεν for ἐξῆλθεν εμπροσθεν πάντων | θαυμαζειν
 αυτους for ἐξίστασθαι πάντας | omit λέγοντας | ειδον for εἶδαμεν 14 του
 τελωνιου for τὸ τελώνιον | ηκολουθει for ἡκολούθησεν 15 ανακειμενων
 αυτων for κατακεῖσθαι αὐτόν | omit αὐτοῦ, καὶ | ηκολουθησαν for ἡκο-
 λούθουν 16 omit ἰδόντες ὅτι ἐσθίει μετὰ τῶν ἀμαρτωλῶν καὶ τελωνῶν |
 δια τι for Ὅτι 17 omit αὐτοῖς ὅτι | αλλα for ἀλλ' | εληλιθα for ἦλθον
 18 μαθηται των φαρισαιων for Φαρισαῖοι | omit οἱ μαθηται² 19 omit ὁ
 Ἰησοῦς | νυμφιοι for υἱοί: νυμ 1st hand over an erasure | omit ὅσον χρόνον
 εχουσιν τὸν νυμφίον μετ' αὐτῶν οὐ δύνανται νηστεῖν: 21 επισυναπτι for
 ἐπιράπτει | ἱματω παλαιω for ἐπὶ ἱμάτιον παλαιόν | tr. to απ αυτου το
 πληρωμα | πλειω for χεῖρον 22 add αλλ εις καινους after παλαιούς |
 διαρρησσονται οι ασκοι for ῥήξει ὁ οἶνος τοὺς ἀσκούς | εκχειται for

ἀπόλλυται | add ἀπολλυνται after ἀσκοί | add βαλλουσιν after καινούς
 23 πορευεσθαι for διαπορεύεσθαι | εσπαρμένων for σπορίμων | τίλλειν for
 ὀδὸν ποιεῖν τίλλοντες 24 οἱ δε for καὶ οἱ | εἶδε for Ἴδε 25 οὐδε τοῦτο
 for Οὐδέποτε | ο for τί 1st hand: τι 2d hand | -ετ αυτ- of μετ' αὐτοῦ
 1st hand, over an erasure 26 εἰσελθων for εἰσῆλθεν | omit ἐπὶ
 Ἀβιάβαρ ἀρχιερέως καὶ | tr. to εἶφαγεν τοὺς ἄρτους τῆς προθεσεως | καὶ
 ἔδωκεν καὶ τοῖς μετ' αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἐξεστὶν φαγεῖν εἰ μὴ τοῖς ἱερευσιν for
 οὐς οὐκ ἐξεστὶν φαγεῖν εἰ μὴ τοὺς ἱερεῖς, καὶ ἔδωκεν καὶ τοῖς σὺν αὐτῷ
 οὖσιν 27 λεγῶ δε ὑμῖν οτι for καὶ ἔλεγεν αὐτοῖς | ἐκτισθῇ for ἐγένετο |
 omit καὶ οὐχ ὁ ἄνθρωπος διὰ τὸ σάββατον

3:1 εἰσελθοντος αὐτοῦ for εἰσῆλθεν πάλιν | add τὴν after εἰς | ἐρχε-
 ται ἄνθρωπος πρὸς αὐτὸν for καὶ ἦν ἐκεῖ ἄνθρωπος | ἐχων ξηραν for ἐξηραμ-
 μένην ἔχων 2 παρετηρουντο for παρετήρουν | θεραπευεῖ for θεραπεύσει |
 omit αὐτόν² 3 tr. to ἐχοντι τὴν χεῖρα | ἐκ τοῦ μέσου for εἰς τὸ μέσον
 4 ἀγαθὸν ποιῆσαι for ἀγαθοποιῆσαι | ου for κακοποιῆσαι | ἀπολεσαι for
 ἀποκτεῖναι 5 περιβλεψάμενος δε for καὶ περιβλεψάμενος | omit συνλυ-
 πούμενος 6 ἐξελθοντες δε for Καὶ ἐξελθόντες | omit εἰθὺς | συνβουλῖον
 for συμβούλιον | ἐποιουντο for ἐδίδουν 7 ο δε for Καὶ ὁ | tr. to ἀνεχω-
 ρησεν μετὰ τῶν μαθητῶν αὐτοῦ | omit ἠκολούθησεν | omit ἀπὸ² 8 omit
 καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἰδουμαίας | σιδωνα for Σιδῶνα | ἠκολούθουν αὐτῷ for πλῆθος
 πολὺ | ἐποιεῖ for ποιεῖ | omit ἦλθαν πρὸς αὐτόν 10 ἐθεραπευεν for
 ἐθεράπευσεν | ἐπεπιπτον for ἐπιπίπτειν | αὐτοῦ after ἵνα is changed by 2d
 hand to αὐτῷ 11 τὰ πνεύματα δε for καὶ τὰ πνεύματα | ἴδον for ἐθεώρουν |
 λεγοντες for λέγοντα ὅτι 12 omit πολλὰ | ποιῶσιν for ποιήσωσιν
 13 ἀναβας for ἀναβαίνει | omit καὶ² | προσεκαλεσατο for προσκαλεῖται |
 omit αὐτός 14 ιβ μαθητας for δώδεκα | tr. to ἵνα ὦσιν μετ' αὐτοῦ οὐς καὶ
 ἀποστόλους ὠνομασεν | omit καὶ² | ἀποστιλῇ for ἀποστέλλῃ | add τὸ
 εὐαγγέλιον after κηρύσσειν 15 ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς for ἔχειν | add θεραπευεῖν
 τὰς νοσοῦς² καὶ after ἐξουσίαν | καὶ περιαγοντας κηρύσσειν τὸ εὐαγγέλιον
 for καὶ ἐποίησεν τοὺς δώδεκα 16 omit τῷ 17 κῶνως δε αὐτοὺς ἐκαλε-
 σεν for καὶ Ἰακώβον τὸν τοῦ Ζεβεδαίου καὶ Ἰωάννην τὸν ἀδελφὸν τοῦ
 Ἰακώβου καὶ ἐπέθηκεν αὐτοῖς ὄνομα | βοανηργε for Βοανηργές
 18, 19 ἦσαν δε οὗτοι σιμων καὶ ἀνδρεᾶς Ἰακώβος καὶ ἰωαννης φιλιππος
 καὶ μαρθολομεος καὶ ματθεος καὶ θωμᾶς καὶ Ἰακώβος ὁ τοῦ ἀλφαιου καὶ
 σιμων ὁ κανανεος καὶ ἰουδας Ἰσκαριωτης ὁ καὶ παραδους αὐτὸν² for καὶ
 Ἀνδρέαν καὶ Φίλιππον καὶ Βαρθολομαῖον καὶ Ματθαῖον καὶ Θωμᾶν καὶ
 Ἰακώβον τὸν τοῦ Ἀλφαίου καὶ Θαδδαῖον καὶ Σίμωνα τὸν Καναναῖον καὶ

Ἰούδαν Ἰσκαριώθ, ὃς καὶ παρέδωκεν αὐτόν. 20 omit ὁ 21 περι αὐτου
 οι γραμματεῖς καὶ οι λοιποὶ for οἱ παρ' αὐτοῦ | ελεγον for ἔλεγον | εξη-
 ρηται αὐτου for ἐξέστη 22 omit οἱ¹ | tr. to οι απο ἱεροσολυμων κατα-
 βατες γραμματις | βεελζεβουλ for Βεεζεβούλ | τον αρχοντα for καὶ ὅτι
 ἐν τῷ ἔρχοντι | add καὶ δι αὐτου before ἐκβάλλει 23 ειπεν αυτοις εν
 παραβολαις for ἐν παραβολαῖς ἔλεγεν αὐτοῖς 25 καν for καὶ ἐάν | δυνα-
 ται for δυνήσεται | omit ἡ οἰκία ἐκείνη | σταθηναι for στήναι 26 εαν for
 εἰ | omit ἀνέστη | omit καὶ² | σταθηναι for στήναι | add ἡ βασιλεια αὐτου
 before ἀλλὰ 27 ουδεις δυναται for ἀλλ' οὐ δύναται οὐδεις | τα σκευη
 του ἰσχυρου διαρπασαι εἰσελθων εἰς την οικειαν for εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν τοῦ
 ἰσχυροῦ εἰσελθὼν τὰ σκεύη αὐτοῦ διαρπάσαι | τα σκευη for τὴν οἰκίαν³ |
 διαρπαση for διαρπάσει 28 tr. to τα αμαρτηματα αφεθησεται τοις
 υἱοις των ανθρωπων | omit ὅσα ἐάν βλασφημήσωσιν 29 omit εἰς¹ |
 omit εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα | αμαρτίας for ἀμαρτήματος 30 εχειν αὐτον for
 ἔχει 31 ερχεται for ἔρχονται | tr. to αὐτου ἡ μητηρ | εστωτες for στή-
 κοντες 32 στηκουσιν ζητουντες for ζητοῦσιν 33 ος δε απεκριθη καὶ
 ειπεν αυτοις for καὶ ἀποκριθεὶς αὐτοῖς λέγει | tr. to καὶ οι αδελφοι μου
 34 κυκλω αὐτου καθημενους τους μαθητας for τοὺς περὶ αὐτὸν κύκλῳ
 καθημένους | εἶδε for Ἴδε 35 add καὶ before ὃς | ποιη for ποιήσῃ | tr. to
 μου αδελφος

4:1 tr. to ἤρξατο πάλιν | προς for παρὰ | συνηχθη for συνάγεται |
 add το before πλοῖον | ενβαντα for ἐμβάντα | παρα τον αιγιαλον for ἐν τῇ
 θαλάσῃ | εν τῷ αιγιαλῳ ην for πρὸς τὴν θάλασσαν ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ἦσαν 2 omit
 πολλὰ | λεγων for καὶ ἔλεγεν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῇ διδαχῇ αὐτοῦ 4 omit ἐγένετο
 ἐν τῷ σπεῖρειν | το for ὁ | ορνεα for πετεινὰ 5 αλλα δε for καὶ ἄλλο | τα
 πετρωδη for τὰ πετρῶδες | οτι for ὅπου | ευθews for καὶ εὐθὺς | ανετειλε
 for ἐξανέτειλεν | omit διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν βάθος γῆς 6 ηλιου δε ανατιλαντος
 for καὶ ὅτε ἀνέτειλεν ὁ ἥλιος 7 αλλα for ἄλλο | επι for εἰς | αυτα for
 αὐτό | εδωκαν for ἔδωκεν 8 επεσαν for ἔπεσεν | εδιδει for ἐδίδου | αυξανο-
 μενον for αὐξανόμενα | φερει for ἔφερεν | το εν for εἰς | λ for τριάκοντα |
 add το before ἐν¹ | ξ for ἐξήκοντα | add το before ἐν² | ρ for ἑκατόν 9 ο
 εχων for Ὃς ἔχει 10 επηρωτησαν for ἠρώτων | οι μαθηται αὐτου for οἱ
 περὶ αὐτὸν σὺν τοῖς δώδεκα | τις η παραβολη αυτη for τὰς παραβολὰς
 11 λεγει for ἔλεγεν | tr. to δεδοται το μυστηριον | omit τὰ 12 omit
 βλέπωσι καὶ | omit ἀκούωσι καὶ | συνωσιν for συνίσωσιν 16 ουτοι δε for
 καὶ οὗτοι | omit ὁμοίως | οιτινες for οἱ | ευθews for εὐθὺς 17 καὶ for ἡ |
 add καὶ before εὐθὺς | σκανδαλιζεται 1st hand for σκανδαλίζονται:

changed by 2d hand to σκανδαλίζονται 18 οι δε for και ἄλλοι εἰσὶν οἱ |
 ακουοντες for ἀκούσαντες 19 βίου for αἰῶνος | ἀπᾶται for ἡ ἀπάτη |
 omit και αἱ περὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ἐπιθυμίαι | ἀκαρποὶ γίνονται for ἄκαρπος
 γίνεται 20 οὗτοι δε for και ἐκεῖνοι | πιπτοντες for σπαρέντες | καρπον
 φερουσιν for καρποφοροῦσιν | add το before ἐν thrice | λ for τριάκοντα |
 ξ for ἐξήκοντα | ρ for ἑκατόν 21 λεγει for ἔλεγεν | omit ὅτι | ο λυχνος
 καιεται for ἔρχεται ὁ λύχνος | ἀλλ' for οὐχ 22 οὐδεν for οὐ | ἀλλ' for
 ἐάν μῃ | tr. to eis φανερον ἐλθῃ 24 omit και προστεθῆσεται ὑμῖν
 26 add οταν before βάλῃ | omit τὸν | την γην for τῆς γῆς 27 ἐγειρεται
 for ἐγείρεται | μηκυνεται for μηκύνεται 28 add γαρ after αὐτομάτη |
 εἰτα for εἶπεν twice | πληρης ο σειτος for πλήρη σίτον 29 omit δὲ |
 παραδω for παραδοῖ | omit εἰθὺς 30 την παραβολην for αὐτὴν παρα-
 βολῇ | δωμεν for θῶμεν 31 κοκκον for κόκκῳ | σποταν for ὅς ὅταν | την
 γην for τῆς γῆς¹ | μικροτερον 1st hand: μικροτερος 2d | ὦν for ὃν
 32 omit και ὅταν σπαρῇ | αὖξει for ἀναβαίνει | λαχανων κ- 1st hand
 over an erasure | tr. to αὐτου ὑπο την σκιαν | κατασκηνουν for κατασκη-
 νοῦν 33 omit πολλαῖς | ἐδυναντο for ἡδύναντο 34 καθ εἰδιαν for κατ'
 ἰδίαν | μαθηταις αὐτου for ἰδίοις μαθηταῖς | αὐτας for πάντα 36 ἀφιουσιν
 for ἀφέντες | add και before παραλαμβάνουσιν | αμα πολλοι ησαν for
 ἄλλα πλοῖα ἦν 37 μεγαλου for μεγάλη | εἰσεβαλλεν for ἐπέβαλλεν |
 add αὐτο after ὥστε | omit τὸ πλοῖον² 38 tr. to ἦν αὐτος | omit τὸ |
 προσκεφαλαιου for προσκεφάλαιον | διεγειραντες for ἐγείρουσιν | omit
 και before λέγουσιν | omit αὐτῷ 39 ἐγερθεις for διεγερθεις | και τη
 θαλασση και εἰπεν for και εἶπεν τῇ θαλάσῃ | φιμωθῆτι for Σιώπα,
 πεφίμωσο | omit μεγάλη 40 λεγει for εἶπεν | οὕτως for οὕτω 41 η
 θαλασσα και οι ανεμοι ὑπακουουσιν for και ὁ ἀνεμος και ἡ θάλασσα ὑπακούει

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(To be concluded)

RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE

THE MYSTERY-RELIGIONS AND EARLY CHRISTIANITY

The influence of the Mystery-religions upon primitive Christianity has recently been treated in a monograph by Clemen¹ and a volume by Kennedy.² Clemen's brochure serves as a supplement to his *Religions-geschichtliche Erklärung des Neuen Testaments*, where this subject was scarcely noticed. The same painstaking scholarship which characterized the latter work is to be seen on every page of the present pamphlet. By way of introduction, the status of the Mystery-religions in the New Testament writers' world is set forth in meager outlines, with the conclusion that these movements were not generally effective in that period. No trace of their influence upon the early Palestinian Christian community is discovered. In Paul's case the possibility of a slight influence is admitted for such terms as *χρίων*, *σφραγίζεσθαι*, *πίστις*, *ὑπακοή*, *ἄγος*, "father" and "child" for teacher and pupil, and less probably *ἀδελφός*, *στίγματα*, and *σωτήρ*. So much for *terminology*. But in the realm of *ideas* Paul is entirely independent. He never thinks of baptism or of the Lord's Supper sacramentally, baptism for the dead being the only seeming exception (I Cor. 15:29). But Paul is held not to have been the author of this custom and not to have given it his approval. Those writers who make Paul indebted to the Mysteries are criticized (1) for importing into the latter ideas and practices which were not there at this date and (2) for unwarrantedly ascribing sacramentalism to Paul. Of the other New Testament writings, Mark and Matthew are found to be wholly free from this foreign influence. Acts' account of the conversion of Cornelius and of Paul may have been colored by similar stories in the Mysteries, but this conclusion is not compulsory. In the remaining New Testament books there are no sure evidences of similar obligations. The real influence of the Mystery-religions upon Christianity is placed in the second century, and first appears in Gnosticism.

Kennedy finds the Mysteries to have been more widely spread and more generally influential in New Testament times. In fact, they

¹ *Der Einfluss der Mysterienreligionen auf das älteste Christentum*. Von Carl Clemen. Giessen: Töpelmann, 1913. 88 pages. M. 3.40.

² *St. Paul and the Mystery-Religions*. By H. A. A. Kennedy. London, New York, and Toronto: Hodder & Stoughton, 1913. xviii+311 pages. 6s.

have already affected Judaism, particularly in the Diaspora, in the pre-Christian period. Next, their general character is described by taking as representative the Eleusinia, the cults of Cybele-Attis and of Isis-Serapis, and the Hermetic literature. Mithraism is ignored because assumed to have exerted no influence in Paul's world. The omission of the cults of Ishtar-Tammuz, Atargatis-Hadad, and Aphrodite-Adonis, which are associated closely with Syria and Cilicia, may not be serious, but one naturally thinks of this territory first in connection with much of Paul's life both before and after his conversion to Christianity. Yet the description of the Mysteries on the basis of the illustrations chosen shows how generally the Mystery conception of religion pervaded the life of that age. A fuller use of the available data would only have increased the intensity of this conviction. On turning to a consideration of Paul in relation to this world, we are told that he was practically uninfluenced by these religious surroundings. A detailed comparison of his *terminology* with that of the Mysteries results, our author thinks, in showing that it is "wholly superfluous" to seek from this source the explanation of Pauline usage. A similar study of Paul's *ideas* yields a like result, for only in the imagery and not in the essence is kinship to the Mysteries to be admitted. Likewise baptism and the Lord's Supper have a purely ethical and symbolical significance for Paul and are never sacramental, in the sense in which that term is used of the Mystery-religions.

Both of these authors have given us scholarly and valuable discussions of this very interesting subject. They employ quite similar methods and arrive at essentially the same conclusions. The method in each case is that of refutation rather than constructive investigation. Not that they fail to be constructive, but the whole trend of their discussion seems to be determined by a selection of opinions from other writers whom they wish to refute. This gives a reader the impression that it would have been quite unnecessary to treat this subject if its claims to attention had not been unduly pressed by writers like Reitzenstein. But the fundamental problem of the full extent and influence of the Mystery-religions in the first century and a genetic study of the early Christians' real vital contact with this situation do not seem to appeal to either of these authors as questions which need to be taken very seriously. In this they appear to have defined their task too narrowly, and so to have lessened the value of their work.

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A NEW EDITION OF MEYER'S ACTS

Fifteen years of research have necessitated the publication of the ninth edition of the Meyer commentary on the Acts of the Apostles.¹ It is Wendt's fourth attempt to solve the problems connected with Acts. The volume is not characterized by pronounced changes of opinion. Entire sections remain as they were. Occasionally a sentence is altered, omitted, or replaced. The preface acknowledges that Norden's *Agnostos Theos* has compelled the author to abandon the defense of the historicity of Paul's address at Athens. There is a more incisive division of material which should render the commentary more usable. The section concerned with sources has been much enlarged. But in general the conclusions previously advocated are rigidly adhered to. This result might have been anticipated. After such definite positions were taken in the eighth edition a reconstruction of view was scarcely to be expected.

The author of Acts, a gentile Christian of the post-apostolic generation, employed a principal source traceable to a companion of Paul. This source is not to be regarded as merely a diary of the apostle's friend, or as a biography of Paul. It also contained much information regarding events in the early history of the Christian church. The aim of the compiler was to provide a *devotional* history of the beginnings of the church. Wendt refuses to construct the source *in toto* but is quite positive that the ninth chapter was not found in it. As far as Paul is concerned, it began with the narrative of the so-called first missionary journey. It contained only a brief description of Paul's conversion now found in chap. 26. The other two descriptions of this central crisis in the life of the apostle are of only secondary value. And the source responsible for the later chapters of Acts is the continuation of the source underlying 15:35-41, 13, 14; 11:19 f.; 6:1-8:2; 5:12-15; 4:32-35; 2:43. The criticisms passed upon this theory by reviewers of the previous edition and the investigations of Harnack and others need no repetition.

Since Acts depends upon Josephus, its date of publication is fixed between 95-100 A.D. But Schürer's verdict on the question of this dependence was that "either Luke never read Josephus or immediately proceeded to forget all about having done so." The explanation proposed for the peculiar conclusion of Acts is that the source employed

¹ *Die Apostelgeschichte. Kritisch-exegetischer Kommentar über das Neue Testament begründet von Heinr. Wilh. Meyer. 9. Auflage. Von Hans Hinrich Wendt.* Göttingen: Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht, 1913. iv+370 pages. M. 8.

terminated at this point. Thus the compiler of Acts is accused of so slavishly copying his source as to fail to chronicle the rather essential fact that Paul died and yet, *mirabile dictu*, dares to add the ninth chapter. Surely the prominence given in recent years to the question of the conclusion of Acts deserved more thoroughgoing attention. Only a footnote contains information regarding the well-sustained argument for the "Western" reading of 13:8. A sentence or two showing the possible connection between "Western" renderings of 13:8; 24:27 and Josephus, *Ant.*, XX, vii, would have added to the value of the commentary. Six pages are devoted to a discussion of the apostolic decree. The decision is in favor of the four-clause text. This text is regarded as authentic. The Jerusalem gathering actually adopted a food regulation. The mistake of the compiler was in universalizing its significance by appending such a verse as 16:4. The decree was intended for a very limited area. But the solution of the difficulty by the elimination route is too easy. One feels that the argument against the "Eastern" text has not been appreciated, that the argument in favor of the "Western" text has not been refuted. Lake's points seem to have escaped the eye of Wendt. Although our commentator's conclusions occasionally appear untenable, the student is impressed with the careful sifting of the material and the air of genuineness which characterize his work.

C. H. MOEHLMANN

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STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF DOCTRINE

The timely dissertation of Dr. Stokes¹ traces the development of the "vision of a new and better moral order" from Augustine through Aquinas to Leibnitz, and in a closing chapter sets forth the relation of earlier conceptions to that of Kant. As none of these writers before Kant employs the phrase "kingdom of ends," Dr. Stokes operates with no scholastic definition, but indicates that the term usually refers to a "community whose purpose is the completest possible moral development of its members." As regards the *City of God*, she considers unfair the current interpretation which makes Augustine teach "that the state necessarily has its origin in fraud and violence, and that it is and must remain the creature of sin" (p. 27). The discussion of Augustine, though suggestive, neglects important recent literature, such as Maus-

¹ *The Conception of a Kingdom of Ends in Augustine, Aquinas, and Leibnitz*. By Ella Harrison Stokes. University of Chicago Press, 1912. iv+129 pages. \$0.75 net.

bach, *Die Ethik Augustins*. The typically Protestant chapter on "Aquinas and the Universal Church" criticizes the chief theorist of the Middle Ages for his "absolute exclusion of reconstructive influences from the mystic body or universal church by the static conception of the infallible authority of dogma and custom," but lauds as a "saving factor" in the system of Thomas the tremendous emphasis on reason, which tended to prepare bolder spirits for the position that whatever contradicts reason must necessarily be false. Thus Thomas is blamed for not being himself a modernist, praised because he unwittingly led others to become rationalists. The treatment of Leibnitz is far better.

In view of the extent of reading necessary in treating this ample theme, one may well overlook occasional vagueness of detail. It is impossible, however, not to regret that the author, carefully as she has noted references to the original sources, rarely tells where she is drawing on the secondary literature listed in her bibliography; many interesting generalizations dangle in the air. Courtesy to previous investigators, as well as the desire to render first aid to earnest but belated pilgrims on the Alpine passes of philosophy, should lead to the labeling of every bypath. As it is, we wander often on uncharted heights, guided merely by the *ipse dixit* of an accomplished *doctoranda*.

With canny antiquarianism Dr. Lehaut¹ has chosen, in these anti-modernistic days, to investigate a fifth-century controversy about the duration of future punishment. Three parties there were that denied the eternity of the pains of hell: the Origenists, the tender hearted, and the unbelievers. The disciples of Origen interpreted the biblical term *aiónios* so as to leave room for restorationism. The tender hearted maintained that some or all classes of sinners would ultimately find release from hell. The unbelievers offered two pagan objections: that a body cannot live in fire, and that justice demands that there be some proportion between the duration of the penalty and that of the fault. The Origenists and the tender hearted, Augustine discomfited by the scriptural proof (Isa. 66:24; Matt. 25:46), pointing out also that we have no firm foundation for the belief in everlasting life if we reject the biblical teaching concerning everlasting punishment. He who accepts the promises is bound to believe the threats: "Nemo dicat in corde suo: verum est quod promittit; falsum est quod minatur" (p. 13). The physical objection that bodies cannot burn forever Augustine met by an

¹ *L'Éternité des peines de l'enfer dans Saint Augustin* (Études de théologie historique publiées sous la direction des professeurs de théologie à l'Institut Catholique de Paris, 4). Par Achille Lehaut. Paris: G. Beauchesne, 1912. 205 pages. Fr. 5.

appeal to the omnipotence of God, who determines the course of nature; and the pagan argument that the duration of penalty should be proportioned to the duration of the sin, Augustine refuted by an appeal to human justice, which punishes sudden crime with life-imprisonment.

In setting forth what the great Bishop of Hippo himself believed, Dr. Lehaut examines first the practical application, in preaching and teaching, of the dogma of eternal punishment; then he sets forth Augustine's formal statements of that doctrine. In this portion of his book Dr. Lehaut sins against Gallic lucidity by quoting Latin by the page. He subordinates or passes over entirely various vital problems in Augustine's theology, such as the ethical quality of predestination to eternal death; he emphasizes rather the idea that punishment is the natural fruit of sin; and in connection with the *massa damnata*, hazards a few pages on the "solidarity which exists among the damned."

In his footnotes the author has revealed his method; they bristle with references to Migne's *Patrologia*, but refer only once (p. 47) to other collections or authors more recent than Iamblichus. By burrowing into the subterranean passages of Augustinianism he has doubtless smoothed the way for later investigators. Incidentally, by remaining in these depths of orthodoxy he escapes all serious contamination from the pestilential miasma of *Dogmengeschichte*.

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THE PROBLEM OF AUTHORITY¹

To his earlier apologetic works on the Christian religion President E. Y. Mullins has now added a vindication of the claims that "authority in religion," and particularly in Christianity, is consistent with freedom and is in fact organic to the fullest freedom. The controversy over authority is an inheritance from the early struggles between Protestants and Catholics, when the former smote Catholicism with the very weapon it had fashioned in its own interest—authority—by finding authority in the Bible and not in the church. Despite an occasional resurgence of the struggle, public interest in the operation has gradually subsided, partly because the calmness which results from prolonged experience and reflection has enabled us to see that the truth of the matter was in part expressed and in part concealed by both sides, and partly because the

¹ *Freedom and Authority in Religion*. By Edgar Young Mullins. Philadelphia: Griffith & Rowland, 1913. 404 pages. \$1.50.

conviction has been growing that the idea of authority is alien to religion, and controversy over the question of the seat of authority must be fruitless, because meaningless. President Mullins does not agree with this tendency, apparently, because he regards the general abandonment of the claim for authority as an unfortunate outcome of the intrusion of the methods and assumptions of natural science into a realm where they are inapplicable (see pp. 126 ff., 267, etc.). Hence the book.

The discussions are distinctly controversial, even polemical, in method. A great number of representative thinkers are called up, their positions ably and clearly summarized, their most vulnerable points exposed and promptly and decisively pronounced upon. The views criticized are rarely presented in the language of their representatives. This is perhaps on account of the want of space but it tends to raise a doubt whether the reader is in possession of the exact doctrine in each case. The author makes abundant use of paradox, metaphor, and epigram. His vocabulary is Anglo-Saxon, his sentences are short and crisp, and his style has a brilliance and dash unusual in books on theology. There is a tendency under such circumstances to make sweeping statements and overstatements, and Mullins has not altogether escaped it. For example, on p. 346 he says: "But the scientific critic, asserting that they [i.e., the Old Testament writers] were men like ourselves *without capacity for the infinite and influenced in their views by tradition and environment*, alleges that they *simply give us one variety of human thought about God* and not authoritative truth on the subject." (Italics are mine.) How many scientific critics would agree to the first and third italicized expressions? Would Mullins himself deny the second? On p. 353 we read: "Who and what was Jesus Christ? This is the permanent question of rationalism." Is it specifically the rationalist and not every thoughtful religious man that asks this question? Again, on pp. 356 f., it is said: "The spiritual life behind and underneath, along with the apostolicity of the books, was the guiding principle in the formation of the New Testament canon, not plenary ecclesiastical authority." Granting the truth in the positive portion of this statement, what church historian would accept the negative position? Continuing: "This does not at all make of the Christian consciousness the ultimate authority. It is not as if men apart from God fixed the canon." Waiving the question whether the idea he here negatives is not the precise equivalent of the positive part of his own statement, one might ask: Who is there that means by "the Christian consciousness" "men apart from God"?

This manner of putting a case is rather characteristic. However, these are blemishes that have attached themselves to this very powerful work through the strength of conviction and enthusiasm of the writer and the apparent rapidity of his composition. He never hesitates or doubts; he does not question but affirms; he pronounces judgments and the undertone of authority is always audible. Opinions as to the underlying purport of the book will vary. Some will regard it as a vindication of the traditional view of inspiration, others may regard it as an attempt to mediate some modern views to the author's large conservative constituency, others again may see in it an effort to combine the new philosophy of pragmatism with the old theology, and still others may see in it an attack upon a dangerous "subjectivism" of which the author mistakenly thinks Schleiermacher the source. After reading carefully the whole work I am uncertain; but I think that the first and third of these suppositions are the best.

Turning now to the treatment of the subject, we find first a discussion of "the modern ideal of freedom." Remarking that "all philosophic roads naturally lead to individualism, or are made to do so," Mullins accepts "the beneficence of the modern movement" but thinks it must be "combined with the restraint necessary to human welfare." The latter has been carried to the extreme in Roman Catholicism, where "the principle of authority becomes absolute" and cancels individualism. The opposite principle, represented by Schleiermacher and Sabatier, has its roots in the early Christian centuries and has now a "leavening influence on all Protestant countries." It is designated "subjectivism." It affirms the supremacy of the Christian consciousness in religion and its method in theology coincides with the method of physical science. Mullins thinks it is "absolute individualism," that it affirms that "nothing is worthy of belief unless a man has discovered it himself." If this correctly represented the views of modern thinkers then there would seem to be no need of argument. He says it represents the complete intellectualizing of religion. In opposition to the "mobility" which subjectivists ascribe to the religious life as its chief characteristic, Mullins says that, to achieve the progressive realization of the religious ideal, "truth must become static in very large measure." How and where shall this static truth be discovered—rather, made known? is the question the answer to which is the thesis of this book.

The author gives a double answer to the question. The first answer draws attention to the creative power of life and its issue in the erection of standards according to which life is hereafter to be guided and pro-

moted: "All human experience inevitably becomes socialized. Its outward expansions take the form of laws and institutions and traditions and canons, rules of action which inevitably become authoritative for society. The particular form assumed is determined by the sphere in which it arises, and the nature of the resultant authority corresponds. Now it is clear that the same law holds in religion as elsewhere" (p. 40). "There arises, then, an external expression of reality or truth or power which is indispensable and binding." Thus authoritative statements (doctrines) of religious truth arise.

Here we reach the author's pragmatism, according to which "knowledge of reality is conceived voluntaristically." It is a very promising phase of the author's thought. In this connection many noble and exalted utterances are made by him, such as: "Religion is not and never was based on logical deductions from the world about us." "In religious experience . . . we enter a world of new realities." "It is its power to give man this kind of knowledge and experience which is the distinct and magic quality in the Christian religion." "The only [?] method of proof here is that of immediate contact with God, the immediate experience of the power we crave, the exemption from sin and its power we so much need" (pp. 162-64). Here he seems to be in precise agreement with Schleiermacher and Clarke and other "subjectivists" whom he wrongly characterizes as saying, "Nothing is worthy of acceptance in religion save that which the individual can and does *intellectually* assimilate for himself" (p. 178). I have italicized the word which it was necessary for the author to use if he was not himself to be classed as a subjectivist, but many of the so-called subjectivists would oppose this view as strongly as he.

But this view of the author's does not suffice for him. Pragmatism knows no absolute, and when that is gone final authority, static reality, static truth, abiding norms depart also. Moreover, the canons of truth reached in this way are only "working principles"—too much like the working hypothesis of science, for which authority is only relative or figurative. Hence the author has recourse to another method.

This is to find a realm from which the methods and presuppositions of science are excluded. "Science," in the author's estimation, appears to be identical with the "exact sciences" or those whose inductions can be expressed in mathematical equations. The affirmation of another realm is made possible by showing first that, according to the self-consciousness of Jesus, "he lived on another plane from ours." Here two important considerations are overlooked—first, that we have no

other way of comprehending the self-consciousness of Jesus but *through* the *Christian consciousness* of those who gave to us the first reflections of his consciousness, namely, the authors of the New Testament narratives and the epistles; second, that to put Jesus on some other plane than that of the moral and religious consciousness in which men live is not to elevate him but to degrade him, since it puts him in a place in which he cannot truly be God to us, for no being can be God to the Christian if we cannot have moral and religious oneness with him.

The next step is to show that there are "intractable residues of science," or "ultimate essences or forms of reality which lie beyond the sphere of exact science." Science deals with manifestations only, but there are "realities behind the manifestations with which religion is concerned." There is a *plus* when science has reached its limits. Science depends on continuity. Here continuity is broken. The query rises: Does religion depend on discontinuity? If so, it abandons the normal, its "laws," too, have limited range, and "authority" itself ceases to be absolute. It appears, then, that authority is saved by Mullins only by splitting the world in two. Science has its world, but the intractable residues belong to another world. This dualism is not an inference of the reviewer, it is an affirmation of the author. The dualism must be moral also. We naturally meet at length the affirmation that Jesus opens to men a way of "escape from the prison-house of the cosmos" (p. 316). Here we meet an evidence that authority-religion involves the view of the world and of life held by mysticism and Catholicism.

The views presented as to the nature of authority, and the authority of Christ and the Bible, can easily be inferred from the above. The authority can be tested, it is granted, but only by the "spiritually competent." Others may accept the truths of revelation "simply as the consensus of the spiritually competent." But how shall the rest of us know that these are actually the spiritually competent? Only the spiritually competent can tell. Only the Pope knows that the Pope is infallible. Pure mysticism or pure legalism is the alternative. The author seems to accept the latter—"for the filial is higher than the legal as the apex is higher than the base of the pyramid. But the apex needs the base" (p. 388)—unless the expression be a slip.

It might be said on the other hand that when the author seems to forget his controversy he often rises to a grandeur and impressiveness of utterance on the subject of our human relations to God and to Christ, with all of which the reviewer deeply sympathizes. Disrobed of an inherited ecclesiastical vestment the work would be a worthy contribution to our religious life.

One lays down the book with the feeling that the debate on authority (in any but a figurative sense) in religion, if once begun among Protestants, becomes interminable until we see that it is ultimately meaningless, because it is an attempt to combine two incommensurables.

GEORGE CROSS

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PERIODICAL LITERATURE

"Das Problem der Entstehung des Christentums" (Johannes Weiss in *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, XVI [1913], 423-515).

At the outset the author states that the "origin" of Christianity, in the historical sense of the word, does not presuppose an absolutely new creation. In history as in nature the "new" is on the whole always a "corralling" of older elements according to a new principle and on the basis of a new experience of reality. Chief attention is given to these elements of newness in Christianity's origin; environmental items receive only secondary consideration. Three main topics are discussed: (1) the messianic movement in Jesus' lifetime; (2) the origin of the primitive community's messianic faith; and (3) the Christ-cult of the heathen communities. Weiss concludes that Jesus had preached his own messiahship, in the eschatological sense, but that he had also found in this realm ample room for the cultivation of a rich religious experience in the present. While by his preaching he had stimulated the disciples to belief in his messiahship, their faith would probably not have survived the shock of his death had not his own personal religious influence upon them been so strong. Thus the messianic faith of the first community goes back to the force of Jesus' own personality. Likewise the gospel of Paul rests upon the conviction that the heavenly Lord and the earthly Jesus are the same person who in unprecedented love and humility gave himself for us on the cross. Paul's Christology, however, is also rich in gnostic mythological traits as well as philosophical conceptions which were prevalent in his environment but which have nothing to do with the earthly Jesus yet Paul is always conscious that the heavenly Son of God, the heavenly Man, could complete his work of redemption only in the form of the earthly and historical Jesus. Paul had no close personal contact with this Jesus, yet he will have derived much from this source at second hand. Likewise the faith of the heathen community, though based upon no personal acquaintance of Jesus, rested upon the enthusiasm of the missionaries and the convincing power of their message. And faith in the heavenly Christ was strengthened by the historical consciousness that this Lord was the Jesus who had died in Jerusalem. Thus he furnished gentile Christians that ideal of suffering and martyrdom which helped to make the new religion a world-conquering faith.

"St. Paul in Arabia" (R. W. Balleine in the *Interpreter*, X, No. 1 [October, 1913], 81-89).

The writer divides his inquiry concerning Paul's visit to Arabia into four heads: (1) occasion, (2) duration, (3) location, (4) purpose.

1. Luke omits mention of the visit probably because he thought it not worth mentioning rather than that he was ignorant of it. The only place the "immediately" of Paul in Gal. 1:17 could be inserted in Acts is before the preaching in the synagogues.

The departure to Arabia is therefore the first recorded act of the apostle after his baptism.

2. The "three years after my return to Damascus" (Gal. 1:18) must include the visit to Arabia plus the events in Damascus (Acts 9:20-25). The two stages of Jewish feeling toward Paul, (a) amazement (vss. 21, 22) and (b) organized opposition (vss. 23-25), and the "many days" by which Luke indicates the interval between them require a reasonable period in Damascus *after* the return from Arabia. The visit in Arabia could therefore be nothing approaching three years and was probably only a few weeks.

3. The retirement was into the desert in the immediate neighborhood of Damascus. The lonely Harras to the east of the Leja, a suggestion of G. A. Smith, fits the situation. Josephus identifies Arabia with the kingdom of Nabataea which territory included the Sinaitic peninsula. This corroborates "Sinai is a mountain in Arabia" of Gal. 4:25. The silence of Luke suggests that the visit was a mere incident in the stay at Damascus and so favors this location. The writer argues at length against the rival theory of Bishop Lightfoot which identifies Arabia with Sinai.

4. The purpose of the visit must have been for solitude and meditation to readjust his mental attitude to the new revelation. The silence of Luke again is evidence that it had no missionary purpose, while a gentile mission within a few days of his conversion is psychologically impossible and out of keeping with Acts 13:46 ff.

"The Resurrection in the Gospels and in St. Paul" (G. W. Wade in the *Interpreter*, X, No. 1 [October, 1913], 43-52).

Of the two main sources for the resurrection in the New Testament, that of the Gospels and that of the epistles of St. Paul, the latter is much the earlier. Paul's ideas of the resurrection are to be inferred from I Cor., chap. 15. It would seem that St. Paul thought of the resurrection body, not as a dead body transformed, but as a new body created by God as an appropriate organ for the spirit in its new non-terrestrial conditions. Paul's reasoning implies that the natural body stays in the grave, that the spirits receive from God other bodies, and into his idea of the resurrection the thought of the empty tomb does not seem to enter.

This idea of the spiritual resurrection body seems quite inconsistent with the tangibility ascribed to the risen Lord by the evangelists. The gospel narratives taken as a whole present discrepancies in the mingled materiality and immateriality which pervades the writer's conceptions of the resurrection body. This suggests the modification of the earliest versions of the resurrection appearance under the influence of the Jewish belief in the literal resurrection of the body (II Macc. 7:10, 11; 14:46).

The writer deduces further considerations in preference for the Pauline view, which, as countenancing no other continuity than the persistence of the personality, he thinks renders faith easier for some minds, and removes certain difficulties which attach to the idea of the resurrection of the physical body as concerning our Lord and the physical resurrection of mankind in general.

"The Stoning at Lystra and the Epistle to the Galatians" (F. W. Crafer in the *Expositor*, 8th Series, Vol. VI, No. 34 [October, 1913], 375-89).

The writer advances a theory with reference to the stoning at Lystra which would attach to that event a new importance in its bearing on the Galatian problem. It is the writer's opinion that the stoning at Lystra made the arduous journey through the

wilds of the Isaurus and the fastnesses of the Taurus impracticable for Paul, so that instead of pursuing his way southeast from Derbe to Tarsus his zeal found vent in a slow and easy traversing of the old ground. According to this supposition the apostle evangelized the cities of Galatia not when being hunted from town to town on his outward journey but on his more leisurely and effective return. Hence the words of Paul, "Because of infirmity of the flesh I preached unto you at the first" (Gal. 4:13). Thus also is to be understood Gal. 4:14, 15. Disfigured and bandaged as he was after his recent experience, instead of their treating such an unseemly preacher with that loathing which the ancient world felt toward the maimed and unsightly, they received him as an angel of the Lord, and, had it been possible, would have plucked out their very eyes to have given to him:

The theory is supported with further considerations and suggestions and the conclusion drawn that if Paul is able in writing to the Galatians to refer to events which happened at Lystra, this region must have been the center of the Galatian churches. This involves the assumption that the epistle was written to a small community and was not a manifesto to South Galatia. This again carries with it an early date for the epistle; for, contrary to the ordinary assumption that the Judaizing mission extended from Perga to Derbe, if the Galatians lived in the district of Lystra a small and speedy mission of Judaizers might have done the mischief.

"The Historical Trustworthiness of the Book of Acts" (H. H. Wendt in the *Hibbert Journal*, XII, No. 1 [October, 1913], 141-61).

The historical interpretation of the Pauline epistles must be undertaken without relying on Acts, and the genuine epistles of Paul must be made the criterion for the historicity of Acts. Applying this principle, as enunciated by F. C. Baur and the Tübingen school, the writer is led to recognize the Book of Acts as of great historical value for a knowledge of the Apostolic age. His inquiry is based on the critical analysis of the sources, and he finds that those elements due to the older traditions are of greater historical value than those of the main source, and that they contain a great deal of valuable material supplementary to the statements of Paul.

"The Integrity of Second Corinthians" (Allan Menzies in the *Expositor*, 8th Series, Vol. VI, No. 34 [October, 1913], 366-75).

Professor Menzies' article is a reply to an article on the same subject by Canon Kennedy of Dublin in the April and July issues of the *Irish Church Quarterly Review*. Professor Menzies contends for the integrity of our II Cor. against Canon Kennedy's contention that the last four chapters are Paul's second epistle which he wrote "with tears." The main argument is with reference to the threat in 13:2. This Kennedy holds was withdrawn in 2:1. Professor Menzies thinks this cannot be so construed but that it rather intimates Paul's intention not to pay the Corinthians another visit likely to cause him so much pain as the last one had done and explains why, instead of coming himself, when he led them to expect him, he sent the letter. Both critics agree that Paul had visited Corinth after I Cor. was written and before he wrote II Cor. and that the threat was uttered at the close of that visit which had ended painfully for both sides. Menzies thinks it inconceivable that the threat should be withdrawn, and after answering some further minor difficulties, he takes issue again with Kennedy as to the abrupt and awkward transition from the last verse of the ninth chapter to the first verse of the tenth. Menzies regards this as of little difficulty because of similar

breaks in other letters of Paul. He tries to show that the break is not absolute and argues for a close sequence in the epistle from first to last in the order the parts lie before us.

"The Latin Prologues of John" (B. W. Bacon in the *Journal of Biblical Literature*, XXXII, Part III [September, 1913], 194-217).

The author's interest is with the Codex Toletanus, a Spanish manuscript of the tenth century which has two prologues to John, the first being a common or monarchical one and the second having the heading "Insidious Prologus Secundus." The first two-thirds of this second prologue to T are parallel to the first part of the chapter of *De Viris Illustribus*, which in H 0 Benedictus constitutes the prologue of Jerome. The last third of T2b is parallel to the fourth form of prologue known as Reginensis and Stuttgartensis. Burkitt argues that this second prologue of T is the original source from which Jerome and Reginensis have drawn, basing his argument on a comparison of the two parallels, thus making the Prologus Secundus of great historical value. He concludes that this second prologue of T gives the earliest form known to us of a very remarkable theory as to the origin of the Fourth Gospel. Bacon argues, to the contrary, that the compound is derived from its two factors and then narrows his interest in T2b, the Greco-Latin prologue, the antiquity and value of which is of great concern. This Harnack has proved older than Philastrius, Jerome's older contemporary, which would determine its date as not later than 383 A.D.

The writer next turns attention to the questions suggested by Clemen's proposal to regard the testimony of Papias to the Fourth Gospel as authentic, thus "outweighing in importance all the rest of the external evidence put together." Bacon here reviews the judgment of Harnack, Zahn, and Lightfoot on the matter. The deadlock between the critics leads the writer to attempt a new way out. He notes the reasonable concessions which he thinks may be made on either side. On the one hand, something of this nature must have stood in Papias, the clause which actually purports to quote his *Exegesis* not being a pure figment of the imagination. On the other hand, the difficulty must be admitted of accounting for the silence of all the early defenders of the gospel, if Papias' testimony had anything like the form proposed by most modern defenders. Bacon seeks an explanation which solves both difficulties together through a closer scrutiny of the text and bases the conclusion at which he arrives on the universally admitted composite character of the prologue in question.

Here Clement and Lightfoot alone attempt to trace the clause "descriptis vero evangelium dictante Johanne recte," which occurs at the end of the first paragraph in T2b, to anything in Papias, and even they regard it as a mistaken inference. As for the second, anti-Marcionite paragraph, it is rejected by all critics as worthless. This narrows attention to the remaining part in which occurs the statement that Papias declared the Fourth Gospel to have been given out "by John in his lifetime." The argument turns on the meaning of the word *manifestum* (evidently intended for *manifestatum*) which appears in this part. Bacon says there is no warrant for making *manifestare* take the place of *edere* which is the proper synonym for *revelare*, the common equivalent for ἀποκαλύπτειν in ecclesiastical Latin. The Greek translation would be ἀπεκαλύφη και ἐξεδόθη ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις (ταῖς ἐν Ἀσίᾳ). Bacon thus arrives at his solution of the twofold difficulty, that this statement refers not to the Gospel but to the Revelation of John. If attached as a note in any manuscript it must have stood between the two, the two writings being in some respects adjacent; and while intended

as an epilogue to Revelation, it was transcribed as a prologue to the Gospel. This would mean that Papias' testimony was rather that the Apocalypse was "revealed to John" and given out by him to the churches of Asia. The writer proceeds to substantiate this conclusion, arguing, on the one hand, the likelihood and probability that Papias should have so testified concerning the Apocalypse, and on the other hand, the anachronism of making Papias a participant in the controversies which arose as to the authorship of the Gospel.

"The Genealogies of Jesus" (Henry A. Sanders in the *Journal of Biblical Literature*, XXXII, Part III [September, 1913], 184-93).

With reference to the reconciliation and interpretation of the genealogies of Matthew and Luke, the author of the article claims that a new turn has been given to the discussion by the discovery of a notable variant in the form of Matt. 1:16 in the Sinaitic Syriac and related authorities. With the publishing of the Sinaitic in 1894 many scholars seized upon this variant as positive proof that the opposition between the genealogy and birth was irreconcilable and that the latter was a later insertion in the text of Matthew, believing that the Syriac represented the original Matthean text for vs. 16.

The combined evidence of the many passages in all four gospels and in Paul shows that the belief in the virgin birth was undoubtedly held in the church from a very early period. The author accordingly proceeds to attack the genealogies which, though also of ancient tradition, are later insertions by a different author in Matthew and Luke. Holding against Burkitt that the Sinaitic Syriac is an older version, he says it is natural that attempts should be made to smooth over the contradictions between the genealogies and the divine birth, but that it is difficult on the other hand to see how the changes should be introduced to emphasize it. He cites further evidence based on the omission of these versions in the Old Latin MS *r2*. The writer also cites evidence for a later insertion in Luke (*a*) from its omission in the Washington MS of the gospels of the fourth century; (*b*) supplementary evidence of its absence in the old lectionaries of Matthaëi; (*c*) the sixth-century Greco-Latin MS *Dd* which gives the genealogy of Matthew in place of the Lukan genealogy, only in the inverted order to agree with the Lukan form and with the addition of the names from Adam to Abraham which Matthew did not give; (*d*) from the form of the names in the Sinaitic Syriac of which there are two MSS in the Arabic, an older Borgian MS which has the genealogy as an appendix and the younger Vatican MS which includes them as part of the text.

"The Date of the Epistle to the Galatians" (Maurice Jones in the *Expositor*, 8th Series, Vol. VI, No. 33 [September, 1913], 193-208).

The article is evoked by the recent conclusion of Kirsopp Lake ("Earlier Epistles of St. Paul") to the effect that the epistle was written after the first missionary tour on the journey between Antioch and Jerusalem, which theory, old in itself, he supports by new considerations. The difficulty for the writer with this view is to harmonize this early date with the historical accuracy of Acts. He sees (*a*) that a period of six months (which is the longest period critics assume between the first missionary tour and the journey to Jerusalem) is inadequate to produce the situation and events which the Epistle to the Galatians implies; (*b*) that the writing of the epistle must be reconciled with Acts 15:3 which implies a most satisfactory outlook in Galatia, if

St. Luke is a trustworthy historian; (c) the difficulty of reconciling this early date with Paul's attitude at the Jerusalem council in quoting the undoubted success of the mission to South Galatia; (d) the inconsistency involved in Timothy's circumcision after the Epistle to the Galatians was written.

Two factors in the epistle itself are evidence to the author for a later date: (1) The visit of Gal. 11:1-10 shows Paul as the more important personage, whereas in an earlier visit of Acts 11:29, 30 and 12:25 (which some identify as the same visit) Barnabas is the outstanding figure. (2) Gal 6:17, "I bear in my body the marks of the Lord Jesus," bespeaks one worn and weary with persecution and suffering. The latter two arguments, not sufficiently weighty in themselves, when combined with the difficulty of reconciling the early theory with Acts, form a body of proof of the strongest character against the preconiliar date of the Epistle to the Galatians.

"The Sanity of the Eschatological Jesus" (Albert Schweitzer, translated by W. Montgomery) I. "Typical Alienist Theories" (in the *Expositor*, 8th Series, Vol. VI, No. 34 [October, 1913], 328-42).

The translator explains that the equivalent of the German title to the above work would be, "The Psychiatric Estimate of Jesus." In the introductory chapter, "Typical Alienist Theories," the author explains the occasion of the work, its purpose, his obligation and warrant in writing. The occasion is a suggestion first appearing in the works of David F. Strauss and recently renewed by a number of medical writers, to the effect that Jesus living in a world of ideas characteristic of the Book of Daniel and the late Jewish apocalypses, and holding himself to be the "Son of Man" and "Messiah" who was shortly to appear in glory, is to be considered as affected by some form of mental disorder. The purpose is a thorough examination of this theory as set forth in certain forms by certain medical writers who have written about Jesus. The writer finds his obligation in the fact that he has been charged with describing in his *Geschichte der Leben-Jesu-Forschung* ("The Quest of the Historical Jesus") a Jesus whose world of thought had the air of a "systematic delusion." His qualification lies in the fact that to his theological and historical studies he has added that of medicine.

At the outset the author points out that the identification of the unfamiliar with the morbid, assumed by certain writers, is illegitimate, but nevertheless defends the "pathographical method" as capable of yielding valuable results. Schweitzer himself holds that Jesus regarded himself as the Messiah and that he looked forward to his glorious return upon the clouds of heaven. In the remainder of the chapter, the author reviews the theories promulgated by Dr. de Loosten, Dr. William Hirsch, and Dr. Binet-Single. The first of these argues that Jesus was the victim of a systematic mania; the second diagnoses the case as a particular form of malady known as "paranoia"; the third designates the mental affliction as "religious paranoia."

"The Text of the Apostolic Decree" (W. Sanday in the *Expositor*, 8th Series, Vol. VI, No. 34 [October, 1913], 289-305).

Professor Sanday takes issue with Professor Lake's recently stated conclusion to the effect that "things strangled," which was omitted in the Western text of the apostolic decree (Acts 15:29), was not in the original and that its place in the Eastern texts is to be explained as an insertion. The two critics agree that the texts of all the MSS of the dominant Greek traditions state that the apostles told the gentile converts

to keep themselves from things offered to idols, from blood, from things strangled, and from fornication; also that the dominant Latin versions have a three- rather than a four-clause text, omitting "things strangled," but with the addition of the negative form of the Golden Rule, and at the end of all, "Ye shall do well being carried along by the Spirit." Both agree that, though both readings are very old, the three-clause text cannot be maintained in its entirety; the negative form of the Golden Rule and the reference to the Spirit cannot be original. Where Professors Sanday and Lake differ is as to the omission of "things strangled." Dr. Sanday is with the consensus of opinion in holding that this omission and the insertion of the Golden Rule was with the intent of changing a "food law" into a moral enactment. Lake's contention here is (1) that the evidence for the omission and insertion in question is not similar, since Tertullian, for example, makes the omission but not the insertion, and that the two readings are independent of each other; (2) that there is no historical evidence whatever that the circles which read the text with the omission had any objection to a food law. Sanday maintains that the reading with the Golden Rule is older than Tertullian and shows that his omission of it in his quotation of the decree was necessary to avoid making havoc of the rest of the quotation, and hence that Tertullian is a precarious foundation on which to build.

As to the antecedent probability as to whether the three-clause group (in the main, of moral precepts) or the four-clause group (of ceremonial observances) was the original apostolic decree, Sanday reviews the circumstances of the time and shows that the lively discussion as to "food law" was pertinent to the conditions of the time, question of foods being one of the burning and practical questions of the day. He explains the omission in the Western text, not (as Professor Lake has misunderstood him as holding) because they had any objections to a food law, but that, as the process went on and the old controversy receded into the distance, the points on which it turned became less intelligible, the special abstention from "things strangled" being a puzzle to the West where no such usage existed. Thus Sanday regards the Eastern readings as reflecting Eastern conditions, likewise the Western as reflecting conditions which obtain away from Palestine. He thus regards the Eastern as the genuine text and explains how he conceives the Western variation to have arisen by a combination process of accident and design. He regards the omission as easier to account for than the insertion, and thinks his theory forms a reasonable bridge of hypothesis between the events of first and second centuries.

"The New Church History" (Henry C. Vedder in the *History Teacher's Magazine*, IV [1913], 275-80).

The new spirit and points of view that have profoundly affected the study and interpretation of history and, by consequence, church history, are traced to (1) the work of Darwin, (2) that of Karl Marx leading to the economic interpretation of history, (3) the development of the new sciences of anthropology, comparative religion, psychology, sociology or the science of society, (4) the new development in philosophy known as pragmatism.

"La réforme en Normandie, et les débuts de la réforme a l'Université de Caen" (H. Prentout in *Revue Historique*, November-December, 1913).

An attempt to account for the early appearance and the strength of the movement for reform in Normandy. It began as a movement within the Catholic church, under

the influence, both personal and literary, of Lefèvre d'Étaples and Guillaume Briçonnet. The author's aim is first of all to establish the independence and priority of the Reformation movement in France, and then to show that, as respects Normandy, the movement was not predominantly political, or social, or economic, but religious and humanistic. The center of its leadership and influence was the University of Caen in which the majority of the faculty and students, between 1560 and 1568, was Protestant.

The men who led the opposition to the ancient Catholic order were De la Mare, friend of Lefèvre and Briçonnet, a humanist and rector of the University of Caen in 1506, and critic of the pride, luxury, and avarice of the Clergy; Clichtone, friend of Lefèvre and editor of his writings; Pierre des Prez, friend of De la Mare and Lefèvre, and professor in the University of Caen after 1514, and rector in 1521; Ludovico Canossa, bishop of Bayeux in 1516, a reformer, and friend of Erasmus; and David Jones, editor of the *Adagia* of Erasmus, rector of the University of Caen, and eulogist of Ludovico Canossa.

The author discovers the influence of Erasmus and the Netherlands upon the University of Caen, in its organization of a "College of the Three Languages" in imitation of Louvain. Charges of heresy were preferred against the University in 1531, in 1538-39, and again in 1544, each of which was successfully repelled. An attempt was made in 1564 to bring the university into a kind of affiliation with the Academy of Geneva. Great numbers of its students, after 1560, figure as Calvinistic pastors.

"Anent the Middle Ages" (G. L. Burr in the *American Historical Review*, XVIII [July, 1913], 710).

Professor Burr attempts to find a warrant for the Middle Ages as a period, in the sway over society exercised by the conception of the "state of God." According to this conception, given its classic form in Augustine's *State of God* (Mr. Burr emphasizes the value of "state" over "city" as a rendering of *civitas*), the state is in the church, not the church in the state; rulers of the state must put at the service of the church not only themselves but all their authority as sovereigns, all their means of persuasion and constraint. The final touch to this conception was put by Leo when, for treason to the Heavenly Emperor, that is, heresy, he assigned the penalty of death. Mr. Burr urges "that if our study of the Middle Ages began a little earlier, we might the better discern beneath all their administrative dualism that great underlying unity, that mediaeval Christendom which men call sometimes the Church Universal, the Commonwealth of Mankind, but oftenest the peregrine city of the State of God." From this point of view the Middle Ages would come to an end with the collapse of the conception of the State of God. This collapse he would date, not from Luther or from Calvin, both of whom were under the domination of the idea of the State of God, but from the protest that arose over an act, the burning of Servetus, prompted by this mediaeval conception of the State of God. In "multitudinous ways the great movements which were to secularize and free the age that followed may be traced to the protest, stirred by that reincarnation of the mediaeval State of God." Mr. Burr does not urge that we should end the Middle Ages here. He only maintains that, thus viewed, the Middle Ages have still some warrant as a period, and that periods in history, if to be intelligible, must overlap.

BOOKS RECEIVED

The more important books in this list will be reviewed at length

OLD TESTAMENT

- Batten, Loring W. A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Books of Ezra and Nehemiah ("The International Critical Commentary"). New York: Scribner, 1913. xv+384 pages. \$3.00 net.
- Beer, G., und Holtzmann, O. Die Mischna, Text, Übersetzung und ausführliche Erklärung. Middot (von den Massen des Tempels), Text, Übersetzung und Erklärung. Nebst einem textkritischen Anhang von Oscar Holtzmann. Giessen: Töpelmann, 1913. M. 6. viii+112 pages. 10 Traktat.
- Beer, G., und Holtzmann, O. Die Mischna, Text, Übersetzung und ausführliche Erklärung. Joma (Der Versöhnungstag), Text, Übersetzung und Erklärung. Nebst einem textkritischen Anhang von Johannes Meinhold. 5 Traktat. Giessen: Töpelmann, 1913. iv+83 pages. M. 4.30.
- Focke, Friedrich. Die Entstehung der Weisheit Salomos. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des jüdischen Hellenismus (Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments herausgegeben von W. Bousset und H. Gunkel). Göttingen: Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht, 1913. 132 pages. M. 4.80.
- Gressmann, Hugo, *et al.* Die Schriften des Alten Testaments in Auswahl neu übersetzt und für die Gegenwart erklärt. 25. Lieferung: Die grossen Propheten und ihre Zeit. Von Hans Schmidt. Bogen 11-15. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht, 1913. 161+240 pages.
- Gunkel, Hermann. Reden und Aufsätze. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht, 1913. vii+192 pages. M. 4.80.
- Koldewey, Robert. Das wieder erstehende Babylon. Die bisherigen Ergebnisse der deutschen Ausgrabungen. Zweite Auflage. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1913. vii+328 pages. M. 15.
- Macdonald, Duncan. The Future of Christianity. London and New York:

- Oxford University Press, 1913. viii+327 pages. 7s. 6d.
- Mercer, S. A. B. Extra-biblical Sources for Hebrew and Jewish History. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1913. xiv+210 pages. \$1.50.
- Robinson, H. Wheeler. The Religious Ideas of the Old Testament. New York: Scribner, 1913. viii+245 pages. \$0.75 net.
- Schlatter, A. Die hebräischen Namen bei Josephus (Beiträge zur Förderung christlicher Theologie, 17. Jahrgang, Heft, 3-4). Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1913. 132 pages. M. 3.60.
- Schwaab, Emil. Historische Einführung in das Achtzehngebet (Beiträge zur Förderung christlicher Theologie, 17. Jahrgang, Heft 3.) Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1913. 169 pages. M. 3.60.

NEW TESTAMENT AND PATRISTICS

- Bauer, Walter. Handbuch zum Neuen Testament. Zweiter Band. Die Evangelien. II. Johannes. Tübingen: Mohr, 1912. iv+180 pages.
- Debrunner, Albert. Friedrich Blass' Grammatik des neutestamentlichen Griechisch. Vierte, völlig neugearbeitete Auflage. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht, 1913. xvi+346 pages. M. 8.
- Ferguson, William Duncan. The Legal Terms Common to the Macedonian Inscriptions and the New Testament (Historical and Linguistic Studies in Literature Related to the New Testament, Second Series, Vol. II, Part 3). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1913. 109 pages. \$0.75 net.
- Hammer, Heinrich. Traktat vom Samaritanermessias: Studien zur Frage der Existenz und Abstammung Jesu. Bonn: Carl Georgi, 1913. 101 pages.
- Haupt, Walther. Worte Jesu und Gemeindefüberlieferung. Eine Untersuchung zur Quellengeschichte der Synopse. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1913. iv+263 pages. M. 7.50.

- Holdsworth, William West. *Gospel Origins. A Study in the Synoptic Problem*. New York: Scribner, 1913. xiv+211 pages. \$0.75 net.
- Kennedy, H. A. A. *St. Paul and the Mystery-Religions*. London and New York: Hodder & Stoughton, 1913. xviii+311 pages. \$1.50 net.
- Klostermann, E. *Die neuesten Angriffe auf die Geschichtlichkeit Jesu*. Tübingen: Mohr, 1913. iii+52 pages. M. 1.40.
- Knopf, Rudolf. *Probleme der Paulusforschung*. Tübingen: Mohr, 1913. 41 pages. M. 1.20.
- Lake, Kirsopp. *The Apostolic Fathers. Vol II. The Shepherd of Hermas, The Martyrdom of Polycarp, The Epistle to Diognetus* ("The Loeb Classical Library"). New York: Macmillan, 1913. v+396 pages. \$1.50 net.
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- Pick, Bernhard. *Jesus in the Talmud: His Personality, His Disciples and His Sayings*. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1913. 100 pages. \$0.75.
- Robison, Henry B. *Syntax of the Participle of the Apostolic Fathers in the *Editio Minor* of Gebhardt-Harnack-Zahn (Historical and Linguistic Studies in Literature Related to the New Testament, Second Series, Vol. II, Part 5)*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1913. 45 pages. \$0.50 net.
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- Schweitzer, Albert. *Geschichte der Leben-Jesu-Forschung*. 2. Auflage. Tübingen: Mohr, 1913. xii+659 pages. M. 12.
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- Weiss, Johannes. *Synoptische Tafeln zu den drei älteren Evangelien mit Unterscheidung der Quellen in vierfacher Farbendruck*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht, 1913. 16 pages. M. 0.50.
- Weiss, Johannes. *Das Urchristentum. I. Teil. 1.-3. Buch*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht, 1913. iv+416 pages. M. 7.60.
- Wernle, Paul. *Die Quellen Lebens Jesu (Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher, 1. Reihe, 1. Heft). Dritte Auflage*. Tübingen: Mohr, 1913. 76 pages. M. 0.50.
- Windisch, Hans. *Der Hebräerbrief*. Tübingen: Mohr, 1913. iv+122 pages. M. 2.50.

CHURCH HISTORY

- Ayer, Joseph C. *A Source Book for Ancient Church History from the Apostolic Age to the Close of the Conciliar Period*. New York: Scribner, 1913. xxi+797 pages. \$3.00 net.
- Bornhausen, Karl. *Religion in Amerika. Beiträge zu ihrem Verständnis*. Gießen: Töpelmann, 1913. viii+107 pages. M. 2.50.
- Bousset, Wilhelm. *Kyrios Christos. Geschichte des Christusglaubens von den Anfängen des Christentums bis Irenaeus*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht, 1913. xxiv+474 pages. M. 12.
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- Edmundson, G. *The Church in Rome in the First Century: An Examination of Various Controverted Questions Relating to Its History, Chronology, Literature, and Traditions. The Bampton Lectures given at the University of Oxford in 1913.* New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1913. xiii+296 pages. \$2.50 net.
- Goetz, Das apostolische Glaubensbekenntnis (Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher herausgegeben von Friedrich M. Schiele. IV. Reihe, 17. Heft). Tübingen: Mohr, 1913. 64 pages. M. 0.50.
- Hardeland, August. *Luthers Katechismusgedanken in ihrer Entwicklung bis zum Jahre 1529.* Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1913. xiii+354 pages. M. 7.
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- Merriam, Edmund F. *A History of American Baptist Missions. Revised Edition and Centennial Supplement.* Philadelphia: Am. Baptist Pub. Society, 1913. xxix+288 pages. \$0.50.
- Papers of the American Society of Church History. Second Series. Vol. I. Report and Papers of the First Meeting of the Reorganized Society, and of Its First Annual Meeting Held in the City of New York, December 27 and 28, 1906, and December 26 and 27, 1907, respectively. Edited by Samuel Macauley Jackson, Secretary. Reprinted together with the new material: *The Letters of Einhard in English Translation.* New York: Putnam, 1913. vi+158 pages. \$3.00.
- Thompson, A. H. *English Monasteries.* Cambridge University Press, 1913. xi+156 pages. \$0.40.
- Batiffol, Pierre. *L'Eucharistie, la Présence Réelle et la Transsubstantiation.* Cinquième édition refondue et corrigée. Paris: J. Gabalda, 1913. ix+516 pages.
- Belmond, S. *Études sur la Philosophie de Duns Scot. I. Dieu. Existence et cognoscibilité.* Paris: Beauchesne, 1913. xvi+362 pages. Fr. 4.
- Dillman, C. *Das Christentum das Ziel der Weltentwicklung. Briefe eines theologischen Naturforschers.* Tübingen: Mohr, 1913. 255 pages. M. 5.
- Eucken, Rudolf. *Ethics and Modern Thought: A Theory of Their Relations. The Deem Lectures delivered in 1913 at New York University. Translated from the German manuscript by Margaret von Seydewitz.* New York: Putnam, 1913. iii+127 pages. \$1.00.
- Fosdick, H. E. *The Assurance of Immortality.* New York: Macmillan, 1913. x+141 pages. \$1.00.
- Haynes, E. S. P. *The Belief in Personal Immortality.* New York: Putnam, 1913. ix+184 pages. \$1.25.
- Hermann, W. *Die mit der Theologie verknüpfte Not der evangelischen Kirche und ihre Ueberwindung (Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher, IV. Reihe, 21. Heft).* Tübingen: Mohr, 1913. 44 pages. M. 0.50.
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- Simpson, P. Carnegie. *The Facts of Life in Relation to Faith.* London: Hodder & Stoughton; New York: George H. Doran Co., 1913. x+294 pages. \$1.25 net.
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- Smyth, Newman. *Constructive Natural Theology.* New York: Scribner, 1913. viii+123 pages. \$1.00.
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- Abelson, J. *The Immanence of God in Rabbinical Literature.* New York: Macmillan, 1912. xii+387 pages. \$3.00.

- Bertelsmann, 1913. iv+251 pages. M. 4.80.
- Winkelman, J. Die Offenbarung. Dogmatische Studien. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1913. 508 pages. M. 9.
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THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF CHILDREN'S FAITH IN GOD

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To the question, How do little children get their notions of God? there is a simple, obvious answer: By instruction and hearsay, just as ideas of angels, fairies, hobgoblins, Santa Claus, and of historical personages are acquired. This "acquiring" of an idea includes, of course, a complex reaction. Language has no power to transfer a thought from one mind to another, but only to stimulate a mind to think. The meaning of the term God, and of any affirmation about him, has to be construed by imaginative combination of thought materials derived from the child's previous experiences. Nor does the idea, once started, continue "in one stay," but items from the child's growing experience are read into it and out of it.

The idea of God varies, therefore, from child to child, and from day to day, according to instruction or hearsay, the meanings that words (such as father) have already acquired, the characteristic experiences of the child (especially his experience of persons), and his usual methods of association and of inference. A boy not yet four years old who had had difficulty with "bad boys" in his back yard arranged there a house for God, saying, "He'll keep the bad boys out; nobody else can." This "house of God" was merely a large doll-house with some additions of the boy's own devising.

When this child was four years and eight months old he spontaneously made a drawing, in which God and Santa Claus, a Christmas tree, flags, home, and toys, which include a locomotive engine on a railroad track, all figure. It is evident that this child, putting his own construction upon the words of others, had built up a notion of God far different from what his elders intended. On the other hand, the direct influence of instruction seems to appear in his argument with a playmate who had asserted that "If you do anything in a dark room God can't see it." "Yes, he can!" was the reply, "He can see you even in a dark room. He looks down through the stars, and I'm not going to do anything to get caught!"

Another boy of about the same age gave the following objective evidence of the Christmas story that he had recently heard. Of his own motion he devised for the entertainment of his parents and some guests a dramatization of the Star in the East. First, extinguishing other lights, he lighted a candle, which was to represent the sun. Then he placed an apple for the moon, and extinguished the candle in order to show that night had come. Finally, announcing that he was God, and was going to bring in the Star of Bethlehem, he marched into the room, bearing some sticks crudely fastened together with the apparent purpose of representing the conventional picture of a star's rays.

As an illustration of how the child's own social experience is read into his thought of God, the following case is instructive. "Mama," said a boy a little older than those just mentioned, "do you know what I'm going to do the first thing when I get to heaven? I'm going to run up to the Heavenly Father and give him a kiss!" Obviously this feeling-reaction to the idea of a Heavenly Father is due in part to experience in a human family.

Thus, both the fact that children have ideas of God, and the variations of these ideas from our adult notions are easily accounted for. That children really believe in God thus conceived is also obvious enough. They believe what they are told, and in this respect no difference is discernible between belief in God, in the Sand Man, or in the Black Man. The influence of mere suggestion upon children's beliefs is possibly more extensive and more prolonged than we ordinarily suppose. On a certain occasion, having

told to a group of children a story of how I had seen a chipmunk store food, which included a muscat gr pe, upon the branches of a fir tree, I remarked, "So there was a green grape growing upon an evergreen tree!" One of my listeners, a girl of about eight years, came to me some days afterward to inquire whether the grape really did grow upon that tree!

Just as children readily accept our instruction, so they willingly imitate our religious acts. The evening prayer, grace before meat, participation in public worship—these, under favorable conditions, are well liked; they require no compulsion. But they cannot, without further evidence, be regarded as clear signs of piety. Nevertheless, even such imitative acts may have immediate social value, and ultimate religious value. A certain family that was accustomed to have brief devotions at the breakfast table included a girl who was still too young to commit the Lord's Prayer to memory. One morning, just after she had triumphantly learned to count up to eight, she joined her voice with the others when the Lord's Prayer was repeated by saying loudly, "One, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight. . . . One, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight!" I would hesitate to deny that even this crude participation in social worship contributed to religious growth. For the social situation was a religious one, and the girl's reaction, bare though it was of definite religious ideas, enriched her membership in the group, and brought her mind nearer to the meaning of the function then being performed.

These facts—the credulity of children's beliefs, the desultory associations that cluster therein, and the imitative origin of children's religious acts—go far toward accounting for the ambiguous or even negative attitude that largely prevails among adults with respect to the religious life of children. Besides, we are just now reacting against two types of religious work with them, the formal or catechetical type, and the revival or conversion-experience type. If these are the only practicable ways of promoting spiritual life in children, then indeed we must look for skepticism as to genuine spiritual life much before adolescence. It is not enough to show that children accept the idea of God, join in religious practices, and make an emotional response to revivalistic suggestion. The

deeper question concerns a life of faith properly so called. This implies not merely belief and imitation, but also emotional satisfaction and motivation of conduct without feverish excesses—in short, a personal realization or experience in a natural life. Does this exist in the small child?

This question precipitates us at once into the problem of the relation of religion to our instincts. For the life of young children, whatever may be said of adults, is predominantly instinctive; rational or deliberative self-regulation is only beginning to organize itself. We can hardly expect to find religion here, in any vital sense of the term, unless men are born with something that may be called a religious nature, whether or not we define it still more closely as a special instinct. There is no denying that recent psychology, when it is listened to, will disturb such assumptions as that "man is incurably religious"; that our mental structure includes a "vital spark" of divinity; that there is a universal "perception of the infinite" or "innate sense of infinity"; that there is a universal yearning for God, or a universal sense of sin; that infants, "trailing clouds of glory," have a gift of spiritual perception that mature mental occupations cover up and obscure; and that there is a specific religious instinct which needs only to meet its proper object in order to produce religious reaction. The same thing that happened with the concept of "conscience" is now happening with respect to the "religious instinct." No psychologist, I suppose, thinks of conscience as a special organ, or as preformed in a way at all parallel, say, to the grasping or sucking reflex. At the basis of my conscience, no doubt, lie certain instinctive tendencies toward sociality, such as gregariousness (pleasure in the mere presence of other members of the species) and responsiveness to approval and disapproval. These tendencies have made me endure social discipline, but they are not yet my conscience. The conscience of each individual is a complex of dispositions induced by specific experiences of discipline mixed with one's own reflection. The "religious nature" likewise presents itself to some psychologists as no unanalyzable endowment or preparedness to function in a specific way, but as an attitude or complex of attitudes and dispositions acquired in the course of individual experience.

Here, as everywhere, our mental life has a background of instinct, but so have politics and science and literature. In none of these directions do we find any fully preformed readiness to act in a specific way. Religion haunts men in the same way as any widespread social custom or expectation to which one may be exposed. Of inherent or constitutional religiousness, we are told, there is none; and there are non-religious men as truly as non-literary.

This prominent, though not, indeed, unanimous trend in the psychology of religion must be subjected to scrutiny before the nature and the depth of child-religion can be determined. This scrutiny might begin with direct analysis of children's religious reactions with a view to tracing out in each phenomenon the parts played respectively by "nature" and "nurture." A part of the evidence for or against the existence of any instinct must, indeed, be gathered by just such child-study. On the other hand, our special problem of the religious nature is so intertwined with certain questions of general psychology that the economical procedure will be to start with considerations that may seem to be far removed from the data of child-religion.

First of all, then, the science of psychology is at the present moment seeking to determine what instinct is, and especially its relation to intelligence.¹ There is agreement that the nervous system of each of us is so organized from birth that certain specific situations, without any previous experience of them, call out specific responses. Witness the shrinking of a child at the rapid approach of a large unknown animal. Here is an "instinct." Now, in addition to every such clearly definable instinct, there is an indefinite mass of what W. McDougall calls "general or non-specific innate tendencies,"² such as the tendency to form habits, the tendency to play, and many more. Here belong tendencies to generalize experiences, and reflectively to organize conduct into a consistent unity.

In the second place, psychology is at the beginning rather than

¹ *The British Journal of Psychology* during 1910 printed as many as five articles, by as many writers, on "Instinct and Intelligence." This was the subject also of an animated symposium at the 1911 meeting of the American Psychological Association.

² *Social Psychology* (Boston, 1909), chap. iv.

the end of the task of cataloguing the special instincts. An inevitable impression from the latest and most critical of all works on the subject, E. L. Thorndike's *The Original Nature of Man*,¹ is that the whole subject is still in flux, and that the chief part of what we need to know is yet to be ascertained.

In the third place, usage, even among psychologists, has not yet rendered the term "instinct" sufficiently precise. Baldwin, Stout, and Lloyd Morgan recommend limiting it to reactions that have "definite motor channels of discharge."² But some psychologists still apply the term to any native tendency, however broad.³

The argument of E. D. Starbuck for an instinctive basis of religion appears to use instinct in the broad rather than the specific sense. In religion as a whole, he argues, there is unreasoned adaptation, some of which is preadaptation, as if there were a special spiritual sense and foresight.⁴ But that this spiritual nature is a generic tendency rather than a specific instinct appears from the functions that it performs. Religion, Starbuck says, organizes and spiritualizes the special instincts. Hence, "the religious impulse, while given a single name, as if it were a single pulse of consciousness, is a compound." It contains fear, love, curiosity, self-regard, the play-impulse. "It is the struggle for existence and the will to live as these have ripened into an aspiration toward the perfect life." This Starbuck calls instinctive to indicate that it is a racial bent rather than an incident of particular experiences.⁵

In apparent opposition to this position, Irving King argues that religion springs out of ordinary experience, by ordinary mental processes, so that a "religious nature" is not required as an explanation of religious phenomena.⁶ The exact force of this argument,

¹ New York, 1913.

² Article "Instinct," in Baldwin's *Dictionary of Philosophy*.

³ A recent example is S. S. Colvin, *The Learning Process* (New York, 1913), who in his list of instincts includes superstition, the love of nature and of solitude, and the aesthetic, religious, and moral emotions (pp. 35-37).

⁴ "The Instinctive Bases of Religion," *Psychological Bulletin*, February, 1911.

⁵ See his six articles on "The Child-Mind and Child-Religion" in the *Biblical World*, July, August, September, November, 1907, February, 1908, and January, 1909. The above quotations are from the article of September, 1907, pp. 200 f.

⁶ "The Question of an Ultimate Religious Element in Human Nature," *Psychological Bulletin*, February, 1911.

and the exact position of its author are not as clear as might be desired. The fact that religion does spring out of everyday experience, and that the process of its springing is describable in terms of general mental laws might conceivably suggest that human nature is fundamentally religious! But perhaps King means merely to deny that there is an ultimate religious "element" in human nature. If so, the term "element" needs to be defined. To this point I shall presently return.

The basal question here concerns mental structure as distinguished from mental function. Functional psychology, of which King and Ames are representatives, takes as its problem not, What are the elements of mind and how are they combined? but, What is done, and of what advantage is it? Of course the notion of mental structure is used *somehow* by all psychologists; it is simply inevitable. Even if, adopting the radical empiricism of Dewey and Mead, we regard "psychical consciousness" as merely a phase of a universal evolutionary flow, we must still recognize the direction of the psychical current. That it has a direction—that the psychical variation is a determinate one—is witnessed to by the existence of genetic psychology itself. If, as radical empiricism maintains, neither sensations nor yet an ego can be retained as "elements," and "impulse" must be substituted therefor, still the implication of structure follows us. Impulses are toward something. Though we do not necessarily know that a given impulse exists until we have acted upon it, we do then know it, and the retrospective definition of it is, as far as it goes, a definition of structure. It is true that the old-fashioned easy explanation of mental processes by referring them to "faculties" committed the fault of making a concept the cause of particulars included under it. To explain religion by a "religious faculty" is as inept as to explain the civil state by a "political faculty." Nevertheless, Aristotle did not utter an empty phrase when he declared that "Man is a political animal." This proposition points to a law as distinguished from a mere incident of development. It signifies that needs and satisfactions

¹ George H. Mead, "What Social Objects Must Psychology Presuppose?" *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, VII, 1910, 174. Cf. his *Definition of the Psychical* (Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago, 1903).

are in this specific way different in the human race from what they are in any other animal species.

Both the change in our ways of approaching the concept "human nature," and the abiding meaning of such terms may be illustrated from the moral life of the race. We no longer think of conscience or of a moral sense as an innate endowment or as, in any way, a present particular possession of all men. The moral variations among men are too great for any such theory. Besides, we know that the life of each of us began at a conscienceless level; that the feeling of right and wrong has been awakened in each of us, and formed into a habit, by our individual experience of social approval and disapproval; and that our judgment as to what is right or wrong is also a reflex of our social environment, although, of course, the individual's own type of feeling and thinking colors the whole. But this influence of society upon the individual is only one aspect of the facts. Society does stamp its standards upon the individual, but society exists nowhere except within the individuals upon whom it acts. In last analysis, then, in the moral training that forms the individual conscience *the race is disciplining itself*. It is struggling consciously to regulate instinctive action, reflectively to prefer some kinds of goods to others. Now, such self-discipline characterizes the human race, but it is found in no other animal species. Here then is mental structure, human "nature."

Before attempting to say how the case stands with man's supposed religious nature, I must offer a few items toward an analysis of the most considerable attempt yet made to construe the religious history of the race without reference to anything religious in the make-up of the human mind. I refer to Irving King's *Development of Religion*.¹ That "out of which" religion springs is for him certain overt actions which have no religious motive. He regards "the reaction" as the "fundamental psychic unit,"² and he holds that "the psychological concept of stimulus and response" is "a sufficient basis upon which to explain conscious phenomena."³ I will not press the question whether here, as in the old faculty-psychology, a genus is made the cause of the species included under

¹ New York, 1910.

² P. 22.

³ P. 11.

it; but I would insist that conscious phenomena are not explained by any concept that includes in itself no reference to the specific direction that consciousness takes in its evolution. An actual response is never "response in general," but always a reaction of a particular kind. The stimulus, moreover, is never "stimulus in general." When psychology traces our developed reactions back to simpler antecedent reactions, it is under as much obligation as any other science—chemistry, for example—to seek precise determinations of the factors involved. To give determinate meaning to the formula, "stimulus and response," especially when mental life is thought of under the evolutionary concept of "adjustment," one must have some notion of the specific nature or laws of both that which becomes adjusted and that to which adjustment is made. Our present interest is to think clearly concerning "that which becomes adjusted." Let us call it the respondent, and let us say that the direction of the responses defines the nature of the respondent. To such definition each instinct contributes an item, and not less each of the generic tendencies already mentioned. Every persistent type of product, as music, or the family, or property, or philosophy contributes something to the determination of the respondent. And this remains true even when we think of the human mind as human *minds* having different positions in an evolutionary order. For the evolutionary order itself is an *order*, a structural phase of the successive respondents.

Does King's theory assume response without a respondent? If not, what sort of respondents has he in mind? It appears that the responses to which religion is traced are those of a psycho-physical organism. This implies organic structure, of course, one aspect of which must be mental structure. Unfortunately, however, King seems not to feel the need of explaining what kind of organic structure he has in mind. The passage in which he comes, as I judge, nearest to a definition of the structural concepts that underlie his whole theory takes a different direction. "Unquestionably," he says, "instinctive and reflex action is more primitive than consciousness or consciously directed activity. . . . Whether we are able to state with precision all the terms in the relationship between overt mechanically controlled action and that which is consciously

directed, it is certainly safe to assume that the conscious processes are truly of the nature of specializations within the primitive reactions, rendering possible the attainment of more complex results or ends. . . . Consequently, all such mental elements as ideas, emotions, and volitions, or whatever else we may choose to call them, are products rather than original data, a fact which must be borne in mind in all discussions involving them."¹ If we take this statement in connection with two others, namely, that "Consciousness . . . is an adjusting apparatus for remedying the deficiencies of instinct"² and that "Evolutionary science proves almost conclusively that instincts are not original, elemental endowments, but rather products, modes of reaction built up in the course of, and hence definitely related to, the process of organic development,"³ we reach, as King's ultimate explanatory "element" something below instinct, even "mechanically controlled action." I am far, however, from supposing that he really regards our mental life as simply a phase or differentiation of a bodily mechanism; rather, I should say, he is so absorbed in tracing developed functions to their more and more remote antecedent functions that he misses altogether the problem of structure.⁴

The same absorbing interest in the functional or response aspects of religion accounts, no doubt, for a parallel unsteadiness in E. S. Ames's treatment of "the respondent."⁵ Inasmuch as I have elsewhere shown that though he makes adjustment a fundamental conception, he leaves in obscurity his notion of that which needs and secures adjustment,⁶ I shall here refrain from discussing his general standpoint, and go at once to his treatment of the religion of childhood. He asserts: (1) that up to two and a half or three years human beings are non-religious, non-moral, and non-personal;⁷

¹ P. 39.² P. 26.³ Pp. 25 f.

⁴ It seems to me that he misses it also in his article, "Some Problems in the Science of Religion" (*Harvard Theological Review*, IV, 1911, 104-18). Describing the structure of mental reactions is not the same as telling "where the psychical comes from" (see pp. 111 and 112).

⁵ *The Psychology of Religious Experience* (Boston, 1910).

⁶ "Religion from the Standpoint of Functional Psychology," *American Journal of Theology*, XV, 1911, 301-8.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, 198, 209.

(2) that it is impossible for a child under the age of nine to pass in any considerable degree beyond the non-religious and non-moral attitude;¹ (3) that the child has no "religious nature";² (4) that "The social feeling of adolescence is original, inner, and urgent,"³ and that in adolescence "Religion arises naturally, being an inherent and intimate phase of the social consciousness."⁴ "For the individual, religion originates in youth."⁵

If all this be true, man has a religious nature, original, inner, and urgent, which clearly makes its appearance with adolescence. It is denied of young children because of their supposed lack of capacity for social response.⁶ If, now, we should discover that childhood is not set off from adolescence by any such social incompetence, it would follow that children also, in their measure, are religious by original nature. I shall presently endeavor to show that there is continuity of social growth between childhood and adolescence, and that this fact is of the greatest significance for religion.

The ground is now cleared for a definite answer to our main question: Do children have a really vital experience of faith in God, or are their religious expressions merely incidental, imitative accommodations to social conventions? A vital faith is possible if any one of the following questions can be answered in the affirmative: (1) Is there a special religious instinct which functions in childhood? (2) Is there any other instinct, functioning in childhood, a particular application of which constitutes a religious reaction? (3) Can the motivation of religion as a whole be traced to any one or more of the generic tendencies of human nature, and if so, do these tendencies function as early as childhood? To the first of these questions a negative answer must doubtless be given; to the second, a qualified affirmative; to the third, an unqualified affirmative.

One psychologist of our day, H. R. Marshall,⁷ has maintained

¹ P. 209.

² P. 222.

³ P. 209.

⁴ P. 249.

⁵ P. 214.

⁶ Ames's over-caution not to seem to attribute a religious "instinct" to primitive men suggests the possibility that I have taken too literally his statements concerning adolescence. See pp. 49, 50.

⁷ *Instinct and Reason* (New York, 1898).

that there is a particular muscular reaction, or group of reactions, that is characteristic of religion, such as the retraction of bowing and closing the eyes in prayer, and the larger retractions of asceticism. These he regards as the expression of a special religious instinct which has the function of repressing the individual in the interest of the group. Suggestive as this special-instinct theory is, it has failed to convince other psychologists. The religious reaction is too rich and various, too commonly joyous, to be held in these narrow bounds of self-repressive expression. Least of all do we find in the spontaneity of childhood anything approaching Marshall's description.

The outlook is different when we ask whether religion builds itself forth in any peculiar way within one or more of the instincts that do appear in childhood. The history of religion, psychologically analyzed, shows clearly the presence in the religious life of all sorts of desire, and so of all sorts of instinct. Fear, pugnacity, the widely ramifying food instincts, the social instincts, all these and still others play their part. But peculiarly intimate to religion generally, and especially to religion in its most highly developed forms, are the instinctive forces that make for social integration. So great differences in this respect exist between different religions and different levels of religion, however, that caution is advisable in the presence of the current tendency to identify religion universally with the social consciousness or with any phase of it. The most that seems to be proved is that religion is an affair of groups—tribes, nations, churches. Again and again, however, the worship of a group represents what is least social in its life—the worship of Kali, for instance. We must discriminate, therefore, between the social organization of religion and the social ends of religion. In prophetic Judaism and in Christianity social ends secure a unique development; they become, indeed, a ground of self-criticism of the religious group itself, whether nation or church.

The social instincts are therefore fundamental to religion universally, but peculiarly and supremely so to the religious structure of our occidental life. The question whether young children are capable of a truly religious experience becomes with us almost identical with the question, What are their capacities of social appreciation and response?

To what extent, then, do the social instincts function before adolescence? No one doubts that mere gregariousness (pleasure in the presence of other members of the species) and response to approval and disapproval appear very early, along with various less constructive social impulses, such as jealousy, and mastering others or submitting to them. But more significant than them all is another spontaneous tendency that makes its appearance in infancy, namely, the parental instinct. It is an entire mistake to suppose that instincts like the parental and the sexual begin to function only when capacity for parenthood has arrived. They appear long in advance. The attitudes of small children, both boys and girls, toward dolls, animal pets, smaller children, and various toys, are truly parental. Thorndike calls this "motherly behavior,"¹ but he points out that men and boys share the impulse more largely than traditional opinion admits.² Its instinctive character is proved by: (1) its universality; (2) the possibility of identifying its primary objects as a class, namely, smaller things thought of as living, and especially those that are helpless, lonely, or suffering; (3) specific motor discharges, such as patting, stroking, laying the cheek against, taking into one's arms, and providing food (real or imaginary) and other objects to meet particular needs; (4) a surprising confirmation of this theory that has been brought to my attention by one of my students. The evidence consists of photographs of two half-grown bluebirds, one of which is in the act of feeding a worm to the other. One of the pictures shows the two facing each other, one with the worm, the other with open mouth; another picture shows the bill of the first bird well down the throat of the other.³

This instinct has a far wider function than to prepare the

¹ E. L. Thorndike, *The Original Nature of Man* (New York, 1913), chap. vii. This is the most thoroughgoing analysis yet made of man's unlearned tendencies.

² Thus, small boys fondle toy horses, pray for them, take them to bed, etc.

³ Conceivably this act is imitative of the mother bird. But imitation does not exclude instinct. Rather, the object imitated may serve as a stimulus for an instinct. In the present case we have to account for the inhibition of an instinct act already become habitual (swallowing whenever a worm is in the mouth), and the performance of an entirely new, unlearned act. The whole is parallel to the act of a mother bird when she first feeds her offspring. There is instinct in both cases, and it is the parental instinct.

individual for parenthood. No instinct, indeed, is limited to the objects with which it has the nearest physiological connection. For example, the infantile way of seizing things and placing them in the mouth shows us the food instinct in operation, but the seizing goes beyond physiological appetite and becomes an assertion of property rights. Just so the instinctive parental attitude underlies much, perhaps all, of what is finest in social adjustments throughout life.¹ Just as imagination makes a boy's toy horse an object of parental solicitude, so also it extends the range of this solicitude upward to older persons. This, I believe, is the origin of filial affection. Small children pat and stroke a parent's face or hand, and when is a little one so happy as when he can play parent to the whole family? A boy of about four years, when his mother was nursing him through the croup, said, "Tell me just what you do for me, mother, so that when I have little boys and girls with the croup, I will know what to do for them." About six weeks later, when his mother had a headache, he assumed the attitude of physician and parent to her just as he had done to his own prospective children. Nothing seems to evoke filial affection so surely as being permitted to help father and mother in their household duties. Doing things for a child does not touch his heart half as much as permitting him to help you!²

We are now ready to see how even little children can make a vital response to the Christian idea of God. When God is presented as Father, it is, in my opinion, the parental instinct that chiefly responds. We love God by getting his point of view. In order to teach four-year-olds to trust the Heavenly Father, the Sunday-school teacher of today is likely to use as material, among other things, the care of father and mother bird for their offspring. How does such material lead toward the desired result? Does the child-mind construe Divine Fatherhood analytically by means of an

¹ Unquestionably conjugal tenderness has this as one factor. The term "baby" as it is used in rag-time love songs is in point here. More representative is Hamlet's description of his father:

"So loving to my mother,
That he might not beteem the winds of heaven
Visit her face too roughly."

² Cf. Patterson DuBois, *Beckonings from Little Hands* (1900).

analogy with bird parenthood? Or does an induction from cases of parental care lead the heart up to Universal Fatherhood? Far different from either of these is the emotional logic of a four-year-old. Central to the process of his mind is the fact that he himself instinctively assumes a parental attitude toward the helpless birdlings that have been brought to his attention. This helps him, by direct sympathy more than by analysis, to enter into the divine purposes. Without illegitimate stretching of terms, we may say that he "learns by doing"—he learns to love the Father by nascently performing fatherly functions.

But it will be asked whether there is not a filial instinct corresponding to the parental. Apparently there is no such second element. "Original nature," says Thorndike, "careless of equity, provides no filial instinct of return devotion."¹ Is it certain, however, that the lack of a second instinct spells inequity? Certainly the way that family honor, "standing up" for every member of the family, and especially resentment of every slur upon the mother show themselves even on the lower levels of moral culture suggests the presence of an instinctive requital of parental tenderness. It is not the naturalness but the unnaturalness of King Lear's daughters that strikes us in their conduct. How was it possible for them not to feel a motherly regard for their aged father?

What, then, of fraternal affection? Does it grow out of a special instinct, and does the love of my neighbor arise through an extension thereof beyond the family? Again it must be said that no second instinct seems to be provided; but only an ability, through parental instinct, to love all members of the family. One easily sees how this can be the case whenever a child shows tender sympathy with a younger brother or sister, or with any member of the family, regardless of age, who is suffering. But tender regard for an equal or for one older, stronger, and not suffering is less easy to construe. A. F. Shand's analysis of gratitude² as involving some realization of what the kindness of a benefactor has cost him, together with desire to requite this cost—this advances us one step toward the solution of our problem. We take a second step when,

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 85.

² Chap. xvi of G. F. Stout's *Groundwork of Psychology* (New York, 1903).

with McDougall,¹ we note that this tender element in gratitude originates in the parental instinct, which is also the source of moral indignation. A final step, which no writer appears to have taken, consists in recognizing the parental instinct *in children* as the source of their gratitude, filial affection, and social communion. Our ability to love, which implies taking the interests of another as our own, is altogether bound up with the primal instinct on which depends the stability of the family.²

Whatever be the case with other religions, then, the Christian religion, the religion of Divine Fatherhood and human brotherhood, is the ideal flowering of a particular instinct that functions from infancy onward. In this sense the child is naturally Christian. To the Christian idea of the All-Father the response is positive, free, vital. Children love and trust him; they struggle to obey him; they desire to help him in his work; they are grateful for his gifts. This is Christian experience.³

Other instincts, of course, have a part. Fears drive the child to sheltering arms. Curiosity blends with the rest. G. E. Dawson infers from children's questions that the "instinct for causality" is a principal factor in child-religion,⁴ and Earl Barnes looks upon the insistent *who's* and *why's* of the young mind as signs of a theological interest.⁵ This interpretation seems, however, to be made under the influence of the outworn dogmatism that confuses religion with doctrine or philosophy. Whenever the causal interest is central in

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 66-81.

² A corollary for Christian education is that the parental instinct as such should be cultivated. It is worthy of inquiry whether the separation of spiritual nurture from the culture of the primary family sentiments has not already resulted in loss in both directions.

³ What facts of child-life did Jesus have in mind when he said that one must receive the Kingdom as a little child? Matthew's explanation, humility, is obviously a commentary on Jesus' words, and it is exceedingly doubtful. See Baumgarten *et al.* in *Die Schriften des Neuen Testaments*, I, 168 f. Doubtless Jesus would contrast the simplicity and ingenuousness of children with the calculating formalism of the Pharisees. But does this go to the bottom of his thought? May he not have been impressed also by the high claims that children make upon life, even the confident, unabashed way in which they extend family feelings toward all the objects of their experience?

⁴ *The Child and His Religion* (Chicago, 1909), p. 38.

⁵ *Studies in Education*, II, 1902, 287.

the child-mind, the appropriate category is science rather than religion. This is the parent's opportunity to start the young intellect upon a correctly scientific analysis of the world. Religion gains nothing, but loses much, through the well-intentioned answer, "God did it," to questions that we adults answer to ourselves in terms of science.¹

It has been said that children must first think of nature after the fashion of mythology. Dawson even makes animism an instinct of childhood.² If this be so, the precept, "Never teach as true anything that must afterward be un-learned," is unwise, perhaps impossible of application. But I find no adequate evidence that small children are incapable of employing the causal category in the same manner as adults. Least of all do the facts indicate that there is a definite stage of spontaneous animistic belief in Tylor's sense of animism. Rather, we find a continuous mental movement from indefinite toward definite ideas, and from emotional thinking toward abstraction and objectivity. Not, then, from experience of nature, mythologically conceived, but from the experience of a present social reality in the family, should we expect the Christian idea of God to grow.

The view of the child's social nature that I have now sketched is different from the one most in vogue at the present moment. In the early manifestation of one of our strongest and finest social instincts, I find a basis for continuous social growth. But we are told that childhood is essentially egoistic, and that genuine unselfishness must wait for adolescence. This theory of moral discontinuity finds its support chiefly in the turn given by G. Stanley Hall and his pupils to the notion, long held, that the development of the

¹ To Professor Dawson's precious collection of children's questions, I should like to add this one from a boy of about five: "Mother, who was my mama before you were?" Lack of space prevents me from discussing the incautious use of the term "instinct" in Dawson's book, as "instinct for causality" and "instinct of immortality." The naturalness of child-religion, moreover, seems to mean for him that religion is preformed, even to specific beliefs, whereas the growth of mind is not primarily from one set of definite ideas to another but from the indefinite toward the definite. On this point, see Irving King, *The Psychology of Child Development* (Chicago, 1903), p. 243. An analysis of Dawson's cases will show that, though the children in question received little or no formal religious instruction, they were nevertheless under the influence of the religious ideas of their elders.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 32 ff.

individual parallels the evolution of the race. That *some kind* of parallel exists probably no one would question. Both the race and the individual show a movement from relatively unorganized mental life toward organized mental control; from immediate ends toward remote ones; from external authority toward internal authority; from the immediate data of sense toward thought systems. To this the new recapitulation theory adds the following doctrines: (a) That the natural development of the individual mind shows a succession of definite forms corresponding in motive, in content, and in date of emergence, to definite stages of racial evolution; (b) That this succession in the individual is pre-determined by a set of successively ripening instincts, or instinct-like tendencies; and (c) That the proper mental and moral food for each period is to be gathered from the level of the instinct then in action, and not from later and higher levels of culture. The popular interpretation of all this, and sometimes the literary interpretation, is that children, or at least boys, are different from adults in the same way that savagery or barbarism is different from civilization. Any boy who is not a social nuisance is in danger today of incurring the suspicion that he lacks boy spirit!

It is high time to ask whether domesticated boys are so unboy-like after all. At the risk of doing scant justice to a large subject, the present condition of knowledge, as distinguished from popular opinion concerning this matter, may be summarized as follows: (1) The doctrine of embryological recapitulation, which is the acknowledged background for that of mental recapitulation, cannot be assumed to be established.¹ (2) With reference to the brain in particular it does not hold. "Man's brain in general follows in its growth a course enormously unlike that by which it developed in the race."² (3) Where comparison between the two mental series, racial and individual, can safely be made, "what little is known is rather decidedly against any close parallelism of the two."³ (4) The sex instinct, which is the supreme case of a delayed instinct

¹ "The view . . . that embryonic development is essentially a recapitulation of ancestral history must be given up" (article "Embryology," by Adam Sedgwick, in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 11th ed., IX, 323).

² Thorndike, *op. cit.*, p. 255.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 256.

that affects the whole mental and moral life, ripens late in the individual but early in the race. (5) Further—and this bears with peculiar weight against those who have founded upon this instinct a saltatory theory of development—the sexual instinct functions mentally long before it functions physiologically. It is prominent before puberty; it is in evidence in early childhood.

If anyone should claim that, even though the theory of recapitulation be a dubious one, common observation of boys shows that they are different from men in the way already alleged, then the following considerations would be in order: (1) On the one hand, the arrival of adolescence shows of itself no power to produce unselfishness in one who has already formed selfish habits. Whether the social nature shall blossom out depends upon *general laws* of growth, such as habit, imitation, and social stimulation. (2) On the other hand, boys who from infancy have abundance of intimate fellowship with socially minded adults show capacity for social motives that goes directly against the theory. (3) The "typical" boy of recent writings on "the boy problem" is a socially neglected boy. He is the boy on the street; or the boy in a boys' school, away from the normal relations of the family; or the boy who goes to extremes because he has been misunderstood and mishandled. He may live in a good house, have plenty of things, and come of refined parents, and yet be socially neglected, that is, lack sufficient association with his elders to call out and exercise a boy's social capacities. Very likely the number of such boys is growing because of the changes that modern conditions are working in the home. In any case, the segregation of boys from adults, with its denial of a fellowship of ends, must have a stunting effect upon the social nature. (4) The theory of moral discontinuity derives its supposed evidence almost exclusively from boy life, scarcely at all from girl life. Why? In part, I have no doubt, because girls, being kept in closer contact with adult life in the home, and having more opportunity to do for others, develop earlier the social capacities that are common to both boys and girls.

Out of these social capacities, which rest ultimately upon instinct, springs the child's faith in God, a faith that may grow to maturity without any reversal of its instinctive motivation. But

this is only the beginning of the story. The human way of satisfying wants is peculiar. In other animal species an instinct comes to rest when adjustment has been made to the immediate physiological situation. Animal hunger, for example, can be completely satiated with appropriate food; but the corresponding human instinct grows into desire for possessions—desire that has no known limit. Just so, curiosity, the instinctive desire to explore things with eye, hand, nose, expands into science and philosophy. The social tenderness that originates as parental instinct, in turn radiates its warmth into all human intercourse, and then yearns for a similar social relation with divinity. Human instinctive actions, broadly considered, then, are not merely instinctive; there is an inner push that leads many of them to burst their shell. To be sure, there is continuity between the lowest and the highest achievements of humanity, but human life becomes as different from “mere” instinct as a singing bird is different from the songless egg whence it has its birth. This self-transcendence, which involves an immanent critique of our satisfactions, is elemental. It is no mere consolidation of instinct acts by repetition and habit, nor is it a mere complex of elementary instincts. We are dealing here with nothing less than an evolution of instinctive desire into self-conscious desire. We become persons by thus turning upon our desires,¹ and society in the strict sense of the term is possible to persons only.

Any adequate account of the generic tendencies of human nature will include this spontaneous movement which transforms merely instinctive satisfactions into personally and socially realized values. Here is where religion has its home in universal human nature. Religion originates in this human (personal-social) way of dealing with satisfactions. It is not limited to any one kind or to several kinds, of satisfaction; its values may be anything whatever upon which the heart fixes with intense longing. Nor does religion consist in any single method of realizing these values, but often in re-creating the values themselves. Religion is the keenest critic of the values upon which religion itself sets our heart; religion is the

¹ Cf. A. O. Lovejoy, “The Desires of the Self-conscious,” *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, IV (1907), 29–39.

sternest judge of the methods of religion. Here is something more inclusive than any mystical eye of the soul; something wider awake than any subconscious endowment; something more warm than mere insight. Here we have, not without arrests to be sure, the process, both racial and individual, of the creation of a personal-social world.¹ Faith in God, at whatever level we take it, is the construing of experience as *response*, and what is this but the effort to live humanly, that is, to realize ourselves as persons and as society? Faith in God, then, has its roots, just as our own personality has, in instinct, but particularly in the instinctive reactions that lead most directly to the organization of social self-consciousness.²

How this elemental thrust, which requires us to be persons in a personal world, manifests itself in the different religions and in the no-religions; how it suffers arrest in persons and in groups; what obstacles it meets and how it overcomes them—all this, for the moment, is of secondary importance. What is vital to our present purpose is to see that this element of human nature is operative in children from the start. It is not a postponed instinct but an omnipresent movement of the mind—a movement toward self-assertion and yet toward social self-integration; a movement toward instinctive satisfactions, and yet toward a self-conscious organization and transformation of them; toward objective analysis, yet toward a synthesis of experience in terms of meaning. Children's hearts turn toward the ideal world as naturally as

¹ E. Murisier in his *Les maladies du sentiment religieux* (Paris, 1901) arrives by analysis of religiously unstable minds at the conclusion that perhaps religion has furnished the central idea, the focus of attention, for the organization of personal life. At greater length M. Delacroix (*Etudes d'histoire et de psychologie du mysticisme*, Paris, 1908) shows how typical mystics have attained to mental steadiness, unity, and practical power precisely through their mystical experiences. Exceedingly suggestive, whether proved or not, is E. Durkheim's theory (*Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse*, Paris, 1912, pp. 343-90) that the idea of soul does not dawn upon early man primarily through experiences like dreams, but through the individual's consciousness that he participates in Mana.

² Within the limits of this article one cannot, of course, adduce the grounds for this theory, nor even give a full exposition of it. In the near future I hope to express myself upon it more fully. In the meantime I shall be satisfied if I can make clear that the problem of "the religious nature" is a real one, and that its *locus* is the point here indicated.

toward the satisfactions of mere instinct. If the child-mind sees little difference between God and a fairy, the inference is not that the God-idea is missed altogether, but that the fairy-idea has for children a religious tinge. The anthropomorphism of childish thought has in it something universal. It is a first, crude humanizing of experience. Subsequently, as analytical thought grows, parts of one's world become dehumanized, subsocial, without obvious meaning. This process of analysis and abstraction brings gains of its own, but when it seems to command that we submit to an unhuman natural order, the human spirit is stung to a reassertion of the personal-social self. "There must be," says this spirit, "something deeper in the world than that, something that cares for values as they appear from the human point of view." To cling to this imperative of the heart, and to order one's life according to it is to reinstate the principle that underlies childish anthropomorphisms. Therefore the naïve faith of a child is continuous with that of adults.¹

It follows that the first paragraphs of this article give only a partial answer to the question of whence children get their ideas of God, and why children believe in him. Suggestion, imitation, and desultory association are certainly here. But to think of the child-mind as an empty receptacle, indifferent to what adults pour into it, is to misconceive the whole situation. Rather both the child and the adult who teaches him about God are working at a problem that is real for both, and the faith that they have in common, though on different levels, expresses fundamental traits of their common human nature.

¹ If this were an inquiry into the logic of religion, I should raise the question whether even the scientific mind really eliminates anthropomorphism, and if so what sort of objects science has left. My present point is merely that children's faith is of the same kind as that of adults, and springs from the same impulses.

THE PRESENT STATUS OF LIBERAL THEOLOGY IN GERMANY

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A subject such as this submitted by the editors of the *American Journal of Theology* involves by its very nature the greatest difficulties, for, of all the problems of reflection, the most difficult is to comprehend aright, and to pass judgment on, the present. We must waive for the present the fact that a scientific judgment in this matter cannot exist, and only bear in mind, that, because of the impossibility of taking a bird's-eye view of the present religious situation, a one-sided exposition, which will inevitably bear the stamp of the author's prejudices and peculiarities, will of necessity be the result. No theologian can write concerning the present without considering himself as a part of that present, and without permitting his own participation in the movements to influence him.

Because of this it is imperative that problems of the contemporary situation must be repeatedly re-examined. It is the privilege and the duty of the theologian from time to time to survey the ways in which the religious spirit is developing, to ascertain what new directions it is taking, to determine which ideas are active and which are not, and to ascertain at what point the theologian himself can most profitably and clearly relate the forces of his own thinking to the situation. Of supreme importance is it that he shall choose the proper period for such a survey, and that he shall trace the lines of thought with great care in order to determine whether they are discontinued, or whether they lead out into the future. Even our age with its rapid movements of life should not take it for granted that religious ideas change every year; the slight oscillations of faith, whose significance for the present we are too apt to overestimate, combine to make genuine progress only after decades.

The period taken for our brief survey of the liberal theology of Germany is prescribed for us by current theological controversies rather than by the process of historical development. At the present time orthodoxy in Germany, inspired by its doubtful good fortune in the application of compulsory discipline in ecclesiastical politics, jubilantly proclaims the impending dissolution of liberal theology. "The pessimism of ebbing vitality" is said to show itself in progressive theology and to indicate that the end is near.¹ The childlike naïveté which in orthodox circles assumes the success of compulsory discipline to be a triumph of the spirit is so ridiculous that serious-minded men have long since ceased to make any reply to such assertions. In rebuttal the critical theology can point to the theological encyclopedia, *Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, the final volume of which has just appeared.² The fact that so monumental a work has been brought to completion by a group of scientific German theologians and that this work is being more and more used and approved by the reading world in Germany furnishes abundant proof that the liberal theology is still in the ascendant.

It is indeed true that the circumstances of development in liberal theology have altered in so far as the generally prevalent greater tendency toward a practical emphasis has been gaining in German religious circles. This condition of affairs is of great advantage to the church; it has already increased to more than three thousand the number of theological students³ which at one time had declined to nearly two thousand. But unfortunately this increase in numbers brings a stronger emphasis on ecclesiastical advance and on professional interests rather than a higher standard of scientific achievements. The emphasis on what is practical and the desire for security in one's position everywhere bring dangers to science.

Now in this desire for practical activity there is a very important

¹ Cf. an anonymous article concerning Troeltsch in *Allgemeine Evangelische Kirchenzeitung*, August 22, 1913, and one by Dunkmann in *Konservative Monatshefte*, July and August, 1913.

² Tübingen: Siebeck, 5 Bände, 1909-1913.

³ We had in the winter term, 1913-14, 3,903 students of Protestant theology in Germany.

fundamental element of religious life which ought never to be overlooked. It is only when practical activity leads to political compromise and compulsion, substituting utilitarian motives for free conviction, that it is vicious and dangerous. A church which is controlled by one party must constantly be on its guard lest it unintentionally cultivate such bad feelings. That totally different kind of practical enthusiasm, however, which seeks genuinely to serve men, which attempts to maintain and to increase the emotional powers of religion, and which resolves to revive in all their former strength the historical values of faith—such a practical enthusiasm is necessary and indispensable. As a matter of fact, it has never been lacking in the liberal theology.

The position of the liberal theology is historically determined by the opposition between scientific investigation and ecclesiastical needs. Ever since Schleiermacher this opposition has been clearly recognized in theology; even orthodoxy has been compelled to take account of *both* sides; otherwise how could it have developed the modern conservative theology? Indeed, in all theological circles it is today recognized that a union of scientific method and of practical purpose is essential for theology. The emphasis, however, is very differently placed by different men; and programs which read very much alike may mean very different things. There should be especially noted the difficulty that as a matter of fact a theology holding to the old forms of faith is unable even with the best of intentions to see clearly the profound seriousness of scientific endeavor, while on the other side science, when working with religious material, is often unable to furnish a real understanding of the innermost nature of its object of investigation. These two defects are easily comprehensible; and they would be much more readily corrected if fanaticism and the desire for domination did not stand in the way of clear vision and fair dealing.

From the very first, the task of liberal theology has been one of mediation; consequently it will seek to bring into closer relations theory and practice, science and religion, in as pure a form as possible. In contrast to this policy, orthodoxy has engaged in politics. It at first excluded science from the religious realm; then,

finding this position untenable, constructed a science acceptable to itself on religious foundations, making use of either Catholic-rational or of pietistic-other-worldly principles. Here the presuppositions revert to the type of thought previous to Kant and to the *Aufklärung*, and previous also to Schleiermacher and his conception of the nature of religion, even though in form and language, and particularly in references to the literature, the procedure may appear to be very modern. It is unfortunate that so much strength should here be expended in a false opposition to liberal theology, when co-operative work on the part of conservatives in dealing with the religious and theological presuppositions dominating the progress of the nineteenth-century theology would mean great enrichment and progress for liberal theology and thus for the entire religious situation. In spite of the fact that from a scientific point of view both theological parties are constantly coming closer together, they seem doomed to mutual misunderstanding in that neither party reads the contributions of the other, but both engage in criticism on the basis of hearsay, allowing the actual principles at stake to disappear beneath sharp personal animosity. Passion is the curse of all religion. Since for years the liberal theology has been the object of unjust and offensive attacks on the part of the right wing, it has therefore retired from its attitude of calmness and quiet.¹ From this attitude of personal aggressiveness on the part of liberal theology, however, we may immediately conclude that it is scarcely yet time to dig its grave. We may rather characterize it in the words of Wilhelm von Humboldt, "Let one undertake what is right and give to it all one's strength, the reward is always immeasurable, whether fate shall crown one's effort with success or not." The consciousness of being in the right is evident in liberal theology from the suggestive answers which it attempts to give to the two most pressing questions of our day, viz.: What is religion? and What is Christianity?

1. It is an immediate evidence of the correctness of the procedure of critical theology that it has given no single or final answer to the first question. Recent science has rendered to religion a

¹ We need only call attention to the more passionate *Fälle* (cases of ecclesiastical discipline), especially the cases of Jatho and Traub.

valuable service in showing how intimately religion is interwoven with all of the expressions of human culture. If ever radical scientific conclusions proceeded to depict religion as a spiritual phenomenon of secondary importance, or indeed to dispense with it as superfluous, this stage of criticism has quickly become obsolete. Indeed even natural science has yielded to the speculative impulse and has established a monistic religion.

Since Schleiermacher, religion has appeared as a thoroughly unique phenomenon of the soul and yet as interwoven with all other activities of the soul; consequently the task of science has been to set forth this relationship between religion and the life of culture. The difficulty of accomplishing this many-sided task inevitably gave rise to a division of the field of labor. Investigators gave more or less exclusive attention to the historical, or to the psychological, or to the epistemological, or to the ethical aspects of religion. Thus arose the various systematic efforts in the theology of the nineteenth century which paved the way for an all-inclusive understanding of religion within the realm of culture.

If we restrict ourselves here to the immediate present, we may first call attention to three attempts at a systematic solution of the problem, "religion and knowledge." None of these attempts has yet proved itself to be entirely satisfactory; still, taken together, they prove the correctness of the direction in which they are moving. I refer to the attempts of Troeltsch, Otto, and Wobbermin, who seek to set religion in positive relation to science.

Since Troeltsch recently set forth his point of view in an article entitled "The Dogmatics of the Religionsgeschichtliche Schule,"¹ I need to say only a few words concerning his fundamental ideas as to the relation between science and religion. Religion in its relation to science seems to be interwoven with both psychology and history. It is impossible to demonstrate an exceptional historical position for religion. It is rather true that in history religion appears as relative, allied with other phenomena of culture. The scientific classification of religion cannot be reached through history but only through philosophy. The rational, epistemological investigation of religion which Troeltsch undertakes inevitably

¹ *American Journal of Theology*, January, 1913, pp. 1-11.

brings us back to the psychology of religion. Psychology, however, furnishes merely the empirical material out of whose irrational content the process of knowledge rationalizes religion. Moreover, this rational process of religious knowledge must base itself on the religious a priori, which is the epistemological presupposition of religion, in analogy to the logical, ethical, and aesthetic a priori elements in other realms. For this reason the religious a priori is brought into peculiarly close relationship with the ethical a priori since the same principles of validity are binding for both. On the psychology and epistemology of religion is built the historical-philosophical interpretation of religion which the rational unfolding of religion must discover in history. It is here that the relatively highest content of historical Christianity comes to light. Finally, the metaphysics of religion must undertake the philosophical, speculative treatment of the idea of God. In harmony with idealism, the originality of religion is here set forth in disclosing the new beginnings and new realities of the life of the spirit. This relating of the religious conception of God and the scientific world view receives in dogmatics a personal-practical coloring. According to this conception of the philosophy of religion, one is not concerned with proofs of religion but simply with its rational classification among the activities of the human spirit. The affirmation of religion is always a consequence of faith, not of knowledge; nevertheless the effort of man in the direction of knowledge has to care for the rational character of faith.¹

The same desire for a rational comprehension of religion is seen in Otto's attempt to connect his philosophy of religion with the epistemological principles of the philosopher Fries.² Otto also defines the religious problem on the basis of Kant and Schleiermacher. He wishes to determine and to establish the unique character of religion; but he desires to do this by rational means. This necessity for a rational foundation leads him to revive the theory of an immediate knowledge with which Fries attempted to construct his philosophical system. Fries erected upon the psy-

¹ See my article on Troeltsch in the theological lexicon *Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, V, 1360 ff; references to literature will be found there.

² Kantisch-Fries'sche *Religionsphilosophie*, Tübingen, 1909.

chological theory of immediate knowledge a graduated epistemological series rich in spiritual content, but rationally difficult to conceive. He crowned this series with the three functions: knowledge, faith, and intuition (*Wissen, Glauben, Ahndung*). All the intellectual activities of man share in these, and religion particularly is determined by all three. By seizing this almost forgotten doctrine and attempting to make Fries's theory of emotion render service to religion again, Otto involved the concept of religion in all the terminological difficulties and in the epistemological schematism of the philosophy of Fries. Thus he failed to assign sufficient independence to the religious aspect of life. Thus, although Otto's attempt is quite in harmony with modern metaphysical movements in theology, his attachment to an unquestionably suggestive but formally antiquated and obscure epistemology was unfortunate.¹ The further development of his ideas in the realm of the history of religion, which Otto is now undertaking, may give to his one-sided psychological-rational principles the needed breadth and may adapt them to the speculative needs of the present.²

In opposition to Otto, Wobbermin, in working out his conception of the basis of religion, has attached himself to the modern position of William James. In the first volume of his work on systematic theology, entitled *Die religionspsychologische Methode in Religionswissenschaft und Theologie*,³ he attempts to unite the pure psychological approach of Schleiermacher and the empirical approach of James, in order thus to attain a genuinely rational definition of religion. The truth-interest of religion like the truth-interest of knowledge in general becomes the link between science and religion, and under the impulse of this interest both the need of exact knowledge and the emotional longing to be certain of one's salvation can find satisfaction.

All three of these theological essays bear the marks of incompleteness. They are sketches which need further elaboration and

¹ See my articles "Wider den Neofriesianismus in der Theologie," *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, 1911 and 1912; also "Das religiöse Apriori bei Troeltsch und Otto," *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*, Bd. 139 (1911), p. 193.

² See his address "Ist eine Universalreligion möglich?" given at the World Congress of Liberal Religion in Paris, 1913, *Christliche Welt*, No. 52, 1913, pp. 1237 ff.

³ Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1913.

criticism, but they are for that very reason full of promise. By contrast, philosophy appears to be too hasty in its discussion of the religious problem and to underestimate its real value and depth. The stimulus which Eucken's theology gave to theology too quickly shifts to the suggestion that philosophy itself is in a position to solve religious problems.¹ And the pupils of Eucken have hastily advanced to claim the religious realm for themselves and for their bold emphatic assertions. This circumstance gives to current liberal theology the feeling that too close an alliance with philosophy has inevitably been harmful. The philosophers constantly incline to the settled conviction that they are masters of all problems, and that theology must await from them suggestions for the solution of its problems. This, however, is absolutely false; for in most cases the philosopher inevitably misunderstands or disregards the fundamental fact that religion lies between theory and practice, a fact which we actually observe and which we must presuppose. Therefore, theology itself is compelled to formulate the problems of the philosophy of religion and itself to furnish the necessary philosophical work as the three above-mentioned theological thinkers have attempted to do.

Although in recent times the answer to the question, "What is religion?" has been sought by the aid of the theoretical reason, nevertheless the earlier attempts to investigate religion as a problem of the *practical reason* have not entirely lost their power. Especial importance attaches to the ideas coming from Wilhelm Herrmann, or due to his influence. The complete separation between scientific knowledge and religious experience has enabled his theology to become closely identified with the practical ecclesiastical interests; and it is noteworthy that orthodoxy has gradually assumed a hospitable attitude toward his teachings, in spite of the fact that his theology with its rejection of all legal authority in doctrine and its assertion of the complete autonomy of faith must be inherently unwelcome to conservatives. It is significant that it is to the practical emphasis of Herrmann's theology that this irenic influence is due. Recently Herrmann in his little book,

¹ Cf. my monograph, *Der religiöse Wahrheitsbegriff in der Philosophie Rudolf Euckens*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1910.

Die mit der Theologie verknüpfte Not der evangelischen Kirche und ihre Ueberwindung,¹ has again shown how his fundamentally mediating and ecclesiastically practical theology can offer guidance to the faith of the church. Religion appears as a fact which rescues men from guilt and anxiety, which is guaranteed through feeling alone, and based upon the ideas in which Jesus shared his faith with his disciples. The emancipation of the inner man, however, is possible only by the conquest of moral weakness and sin through complete trust in a pure higher personal life. Herrmann's genuinely acute and accurate psychological observation here makes central a moral phenomenon of human society, which is by no means accidental, but which is in fact ethically and religiously fundamental.

It is this *ethical* foundation of the theology of the Ritschlian school that gives it its relationship to the neo-Kantian philosophy—a relationship which, for a time, appeared to be one of direct dependence. As a matter of fact, the Ritschlian theology has never been thus dependent; but Herrmann simply employed the keenly critical view of science set forth by the neo-Kantians in order to separate science and morality and thus to achieve freedom for religion. The neo-Kantians, on the contrary, are constantly seeking to draw religion into their scientific ethics, and to represent religion as a phenomenon necessary indeed but not fundamental for the life of the spirit. Although the leaders of the school—Cohen in *Kants Begründung der Ethik*,² and Natorp in *Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der Humanität*³ have furnished valuable contributions to the understanding of religion, they seem to have no followers to pursue inquiries in this direction and it looks as if the neo-Kantian school were ceasing to maintain an inwardly appreciative attitude toward the religious problem and a corresponding philosophical consideration of the subject. This is greatly to the disadvantage of this school which in this point is behind the position of modern speculative philosophy. For the mutual relation between ethics and religion continues to be the

¹ Tübingen: Siebeck, 1913.

² 12. Aufl. Berlin: Cassirer, 1910.

³ 2. Aufl. Tübingen: Siebeck, 1908; cf. my review in *Christliche Welt*, 1909, No. 10.

most promising and important subject of investigation, and the exact nature of this relationship can be clearly ascertained only by the mutual criticism of theologians and philosophers. For such labor, however, there must necessarily be presupposed on both sides an understanding and a love for both objects of investigation.

We must now mention the attempts to ascertain the nature of religion from the *aesthetic* point of view. Efforts of this sort are for the most part of an artistic rather than a scientific character, and therefore are more influential in the realm of popular religion than in that of theology. It is noteworthy that an aesthetic mysticism has found comparatively widespread acceptance; it is based partially on a monistic foundation (Wilhelm Bölsche); and it finds acceptance partially in the societies of Freemasonry and Free Thought (the Horneffer Brothers and Bruno Wille, the monthly *Die Tat* [Jena: Diederichs]). Since these religious movements are for the most part unsystematic, they are of importance for theology only as signs of the times. Otto is the only theologian who has thus far attempted to establish scientifically a relationship between religion and aesthetics; and here he is simply a follower of Fries.¹ Aesthetic feeling appears closely related to religious feeling, and the use of symbols for artistic and religious ideas serves to bring these into closest connection. Apart from the valuable emphasis on the significance of symbols for both art and religion, these conceptions are still too indefinite to have exercised much influence on theology. Still there has been a certain amount of critical examination of this theological attempt in which the significance of the religious-aesthetic problem is at least being fully recognized.² It looks, however, as if theology had not yet gone far enough in its epistemological problem to be able to devote itself to the difficult task of examining the relation between religion and aesthetics. Clear as it is to us since Schiller and Schleiermacher that both realms are spiritually related, it is equally necessary to preserve their mutual independence and integrity.

The foregoing discussion shows that the scientific theology in

¹ Cf. the above-mentioned *Kantisch-Fries'sche Religionsphilosophie*.

² Georg Weiss, *Fries' Lehre von der Ahndung in Aesthetik, Religion und Ethik*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1912.

Germany has not prematurely settled the problem of the basis of religion, but that, while making general progress, it is devoting itself to the task of making much richer and more comprehensive developmental possibilities for the future. This fact gives assurance that it is on the right track.

2. At first it seems as if we have a more complicated situation in regard to the answer to the second question which we suggested, viz., What is Christianity? Owing to the fact that the discussion of this problem has been carried on too much in public and popular ways so that right of way has been given to both pious ignorance and skeptical dilletantism, conclusions have been too hastily formulated. It is, of course, true that this question stands much closer than the other to the general interests of faith and that the welfare of Christianity seems to demand an immediate answer to it. As if science had the power to introduce confusion into genuine religious life! It can disturb only a pseudo-religion.

The problem of the nature of Christianity has developed in current theology in two quite distinct directions. In the first place it was the problem of the relation between Christianity and history which led to serious disturbance. After the abandonment of the mediaeval belief that the New Testament narrative was essentially super-historical, the progress of the scientific dissolution of Christian tradition could not be halted. Close upon the discovery that it was impossible to reconstruct a "life of Jesus" followed a criticism of the words of Jesus. A clear distinction was made between Christ and Jesus. The clearer the traits of the Christ of dogma became, the more doubtful did historians feel as to the possibility of finding in the New Testament definite knowledge concerning historical fact. As a consequence it was felt to be increasingly difficult to base affirmations of faith on historical uncertainties; and there was a rapid advance to the sensational attempt to renounce history entirely and to eliminate even the remnants of historical fact through radical hypotheses. Along with the vigorous attacks on the historicity of Jesus came the religious attempts of Kalthoff and Jatho to set forth a Christianity without historical credentials. Under these circumstances it has become impossible for scientific theology to defend its own cautious

position over against daring hypotheses and to preserve calmness of spirit. On the other hand, orthodoxy made use of these extravagances of critical method to direct the severest attacks against the piety and the character of the critical theologians. Thus in the past months Heitmüller's extremely calm and clear exposition of the character of Jesus has been the subject of the most painful suspicions. This very exposition of Heitmüller's has the great positive value of firmly establishing a certain amount of genuine tradition concerning Jesus in opposition to all superficial criticism. For that very reason it was obliged to maintain an attitude of careful objectivity and personal restraint.¹

In the face of this thoroughgoing scientific research it is impossible for the dogmatic theologian to retire behind the faith of Christ. Liberal theology must reckon more clearly than it thus far has with the consequence resulting from the lessening and the uncertainty of the tradition concerning Jesus. The consciousness of value in relation to history must be so altered as to lay emphasis not so much upon bare fact as upon the spiritual significance and continued influence of the facts. So far as this problem is concerned, just now, everything is in a state of flux. At present there does not exist any clear systematic attempt to set forth the significance of Jesus for Christian faith in accordance with the recent results of historical criticism. But it is better that this problem should wait until the intense religious prejudice against the liberal theologians shall have given place to confidence in their earnestness and reverence. As a preparation for this work attention must now be given to the other more important scientific question which Christianity today presents.

The second difficulty which Christian faith today encounters is perhaps less evident but not less fundamental. It concerns the bringing of the Christian realm of ideas into the general field of culture. Not only the origin of Christianity but also its development is interwoven in the general history of intellectual life. For this reason Christianity frequently appears as a syncretistic and somewhat inconsistent whole, which, because of this character, can represent only a relatively high culture value. Its religious

¹ W. Heitmüller, *Jesus*. Tübingen: Siebeck, 1913.

ideas and power seem to be parallel with vigorous life-movements which along with it and through it come to full validity. The triumph of the individual, which up to the present has been emphasized in Christianity, is supplemented by powerful sociological influences which formerly received slight attention. Society is now being raised to a constituent factor of equal importance.¹ The idea of redemption is connected with the work of all founders and promoters of ethical religious culture and attains its full efficacy only in society. Revelation likewise appears as a psychological phenomenon which must receive a sociological interpretation, and which establishes quite novel lines of connection in social groups. The individual loses his one-sided valuation in religion, and the attempt is made to place the individual and society on the same level in Christianity as well as in profane life. Personal religious convictions press to attach themselves to the great social movements of the human spirit. Anxiety for one's own soul retires behind the desire to serve the soul of humanity. These are powerful alterations of the Christian religious attitude which have been evoked by recent historical and psychological judgments and conceptions.

If, as a result of this point of view, Christianity loses its absoluteness in the general stream of religious phenomena, it nevertheless in this way attains the capacity to assert itself as the dominating spiritual factor in culture. Because of the fact that it subordinates all values of the human spirit and of economic culture, of the individual soul and of society, to the primary religious ideal of self-denial and voluntary dependence on the directing will of God and upon the universal moral command of brotherly love, it gives new and universally valid power again to the indispensable symbolic representations which were effective in the personality of Jesus and in the first Christian community. But these ideals now for the first time receive a world-encompassing significance, since their historical permanence through the centuries of ancient and varying forms of complicated culture has thus proved that an enthusiastic wave of faith has now grown to be the Christian world-religion. This development is comprehensible to the theologian

¹ Troeltsch, *Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen*, Tübingen, 1912.

today only as he understands the moral-religious forces of Christianity in their connection with the world-process of development, and learns to comprehend the fact that in its inner power of adaptation the Christian religion reveals the most astonishing capacity of original religious power to the advance of culture. The problem of the Christian conception of religion and of the world is precisely the problem of understanding how the creative life of any religious personality in the past or in the present effects an advance of the culture of humanity in general.

On the basis of these relationships there arises that universal historical understanding of Christianity which will constantly increase the active capacity of religion far more effectively than does an external absoluteness which has today become lifeless and uninfluential, and which considers only the individual. It must be admitted that the paths to such an understanding lie before us as yet unsurveyed and untrodden. But this means only the greater opportunity for German theology in the next generation to establish in relation to these central problems its right to exist.

CANAANITE INFLUENCE ON THE RELIGION OF ISRAEL¹

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I. THE PROBABILITY OF CANAANITE INFLUENCE

1. Canaanite influence on the religion of Israel is probable from the gradual and incomplete manner in which the conquest of Canaan was effected by the Hebrews. In regard to this event the Old Testament traditions are singularly contradictory. The Deuteronomic editor of Joshua and the Priestly writer in the same book hold that the twelve tribes entered the land together under the leadership of Joshua, captured all the cities in a rapid campaign, and destroyed all their inhabitants (Jos. 10:28-43; 11:10-12:24, D²; chaps. 13-22, mainly P). On the other hand, the older JE passages that are included by the Deuteronomic editor mention a number of cities that were not taken by Joshua, e.g., Jerusalem (15:63), Gezer (16:10), Taanach and Megiddo (17:11-18), or that were captured by other persons, e.g., Hebron by Caleb (15:14), Debir by Othniel (15:15-17), the Highland of Israel by the tribes of Joseph (17:14-18). J and E also agree that the Canaanites were not annihilated, but continued to "dwell in the midst of Israel unto this day" (Exod. 23:29 f.; 34:11-16; Jos. 13:1b, 13; 15:63; 16:10; 17:12 f.).

There can be no doubt that the older conception of JE is the more historical. Jerusalem was not taken until the time of David (II Sam. 5:6-9; cf. Judg. 19:10-12; against Jos. 12:10). The Canaanites were not expelled from Gezer until the time of Solomon (I Kings 9:16; cf. Judg. 1:29; against Jos. 12:12). Beth-shan remained in the hands of the Philistines until the time of David (I Sam. 31:10; cf. Judg. 1:27). Taanach and Megiddo were still Canaanite in the time of Deborah (Judg. 5:19; cf. 1:27; against

¹ For literature on this subject see my article "Canaanites" in Hastings' *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*.

Jos. 12:21; 21:25). Shechem was still a Canaanite city in the time of Abimelech (Judg. 9:28; cf. Gen. 34:2). The older histories agree that the Canaanites were not exterminated, as D and P in Joshua record, but that they continued to dwell in the midst of Israel, as narrated by J in Joshua (cf. Judg. 3:1-6; II Sam. 24:7; I Kings, 9:20-21). The prohibitions of marriage with the Canaanites that continue down to Deuteronomy (Exod. 23:32 f.; 34:11-16; Deut. 7:1-4) show that they lived in the land long after the Hebrew invasion.

Another conception of the conquest is found in Judg., chap. 1. This agrees with the JE sections in Joshua that the Canaanites were not exterminated (Judg. 1:19, 21, 27-36). It differs from JE in representing the tribes as conquering their territories separately, or at most in pairs, not as united under the leadership of Joshua. This appears to be the earlier form of the J tradition, and to be historically the more trustworthy. There is no trace in later history of such a union of the tribes as the JE documents in Joshua assume. In the Song of Deborah (Judg., chap. 5), Deborah, in the face of mortal danger, is able to get volunteers only from the northern tribes who were directly menaced by Sisera. Throughout the Book of Judges, apart from editorial passages, the Judges appear as tribal leaders only, and the tribes are often at war with one another (Judg. 3:27; 6:34 f.; 8:1; 9:6; 11:8; 12:4-6; 15:11 f.).

Still another tradition of the conquest is found in Num. 14:44 f.; 21:1-3. Here the Israelites invade the south of Canaan and capture the district subsequently known as Hormah. This is a duplicate to Judg. 1:16 f., but differs from it in bringing some of the tribes into Canaan from Kadesh on the south, while Judg., chap. 1, represents them as all entering from the east (Judg. 1:16; 2:1).

There is much in favor of the correctness of the narrative of Numbers. If Judah and Simeon conquered their territories independently, as Judg., chap. 1, relates, it is improbable that they were united with the other tribes as far as Gilgal. If such a union had existed, it would not have been dissolved on the border of Canaan, when the hardest fighting remained still to be done. The

account of Numbers which makes part of Israel invade Canaan from Kadesh furnishes a much more natural introduction to the separate conquests by Judah, Simeon, Caleb, Othniel, and the Kenites in Judg., chap. 1, than does the present context in J. Şephath is only about 40 miles distant from Kadesh. It is more probable that it was conquered directly from Kadesh, as Numbers relates, than by the circuitous route around the land of Edom, by way of Gilgal, Jericho, and Jerusalem, as Judg., chap. 1, assumes. The separation of Judah from the northern tribes down to the period of the monarchy by Jerusalem and a belt of Canaanite towns in the center of the land is more easily explained, if the two main divisions of Israel invaded Canaan from opposite sides and failed to make connection, than if they entered the land together.

This form of the tradition is confirmed further by the inability of the Hexateuchal documents to combine the stay at Kadesh with the stay at Sinai. In Num. 10:33; 11:35; 12:16 J represents the Israelites as journeying directly from Sinai to Kadesh. Deut. 1:19, which depends on J, makes Kadesh follow Sinai (cf. 33:2), and Deuteronomy knows no earlier visit to Kadesh. E, on the other hand, seems to have placed Kadesh immediately after the crossing of the Red Sea (Exod. 15:25b; cf. 17:7; Deut. 33:8; Num. 20:1-13). E and D make the forty years' wandering follow Kadesh (Num. 14:25; Deut. 1:46-2:1), but P omits Kadesh from the list of stations (Num. 33:17; cf. Num. 12:16 J; Deut. 33:2), and does not insert it until the end of the forty years' wandering (Num. 33:36, 37; cf. v. 38). J mentions no wandering in the desert, but makes the tribes stay at Kadesh until the generation that had come out of Egypt had perished (Num. 14:31). This uncertainty of tradition is probably due to the fact that the Hebrew tribes were divided before the conquest into two great groups. The Leah tribes that entered the land from the south were settled at Kadesh, the Rachel tribes that entered it from the east were settled at Sinai; and these two sojourns may have been widely separated in point of time, just as the two conquests of Canaan.

The evidence of archaeology on the whole favors the view that the Israelites entered Canaan, partly under the Eighteenth Egyptian Dynasty, and partly under the Nineteenth. Jacob-el and

probably Joseph-el appear in the list of Thutmose III (1500 B.C.). The Habiru of the Tell el-Amarna Letters (1400 B.C.) are certainly some sort of Hebrews. The personal name Ahi-yawi in the letter from Taanach looks like a Yahweh compound. The Shasu, or Bedawin, who were attacked by Seti I are evidently the same as the Habiru; and in the inscriptions of Seti I and Ramses II we probably meet the name Asher. Finally Merneptah in his triumphal stele speaks of Israel as settled somewhere in central Palestine. On the other hand, the mention of the store-cities of Pithom and Raamses in Exod. 1:11 (J) indicates, in the light of Naville's discoveries, that Ramses II was the Pharaoh of the oppression, and that the Exodus cannot have occurred earlier than the reign of Merneptah. The only way apparently in which these facts can be explained is by the hypothesis that Israel entered Canaan in two divisions, one under the Eighteenth Dynasty, and the other under the Nineteenth Dynasty. The first division was probably the Leah tribes of Judg. 1:1-20, the second division was the Rachel tribes of Judg. 1:21-29.

The older sources show, accordingly, that the conquest of Canaan by Israel was a process that extended over several centuries. The aborigines were not exterminated, but certain Hebrew clans forced their way into the land, and occupied the rural districts, while the walled cities remained, for the most part, in the hands of the Canaanites. For a long while there was hostility between the two races; but gradually this ceased, and a process of amalgamation began. Cities that could not be conquered were eventually united to Israel by treaties that gave them full political rights. Whole tribes that made peace and accepted the worship of Yahweh were incorporated into the nation and counted as "sons of Israel." In process of time, through conquest, treaty, or inter-marriage, Canaanites and Hebrews were fused into one people and dwelt in the same cities, as was the case, for instance, in Shechem in the days of Abimelech (Judg., chap. 9). The Israel of David's day was not the lineal descendant of the nation that entered Canaan under Moses and Joshua, but was a hybrid race composed partly of Israelites and partly of Canaanites. This mixing of races could not occur without appropriation

by the Hebrews of some elements at least of the religion of their predecessors.

2. Canaanite influence on the religion of Israel is probable also from the adoption of Canaanite civilization by the Hebrews. When the Hebrews entered Canaan they were rude nomads of the desert, while the Canaanites had attained a high civilization. From the Canaanites they received the forms of city life and the institutions of city government. From them they learned agriculture and all the other industries of settled society. This is frankly acknowledged by Deuteronomy, e.g., 6:10 f.: "Yahweh thy God shall give thee great and goodly cities which thou buildedst not, and houses full of good things which thou filledst not, and cisterns hewn out which thou hewedst not, vineyards and olive trees which thou plantedst not" (cf. 19:1). It is confirmed also by archaeology. No break in the civilization of Canaan is caused by the advent of the Hebrews. The ancient manners and customs were gradually adopted by Israel as it passed from the nomadic to the agricultural form of life. It is probable even that the newcomers adopted the language of the Canaanites instead of the Aramaic dialect that they spoke originally. The language that we call Hebrew is the language of the glosses to the Tell el-Amarna Letters, and Isa. 19:18 calls it "the tongue of Canaan." With this adoption of the civilization of Canaan there must have come adoption of the gods of Canaan. Agriculture could not be carried on without observing the ceremonies that accompanied the planting of the seed and the reaping of the harvest. The forms of city government could not be maintained except with recognition of the local divinities.

3. The warnings against Canaanite religion that continue in Hebrew legislation down to the Exile show that it was a real menace. The primitive Mosaic commandment, "Thou shalt worship no other god than Yahweh," is enlarged already in J's Book of the Covenant (Exod. 34:11-16) with prohibitions of treaties and marriages with the Canaanites, worship of their gods, and use of their religious emblems. E's Book of the Covenant (Exod. 23:24, 32 f.) contains the same prohibitions, and these are repeated by Deuteronomy (7:1-5, 25). Even the late Holiness Code (Lev. 18:3)

reiterates the ancient commandment: "After the doings of the land of Canaan, whither I bring you, ye shall not do; neither shall ye walk in their statutes."

4. The Old Testament histories and the prophets inform us that Israel served the gods of the Canaanites. This apostasy is asserted by J (Judg. 3:5 f.) and by E (Judg. 2:10, 13), as well as by the late Deuteronomic editors of Judges and Samuel (Judg. 2:7, 11, 12; 3:7; 6:25-32; 8:33; 10:6, 10; I Sam. 7:3 f.; 12:10). It is confirmed by the testimony of Hosea (2:8, 13, 17; 11:2; 13:1) and of Jeremiah (2:8, 23; 7:9; 9:14; etc.). If these Canaanite divinities were worshiped, it is incredible that their cults should not have exerted some influence upon the religion of Yahweh.

II. SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF CANAANITE INFLUENCE ON THE RELIGION OF ISRAEL

1. *Canaanite gods*.—All the great celestial powers were worshiped by the Canaanites. Among these were Shemesh, "the sun," whose cult is attested by such place-names as Beth-Shemesh, 'Ir-Shemesh, 'En-Shemesh; Yārēah, "the moon," which appears probably in Yērēhō, Jericho; Addu, or Hadad, the storm-god, often mentioned in the Amarna Letters; Resheph, "the lightning," often mentioned in Egyptian texts of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Dynasties; Ūru, "light," in Ūru-salim, Jerusalem, and the personal name Ūru-milki in the Amarna Letters.

These divinities had marked individuality, and could not easily be identified with Yahweh. Accordingly in early Hebrew theology they were subordinated to him as servants who waited upon him. They were "the host of heaven," or the "sons of God," i.e., beings of a divine nature but inferior to Yahweh. They were worshiped by some of the Hebrews down to the Exile, but this was felt to be deliberate apostasy from Yahweh (Deut. 4:19; 17:3; II Kings 23:5; Jer. 8:2; Job 31:26). Still it is possible that attributes even of these deities were transferred to him. Particularly is this true of Hadad, the storm-god, who bears a striking resemblance to the early Hebrew theophanies of Yahweh in the thunderstorm (e.g., Judg. 5:4-5; Ps. 18).

Most of the Canaanite nature-gods possessed no such individuality as those that have just been mentioned. They had no personal names, but were known merely as the *ēl*, "power," or *ba'al*, "owner," of this or that place or object. The title *ēl* occurs frequently in Amorite personal names of the First Dynasty of Babylon. In Palestine it is found as early as 1500 B.C. in place-names in the list of Thutmose III. Personal names in the Amarna Letters are often formed with it. Sixteen place-names compounded with it are found in the Old Testament. These are probably all survivals of Canaanite nomenclature.

When the Hebrews settled in Canaan the *ēlōhīm* were at first felt to be foreign deities, and worship of them was conscious defec-tion from Yahweh; but as the two races blended, these gods were gradually regarded as identical with Yahweh. *Ēl* was the generic name for "god" in Hebrew, and was used as a synonym of Yahweh. It was easy to think that the *ēlōhīm* of Canaan were only his local manifestations. This process of syncretism has left interesting traces in the Book of Genesis. In Gen. 16:13 (J) El-roi, the numen of the spring at Beer-lahai-roi, preserves his identity, and appears to Hagar as the "messenger of Yahweh"; in Gen. 31:11, 13 (E) the *ēl* of the standing stone at Beth-el is also the "messenger of God"; but in other passages the messenger and Yahweh are identified (e.g., Gen. 16:13; 29:19; 48:16; Exod. 3:4). In these cases the old local *ēl* is completely absorbed by Yahweh. So far did this process go that the plural *ēlōhīm* eventually became a singular in the Hebrew consciousness and was used like *ēl* as a syno-nym of Yahweh. This identification of Yahweh with the local gods of Canaan must have introduced many new elements into the Hebrew conception of his character.

Another title of deities who presided over physical objects or places was *ba'al*, "proprietor."¹ Amorite personal names com-pounded with *ba'al* are common in the Obelisk of Manishtusu and in tablets of the First Dynasty of Babylon. The name is frequent in Egyptian texts of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Dynasties. It appears also in the Amarna Letters and in one of the letters discovered by Sellin at Taanach. The numerous place-names

¹ See my article "Baal" in Hastings' *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*.

compounded with *ba'al* in the Old Testament are doubtless all of Canaanite origin. They bear witness to a general diffusion of the *ba'al*-cult throughout the land. There must have been innumerable other *bē'ālm* whose places of worship are not recorded, since, according to Jer. 2:28; 3:6, they were as numerous as the towns, and were worshiped on every high hill and under every green tree. The *bē'ālm* of the fertile region where Hosea lived were regarded as the givers of wool and flax, oil and wine, grain, vines, and fig trees (Hos. 2:5, 9, 12); but, as the place-names show, there were also *bē'ālm* of springs, trees, mountains, and cities who did not necessarily possess an agricultural character.

These local divinities of Canaan exerted a peculiar fascination upon the Hebrews. As the Book of Judges and the early prophets repeatedly inform us, "Israel served the *bē'ālm*." At first they were regarded as different gods from Yahweh; but *ba'al*, "proprietor," was a generic name that might also be applied to him, and little by little they were identified with him. This process has left an interesting monument in personal names of the period of the Judges and of the early monarchy. In such names as Jerub-ba'al, "the *ba'al* contends"; Ish-ba'al, "man of *ba'al*"; Ba'al-yada', "the *ba'al* knows"; Ba'al-hanan, "the *ba'al* is gracious," *ba'al* is certainly a title of Yahweh. In one case, Ba'al-Yah, "Yahweh is the *ba'al*," the identity of the *ba'al* with Yahweh is asserted. In popular conception in the time of Hosea the *bē'ālm* were not foreign gods but local Yahwehs (Hos. 2:11, 13, 16). Thus the idea of Yahweh was corrupted with all sorts of foreign notions, and the prophets from Amos onward faced the problem, how to purge the religion of Israel from the heathen elements that had entered it. Hosea (2:16) insisted that Yahweh should no longer be called *ba'al*, and that the worship of the *bē'ālm* should be given up, but his words and those of the other prophets made little impression. The Book of Deuteronomy and the reformation of Josiah had for their chief aim the destruction of the *bē'ālm* by the abolition of the high places and the centralization of worship at Jerusalem; but both Jeremiah and Ezekiel confess that their efforts were unsuccessful. The Exile, which removed Israel from the holy places and the old religious associations of Canaan, eradi-

cated this cult nominally from orthodox Judaism, but even after the Exile, it lingered in the rural districts, where it was gradually transformed into saint-worship, as in modern Islam; and many rites were retained in the national ritual that owed their origin to Israel's predecessors.

Besides the *bē'ālīm* who were the proprietors of particular places or physical objects, the Canaanites recognized other *ēlōhīm* who presided over their clans and over the manifold happenings of human life. Such were 'Ashtart, the 'Ashtoreth of the Old Testament and the Astarte of the Greeks, the goddess of sexual love and of reproduction, whose worship in the pre-Israelite period is attested in a variety of ways;¹ 'Anath, the goddess of war, who is found in the place-names Beth-'Anath and 'Anathoth; Gad, "fortune," who survives in the place-names Gad and Migdal-Gad; Shalem, "peace," who appears in Jeru-salem and in compounds with Shalman in Amorite names in Babylonia; Edom, "maker," who is called the wife of Resheph in an Egyptian magical text (Müller, *Asien*, p. 315), but who is usually masculine and is found in various place-names and in the personal name 'Obed-Edom.

The worship of 'Ashtart by the Hebrews is certain from numerous passages that state that Israel served the *bē'ālīm* and the '*ashtārōth*. The recognition of the other gods of this class is proved by personal names and by occasional explicit statements. These gods, particularly the feminine ones, were too individual to be fused easily with Yahweh. They remained his rivals, and their worship was forbidden. The only influence that they can have exerted on the religion of Israel was through borrowing of their sacred objects or ceremonies. In the case of 'Ashtart, as we shall see later, this influence seems to have been considerable.

Another class of tribal gods consisted of those whose names were the imperfect third person singular of verbs, like the Arabian god, Yaghuth, "he helps," or Yahweh, "he causes to live" (?), which described the god in question as the agent in a particular sort of activity. From these were formed tribal names such as *Yisrā-ēl* (Israel), "the striver is god," *Yishma'-ēl* (Ishmael), "the hearer is god," and *Yērahmē-ēl* (Jerahmeel), "the pitier is god,"

¹ See my article "Ashtart" in Hastings' *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*.

which asserted that these deities were the chief gods of these clans. These tribal names imply that there were once gods called Yisrā Yishma', and Yērahēm, whose names were formed like Yaghuth and Yahweh. In the Babylonian inscriptions and in the place-list of Thutmose III (1500 B.C.) we meet the Amorite tribal and personal names Jacob-el and Joseph-el, which suggest that Jacob, "the supplanter," and Joseph "the adder," were originally names of gods. Such place-names as Jabne-el, Jezre-el, Jiphtah-el, Jekabze-el, Jokthe-el, Jirpe-el, which are probably survivals in the Old Testament from Canaanite times, seem also to contain the names of departmental deities that are formed in a similar manner.

These patron-gods of ancient clans were not identified by the Hebrews with Yahweh, and their names did not become his epithets; but they were degraded to the rank of human ancestors of the clans that were named after them. Their ancient shrines were transformed into graves, and the homage that was still paid them was regarded as reverence for forefathers; e.g., the grave of Jacob at Abel-mizraim (Gen. 50:11) and of Joseph at Shechem. Such names as Jabne-el, Jezre-el, etc., are properly names of persons. Their use as place-names can be explained only by elipsis of *bēth*, "house of," as in Ba'al-mā'ôn over against Bēth-ba'al-mā'ôn. All of these names, accordingly, point to a cult of assumed ancestors at their supposed places of burial.

Most of the Canaanite tribal gods, like the nature-gods, had no proper personal names. They were called by titles of kinship or authority, like the human heads of families. Some of these titles that are attested by the Amarna Letters and by the Babylonian and Egyptian inscriptions are: Ab, "father," in Abi-shua in the fresco of Khnumhotep, and Abimilki, king of Tyre in the Amarna Letters; 'Amm, "paternal uncle," in 'Ammi-anshi in the tale of Sinuhe, and 'Ammu-nira, king of Beirut in the Amarna Letters; Dād, or Dōd, "uncle," in Dada-waqar, in the Obelisk of Manishtusu and Dudu, the Egyptian commissioner in the Amarna Letters; Ah, "brother," in many Amorite names of the Obelisk of Manishtusu and of tablets of the First Dynasty of Babylon; Melek, "king," in Abi-milki, 'Abdi-milki, Ili-milki, and Milk-uru in the Amarna Letters; Adōn, "master," in Adunu, king of 'Arqa in the Amarna

Letters; Dan, "judge" in Addu-Dan in the Amarna Letters and in the place-names Dan and Maḥaneh-Dan; Shem, "name," in Shumu-Addu in the Amarna Letters; 'Elyōn, "high," the god of the Canaanite king Melchizedek (Gen. 14:18 ff.) and a god of the Phoenicians according to Philo Byblius.

All these Canaanite titles of divinity were gradually applied to Yahweh by the Hebrews. Thus Ab, "father," appears in the personal names Abi-el, Abi-jah, and Abi-nadab; 'Amm, "uncle," in 'Ammi-el, Eli'am, and Ithre'am; Dôd, "uncle," in Dôd-Yahu; Ah, "brother," in Ahi-jah, and Ahi-tub; Melek (Molech), "king," in Ahi-melek, Malki-shua', and Malki-jah; Adon (Adonis), "lord," in Adoni-jah, and Adoni-ram; Dan, "judge," in Dani-el; and Shem, "name," in Shemu-el (Samuel). In all these cases it is certain that these titles do not designate primitive Semitic, or Canaanite departmental gods, but have become epithets of Yahweh. With the application of these titles to Yahweh attributes of the Canaanite divinities must have been transferred to the conception of his character.

2. *Revelation*.—The Canaanites believed that the gods manifested themselves in all sorts of physical phenomena. In one of the cuneiform letters from Tell Ta'annek we read: "If the finger of the goddess Ashera shall indicate, let one observe and obey." The existence of oracles is further established by such place-names as Akshaph, "divination"; 'En-mishpat, "spring of decision," at Kadesh, "the sanctuary"; the terebinth of Moreh, or "the oracle"; the terebinth of Me'onenim, or "the diviners"; Gibe'ath hammoreh "hill of the oracle." The gods could also manifest themselves by taking possession of men and using them as mouthpieces. The report of the Egyptian commissioner Wenamon (ca. 1100 B.C.) relates of the king of Gebal: "Now while he sacrificed to his gods, the god seized one of the noble youths, making him frenzied, so that he said, Bring the god hither! Bring the messenger of Amon!" This shows that the ecstatic prophets of Ba'al and Ashera that we meet in later Hebrew history (I Kings 18:19) were no new thing among the Canaanites.

All these forms of revelation were recognized by the Hebrews as used by Yahweh. In the period of the early monarchy he was

believed to show himself in earthquake, fire, and storm; in sacred springs, trees, mountains, and stones, and in the lot of Urim and Thummim. He also took possession of seers, compelling them to utter his message. It seems probable that many of these media of revelation were indigenous in Canaan, and were simply transferred to the service of Yahweh after he had absorbed the gods of Canaan.

3. *Holy places*.—In every place where a god was believed to manifest himself in a special way the Canaanites established a sanctuary, usually consisting of a space surrounded with a wall and open to the sky. Over a hundred places in Canaan are attested as holy by the meaning of their names, by the rites that were practiced there, or by the evidence of archaeology. A number of these are mentioned already in the Amarna Letters and in the Egyptian records. The others appear first in the Old Testament, but there is no reason to doubt that the names are ancient. When Yahweh triumphed over the *bē'ālīm* and other *ēlōhīm* of Canaan these holy places were appropriated by him. They were the "high places" in which Israel worshiped Yahweh without opposition until the period of the great prophets. Then the growing opposition to the identification of Yahweh with the *bē'ālīm* led to a dislike of the high places that culminated in the Deuteronomic centralization of worship at Jerusalem and the prohibition of these ancient sanctuaries. Deuteronomy was unable, however, to destroy the reverence for these places. Their sanctity has lasted without interruption down to modern times. In spite of all the efforts of Judaism, Christianity, and Mohammedanism, one may still say with the author of Kings, "Nevertheless the high places are not taken away, the people still sacrifice and burn incense in the high places."

An essential part of the equipment of a high place was a *maššēbhā* or "standing stone," which constituted the *bēth-ēl*, or "abode of deity," and served in primitive times at once as temple, image, and altar. In the list of Thutmose III (No. 11) we meet Kirjath-nešib, "town of the standing stone." The excavations have revealed such stones in the high places of all the cities in the Canaanite level. Many of them are mentioned in the earlier writings of the Old Testa-

ment: e.g., at Gilgal (Jos. 4:3, 20), Beth-Shemesh (I Sam. 6:18), Zorah (Judg. 13:19), Bethlehem (Gen. 35:20), Bohan (Jos. 15:6; 18:17), Zohemoth (I Kings 1:9), Mizpah (I Sam. 7:12), Gibeah (I Sam. 20:19), Bethel (Gen. 28:18-22; 31:13; 35:14); Ophra (Judg. 6:20), Shechem (Jos. 24:27; Judg. 9:6), Ebal (Deut. 27:4), Gilead (Gen. 31:45-52). Some of these may have been set up by the Hebrews after the conquest, but most of them were probably inherited from the Canaanites. That Yahweh was believed actually to inhabit them is shown by the facts that the one set up by Jacob was called Beth-el, "dwelling of God," or *Ēl-bēth-ēl*, "God of the dwelling of God" (Gen. 35:7); and the one at Shechem (read "pillar" instead of "altar") was called *Ēl-ēlōhē-Isrāēl*, "God, the God of Israel" (Gen. 33:20). In Jos. 24:27 it is said of this stone: "It hath heard all the words of Yahweh which he spake unto us." In later times the *maṣṣēbhōth* were forbidden as connected with the gods of Canaan, and therefore improper in the service of Yahweh (Exod. 23:24; 34:13; Lev. 26:1; Deut. 7:5; 12:3). Of this opposition no trace can be discovered in the pre-prophetic period.

The *āshērā*, or sacred post, was also an indispensable accessory of Canaanite high places. At an early date 'Ashtart was confused with her symbol, so that *Āshērā* becomes a proper name in tablets of the Hammurabi Dynasty and in the Amarna Letters. The Canaanite *āshērtm* were also appropriated by Yahweh after the conquest of the land. Both in Samaria and in Jerusalem they stood in his temples (II Kings 13:6; 18:4; 21:7; 23:6, 15). They were unchallenged in the cult of Yahweh down to the Deuteronomic reformation. After that time an effort was made to destroy them (Exod. 34:13; Deut. 7:5; 12:13).

Altars were not found in the most ancient Canaanite high places. The *maṣṣēbhā* served originally both as idol and as altar. Subsequently a separate stone, or mound of earth, was set apart for purposes of sacrifice. Many such altars have been discovered in the Canaanite level in the mounds of Palestine (Exod. 34:13; Deut. 7:5; 12:3; Judg. 2:2). They were appropriated by the Hebrews along with the high places. The *Sāḥra*, or sacred rock, on which the altar of Solomon's temple stood, has all the characteristics

of the rock-cut Canaanite altars discovered at Taanach and Megiddo.

4. *Sacred traditions.*—If, as we have seen, the Hebrews mingled with the Canaanites, identified the *bē'ālm* with Yahweh, and adopted their high places as his sanctuaries, it is highly probable that they accepted some at least of the myths and legends that were connected with the holy places of Canaan. If such traditions exist in the Old Testament, they are to be sought in the heterogeneous mass of material that has found a place in the Book of Genesis. Here are traditions of Babylonian, early Hebrew, and late Hebrew origin. May not Canaanite traditions also have found their way into the record?

That such is actually the case is shown by the following considerations. Many of the patriarchal stories of Genesis are connected with places in Canaan. The terebinth of Moreh or "the oracle" is said in Gen. 12:6 to have been the place where Abram first pitched his tent in the land of Canaan. The terebinths of Mamre (13:18; 14:13; 18:1) also owed their sanctity to Abram. The tamarisk tree in Beersheba was planted by him (21:33). Machpelah, Shechem, Ephrath, and Bethel were holy as burial places of the patriarchs and their families. The venerable altar at Shechem owed its origin to Abram (12:7). The altar east of Bethel, according to 12:8; 13:4, was built by Abram, but according to 35:7, by Jacob. The altar at Hebron was reared by Abram (13:18). The sacred stones at Bethel, Mizpah, and Shechem were set up by Jacob (28:11-22; 35:14; 31:46 ff.; 33:20). Even if the lineal forefathers of Israel lived in Canaan, memory of the trees that they planted, altars that they built, and stones that they set up could not have been preserved by their descendants during the four hundred years that are assigned to the sojourn in Egypt. Such stories cannot be of primitive Hebrew origin, but must have belonged originally to the Canaanites, as explanations of their local sanctuaries.

Moreover, in the Book of Genesis there are two divergent views concerning nearly every feature of patriarchal history. This points to a blending of two independent strands of tradition, a Hebrew and a Canaanite.

a) There are two ideas as to the time when the patriarchs lived. According to one, they formed part of the Aramaean migration (Gen. 31:20, 47 E; 29:10 J; 25:20 P; Deut. 26:5). Through recent archaeological discoveries it is now known that the Aramaeans first moved out of Arabia in the thirteenth century B.C. Before this time we find no trace of them in the Egyptian, the Babylonian, or the Assyrian monuments.

With this tradition another conception in the Book of Genesis is an irreconcilable conflict, according to which the patriarchs belonged to the twentieth century B.C. In Gen. 14:1 Abram is represented as a contemporary of Amraphel (Hammurabi), the sixth king of the First Dynasty of Babylon (1958-1916 B.C.). The same conception is found when we compute the dates of the patriarchs from the figures that are given in the Old Testament.

The same difficulty emerges when we study the proper names in Genesis. Several of these occur as tribal or geographical designations in Egyptian inscriptions of a time long prior to the Aramaean migration. Lot occurs in Egyptian texts as early as the Twelfth Dynasty (2000 B.C.). Jacob and Joseph are found in the list of conquered races in the annals of Thutmose III (*ca.* 1500 B.C.). From these names it appears that three hundred years before the Exodus and one hundred years before the Aramaean migration Jacob and Joseph, the assumed ancestors of the Hebrews, were present in Canaan. The only solution of this difficulty is the recognition that these diverse conceptions come from independent sources. The belief that the patriarchs were Aramaeans is derived from an old Hebrew tradition that was brought in from the desert, while the belief that they lived in the third millennium B.C. was indigenous in the land of Canaan.

b) There are two conceptions of the region from which the patriarchs migrated. According to J, it was Haran in Mesopotamia; according to P, possibly following E, it was Ur of the Chaldees in Babylonia (Gen. 11:31). These two conceptions correspond with the two that we have noted already of the age to which the patriarchs belonged. Haran was a chief center of the Aramaeans, while Babylonia was conquered by the Amorites about 2500 B.C. That some clans of this latter race, after settling in the

neighborhood of Ur in southern Babylonia, should migrate westward and join their kindred in Palestine is not at all improbable. It appears, therefore, that, while the tradition which makes the patriarchs come from Haran is probably of Israelite origin, that which makes them come from Ur must be regarded as of Canaanite origin.

c) There are two conceptions of the region in which the patriarchs dwelt. One places them in the desert, the other, in the land of Canaan. The only way to account for this diversity is by the theory that the traditions were derived from different sources. The conception that locates the forefathers and their families in the desert is of old Hebrew origin, while the one that places them in Canaan is of Canaanite origin.

d) The two names that are given to most of the patriarchs are evidence that the traditions concerning them have come from two sources. Abram bears also the name Abraham. The names sound similar, but they have no etymological connection. Jacob is identified with Israel; Esau, with Edom; Joseph never appears as a Hebrew tribe, but is always represented by Ephraim and Manasseh; and in like manner Lot is represented by Moab and Ammon. The only natural explanation of these phenomena is that the two sets of names represent independent traditions, one derived from the Canaanites, the other from Israel; and that the assignment of two names to one person is a result of a fusing of the Canaanite with the Hebrew tradition. In support of this view the fact may be noted that the names of one set are of Canaanite formation, while those of the other set are of Aramaean formation. Abram, Jacob, Joseph, Esau, Lot occur as Amorite names in Babylonian and Egyptian inscriptions as early as 2000 B.C. On the other hand, Abraham, Isaac, Israel, Ephraim and Manasseh, Edom, Moab and Ammon, which are identified with the names just enumerated, are never found in monuments before the fourteenth century B.C., and are evidently derived from an Aramaean tradition that was brought into Canaan by the Israelites.

It appears, accordingly, that it is highly probable that a large number of the patriarchal traditions of Genesis are ultimately of Canaanite origin, and that they are the sacred sagas that were connected with the ancient sanctuaries of the land.

The same conclusion holds good for the Hebrew traditions and laws that have Babylonian counterparts. These cannot have been borrowed by the Babylonians from the Hebrews because they can be traced in Babylonia long before their appearance in Israel. The theory of a common primitive Semitic origin is precluded by the pronounced Babylonian character of the material. The theories that the Hebrews learned these traditions from the Assyrians at the time of the Assyrian supremacy, or from the Babylonians at the time of the Exile, are impossible because these Babylonian elements appear in the earliest Hebrew records. The theory that they were learned by Abraham in Ur of the Chaldees is unlikely, for the Bedawin have never adopted the civilization of the lands on whose borders they have wandered; and moreover, as we have just seen, it is doubtful whether the connection of Abraham with Babylonia is a genuine Hebrew tradition. The only theory that remains is that these Babylonian traditions migrated to Canaan long before the Hebrew conquest, and were learned by the Hebrews from the Canaanites after their settlement in the land. The Babylonian records testify that for nearly 2000 years prior to 1700 B.C. Canaan stood under the influence of Babylonian civilization, and this testimony is confirmed by the discovery at Taanach of a seal of Canaanite workmanship with a Babylonian inscription, and at Gezer of the so-called Zodiacal Tablet. The fact that the kings of Canaan used Babylonian in their correspondence with the Pharaohs in the Amarna Letters (*ca.* 1400 B.C.) bears witness to deep and long-continued Babylonian influence in that land. Accordingly, the Babylonian elements in the Old Testament are to be regarded as also Canaanite elements. Along with many of the stories of the patriarchs they were part of the body of sacred traditions that clustered around the sanctuaries of Canaan.

5. *Sacrifices*.—The cult that went on at the high places of Canaan remained unchanged after their appropriation by Israel, only now it was rendered to Yahweh instead of to the *bē'ālm* and the *'ashtārōth*. The few accounts that are given of early Hebrew ritual show that the forms of animal sacrifice were practically identical with those of the Canaanites and other early Semites.

Traces of infant-sacrifice are numerous among the Canaanites.

In all the high places multitudes of jars have been found containing the bones of new-born infants. The Old Testament contains frequent allusions to this custom among the Hebrews. The original form of the Book of the Covenant, preserved in Exod. 22:29, contains the command, "The first born of thy sons thou shalt give unto me," without any provision for redemption. That this was understood of sacrifice is shown by the statement of Ezekiel that Yahweh gave Israel this commandment in wrath in order that he might make them desolate (Ezek. 20:24-26, 31). In prophetic circles, opposition to this rite arose at an early date (Gen. 22:11 J). In spite of this, however, these sacrifices continued to be offered (II Kings 16:3; II Chron. 28:3; Mic. 6:7; Jer. 7:31; 19:5; 32:35). Melek (Molech), "king," was one of the titles of Yahweh, and the child-sacrifices offered to "the king" were understood by the people as offered to Yahweh (Lev. 18:21; 20:2-5; II Kings 23:10; Jer. 32:35). Archaeology also shows that the sacrifice of infants lasted among the Hebrews down to the Exile.

Sacrifice of adults is known to have been practiced by the Canaanites. Similar sacrifices among the Hebrews, such as Jephthah's daughter (Judg. 11:31, 39), or the sons of Hiel the Bethelite (I Kings 16:34), may have been due to Canaanite influence.

The agricultural offerings of the Hebrew ritual, such as first fruits, libations of wine, anointing the sacred stones with oil, and presentation of cakes of unleavened bread, must all have been derived from the Canaanites, since none of these could have been brought to Yahweh in the desert. Their foreign origin is shown by Gen. 4:5 f., where Cain's offering of fruits is regarded as less acceptable to Yahweh than Abel's sacrifice of the flocks.

It is known from the Egyptian inscriptions that incense was burned for the Pharaoh (Müller, *Asien*, p. 305), and there is no doubt that it was also presented to the gods. In the annals of Thutmose III it is often mentioned as part of the tribute of Canaan (Breasted, *Ancient Records*, Index, s.v. "Incense"). Incense-burners also have been found in the mounds. Incense can hardly have been used by the nomadic Hebrews in the desert. Its presence in the later ritual, accordingly, points to Canaanite influence.

6. *Holy days*.—The holy days of ancient Israel originated, for the most part, in the period before the conquest, but they were all transformed after the settlement in Canaan to adapt them to the conditions of agricultural life. The New Moon was a primitive Semitic festival, but among the later Hebrews it was connected with agriculture. On it the buying and selling of grain were prohibited (Amos 8:5), and field work was not done (II Kings 4:23). In like manner the Sabbath, which is habitually connected with the New Moon in the phrase "New Moons and Sabbaths," and which apparently was originally connected with the four phases of the moon, was changed after the occupation of Canaan into a day of rest from agricultural labor. In J's recension of the Book of the Covenant (Exod. 34:21) we read: "Six days thou shalt work [*abad*, used of tilling the ground], but on the seventh day thou shalt keep a Sabbath: in plowing time and in harvest thou shalt keep a Sabbath." The Sabbath may have been known to the Canaanites, and this change in its character from an astronomical to an agricultural holy day may have been made already by them.

The Passover was undoubtedly a primitive Semitic spring-festival accompanied with sacrifice of the first-born lambs, but its celebration with unleavened bread in the legislation of D and P (Deut., chap. 16; Exod., chap. 12) discloses Canaanite influence.

Three pilgrimage feasts yearly seem to have been a feature of the primitive Mosaic religion (Exod. 23:14, 17; 34:23), but after the occupation of Canaan these were transformed into agricultural festivals, the "days of the *bē'alim*," as Hosea calls them (2:13). The Feast of Unleavened Bread celebrated the early barley-harvest. J, E, and D say that it consists in eating cakes of unleavened bread for seven days in the month Abib (Exod. 34:18 J; 23:15 E; Deut. 16:3 f.). The Holiness Code (Lev. 23:10 f.) adds that it comes at the time when the harvest is reaped, and prescribes that a sheaf of first fruits shall be waved before Yahweh. This is also why unleavened cakes are eaten. People are so impatient to taste the new crop that they do not want to wait for the process of leavening. A feast of this sort evidently cannot have originated in the desert; it is part of the agricultural ritual of the land of Canaan.

The Feast of Weeks, according to J (Exod. 34:22), marked the

beginning of the reaping of the wheat-harvest. E (Exod. 23:16) calls it "the feast of harvest, the first fruits of thy labors." D and H say that it was celebrated seven weeks from the time when the sickle was first put into the grain, i.e., from the beginning of Unleavened Bread (Deut. 16:9 f.; Lev. 23:15 f.); hence its name, the Feast of Weeks. According to H it was observed with the presentation of two wave-loaves of leavened bread before Yahweh. The agricultural character of this festival is obvious: it must have been of Canaanite rather than of primitive Hebrew origin.

The Feast of the Ingathering, according to J (Exod. 34:22), came at "the year's turn," i.e., at the end of the agricultural cycle. E (Exod. 23:6) says that it comes "when thou gatherest in thy labors out of the field." Deut. 16:13-15 and H (Lev. 23:39-42) call it the Feast of Booths, because during that week the population lived in huts of boughs. It is customary in Palestine today for the people who are picking the fruit to live in such huts. This feast in its present form is evidently of Canaanite origin.

As a result, accordingly, of our investigation we reach the conclusion that the religion of Yahweh was deeply affected by Israel's conquest of Canaan. Yahweh triumphed over the *be'ālm* and the other gods of the land by absorbing them. All their attributes, activities, sacred objects, holy places, altars, sacred traditions, ritual, and feasts were appropriated by him; and the result was that his religion was mixed with all sorts of alien elements, just as Christianity in its first centuries was mixed with Greco-Roman ideas. When the battle was won and the rivals had disappeared, it became apparent that Yahwism must be purged of much contamination that it had contracted in its career of conquest. Just as the Protestant Reformation was necessary to cleanse the Church of the heathenism that it had absorbed in fifteen centuries, so it was necessary that Amos and his successors should appear to remove the taint of Canaan from the religion of Moses.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF JESUS FOR MODERN RELIGION IN VIEW OF HIS ESCHATOLOGICAL TEACHING

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It is hardly too much to say that the study of the Gospels has been revolutionized in recent years by the new emphasis laid on the apocalyptic factor. At the close of last century, New Testament scholars, in spite of their numberless differences on points of detail, were agreed on the general interpretation of the life and work of Jesus. He was the prophet of a new righteousness, based on a new conception of the nature of God and of man's relation to God. In the proclamation of his message he availed himself of the current expectation of a kingdom of God, which would be ushered in by the promised Messiah; but while acquiescing in the traditional ideas he had recognized their insufficiency, and had tacitly revised them and filled them with a new content. The Kingdom, as he conceived it, was not a visible transformation, effected by a sudden crisis, but a spiritual fulfilment. For the world at large it would come about by the gradual diffusion of a truer knowledge of God, and the molding to his will of all human interests and institutions. For the individual it would be realized in a life of inward communion with God and perfect obedience to him. In like manner, while Jesus claimed to be the Messiah, he impressed a meaning of his own on the traditional title. He was the Messiah in the sense that he delivered men from spiritual bondage by opening up to them the true way of life. The sovereignty to which he felt himself called by God was ethical in its nature and rested wholly on moral sanctions. It was the tragedy of his career that this higher conception of messiahship, which he himself cherished, was in conflict with the popular hope. The apocalyptic language in which he was obliged to express himself was understood literally, and even his disciples could not shake off their dreams of a triumphant deliverer, coming in the clouds of heaven to establish the

Kingdom of God. By the silent influence of his companionship—occasionally by direct teaching—he tried to win them over to his own conception of the character and work of the Messiah; but they remained without understanding to the end. Such, in brief outline, was the reading of the gospel history in which nearly all scholars concurred until a few years ago. The apocalyptic element in the thought of Jesus was recognized, but it was held to be merely formal and peripheral. It belonged to the contemporary language which he found to his hand and which he employed with reluctance and misgiving. His teaching throughout was at cross-purposes with the vehicle in which he was compelled to deliver it. The conclusion was therefore drawn that in interpreting Jesus for our own day we need not trouble ourselves about his eschatology. His real intention was only warped and obscured by those inadequate categories imposed on him by the thought of his time.

A closer study of the Gospels, in the light of that great mass of Jewish apocalyptic literature which is now accessible, has entirely changed these generally accepted views of the life and teaching of Jesus. The element which it seemed necessary to neglect or explain away is coming to be regarded as nothing less than central. Jesus did not employ the contemporary hopes as imagery, or understand them in some new esoteric sense, but embraced them with a full conviction. He looked for a literal kingdom, which was presently to manifest itself in the manner anticipated by the popular hope. He thought of himself as destined to exercise the messianic office, and to this office he attached its traditional import. His purely religious message was only the other side of his eschatology, and was everywhere determined by it. Only a few years have passed since this new interpretation of the life of Jesus challenged a serious attention, and scholars have been occupied thus far in testing its validity, and adjusting it in detail to the given facts. This preliminary work has not yet by any means been completed; but at least the outline of a new picture of Jesus has begun to emerge from the investigation. To what extent is it likely to modify our whole conception of Christianity? It is vain to imagine that any question affecting the life of Jesus can ever be regarded as of merely historical interest. Our estimate of what he did and thought, and

of the meaning he attributed to his message cannot but reflect itself in our religious attitude today.

In one sense the new reading of the gospel history may be said to mark a reaction. The church was founded on the belief that Jesus was the Messiah of prophecy, who would return in glory to bring in the Kingdom; and in spite of all attempts to spiritualize this conception it has never ceased to hold its own in popular Christianity. There are millions in our churches today who have never thought of doubting that the apocalyptic statements in the Gospels are to be taken literally. They anticipate a great crisis in which the present world will come to an end, and a second advent of Christ, in his character of Judge and King. It is not a little curious that the apocalyptic view of the Gospels has found its most active opponents among professedly conservative scholars. They seem to forget that the position they defend is the recent conquest of a rationalizing theology, and has never been really accepted by the general mind of the church.

But between the modern view and that of popular Christianity there are two all-important differences: (1) The eschatology of Jesus, as understood by the church, has been tempered with later theological elements. It is assumed that when Jesus spoke of the Messiah and the approaching Kingdom he meant to suggest far more than he actually said. His utterances have to be so construed as to allow room for the ideas of Paul and the Fourth Evangelist, and the teaching of the creeds. The modern interpretation, however, forbids this reading of subsequent doctrine into the thought of Jesus. He shared in the apocalyptic outlook of his own time; and we must not shrink from taking his conceptions in all their apparent crudeness and realism. (2) The eschatology of Jesus was formerly accepted as part of his revelation. It was believed that in virtue of his divine endowment he knew the mysteries of the future, and in some partial measure disclosed them. To the modern view, however, these apocalyptic sayings, which might seem to demonstrate his higher knowledge, are evidence of his limitation. The ideas expressed in them were not drawn from any supernatural source but from a tradition which had formed itself in the course of Jewish history. Jesus lived and thought in that

world of apocalyptic belief. What we now perceive to have been mere imaginations, possible only in an unscientific age, appealed to his mind as realities, and gave direction to his message.

According to the new interpretation, then, Jesus took up that apocalyptic hope which had long been cherished in Israel and which had lately received a fresh impulse from the preaching of John the Baptist. Like John he believed that the Kingdom of God—the new age in which God would assert his sovereignty—was presently to set in. The old order of things would disappear and give place to another, which would be subject to entirely different laws. Possessed with this conviction he made it his task to prepare men for the Kingdom and to gather around him the nucleus of a new community that should inherit it. At the outset he appears to have come forward merely as the prophet of the Kingdom; but in the process of his mission there grew up in him a new consciousness of his vocation. He learned to realize that the coming of the Kingdom was bound up with his own personality—that he was himself the destined Messiah who would inaugurate it. More than ever, as his death at the hands of his enemies became certain, his conception of himself as the Messiah took definite shape in his mind. He looked to a day in the future when he would be clothed with the attributes of the Son of Man who was to descend from heaven to judge the world. By the death which threatened to crush him utterly he would be exalted to a higher state of being, and would assume his throne as Messiah.

Such, in a few words, are the conclusions to which we are led by the new reading of the life of Jesus. Those who accept it are in substantial agreement on the main points; but in matters of detail there is still, and perhaps will always be, a wide diversity of opinion. Three questions in particular are much debated, and it is important to note them in view of our present inquiry: (1) Did Jesus conceive of the Kingdom as coming by a gradual process or by a sudden catastrophe? For the most part, undoubtedly, he indorses the current apocalyptic idea of a great crisis, followed at once by the breaking-in of the Kingdom; but occasionally, as in the parable of the Leaven and the various parables of the springing seed, he appears to contemplate a development. He may have

hesitated between these two views, but in any case the main character of his teaching remains the same. The Kingdom is that of the apocalyptic hope, whether its coming is envisaged as a sudden glory or as an unfolding dawn. (2) Did he regard the Kingdom as wholly in the future, or as already in some manner present? Here again he speaks, for the most part, of a future kingdom; yet the future and the present are blended together in his mind. The Kingdom is still to come, but it is so near at hand that it can already be discerned and apprehended. Its powers and influences have projected themselves into the present age: men can order their lives even now as children of the Kingdom. (3) Did he think of himself as already Messiah, or only as destined to messiahship after he had finished his work by death? His references to the coming of the Son of Man seem clearly to indicate that he distinguished between what he was now and what he would be hereafter. He read his claim to the messiahship in terms of the apocalyptic hope, which looked for an angelic being, sent down from heaven. Nevertheless, he is conscious of a supreme authority bestowed on him in the present. In a latent and potential sense, if not actually, he is already the promised Messiah.

From the ambiguous nature of these and many other questions with which we are confronted in the gospel history, we at least learn the danger of enforcing a too consistent eschatology. It may be granted that Jesus acquiesced in the traditional hope and made it the basis of his message; but he adopted it as a whole, without binding himself down to every detail. To class him with the purely apocalyptic thinkers is to misunderstand him altogether. Moreover, we have to allow for elements in his thought which had nothing to do with his eschatology and continually clashed with it. Even a professed apocalypticist like the author of IV Esdras will ever and again break away from his rigid scheme when he is overpowered by high feeling or moral conviction; and we cannot expect to find in eschatology the exclusive key to the thinking of Jesus. His interests were too large and many sided to adjust themselves at every point to certain prescribed beliefs. Whatever may have been his relation to the apocalypticists, he was much more nearly akin to the prophets. No sober investigator who weighs the whole evidence

of the Gospels will fail to allow for the freedom and independence of Jesus. He accepted the Jewish eschatology as he did the Law; but in his treatment of both of them he relied on his own insight and not on mere tradition.

The teaching of Jesus cannot be resolved into mere eschatology; but we have still to admit that at least its framework is eschatological. An attempt has been made to escape from this conclusion by the road of literary criticism. The apocalyptic element, it is argued, was imported into our Gospels after the hope of the parousia had become dominant in the church. Jesus' own teaching was revised in the interest of this later eschatology, and a wrong impression was thus given of its nature. Some color is lent to this theory by the presence in the Gospels of certain passages—such as the “little apocalypse” of Mark—which bear evident traces of later elaboration; but as a whole it has failed to justify itself. The apocalyptic strain in Jesus' teaching is not confined to isolated passages which a little ingenuity can explain away. It is all-pervasive; and the Sermon on the Mount and the parables bear witness to it as well as do the definitely apocalyptic chapters. For that part, the prevalence of the hope in the early church is itself proof that it was recognized from the beginning as essential to the Christian message. This, then, is the new situation with which the religious thinking of our time has to reckon. For the last generation theology has taken for its watchword “Back to Christ”; and this reversion from the later doctrinal constructions to the simple teaching of Jesus has been welcomed as the first movement toward a more rational faith. Now we are discovering that the return to Christ is also beset with difficulties. The original teaching, on which we are asked to build as on a sure foundation, is involved in presuppositions which are far more alien to the modern mind than those of the old theology. It can hardly be wondered at that the new interpretation is viewed with suspicion, even by many who have felt themselves constrained on critical grounds to accept it.

The difficulty most commonly urged is not, when rightly considered, a very serious one. It is maintained that if we think of Jesus as sharing in the apocalyptic hope we must regard him as

mistaken in his outlook on the future. His death was followed by no supreme crisis; the Kingdom, so far from coming "within this generation," has not yet appeared after two thousand years. If his message thus rested on a misconception, we can ascribe to it no validity or meaning. Behind most of the attempts to construe the Kingdom as something inward and spiritual we can trace the desire to acquit Jesus of the imputation of error. Even when the apocalyptic character of many of the sayings is granted, some effort is usually made to refer them to a far-distant future. The suggestion is that we must hold to those predictions of Jesus until the end of time has proved whether they were right or wrong. One may question the ingenuousness of this procedure; but in any case it defends the literal accuracy of the forecasts by emptying them of all purpose. The mere coming of the Kingdom, long ages hence, was of no concern to Jesus. What he insisted on was the fact of its imminence. In the knowledge that it was even now at the door, men were to find the decisive motive for repentance and moral renewal. If we grant that his outlook was apocalyptic, we have no choice but to admit that he was mistaken; and there is no reason that our faith in him should in any way be impaired by this admission. The time has gone by when it was deemed necessary to claim for him an infallible judgment in all matters of human knowledge. Even a conservative theology is willing to concede that his ideas on history, science, criticism, were subject to the limitations of his age. And this may safely be granted, too, with regard to his anticipations of the future. He framed them in accordance with that apocalyptic scheme which lay to his hand; and the event proved that they were delusive. But they cannot affect our attitude to him unless they belong to the substance of his religious message.

Here, however, we are thrown back on a much graver difficulty. The eschatological ideas of Jesus were not external to his message, like his judgments on history and criticism, but were closely related to it. His conceptions of the divine purpose, of man's duty and destiny, of his own nature and mission, were all expressed in terms of the apocalyptic hope. Does it not follow that his work was so conditioned by obsolete modes of thinking that we must cease to

claim for it any permanent significance? The criticism of a former age might occasionally suggest that Jesus was mistaken in his forecast of the Kingdom, or in his own title to be the Messiah. But we now have to reckon with doubts of a more radical nature. The conceptions of Kingdom and Messiah, as viewed in the light of modern investigation, were wholly imaginary. Their origin can be traced in the accidents of Jewish history, in primitive mythology and speculation. Since the message of Jesus was entangled with these conceptions, which were the product of mere fantasy, must we not conclude that it was itself unreal? It rested on presuppositions which had no validity except for the age he lived in. Schweitzer expresses what seems to be the inevitable inference from the new reading of the Gospels when he declares, at the end of his well-known book: "Jesus belonged to his own time, and cannot be transported into ours." Bound up as it is with the ancient apocalyptic, the teaching of Jesus has no significance for modern men.

Now before attempting an answer to this difficulty, there is one caution which we shall do well to bear in mind. Undoubtedly we owe much to the historical method, as applied to the study of religion; and it has nowhere yielded more fruitful results than in the tracing of that long development which issued in the Christian eschatology. But there is a natural fallacy which the one-sided application of the historical method has done much to encourage. We are apt to take for granted that when we have ascertained the genesis of a religious idea, and have related it to the conditions of a given time, we have finally disposed of it. As a mere historical phenomenon it can have no further relevance to our living thought and belief. But the truer attitude of mind is surely that which allows for something permanent amid the changing phases of development. The form in which the idea embodied itself from time to time was determined by historical accident; but the idea itself was independent of the form. Its truth and value cannot be assayed by any analysis of the process whereby it struggled toward an ever fuller expression. It is from this point of view that we need to arrive at our judgment of apocalyptic. That hope of the Kingdom on which it centered was indeed shaped by contemporary conditions, and was rooted in myth and fantasy.

But it does not follow that it was mere illusion, and that the message connected with it had meaning only for a particular age. We can see, rather, that the hope was fundamentally the same as that which has ever sustained the higher life of humanity. The form was peculiar to the time, and we can now perceive its inadequacies; but it gave expression—and in many ways magnificent expression—to a lasting reality.

Nevertheless, if Jesus moved wholly within the limits of Jewish apocalyptic thinking, we should have to confess that his work has now almost lost its value. The anticipation of a coming reign of God was indeed a noble one, and it cannot be said even of IV Esdras and the Psalms of Solomon that they have nothing to offer to our religious life today. Yet we cannot but feel that in these and the other apocalyptic writings the vital idea is entirely dependent on the perishable form. If Jesus looked merely for the traditional Kingdom, his work was for the age which found meaning in that conception, and can make no appeal to modern men. But was the thought of Jesus thus identified with the apocalyptic scheme? Is it not apparent, rather, that he employed the scheme only as a vehicle whereby he communicated a purely spiritual message?

One fact must here be clearly emphasized. It was commonly maintained by the older criticism that Jesus adopted the current eschatology by way of imagery—aware of its insufficiency, yet forcing it into the service of his own higher teaching. The modern interpretation cannot accept this view of the attitude of Jesus. It recognizes that he himself participated in the hopes and conceptions of his time. He believed that the world of nature and of human society would presently undergo a complete transformation, and all his teaching was determined by the thought of this coming change. But between the outlook of Jesus and that of the ordinary apocalyptic there was one all-important difference. Hitherto, while assuming that the Kingdom would be reserved for the righteous, men had been content to think of it externally. They cheered themselves, amid the miseries of the present, with glowing visions of the renovation of nature, the removal of disease and sorrow, the deliverance and exaltation of Israel. Jesus conceived of the Kingdom on its inward side. He no doubt assumed that it would bear

those material aspects on which the apocalyptic writers had delighted to dwell, but he allows them to fall out of sight. The Kingdom, as it presents itself to his mind, is the new age in which the will of God will be all in all—the better order in which men will enter into fellowship with God and offer him a service that grows spontaneously out of trust and love. To demonstrate that he so regarded the Kingdom, we do not need to resort to any artificial process of allegorizing and interpreting the statements of the Gospels. It is manifest everywhere that he was solely occupied with the moral and spiritual attributes of the coming age. The conventional apocalyptic picture has become for him merely the background and setting of his own conception of a reign of God, in which men will be brought into inward harmony with God's will.

Thus the permanent significance of Jesus' message is in no way impaired by its external dependence on the apocalyptic tradition. While he proclaimed the Kingdom it still remains true that what he taught was the new relation to God—the new obedience to him. It remains true, also, that what he gave to the world was a revelation, out of the depths of his own inward life. The scheme he had borrowed was nothing but the framework for those higher conceptions which had come to him immediately, in his personal communion with God. We may go yet farther and claim that the contemporary forms, so far from limiting him, were necessary to the fulness and purity of his revelation. They enabled him to escape from the horizons of his time and deliver a message that should have a lasting validity. This may be illustrated by the method adopted by various great thinkers who have endeavored to fix the absolute principles of the moral law. They have begun by imagining for themselves an ideal world—a Republic, or Utopia, or Kingdom of Ends—in which the disturbing influences that warp all human action under the makeshift conditions of the present have ceased to be operative. Only in this manner could they conceive of an absolutely binding law. The Utopia into which Jesus projected himself was that new age wherein the will of God would be done on earth as it is done in heaven. He had no need to imagine it, for it loomed before the mind of his time as an immi-

nent reality; yet, as we see it now, it was only a fantasy, born of a mood of thought which has altogether passed away. None the less it was the background against which he was able to body forth his ideal of an ultimate law of righteousness; and the ideal remains valid, although the vision of the Kingdom has long since dissolved.

It has been argued, however, by many who hold the apocalyptic view of the Gospels, that Jesus intended nothing more than to impose a relative and provisional rule of life. He looked for a kingdom in which all existing evils would be done away, and in which there would be no further need of patience, forgiveness, self-sacrifice. Since he was ever insisting on these and similar virtues we must conclude that his aim was a restricted one. The principles he laid down were to hold good only for the critical interval, while men were preparing themselves for the Kingdom, and would finally be superseded. But it would not be difficult to prove in detail that this theory of an "interim morality" which has found favor with not a few recent writers is based on a narrow, pedantic view of the nature of Jesus' teaching. It fails to recognize that the precepts he enunciated were not meant as definite rules but as examples of how the new spirit would manifest itself. The heirs of the Kingdom were to live as children of God. Amid the imperfect conditions of the present they were to exercise that higher will which would be required of them hereafter. Thus the morality of Jesus was nothing less than the righteousness of the Kingdom. He held up to men an absolute moral law, to which they were to conform their lives even now. For that part, the permanent validity of his teaching would not fall to the ground even if it could be proved that what he inculcated was an "interim morality." We should still have to conceive of him as looking toward an ultimate ideal, and molding the lives of men that they might attain to it. The "interim" for which his teaching is valid would be nothing else than the whole period of waiting and struggle that divides humanity from its goal.

The message of Jesus, therefore, loses none of its significance although we interpret it from the apocalyptic point of view. But what of his person? He claimed to be the Messiah, and in virtue of this claim the church has believed in him, and made him the

object of faith and worship. As we now perceive, however, the messianic category was itself a fanciful one, belonging to that apocalyptic world of thought which has grown meaningless. Must it not follow that we can no longer attach the old significance to the person of Christ? Those attributes which are ascribed to him in our prayers and hymns—the attributes of Judge, Intercessor, Savior, Lord of Glory—are all bound up with the messianic conception. If it is once discarded, must not the whole foundation of Christian piety crumble away?

It would be futile to argue that the acceptance of the modern view has made no difference. The doctrine of Christ, as formulated in the ancient creeds of the church, grew out of a given eschatology, and cannot be separated from it. Terms which were formerly accepted as literally descriptive of the nature and office of Christ have now a merely figurative value; and it is doubtful whether the church can long afford to insist upon them. As time goes on, and the ideas associated with them become ever less tenable, their only effect can be to obscure the real import of the life of Jesus. So far as the belief in his messiahship implies an eschatological scheme, in which he was called on to enact a definite part, we cannot allow that it had any correspondence with fact. But here again it is necessary to make a distinction between the form and the essential idea conveyed by it. We may acknowledge that the form was an inadequate, and even an illusory one, and still discern that it expressed for the mind of a particular age the true significance of Jesus. In the apocalyptic figure of the Messiah the Jewish people had gathered up their highest religious ideals. They conceived of the Kingdom as coming in through a deliverer, a representative of the divine justice and holiness, a revealer and dispenser of the eternal life. Jesus could define the vocation of which he was conscious by no other category than that of messiahship. For him, as for his contemporaries, it was involved with the data of eschatology, but these do not affect its ultimate meaning. It can be detached from them and embodied in other forms which correspond more truly with our own impression of the worth of Jesus. As a matter of fact, the faith of the church ceased to be satisfied, even within the first generation, with the original messianic

idea. Jesus became the Lord, the Savior, the Incarnate Word, the Son of God. The believers who had come in from the great gentile world did not hesitate to pierce the Jewish apocalyptic forms, and to describe, in their own language, what they had found in Jesus. There is no reason why our faith today should not exercise a similar liberty. The significance of Jesus is inherent in his own personality; and we apprehend it no less truly when the conception of messiahship is merged in some other, to which our modern thought can respond.

Jesus and his message do not lose their meaning for us when we read the Gospels in the light of the new interpretation. Indeed we may go still farther, and claim that by means of it the way has been opened for a truer and more vital understanding of the Christian message. Allusion has just been made to that restatement of the gospel which was begun in the early church and was carried out more and more fully in the course of the next three centuries. The apocalyptic categories which Jesus himself had used were gradually replaced by others, of a more abstract and philosophical nature, to which the gentile mind could respond more easily. From this later modification of Jesus' teaching, rather than from the teaching itself, the Christian theology has taken its departure. It represents the attempt to translate an eschatological message into terms borrowed from Greek speculation, and in this manner to express more fully its inner purport. Now it is a positive advantage that by the new reading of the Gospels we have been enabled to get behind the traditional church theology. The feeling has long been prevalent, within the church as well as outside of it, that the accepted creeds were inadequate and had ceased to make any real appeal. Yet they claimed to embody the faith as it had been once for all committed to the saints. Any endeavor to revise them, or even to look too narrowly into their historical development, was regarded as a veiled attack on the Christian revelation. But now we are in a position to distinguish between the original message and the theology that grew out of it. We can estimate the later doctrines at their true worth as interpretations, which are not necessarily binding on a new age, expressing its thought in different language. It is much that at this

critical time, when some readjustment of doctrine has become so urgent, we are finding our way back to the starting-point. Since we can reconstruct the message as Jesus himself delivered it, we are no longer dependent on the versions which have come down to us through the creeds. We can set to work, freely and intelligently, on that new presentation of Christianity which is required by the needs of our own time.

It may be objected that a new statement of the truth of Christianity has been rendered more difficult by the recovery of those forms which Jesus himself employed. Whatever may be lacking in the traditional doctrines, they are richer in themselves, and are more in keeping with our modern ways of thought than the fancies of apocalyptic. The idea of the Logos, grounded though it is in Greek speculation, affords a deeper basis for Christology than the original messianic conception. The belief in a cause of God, establishing itself gradually by the action of moral forces, is far truer and grander than the belief in a kingdom which will be introduced suddenly and miraculously. If we need a new interpretation of Christianity, is it not better to start from the later doctrines than from the eschatology set before us in the Gospels? Certainly the doctrines have still their meaning for us. It would be foolish to throw away as worthless all the results that have been patiently accumulated by nineteen centuries of Christian reflection. None the less the apocalyptic categories are in some ways better fitted than the theological to convey the essential message of Jesus. Their superiority consists in the very fact that we cannot construe them literally. In the theological doctrines the gospel is set forth in reasoned terms, and we are bound down to this one interpretation of it and no other. But apocalyptic makes its appeal to feeling and imagination. The reason is left unfettered, and can apprehend the underlying message, and formulate it anew. The vitality of our religion during all these ages has been due in no small measure to this, that Jesus never sought to express his meaning in abstract theological form. If he had spoken in the language of the creeds, his message would long ago have become obsolete, beyond hope of revival. But he availed himself of the plastic forms of the

current eschatology; and these have never ceased to retain their place alongside of the theological doctrines. Each new generation has felt itself free to associate its own deepest thoughts and longings with that hope of the Kingdom of God which had been given by Jesus. To one age it has meant an inward realization of the divine life, to another the union of all mankind in a spiritual commonwealth, to another the perfecting of the social order on a basis of justice and liberty. These ideals, and others like them, were all implicit in the conception of Jesus; and by clothing his message in the apocalyptic imagery he imparted it in all its richness and comprehensiveness. However we remold it, in accordance with our own needs and our own outlook on the world, we can still give effect to his purpose.

It has been maintained by Father Tyrrell in his last book, *Christianity at the Cross Roads*, that a positive place must be assigned to apocalyptic in the modern reconstruction of theology. He contends that in ordinary Protestantism the tendency has been to resolve religion into a mere rule of conduct or an intellectual scheme of doctrine. Apocalyptic, though belonging in all its details to a bygone tradition, assumes the existence of a supernatural order, with which our earthly life is meant to relate itself. It falls in with that mystical and sacramental conception of religion which has found its home within the Catholic church. One cannot but feel that Tyrrell entirely misapprehends the place of apocalyptic in the teaching of Jesus. It has no affinities with Catholic mysticism and sacramentalism. It serves, not to reduce the ethical demands to a subordinate or collateral position, but to enforce and exalt them. The coming of the Kingdom is nothing else than the ultimate fulfilment of righteousness. Yet in one sense there is truth in the argument that those apocalyptic forms in which it was originally delivered have still their place and function in Christianity. Our modern thought cannot accept them literally, and regards them as a shell that must be penetrated before we can apprehend the substance of the teaching of Jesus. But a religious message loses half its power unless it can speak to men in the language of the imagination. Ever since the days of the primitive

church the apocalyptic hopes have continued to hold their own, in spite of all efforts to supplant them by abstract doctrine. Christian piety has attached itself to them, much more than to the doctrines, even when it recognized most clearly that their value was only symbolical. And in this we may discern the working of a profound instinct. Men have never ceased to feel that there was something in the gospel of Christ which eluded all the formulae of theology, and could be expressed only in symbol. By means of the apocalyptic conceptions they have been able to realize, in some dim measure, this larger meaning of the Christian faith. The conceptions might resolve themselves, under the light of criticism, into little more than poetic fancies, but they had the wealth and suggestiveness of poetry. They reflected, as in a glass darkly, the higher spiritual realities. We can hardly doubt that in the future, as in the past, the message of Jesus will make its appeal to men through those consecrated forms in which he himself imparted it. They will only gain a larger significance when men have learned to understand them in their true character, as the imaginative vesture of the new revelation.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH TO PROPHECY

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The psychology of religion is no longer a new field of research. Within the last two decades, it has been pursued from various points of approach, and no one who has followed its development can question its contribution to the clearer understanding and deeper appreciation of religion in its relation to the whole mental life.

During these years both psychology and religion have been subjected to new scrutiny; a psychological method of dealing with religion has added zest in both fields of inquiry, and has produced interesting and stimulating results. These researches and their results have been of great practical value, especially in the province of child and adolescent religion.

But comparatively little has been done in the way of a scientific analysis and an attempted explanation of the special and higher forms of religious experience, as exhibited by the prophet or the mystic. The literature in this field is still scanty. Professor Ames¹ in his recent volume devotes a chapter to the psychology of religious genius. A. B. Davidson² has dealt specifically, though briefly, with some of the phases of this topic. George Adam Smith³ in his commentaries on the prophets drops interesting hints of the possibilities in this line of research. Two more recent small volumes by Kaplan⁴ and Joyce⁵ show the tendency of the times. These books are in the nature of essays on the subject of prophetic psychology, rather than systematic and exhaustive treatments. Among the Germans even less has been done from the truly psychological point of approach. Giesebrecht⁶ and Kurtz⁷ have

¹ *The Psychology of Religious Experience.*

² *Old Testament Prophecy*, and articles on (1) "Prophecy and Prophets," (2) "Jeremiah" in *HBD*.

³ *Expositor's Bible.*

⁵ *The Inspiration of Prophecy.*

⁴ *The Psychology of Prophecy.*

⁶ *Berufsbegabung der Propheten.*

⁷ *Psychologie der vorexilische Prophetie.*

written monographs on prophetic psychology, and Duhm¹ and Cornill² in their commentaries have shown something of what might be accomplished by a thorough working of this field.³

But it remains for this interesting, not to say tantalizing, subject to receive the attention it deserves and it will not be strange if the next wave of interest in both the Old Testament and the New centers along this line, for in many ways it furnishes a more engrossing and productive angle of approach to the literature than does the purely historical. Historical criticism has by no means completed its task, but it may be that it has now come to such a stage of maturity that it is willing to take to itself an ally that will help it to achieve more positive results. For such a position psychological analysis and explanation is a contender.

This paper is an attempt to present a method of approach to the religion of the prophet. The method purports to be psychological and to distinguish between those materials which may be entered and considered in a scientific evaluation of so elevated a type of religious experience, and those which may not. At our basis lies the historical method and we must heed well all its findings; but on this basis we make a new evaluation—the psychological—which is even more exacting in its demands for accuracy and balance of judgment.

It goes without saying that such a program as is here presented is not merely theoretical. It could not be put forth at all without considerable concrete study in the field of both psychology and prophecy. In testing out our method two ways of dealing with the prophetic materials are open. One way is to draw illustrations for any particular thesis in the process of development of the program from the whole range of prophetic literature. Naturally this is the easier, for it furnishes a much wider choice of concrete illustrations, and by their use the method can be rounded out much more satisfactorily in its practical application. The other and harder method of application is to take the whole life of a single prophet, so far as the sources furnish us the materials, and work it out in a more human and intelligible picture. In such a study lies the particular value of this program of prophetic experience, if it turns out to have

¹ *Commentaries on the Prophets.*

² *Commentary on Jeremiah.*

³ Hölscher's *Profeten* (1914) appeared too late for use here.

a particular value. It is an ambitious program and is not content to give up the pursuit of so high a form of religion until scientific research has done its work and the laws of cause and effect in the religious realm have been applied. It is not necessarily an attempt to prove that all forms and degrees of religious genius can be analyzed and defined in terms of modern psychology, but rather a willingness to go as far as facts carry us and then to make proper and valid inferences on the basis of such facts. If there remain an unexplained residuum, we have the assured belief that psychology will not be discredited, just as we are led to believe that religion will not suffer if psychological science is able to give a reasonable explanation of some of the phenomena that formerly were considered too sacred to be scrutinized.

Two preliminary tasks arise for one who applies this or any similar program—tasks arising from the nature of the prophetic materials. The first pertains to the interpretation of the literary form in which the prophet gives expression to his experience. A casual perusal of the prophetic books will show that all the prophets were conscious of what they interpreted to be a divine compulsion; the most common form of the manifestation of this extra-human influence is visions and voices. The question raised here is not one as to the reality of the experience, but one as to whether the form in which it is found is literal or figurative. Manifestly, we cannot settle the question *a priori*, nor even by appeal to the facts in the case of one or two prophets. It is a question which must be raised afresh as we approach the record of each individual prophet. All that can be done here, then, is to indicate what would seem to be a scientific procedure in addressing ourselves to the problem.

The problem, then, is: Are vision and voice a convenient literary form inherited from the past or developed for the exigency by means of which to give vivid, outward expression to the inner experience, or are they a genuine and real part of the experience? Unless we recognize this problem, all sorts of complications may arise in attempting a reasonable exegesis. From this point of view, each seer presents his own problem. They cannot all be treated according to one criterion. Amos, Isaiah, and Ezekiel present, each his own peculiarity of vision form, and in each case a faithful effort

must be made to distinguish between that part which is mere figure or framework, consciously so used, and that which for the prophet was an integral and real part of his experience. This will require the most subtle literary and psychological criteria, but the attempt is worth making if we are to get at the core of the matter.

The second preliminary consideration, viz., the question of the sources, may be passed with a word. We have fallen upon perilous times in matters of historical criticism, and in the *mêlée* none has suffered more than some of our most endeared Old Testament prophets. In the present status of criticism, it is impossible to be exact in the use of literary materials. The only safe plan to pursue is to take the minimum of authenticated sources as our basis of procedure, and even then we are not sure that some of these will not be discredited tomorrow. Yet there is some comfort in the fact that the psychological reconstruction suffers less in these uncertain days than the historical; for history has to do with exact facts and without them it cannot proceed far, while the psychological method gets its chief value in the study of the bold outlines of a life. This is not to say, however, that it is not closely conditioned by historical fact, at every step.

We undertake now a plan for the genetic study of the prophet's experience and distinguish four principal topics, as follows: (1) antecedents and inheritances; (2) environment; (3) temperament; (4) the prophetic experience.

I. THE PROPHET'S ANTECEDENTS AND INHERITANCES

In the light of biological and psychological science, it is becoming ever more certain that the roots of our lives, our beliefs and practices, are deeply imbedded in the past; that the average individual is what he is largely because of what he has lived through in racial history, however narrowly or widely those terms may be interpreted; and that even the most extraordinary person is not wholly free from this enslavement to the past. There are ever fewer and fewer geniuses, in the sense that they transcend and defy explanation in terms that can be accounted for. Therefore, it will not be strange if we find some of the prophet's peculiarities in these inheritances. He may have passively accepted them and been

unconsciously guided by them, or, he may have analyzed their influence upon his times and reacted against them. A study of these antecedents will have to do with both the form and the content of the prophet's message. What, then, has the previous age contributed to the form of prophecy in its golden age? This will require a complete study of the earlier forms of prophecy in Israel, as well as of the form of prophetic messages among other and earlier peoples; in other words, a genetic study of the form of prophecy, for rudiments of form are likely to persist even after the content has completely changed. It is well to note that here we are dealing with a different question from the one raised in the preliminary study. There we asked: Was the form in which the prophet couched his message a true facsimile of that message as it came to him or was he consciously using literary form as the vehicle of his thought? Here we ask the still more ultimate question: What influence had the form of earlier prophecy on the form in which the prophet felt bound to receive his message in order that it might be authentic? Did his inheritance along this line dictate to him the psychological condition in which his mind must be placed, in order that he might be receptive to the divine message, or did he strike out rather boldly and independently, and largely disregard the form dictated by tradition; in short, was he able to distinguish between form and essence; e.g., did trance and ecstasy so persist in the time of Amos and Isaiah that they were sought by these men as genuine prophetic experiences, as forms that were considered a necessary and integral part of the message; or, on the other hand, has the prophet here supervened his inheritance, and developed a new conception of prophecy in which the essential element is not, in any degree, linked to form, but consists entirely in its ethical and religious content, regardless of the way in which it may have been intuited; or, in the third place, does he fall somewhere between these two extremes, showing considerable progress toward an ethical religion inwardly conditioned, but not being able entirely to free himself from inherited and conventional forms?

Then what have inherited ideas had to do with conditioning the prophet's mind for his work, either by hindering or by helping? Here we must take into survey the religious conceptions of the

pre-prophetic age and scrutinize them as carefully as possible. It is not difficult to see that there was great progress in the purification and clarification of religious ideas in the two centuries preceding the great prophets, and, although Amos comes upon us suddenly and seemingly without proper introduction, with his independent social and ethical ideas, yet we may find, on closer analysis, that in him and his successors many ideas that were already in process of crystallization have come out into the clear light, fostered by their vigor and insight, and have entered more or less fully into the currents of their common thoughts. This fact could no doubt be much more completely shown than is commonly thought, if our authentic sources for this period were not so few. It is reasonable to believe that there were currents of ethical thought preceding Amos, of which we have scarcely any direct hint. It may be possible to trace these out more clearly than has yet been done, even with the meager sources at our disposal. Such a study would scarcely have warrant were it not for the fact that we have a growing appreciation of the debt each generation owes to its predecessors. Such a study, if in any degree successful, will not detract one whit from the greatness of these great men. They will still retain a sufficient meed of praise; they stand out on the basis of what they were and what they did, but it will help us to understand them better and thus to appreciate them the more. An examination of these inherited views would include such topics as the pre-prophetic or (in the case of later prophets) the earlier prophetic views of God; the cultus; the ethical element in religion in this period; the prophet and his work, his relation to politics and government, his attitude toward the innovations of advancing civilization, etc.

II. THE PROPHET'S ENVIRONMENT

Here, at the outset, it is necessary to define terms, so as to make a clear distinction between the matter treated in the foregoing topic and that which is to be included here. In the above section, we attempt to deal with influences which persist from a former age. Here, we desire to classify those influences which are new, which take origin in the prophet's own time, owing to political and social

changes and exigencies. Here again it is not incumbent upon us to find the prophet entirely a child of his own times, else he would not be worthy of special study; but when we do study the conditions with which he was surrounded and find him in part influenced by them, in part withstanding them, we understand him the better for so doing. And this juxtaposition of his own views to those current among his people may be one of the secrets of the development of his character. If great men are the product of great times, then the inference is clear, if we would learn the secret of the men themselves. Was the prophet a nationalist, and, if so, was he one for the same reason that his fellow-Israelites were, or did his insight into conditions drive him to a new interpretation of the political significance of his nation? Was it the political influence or was it the social that bulked largest in the making of Amos and the content of his scathing sermons? What were the peculiar circumstances, within and without, that gave Hosea his hot, tender message of divine love? What do the messages of Isaiah and Jeremiah owe to the political and religious background of their day? Do their differing environments throw any light upon the fact that Micah prophesied with no uncertain tone the fall of Jerusalem, while Isaiah repeatedly held to the inviolability of the Holy City, even though he was convinced that the surrounding country districts would be devastated? In a word, to what extent do the confines of time and place and circumstance limit the horizon of the seer and prescribe the materials which shall furnish content and coloring for his message? In a study of this character, not only do we learn what contribution an age makes to a man's thinking and doing, but, what is more important, we get here, in the clash between ideals and actual conditions which must be faced, the breeding-ground of persistence, vigor, character, and message, by means of which the man makes his contribution to his age and all subsequent ages. The environment of home, church, school, society, and country are not a negligible factor in any life, however extraordinary or peculiar.

III. THE PROPHET'S TEMPERAMENT

Temperament is rather an elusive term when its analysis is attempted, but unless we can deal with it in more or less satisfactory

fashion, some secret of prophetic greatness may escape us; understanding it, we may see clearly some of the factors that have hitherto been indistinct. First of all there is a temperament of youth and of rising manhood, becoming conscious of itself, as distinguished from that of the mature man who has settled down to face the hard facts of life. Did the prophets receive their calls in young manhood just as they were emerging from the enchanted land of adolescence? If so, much light is thrown upon their experience by modern studies in the later adolescent period. Does it make any difference whether Isaiah was twenty or forty years of age when he saw the Holy One, high and lifted up, his train filling the temple? Can age have anything to do with the peculiar sternness and severity of Amos' messages?

While temperament is admitted to be largely hereditary—possibly because we know so little about it—yet it may be much more a product of training, and especially of very early impressions, than we are wont to believe. While evidence on this point is almost entirely lacking in the case of the prophets, yet we must not neglect any of it that lies at hand, if it will help to explain peculiarities of individuals. City-breeding gives a certain bent to one's conceptions; pastoral life, another, and agricultural pursuits, yet another. Acquaintance with the best science of an age gives a type of thinking very different from that found among those who think naïvely.

But more important than these is that peculiar, inborn, mental composition which distinguishes individuals and which seems so deep rooted as to defy all attempts to classify it under a norm or type. Though all external stimuli may seem to be similar if not identical, mental reactions are found to be very different from each other in different individuals. You cannot run the thinking of mentally active people into the same mold, but under the most favorable conditions, it is by no means a rarity to get the most diverse types of mental process and product. What is the explanation? One man is a rationalist; another is highly emotional. Either may become a mystic and have inexplicable experiences, but they arrive at them by very different routes. One man is active and aggressive in temperament; another is passive and retiring. Infilled with a divine passion, one of these men experiences the over-

powering influence of a great Spirit or Personality, in whose hands he is passive and helpless; the other is conscious of his own heightened power of activity, under the inspiration of the same Spirit. They may be equally vigorous and fiery in carrying out the mission intrusted to them. Will these and other observations by modern psychology, when applied to the prophet, help us the better to understand the man and his message?

IV. THE PROPHET'S EXPERIENCE

We come now to the crux of the whole matter, an attempt to explain, or at least to interpret, that peculiar experience which makes a prophet a prophet, which distinguishes him from any other class of religionist and lifts him to a table-land of insight and outlook which intensifies his religious energy many fold and charges his whole life and being with a new purpose and opens up larger capacities. If we cannot, to some extent, enter into this holy of holies, all our preliminary drawings-nigh will be largely of no avail, for the only excuse one may give for undertaking this overweening task of psychological analysis is that he may get near to the heart of the experience of men who had a peculiar consciousness of the immediate presence of God in their lives, and a special sensitiveness to his revelation, both of himself and of his message to them. We are not here concerned with mere description; we must go deeper; an effort must be made to interpret the experience and its meaning for our time, as well as for the prophet and his day. The most rigid and critical tests of modern research in the psychological field must be applied. If the prophet was self-deceived and a satisfactory explanation in subjective terms can be made of his experience, this does not, in the least, detract from what he was and what he accomplished, but it makes it practically impossible for his experience and his type of character to be duplicated in our more scientific age, at least among those who understand the viewpoint of psychology. But if we must conclude that there is more than the subjective, that his experience is the result of a divine personal energy working upon, and co-operating with, an intense human spirit, we get a religious state devoutly to be wished and sought by men of every time.

Professor Ames, in his chapter on "Psychology and Religious Genius," says:

[It has often been assumed that genius, including religious genius] designated an assumed irreducible and unanalyzable factor in human nature, a kind of given endowment which the science of psychology cannot legitimately adopt. It is a part of the scientific attitude to insist upon the application of analysis and interpretation to all factors and functions of the mental life. It is too much to expect that psychological explanations will not be undertaken simply because the phenomena involved are complex or obscure, or because some people insist that they are wholly inscrutable. The results of the investigation may be negative or meager or only partially sustained, but no phenomena of human experience can lay claim to immunity from at least the attempt to understand them. Therefore any statement of genius which assumes it to involve factors radically different from those of ordinary experience is vitiated at the outset by that assumption.

Professor Leuba goes even farther and gives the distinct impression that psychology has the legitimate right to preempt to itself the entire field of religion and to declare that there is no phenomenon in this field that psychology cannot grapple with and explain.

Psychology, on its side, claims the right to submit every content of consciousness to scientific study, whether it be dubbed "inner," "spiritual," or otherwise; moreover, it has begun to make good that claim.¹ . . . Religious experience ("inner experience") belongs entirely to psychology—"entirely" being used in the same sense as when it is claimed that the non-religious portions of conscious life belong entirely to science.² . . . I trust that it has become clear that the hope to lift a theology based on inner experience out of the sphere of science is preposterous; since whatever appears in consciousness is material for psychology. Religious knowledge may be said to be immediate and independent of science only in the sense in which this can be stated of any experience. Any bit of conscious life is in itself, as a fact of consciousness, unassailable. But a theology that should remain within a domain inaccessible to science would be limited to a mere description of man's religious consciousness and would be deprived of the right to any opinion on the objective reality of its objects and on the universal validity of its propositions. . . . If super-human factors are at work within human experience, there are no ways of discovering them except the ways of science.³

On the other hand, Professor Pratt is much less sanguine as to the ability of psychology to solve all problems in the province of religion:

¹ Leuba, *A Psychological Study of Religion*, p. 211.

² *Ibid.*, p. 212.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 242.

Equally misleading does it seem to me to suppose, as some leading "functional" psychologists seem to do, that the psychology of religion can ever so develop as to be in any sense a substitute for philosophy or theology. In the opinion of this school, ethics, aesthetics, logic, epistemology, and metaphysics are ultimately nothing but functional psychology.¹ . . . The psychology of religion must . . . content itself with a description of human experience, while recognizing that there may well be spheres of reality to which these experiences refer and with which they are possibly connected, yet which cannot be investigated by science.²

These quotations from leading scholars in this field show that the psychology of religion is yet in process of finding itself and that there is no consensus of opinion even among these experts themselves as to its proper province. The theory of Professor Leuba which allows no objective validity to the content of "value judgments" is not likely to be very generally accepted and will need further elucidation and buttressing. On the other hand, Professor Pratt seems rather too modest in his claims for the new science. However, for his side of the case it may reasonably be said that the psychology of religion is scarcely likely to be so successful in revealing and explaining the content and meaning of our religious selves that men will cease to philosophize and theologize; i.e., to transcend the boundaries of pure scientific observation and induction and to move out into the realm of speculation and "faith." The criterion set forth in Professor Ames's statement of the case seems sound, and there is little danger that a thoroughgoing psychology will go too far. If we persist in creating for ourselves, or if there is already created for us, an extra-scientific world, a "faith" realm, then it is clear that psychology can have no dealings with it, either to prove or to disprove its existence. Philosophical assumptions are not material for psychological analysis; while psychology may satisfy itself in the explanation of religious genius, without the assumption of an extra-human, divine element, and while in some cases its analysis may be true to the facts, yet it can never prove that it has the truth in all cases, nor yet can it even prove in what specific cases it has the whole truth in the matter. So long as we admit a realm, the objective reality of which is not subject to psychological scrutiny, religion

¹ Pratt, article "Psychology of Religion," in *Journal of Religious Psychology*. V, 391.

² *Ibid.*, p. 393.

will present phenomena which do not lie within the realm of scientific proof, and whether we assume divine afflatus, or whether we rule it out, *either* assumption is a postulate of the mind and not a proved fact. Furthermore, the term "ordinary experience," used by Professor Ames in the last sentence of his quotation, does not claim that some degree of a personal knowledge of God is not a part of normal religious experience; thus we may not assume at the outset that the genius is a man of peculiar endowments, different in kind rather than in degree from those of his fellows. But if, in the course of our investigations and analyses of any specific character, we find elements which cannot be separated out and classified according to the accepted norms, if there is found the unanalyzable residuum, it is the part of the scientific attitude to recognize it, even if we must hold judgment temporarily in suspense, or plead the cause of a yet undeveloped science.

The theory that greatness is constituted not so much of entirely new and strange elements as of a proper and symmetrical blending of the common qualities and graces unmistakably has some startling illustrations in its favor. If it be true, then the Hebrew prophet may not be such a psychological enigma as a more superficial view would indicate.

As has already been pointed out, it is safe to assume that in many ways the prophet was a child of his times. Mentally, his stock of ideas is very largely that in common circulation. The different currents of ideas may combine in varying proportions. In his case, the ideas of the prophetic party, which is essentially, though not nominally, the religious party, have the predominance, while the formalistic side of religion represented by the cultus does not appeal to him. Furthermore, the prophet is not an apathetic thinker; his mental life is enkindled and intense. He has a peculiar ability to rearrange ideas, so that new truths present themselves clearly. The prophet is not a traditionalist; he does not live in the past; on the other hand, he is willing to take from the past beliefs which are conserving elements in the present religious and social crisis. Again, he was no mere dreamer of dreams who looked sanguinely for the "far-off divine event" which would usher in a glorious age. He lived in and for his own day; and he was the greatest man of his

day, simply because his mental vision took in the whole range of facts, however disquieting some of them might be. He was not a false optimist nor was he a false pessimist, but he saw the truth as it was, not simply as a closed revelation, but also as based on facts interpreted in harmony with universal law.

This mental alertness made the prophet a student of his times. The question whether or not he was an educated man in any technical or academic sense is not of so great importance. He was awake and new truth was constantly coming to him; his education was never declared "finished." Thus it was easy for new revelations to be received by him; he could neither resist nor reject them. Mental alertness and breadth, ethical depth, and religious exaltation which in its purest form expresses itself in a consciousness of fellowship with God form together an equilateral triangle, or better, a closed circle of experience. They are all of a piece; they produce the symmetrical person. It may be quite impossible to say in which of these three compartments of the individual's mental life the enkindling begins, or what may have been the specific cause which served to fan the smoldering spirit into flame, but if these three elements are combined in proper proportions, the one reacts upon the others until in turn all three are raised to a white heat, and then "who can but prophesy"?

It may be well to note that for the prophet there seemed to be no well-defined differentiation of national, social, and religious consciousness from each other, and we may even go farther and say that, at times at least, he was scarcely able to detect a personal consciousness as distinct from these three. The age of clear individualism was yet in the future and the prophet was not, consciously at least, a psychologist. So far as he analyzed his mental states at all, he was interested largely in their religious meaning. But, if the foregoing analysis contains any truth, it throws light upon the attitude of the prophet; it explains why he was so zealous in matters of politics and government; it opens up a reason for his proclivities toward social reform; it helps to explain his ardent love for his people, even in their sin and wickedness. They were an undifferentiated part of himself and of his God. Furthermore, this analysis may go far in explaining his religious

nature, for, if he was so intimately associated with his people—the nation—on one hand, and his God on the other, so that his own consciousness was both a social- and a God-consciousness, he could have been but a mouthpiece of God to the nation, feeling himself a passive agent in God's hand, even when he had been most active, mentally and morally, in preparing himself for his mission. As his social message grew upon him, it assumed proportions which made it appeal to him as superhuman and hence as divinely originated. This idea as a principle of interpretation would, of course, require to be worked out in detail in accordance with ascertainable facts, in the case of each separate prophet.

One set of interpreters of the psychology of the prophet makes the original element in his experience to be a "premonition"¹ that the nation is to be destroyed. His ideas follow this order: first, he has a premonition of this event; then, he looks about for that which is to be the cause of destruction, and finds it in the sin of the nation; then, more gradually he is led to predict the agent of the destruction.

But whence the premonition? It must be manufactured out of thin air. What data in the mind of the prophet serve to give this premonition ballast and content? Would it not be much more natural, as well as scientific, to suppose that the prophet received his impetus either from a study of the social and political conditions, or from so real and compelling a fact as a new and higher conception of the nature of God, based on study and observation—i.e., real mental activity—and that then, as a natural consequence of his observations, he concluded that the downfall of the nation, if the nation persisted in its present way, was but a matter of time?

Finally an attempt must be made to interpret not only the larger and more general experience of the prophet, but also that more specific experience which may be called religious, through which he became conscious of his call from God and his mission to the people. After a careful study of the narrative in order to discover and set aside any literary device that may have been used to convey the fact of his experience to his hearers or readers, we have next to determine if possible whether he is relating a single outstanding experience which was epoch-making in his career, or

¹ Kaplan, *The Psychology of Religion*.

whether these experiences came to him periodically, due to excessive mental strain and possibly some temperamental abnormality, or whether his religious messages came to him intuitively, in the more or less even tenor of his way and without special excitation or ecstasy. Psychologically all these are possible modes or grades of inspiration. To critical thinking, they are of varying value; so are they also to naïve thinking, but in inverse ratio. We are prone to think that in just the proportion in which ecstatic and trance states were absent or suppressed was the prophet's experience valid and his utterance valuable; hence we have a tendency in the case of the greater prophets to reduce this element to the minimum; but this somewhat dogmatic view may err in the wrong direction. It is too easy to assume that certain types of experience are authentic and therefore that opposite types must be weak, if not even vicious. By their fruits must they be known. If one man gets his vision of truth mystically, it is not for the scientifically minded to declare his experience invalid, in the nature of things, and vice versa. But it would not be surprising if we found that, as the ethical element in the prophet's message comes to the fore, the more or less irrational and subnormal forms of inspiration recede, for rational and ethical truth are discerned by the more sober and logical mental processes.

Thus it is not difficult to see that in the pre-prophetic period, the ecstatic and trance states were considered quite a requisite preparation for, and hence a necessary and essential part of, the prophet's experience. In the period of the greater prophets, however, this ecstatic possession, as a state, was at the minimum, and a conscious intuition of truth, with little or no excessive excitation, took its place. Of this even Davidson is quite certain, for he uses as the closest analogy to the prophetic experience "the condition of the religious mind in earnest devotion, or rapt spiritual communion with God."¹ If we could reduce the prophetic experiences thus to one type, it would greatly simplify our problem, but when one reads the prophets it is quite reasonable to believe that these abnormal states of ecstasy, trance, vision, and audition did, to some extent, persist and insinuate themselves into prophetic times. Whether they did or not, and, if so, to what extent they did is the real

¹ Davidson, *HBD*, IV, 115, article on "Prophecy and Prophets."

problem, for modern psychology undertakes to explain all these states as self-induced, and not necessarily due to a supernatural cause. In fact, there is a growing certainty that the supernatural does not work in such capricious ways; but again, we must remember that the prophet is not a modern, in spite of all his points of superiority, and that even we moderns may not have the whole truth as yet. The point is that we must not discredit the prophet, if it can be reasonably shown that he did perceive truth while in these so-called abnormal states.

But for those who take a religious view of the world, there is no question as to the essence, the kernel of the prophet's experience and message. We believe that, not only at the heart of things, but in the van as well, "our God is marching on"; he makes progressive revelation of himself and of eternal truth, but he speaks clearly only to the sincere and inquiring mind. The prophet was passionate to know truth and righteousness. He lived in a time when new truth and new inspiration for right living were sorely needed. He went to what he believed to be the fountain-head of wisdom and goodness and he received them. That is probably as much as we can say. A quotation from Davidson applies just here:

It is vain to speculate how the Divine mind coalesces with the human, or to ask at what point the Divine begins to operate. Some have argued that the operation was dynamical; i.e., an intensification of the faculties of the mind, enabling it thus to reach higher truth. Others regard the Divine operation as of the nature of suggestion of truth to the mind. What is to be held, at all events, is that revelation was not the communication of general or abstract ideas to the intellect of the prophet. His whole religious mind was engaged. He entered into the fellowship of God, his mind occupied with all his own religious interests and all those of the people of God; and his mind thus operating, he reached the practical truth relevant to all occasions.¹

¹ Davidson, *HBD*, IV, 116, article on "Prophecy and Prophets."

WIDENING THE CHURCH'S INVITATION

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I

Most Christian churches today are fairly hospitable, and accept for membership anybody of respectable character, with few questions asked. Nevertheless it remains true that in joining, a man is universally supposed to give tacit assent to certain theological and historical beliefs. In many churches the Apostles' Creed, so called, is recited weekly. Most have printed statements of belief which are published as representing the convictions of the members. A frank statement of doubt or disbelief in—say—the resurrection of Christ, or the inspiration of the Bible, or the incarnation, or the atonement, is regarded as treason and as warranting the charge of hypocrisy if the member remains within the church. The church stands in the eyes of the world for such doctrines; and those who do not believe them stay for the most part outside, however much they acknowledge the value of her work, and however wistfully they may realize the inspiration her fellowship and counsel might give.

The contention of this paper is that the churches should frankly cease to be groups of believers in certain creeds; that they should widen their invitation, not winking at the heresies of their more liberal members, but making it plain that there is no such thing as heresy for them, that a member is free to believe or disbelieve according as his own reason and experience lead him. The church, that is, should put as her one requirement the wish and earnest endeavor to live the Christian life. Are you willing, she should ask, to enrol yourself publicly as a follower of Christ, to live the sort of life he taught, at whatever needful personal sacrifice? If so, you have a perfect right to the name Christian and to the fellowship of the church, whatever your doctrinal views may be. In this way the church might come to include all those who hate evil and

would learn to do well, attention would be focused on conduct rather than on beliefs, and free discussion of the latter would be encouraged. Each individual would formulate his own creed, brief or elaborate, but there would be no church-creed.

How largely such a procedure would add to the membership of the church it would be precarious to predict. Certainly many would, as now, stand without because they are not ready to take up their cross and follow Christ. The lure of the world and its illicit pleasures—the transitory sweetness of sense-indulgence, the pride of unscrupulous personal success—are a steady counter-agent to the Christian preaching of purity and service. But as certainly there are many others today who remain without the church because they do not feel welcome and at home within her portals. Thousands there are, religious at heart, essentially Christian in spirit, hating sin and selfishness, personal impurity and social injustice, who are repelled from the church by her, unobtrusive perhaps but none the less real, barrier of theoretic dogmatism. Is the maintenance of this barrier worth the cost?

II

[The cause of the retention of church-creeds is not merely the inertia of tradition. It is a passionate loyalty to what we believe to be true and know to be precious. We would not tamper with the heritage that has been handed down to us and leave an emasculated Christianity for the future. To be true to the faith committed unto us is our duty and our deep desire. We fear that a creedless Christianity would degenerate into a mere society for ethical culture or social service—excellent ends, but not inclusive of all that we mean by Christianity. There are specifically Christian experiences, there is a specifically Christian life, for the exposition and explanation of which the dogmas exist, and the realization of which by each generation is too vital a matter for us to relegate those dogmas to the background.

But will a profession of belief in these dogmas insure a realization of the spiritual truths they enshrine? Or will a lack of such profession debar a man therefrom? The fact of it seems to be that these doctrines, once so throbbing with meaning, are now

mere husks to the average Christian, retaining a vague halo of holiness, arousing a humble sense of reverence and allegiance, but almost meaningless in terms of life. It may even be questioned whether the creeds are not often veils between us and the insights they once crystallized; their antique language gives a semblance of unreality and remoteness to truths which, if they were to enter into our own experience, would be personally significant, burningly real, cataclysmic. To bow before a creed, which represents others' experience and insight, may be to choke off the development of one's own religious experience, to make religion a second-hand affair rather than a personal aspiration, struggle, and victory. Were it not better done to leave to the preacher the function of making real to his flock the insights that lie behind the creeds and of leading them on to the re-enactment in their lives of the experiences that gave them birth? Should we not be actually fostering a deeper religious life if, instead of thrusting a stereotyped and half-comprehended creed upon everyone, we were to let creeds become again—as they were in the greatest days of the church—elastic, fluid, responsive to the insight of the individual soul? Would it not be better to run the risk of inaccuracy and crudity of expression in a man's professions for the sake of having those professions represent his own growing experience?

The practical situation is that many of those who are capable of comprehending the real meaning of the creeds will not attend a church where they feel that they are supposed to believe what they as yet see no reason for believing. Were the church to make it plain that all belong to her who love, believe in, and are trying to live by the Christian way of life, no matter how they describe and formulate it, or how imperfectly they understand it, these men and women would far oftener come to her for inspiration and comfort. In time, in the atmosphere of Christian traditions, they might ripen into a fuller religious experience. So it seems that the very end for which the conservatives aim would be better attained by reversing their methods—that we should lose our creeds if we would truly find them.

But supposing that full freedom of belief within the church would make for a certain loss; supposing that the contemporary

creed of a given church is absolutely true and ultimate, and that the relegating of it to the background would weaken belief therein; supposing, further, that the attainment of a full Christian experience is dependent upon the grasp of these truths—would even this justify us in insisting upon them? It is a pity that every man should not have the full-rounded Christian experience; but this is no time to stickle for spiritual completeness, when the very rudiments of the Christian life are thereby hid from many. While we haggle over salvation by faith, or the atonement, or perchance the proper way to baptize or govern the church, the forces that make for sensuality and worldliness are busily at work. After all, however precious they are, the dogmas are of secondary importance; and if they stand in the way of what is of first importance, if they are stumbling-blocks in our brothers' way, keeping them from that conversance with Christianity which even without the dogmas could mean so much for their stimulus and consolation, they should be ruthlessly set aside. Efficiency always implies sacrifice; and we must offer our spiritual teaching in terms that all can accept, even if it is less than we would wish to give.

A phrase commonly repeated by conservatives is that conduct is the fruit of belief—the meaning being that the proper way to produce a noble life is to teach correct opinions. In this idea there is some truth; certain beliefs naturally stimulate certain types of conduct, and a man's opinions are by no means unimportant. But the least observation would show that a noble character is by no manner of means the exclusive possession of the orthodox. Right living is far oftener and more easily attained through the contagion of example, or through the direct perception of its worth, than indirectly, as a corollary of one's world-view. Indeed, the desirability of the Christian life is much more obvious and generally admitted than the truth of Christian dogma. A man does not need a creed to supply him with motives for living in what is so evidently the best way. Does the youth need to understand the theory of morals to be led to love honor, chivalry, generosity? I question whether the study of ethics has ever had any appreciable bearing upon a man's allegiance to an ethical code. In nearly all matters, truths of practice are far surer and more

convincing than truths of theory. And just as we do not need to teach the psychology of morality to the lad whom we wish to guide into the path of honor and integrity, just as we do not need to start a practical electrician upon the study of that utterly dubious realm, the theory of electricity, so we do not need to induct our tyro in Christianity into the mysteries of theology. Such a procedure inverts the natural sequence of interest and intelligibility. Certainly there is a reason why, behind every practical precept of morals and religion; the comprehension of these reasons is a legitimate aim for mature minds. But quite without such insight, and usually prior to it, the practical ideals make their own appeal and prove themselves right in daily experience.

III

If the main arguments for the retention of church-creeds are thus answerable, let us see what positive advantages may be expected to follow their abolition.

The first advantage we may mention is that it will restore the right emphasis to Christianity—showing it to be not primarily a theory about the universe, but a way to live. The church has been so much afraid of “heresy,” so little afraid of sin, that the world has largely mistaken its mission—if it has not mistaken it itself. It is indeed to our common shame—for these matters could be quickly mended if the general conscience of Christians were quickened—that men who have, for example, amassed fortunes by ruining competitors or paying starvation wages to employees, should remain unrebuked in our midst, while other men, who would scorn to make money at such a cost, men of honor and principle, men of the true Christian spirit, should be practically kept out of the church by their beliefs or lack of belief about matters of fact. Freedom from mammon-worship and the spirit of brotherhood in business are by no means all of Christianity; but they are, to my mind, a far more essential aspect of it than assent to any doctrines. If we should substitute a covenant for a creed, a vow of allegiance to unselfish and pure living, of personal loyalty to Christ and his ideals of conduct, we should not only be doing something far more important than the winning of assent to

any cosmological or historical beliefs, but we should be directly appealing to the very widespread hunger for goodness and indignation at evil and greatly increasing the prestige and importance of the church in the eyes of the world.

Scarcely less important a result would follow in that we should cease alienating the intellectually scrupulous. Dogmatism has been the great vice of the church, embittering against her men of the true scientific, the open-minded, non-partisan spirit, and arousing a perpetual distrust of her among those who feel that free thought is essential to progress. The utterances of the preacher will always be discounted by the world so long as he is known to be committed to certain conclusions, and a theology will always be received with suspicion which is artificially protected from criticism and alteration. It is bad enough in itself that we accept from immature converts a profession of belief in matters about which they cannot possibly judge—a belief which must be largely based on a lack of any ideas to the contrary. But when we find that we are repelling thousands of the more alert, who are not so ready to commit themselves to an assertion of belief in matters beyond their ken, it becomes a matter, not only of fine scrupulousness, but of serious practical importance.

The "conflict of science and religion"—perhaps we should better call it now a deadlock, since it has lapsed from the forefront of attention—has consisted not so much in a dispute about particular facts as in a fundamental divergence of ideal. The true scientist welcomes criticism, free inquiry, new ideas; hopes for continual progress from old theories to truer ones; is ready to discard his creed whenever he gets fresh light; teaches his disciples to experiment for themselves and work out so far as possible their own conclusions. The church, on the other hand, came somehow during the early centuries to be a body of people who—though for the most part very ill qualified to judge of such matters—had committed themselves to a certain set of beliefs, and wished, not a free and candid investigation of them, but an unquestioning acceptance. This attitude may have been advisable in the early period of the life of the church; but today it is, as a mere matter of tactics, the worst possible attitude. The modern world distrusts any insti-

tution that takes a partisan attitude toward truth. And the apparent dread of free thought makes it a position of weakness. As a matter of fact, the essential truths of Christianity are in no need of such timorous safeguarding; they are not only defensible, they are verifiable; they ought to be a part of the body of universally accepted truth, and they will be—but not until they are taken on their merits instead of because they are the traditional beliefs of a certain church. The physicist is free to accept or reject any physical theory, according to the evidence as he sees it; if the Christian were equally free to believe or doubt the doctrines worked out by earlier generations, thousands would heartily join the church who at present look upon her as the enemy of candor and open-mindedness.

An incidental gain of no small moment would be that the ministry would attract a much more alert and intellectually gifted set of men than it does at present. On the whole, and with many exceptions, the theological schools are getting, not the pick of our youths, but third-rate, fourth-rate men. And one great reason is that the man of fineness and intellectual conscience dislikes intensely to put himself in a position where he will be practically bribed to profess just such and such beliefs and no others. Many ministers today are uncomfortable in the secret knowledge of their own heresy, many would be made uncomfortable were they to acknowledge their real convictions. That such a situation should be forced upon the spiritual leaders of the nation is as intolerable as it is unnecessary. Were these men free to speak out, they would not tear down the Christian structure; on the contrary, they would the better buttress it, for the weakness of the church has been her clinging to indefensible positions. And they would breathe deeper, preach with a truer note, speak out of their hearts rather than in time-honored phrases.

Still another advantage lies in the possibility which this attitude will alone open up of union among Christians. It is chimerical to hope that any one church can convince the others and win their acceptance of its distinctive doctrines. Union must come in another way. Differ as we do, and shall for any visible future, in creed, we agree in seeking to repeat the same universal Christian

experience, we agree to common duties and common ideals, we agree in a common loyalty to Christ and a common zeal to work under his leadership for the bringing in of the Kingdom. We know that the coming of that Kingdom would be greatly hastened, and our personal Christian life vastly quickened, by a closer co-operation and the enthusiasm that a sense of union would bring. And yet we block the way to this consummation by internecine disagreements upon what is secondary. There is no essential reason why a great body of men each of whom is free to formulate his own creed should not form one church, fired with a common hatred of sin, a common belief in and dedication to Christian living. Such a church could, and would, regenerate the world. And the true creed, whichever that may be, would win general acceptance much more rapidly than it ever will while each church has its particular creed which it feels a duty to support.

But the imperious reason for the letting-down of the creed-barrier is that the men without need the church and the church has need of them. There are souls to be saved, there are millions who are spiritually starved. What right have we to offer them spiritual food only in terms which many of them cannot accept? Many such eager souls, finding one sort of barrier at the Methodist door, another at the Presbyterian door, and so down the line, end by putting their idealism and courage and energy into socialism or anarchism (witness, for example, the passionate idealism and soul-hunger in Giovannitti's poem "The Cage," in the June *Atlantic*), or some other of the non-Christian movements which are pushing in so many different directions and scattering that human power which ought to be brought into one concerted movement for the uplift of humanity. The church ought to be the great brotherhood of those who are battling against evil, the universal director and organizer of the world's good-will. In this long and not always winning battle it is a grave fault to let minor considerations weaken and divide the forces of good, the army of God. The times call for a large tolerance in unessentials.

Christianity once had and lost the opportunity of breaking down all barriers between men and ushering in a real human brotherhood. She broke down indeed the old barriers, but she

erected new ones. It is not too late, however, for her to realize her opportunity. In so doing she will be returning to the spirit of Christ and the noblest of the prophets. Christ never demanded orthodoxy of belief; his invitation was: "Come unto me all ye that labor and are heavy laden." The question he asked was: "Can ye drink of the cup that I drink of?"—the cup of self-renunciation. The test he pictured at the Judgment Day was that of practical service. His daily concern was not with right opinion but with right living and the coming of his Father's kingdom—the reign of righteousness and peace on earth. Why should we not accept his valuations? Why not preach Christianity as it was originally preached, not as an aggregate of (to many) difficult beliefs, but as an ideal of difficult practice; convinced that he who does the will of the Father shall know enough of the doctrine, and that, in any case, the doing of the will is more important? Why complicate what will always be a difficulty for the will with an unnecessary, and almost irrelevant, difficulty for the intellect? Why not sincerely repeat the prophets' invitation, which Christ made his: "What doth the Lord require of thee but to do justice, to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God?" Why not frame the church's invitation in those glorious words which are the last words of the Bible to us: "The Spirit and the Bride [that is, the church] say, Come! And let him that is athirst come! Whosoever will, let him come and drink of the water of life freely!"

CRITICAL NOTES

THE FREER GOSPELS¹

Mark 5:1 ηλθαν for ἤλθον | τη for τὴν 1st hand: changed by 2d (or 3d?) to την | γεργυστηνων for Γερασσηνῶν 2 ἐξελθόντων αυτων for ἐξελθόντος αὐτοῦ | omit εἰθὺς | ἀπηντησεν for ὑπήντησεν | tr. to ανθρωπος εκ των μνημων (a 1st hand, over erasure of τ) 3 tr. to ειχεν την κατοικησιν | μνημοις for μνήμασιν | αυτον ουκετι εδυνατο for ούκ ἐτι οὐδεὶς ἐδύνατο αὐτόν 4 tr. to πολλακεις αυτον | δεδεσθαι και πεδες και αλυσει for πέδαις καὶ ἀλύσει δεδέσθαι | διεσπακεναι δε for καὶ διεσπάσθαι | omit ὑπ' αὐτοῦ | συντετριφεναι for συντετριφῆναι | μηδενα δε ἴσχειν for καὶ οὐδεὶς ἴσχειν | add ἐτι before δαμάσαι 5 νυκτος δε και ημερας δια παντος for καὶ διὰ παντός νυκτός καὶ ἡμέρας | ορεσιν και εν τοις μνημοις for μνήμασιν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὄρεσιν 6 ἴδων δε for καὶ ἰδὼν | omit ἀπὸ | προσεδραμεν for ἔδραμεν | αυτω for αὐτόν 7 συ for σοί | omit τοῦ² 9 λεγων for λεγὼν 10 αποστιλη αυτον for αὐτὰ ἀποστείλῃ 11 tr. to αγελη χοιρων μεγαλη προς τω ορι 12 παρακαλεσαντες for παρεκάλεσαν | ειπαν for λέγοντες 13 πνευμα (πνᾶ) for πνεύματα | εισηλθαν for εἰσῆλθον 14 αηγγειλον for ἀπήγγειλαν | εξηλθον for ἤλθον 15 ευρισκουσιν for θεωροῦσιν | omit καθήμενον ἱματισμένον καὶ | λεγωνα for λεγὼνα 16 ειδotes for ἰδόντες 18 ενβενοντος for ἐμβαίνοντος 19 διαγγειλον for ἀπάγγειλον | tr. to σοι ο κυριος | ηλεκεν for ἠλέησεν 21 διαπερασαντες for διαπεράσαντος | tr. to εν τω πλοιω του ιησου 22 add ἴδου after Καὶ² | τις for εἷς | ω ονομα for ὀνόματι | ειδων for ἰδὼν | προσπιπτι for πίπτει 23 παρακαλει for παρακαλεῖ | ζησεται for ζήσῃ 25 ιβ for δώδεκα 26 εαυτης for παρ' αὐτῆς 27 add και before ἀκούσασα | omit τὰ | omit ἔλθοῦσα | omit τοῦ ἱματίου 28 omit Ἐάν | tr. to καν των ἱματιων αψωμαι αυτου 29 ευθεως for εἰθὺς | ειαθη for ἵαται 30 ευθεως for εἰθὺς | ειπεν for ἔλεγεν 31 omit αὐτοῦ | συντριβοντα for συνθλίβοντά | τις μου 1st hand: μ erased (or accidentally washed out) so as to read τι σου 32 omit ἰδεῖν | πεποιηκυῖαν for ποιήσασαν 33 ἰδυῖα for εἰδυῖα | add ἐπ before αὐτῇ | add ἐμπροσθεν παντων

¹ A collation with the text of Westcott and Hort, begun in the July number and continued in October and January.

before *πασαν* | *αιτιαν* *αυτης* for *ἀλήθειαν* 37 *αυτω ουδενα* for *οὐδένα μετ' αὐτοῦ* | *παρακολουθησε* for *συνακολουθήσαι* | *μονον* for *τὸν*¹ 38 *ερχεται* for *ἔρχονται* 40 add *ειδοτες οτι απεθανεν* after *αὐτοῦ*¹ | *ο* for *αὐτὸς* | *εαυτου* for *μετ' αὐτοῦ* | add *κατακειμενον* after *παιδίων* 41 omit *αὐτῇ* | *ταβιθα* for *Ταλειθά* *κούμ* 42 *ευθεως* for *εὐθὺς*¹ | *ιβ* for *δώδεκα* | omit *εὐθὺς*²

6:1 omit *ἐκείθεν, καὶ ἔρχεται* 2 *ηρξαντο* for *ἤρξατο* | tr. to *εν τη συναγωγη διδασκειν* | omit *οι* | *αυτω* for *τούτῳ*² | omit *αι* | *γεινονται* for *γινόμεναι* 3 *αδελφος δε* for *καὶ ἀδελφός* | *ῥωση* for *Ἰωσήτος* 4 *ελεγεν δε* for *καὶ ἔλεγεν* | omit *αὐτοῖς* | *συνγενεσιν* for *συγγενεῦσιν* | omit *αὐτοῦ*² 5 *ουκετι ποιησαι* for *ἐκεῖ ποιῆσαι οὐδεμίαν* 6 *εθαυμαζεν* for *ἐθαύμασεν* | tr. to *κυκλω κωμας* 7 *ιβ* for *δώδεκα* | *εδωκεν* for *ἐδίδου* 8 *παρηγγελλεν* for *παρήγγειλεν* | *αρωσιν* for *αἰρωσιν* | tr. to *μη πηραν μη αρτον* | *πηραν* for *ζώνην* 9 *αλλ'* for *ἀλλὰ* | *ενδυσησθαι* for *ἐνδύσασθαι* 10 omit *αὐτοῖς* | *αν* for *ἐάν* 11 *ακουση* for *ἀκούσωσιν* | *αυτων* for *αὐτοῖς* 12 *εκηρυσσον* for *ἐκήρυξαν* 13 *εξεπεμπον* for *ἐξέβαλλον* | add *αυτους* after *θεράπειουν* 14 *βαπτιστης* for *βαπτίζων* | *εκ νεκρων ηγερθη* for *ἐγήγερται ἐκ νεκρῶν* | *αυτου* for *ἐν αὐτῷ* 1st hand: *ω* added by 2d hand above *-ου* 15 *ηλιας* for *Ἡλείας* 16 *ειπεν οτι* for *ἔλεγεν* | tr. to *εγω ον* 1st hand: *ον εγω ον* 2d hand 17 omit *ο* | add *τη* before *φυλακῇ* 18 *γυναικα εχειν* for *ἔχειν τὴν γυναῖκα* 20 *ῖδως* for *εἰδώς* | *ηπορειτο* for *ἠπόρει* 22 *αυτης* for *αὐτοῦ* | *και αρεσασης* for *ἠρεσεν* | *ειπεν ο βασιλευς* for *ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς εἶπεν* | *ετησαι* for *Ἀιτησόν* | *δ αν* for *ἐάν* 23 omit *καὶ ὥμοσεν αὐτῇ* *Ὅτι ἐάν με αἰτήσης δώσω σοι* | *ημισυ* for *ἡμίους* | omit *μου* 24 *η δε* for *καὶ* | add *αιτησε* before *Τὴν* | *βαπτιστου* for *βαπτίζοντος* 25 omit *πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα ᾗτήσατο λέγουσα* | omit *ἐξαυτῆς* | *μοι δωσης* for *δῶς μοι* 26 tr. to *αυτην αβετησαι* 27 *ευθεως* for *εὐθὺς* | omit *ὁ βασιλεὺς* | *σφεκουλατορα* for *σπεκουλάτορα* | *ενεχθηναι* for *ἐνέγκαι* | add *επι πινακει* after *αὐτοῦ* | *φυλακει* first written, then changed by 1st hand to *φυλακη* 28 omit *αὐτὴν*¹ 29 *ηλθον* for *ἦλθαν* | *κηδευσαι* for *καὶ ἦραν* | *αυτον* for *αὐτὸ* 30 *απηγγειλον* for *ἀπήγγειλαν* | add *και* after *πάντα* | *εποιησεν* for *ἐποίησαν* | omit *δσα*² | *εδιδασκεν* for *ἐδίδαξαν* 31 *ειπεν* for *λέγει* | omit *αὐτοί* | *αναπανεσθαι* for *ἀναπαύσασθε* | *λοιπον* for *ὀλίγον* | omit *οι*² | *ηυκερουν* for *εὐκαίρουν* 32 *κα* 1st hand for *καὶ*: *και* 2d hand | omit *ἐν* | tr. to *eis ερημον τοπον τω πλουω* 33 *ῖδον* for *εἶδαν* | *αυτον* for *αὐτοῦς*¹ | *ὑπαγοντες οι οχλοι* for *ὑπάγοντας* | *επεγνωσαν* for *ἐγνωσαν* | omit *καὶ προῆλθον αὐτούς* 34 *εσπλανχυσθη* for *ἐσπλαγχνίσθη* | *αυτοις* for *αὐτοῦς* | *ηρξαντο* for *ἤρξατο* 35 omit *αὐτοῦ* | *λεγουσιν* for *ἔλεγον* |

παρηλθεν for πολλή 37 \bar{p} for διακοσίων | δωμεν for δώσομεν | add ἵνα
 εκαστος αυτων βραχυ τι λαβη after φαγεῖν 38 tr. to αρτους εχετε |
 ειδεται for ἴδετε 39 ανακλιναι for ἀνακλιθῆναι | συνποσια for συμπόσια¹ |
 omit συμπόσια² 40 ανδρες \bar{p} for κατὰ ἑκατὸν | ανα \bar{n} for κατὰ πεντή-
 κοντα 41 ηυλογησεν for εὐλόγησεν | add πεντε before ἄρτους | add
 αυτου after μαθηταῖς 43 κλασματος ιβ κοφινους for κλάσματα δώδεκα
 κοφίνων 44 omit τοὺς ἄρτους 45 ενβηναι for ἐμβῆναι | omit εις τὸ
 πέραν | βηθαῖδαν for Βηθσαιδάν | add αν after ἔως | απολυση for ἀπολύει
 48 add σφοδρα after αὐτοῖς | add και before περι | omit πρὸς αὐτοὺς
 49 tr. to περιπατουντα επι της θαλασσης | φαντασμα εδοξαν ειναι for
 ἔδοξαν οτι φάντασμά ἐστιν 50 ειδον for εἶδαν | και ευθως for ὁ δὲ
 εὐθὺς | tr. to μη φοβεισθαι εγω ειμι 51 εκ περισσου for λίαν | αυτοις for
 ἑαυτοῖς | add και θαυμαζον after ἐξίσταντο 52 συνηκον for συνήκαν |
 ην γαρ for ἀλλ' ἦν 53 ηλθαν επι την γην for ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν ἦλθον | omit
 και προσωρμίσθησαν 54 add οι ανδρες του τοκου after αὐτὸν 55 add
 εις before ὅλην | περιχωρον for χώραν | omit τοῖς | κρεβαττοις for κρα-
 βάττοις | οτι for ὅπου | add εκει after ἔστιν 56 οσποταν for ὅπου ἂν |
 εισεπορευοντο for εἰσεπορεύετο | omit εις^{2,3} | επιθουν for ἐτίθεσαν

7:2 τινες for τινὰς | τινας for οτι | εσθιοντας for ἐσθίουσιν | add
 εμεψαντο after ἄρτους 3 πυκνα for πυγμῇ 4 add δε οταν ελθωσιν after
 ἀγορᾶς | βαπτισωνται for βαντίσωνται | add και κλειων after χαλκίων
 5 επιτα for καὶ¹ | ερωτωσιν for ἐπερωτῶσιν | add λεγοντες before Διδ |
 tr. to οι μαθηται σου ου περιπατουσιν | add ταις before χερσίν 6 add
 αποκριθεις before εἶπεν | add οτι before Καλῶς | επροφητευσεν for
 ἐπροφήτευσεν | omit οτι | αγαπα for τιμᾷ | εχει for ἀπέχει 9 στησεται
 for τηρήσῃτε 10 αθετων for κακολογῶν 11 αν for ἑάν² 12 add και
 before οὐκέτι 13 add την εντολην after λόγον | παρεδοτε for παρεδώ-
 κατε | omit και παρόμοια τοιαῦτα πολλὰ ποιεῖτε 14 παντα for πάλιν |
 ακουεται for Ἀκούσατέ | συνιεται for σύνετε 15 αυτο 1st hand for
 αὐτὸν²: changed to αυτον by 2d hand | tr. to αυτον κοινωσαι | add εκεινα
 before ἔστιν² 16 add ει τις εχει ωτα ακουειν ακουετω 17 εισηλθον for
 εἰσηλθεν | περι της παραβολης for τὴν παραβολήν 19 διανοιαν for
 καρδίαν | αλλα for ἀλλ' | χωρει for ἐκπορεύεται 21 after γὰρ a letter
 (α of α|πο?) has been erased | omit οὐ² 21, 22 μοιχαι πορνιαι κλοπαι
 φονος (changed by 1st hand from φονοι) for πορνεῖαι, κλοπαί, φόνοι,
 μοιχεῖαι | πλεονεξιαι was first written, then changed by erasure to
 πλεονεξια | πονηρια for πονηρία 23 omit ταῦτα 24 και for Ἐκεῖθεν

δὲ | omit καὶ Σιδῶνος | add τὴν before οἰκίαν | ἠδυνήθη for ἡδυνάσθη
 25 ἀκουσασα γὰρ for ἀλλ' εὐθὺς ἀκούσασα | omit αὐτῆς | ἐν πνευματι
 ἀκαθάρτῳ for πνεῦμα ἀκάθαρτον 26 συρα φοινίσσα for Συροφοινίκισσα
 27 ὁ δὲ ἰησοῦς εἶπεν for καὶ ἔλεγεν | tr. to καλὸν ἐστὶν | tr. to βαλεῖν
 τοῖς κυναρίοις 28 αὐτῷ λεγούσα for καὶ λέγει αὐτῷ | omit Naί | ψυχῶν
 for ψυχῶν 29 tr. to τὸ δαιμονιον ἐκ τῆς θυγατρὸς σου 30 omit αὐτῆς |
 τὸ δαιμονιον ἐξεληλυθὸς καὶ τὴν θυγατέρα βεβλημενὴν ἐπὶ τῆς κλινῆς for
 τὸ παιδίον βεβλημένον ἐπὶ τὴν κλίνην καὶ τὸ δαιμόνιον ἐξεληλυθὸς
 31 καὶ σιδῶνος ἦλθεν for ἦλθεν διὰ Σιδῶνος | eis τὴν δεκαπλῶν for
 Δεκαπλόως 32 μογγιλάλον for μογιλάλον 33 προσλαβομενος for
 ἀπολαβόμενος | omit τοὺς | omit αὐτοῦ¹ | tr. to πτυσας eis τὰ ὠτα αὐτοῦ
 καὶ | γλωσσας for γλώσσης 34 ἐφθεθα for Ἐφθαθά | διανυχθητι for
 Διανοίχθητι 35 add εὐθεὺς after καὶ¹ | διηνυγησαν for ἠνοίγησαν
 36 ὅσω for ὅσον | omit αὐτοὶ 37 ὑπερπερισσῶ for ὑπερπερισσῶς |
 πεποιήκεν for ποιεῖ | omit ἀλάλους

8:1 add δὲ after ἐκείναις | add αὐτῶν after ἐχόντων | add αὐτοῦ after
 μαθητὰς | omit αὐτοῖς 2 τῷ οὐλῳ for τὸν οὐλῳν 3 add εἰς before εἰς |
 ἠκασιν for εἰσὶν 4 omit αὐτοῦ | λεγοντες for ὅτι | ὥδε δυνασαι αὐτοὺς
 for τοὺτους δυνήσεται τις ὥδε 5 ὁ δὲ ἠρωτήσεν for καὶ ἡρώτα | add ὥδε
 after Πόρους | tr. to ἄρτους ἐχετε 6 κα for καὶ¹ | παρηγγελεῖν for
 παραγγέλλει | ζ̄ for ἐπτά | αὐτοῖς for τοῖς μαθηταῖς αὐτοῦ | παραβῶσιν
 for παρατιθῶσιν 7 tr. to αὐτὰ εὐλογησας | omit καὶ ταῦτα | παραβῆναι
 for παρατιθέναι 8 περισσεύματα for περισσεύματα | omit κλασμάτων |
 ζ̄ for ἐπτά | σφυρίδας for σφυρίδας: add πληρεῖς after it 9 add οἱ
 φαγοντες after δὲ 10 ἐνβας εὐθὺς for εὐθὺς ἐμβὰς | omit τὸ | add καὶ
 before ἦλθεν | πρὸς τὸ ὄρος δαλμουναι for εἰς τὰ μέρη Δαλμανουθά
 11 ἀπ for παρ' | ἐκ for ἀπὸ 12 omit αὐτοῦ | σημιον ἐπιζητεῖ for ζητεῖ
 σημεῖον | omit λέγω | οὐ for εἰ | tr. to ταυτη τῇ γενεᾷ 13 ἐνβας eis τὸ
 πλοῖον for ἐμβὰς 14 ἀπελθοντες for ἐπελάθοντο: add οἱ μαθηταὶ αὐτοῦ
 after it | ἐν ἑνὶ μονον ἐχοντες ἄρτον for καὶ εἰ μὴ ἕνα ἄρτον οὐκ εἶχον
 15 φαρισεῶν for Φαρισαίων | add ἀπο before τῆς² | τῶν ἡρωδιανῶν for
 Ἡρώδου 16 οἱ δὲ for καὶ 17 add ὁ ἰησοῦς before λέγει | add ἐν ἑαυτοῖς
 ολιγοπιστοὶ after διαλογίζεσθε 18 ἐχετε καὶ οὐ βλέπουσιν for ἐχοντες οὐ
 βλέπετε | ἐχεται καὶ for ἐχοντες² | omit καὶ² 19 πεντακισχιλίου 1st hand:
 ε added after χ by 2d | tr. to πληρεῖς κλασμάτων 20 add δὲ after ὅτε |
 ζ̄ for ἐπτά: add ἄρτους after it | σφυρίδων for σφυρίδων | omit κλασμάτων |
 οἱ δὲ εἶπαν for καὶ λέγουσιν αὐτῷ | ζ̄ for Ἐπτά 21 λέγει for ἔλεγεν | add

πως before Οὕτω 22 βηθαῖδαν for Βηθσαιδάν 23 αυτου for τοῦ τυφλοῦ |
 ἐξηγαγεν for ἐξήνεγκεν | ενπτυσας for πτύσας | add και before ἐπιθεις | add
 επ before αὐτῷ | ηρωτα for ἐπηρώτα | ει βλεπει for Εἰ τι βλέπεις 24 ο δε
 for καὶ | λεγει for ἔλεγεν | omit οτι | omit ὁρῶ 25 επεθηκεν for ἔθηκεν |
 add αυτου after χεῖρας | απεκατεσταθη for ἀπεκατέστη | ανεβλεπεν for
 ἐνέβλεπεν 1st hand: ε added above α by 2d hand | παντα τηλαυγως for
 τηλαυγῶς ἀπαντα 26 add τον before οἶκον | μη for Μηδὲ 27 tr. to
 τους μαθητας αυτου επηρωτα 28 απεκριθησαν for εἶπαν αὐτῷ | οι μεν for
 οτι¹ | αλλοι δε for καὶ ἄλλοι | ηλιαν for Ἑλείαν | ενα for οτι εἰς 29 λεγει
 αυτοις for καὶ αὐτοῖς ἐπηρώτα αὐτοῖς | omit εἶναι | add δε after ἀποκρι-
 θεις | add ο υἱος του θεου του ζωντος after χριστός 30 λεγουσιν for λέγω-
 σιν 31 add απο τοτε before ηρξατο | απο first written for ὑπό: changed
 by 1st hand to ὑπο | omit τῶν³ | τη τριτη ημερα for μετὰ τρεῖς ἡμέρας
 32 παρησια for παρρησίᾳ | tr. to αυτον ο petros 33 ἰδως for ἰδὼν | add
 τω before Πέτρῳ | λεγων for καὶ λέγει 34 omit αὐτοῖς | ακολουθεν for
 ἔλθειν | aras for ἀράτω | omit αὐτοῦ καὶ 35 αν for ἐάν | ψυχην αυτου for
 ἐαυτοῦ ψυχὴν | απολεση for ἀπολέσει² | εαυτου ψυχην for ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ
 36 add τον before ἀνθρωπον | εαν κερδηση for κερδήσαι | ζημωθη for
 ζημωθῆναι | εαυτου ψυχην for ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ 37 δωσει for δοῖ 38 αν
 for ἐάν | omit λόγους | omit ταύτη | και for μετὰ

9:1 tr. to των ωδε | omit αν 2 μεθ for μετὰ | add τον before
 Ἰωάννην | καθ for κατ' | add εν τω προσευχεσθαι αυτοις before μετε-
 μορφώθη | add ο ιησους after μετεμορφώθη 3 ως for οἷα | omit οὕτως
 4 add ἰδου before ὥφθη | αυτος for αὐτοῖς | ηλιας for Ἑλείας | μωυση
 for Μωυσεῖ 5 ειπεν petros for ὁ Πέτρος λέγει | tr. to ωδε ημας | θελεις
 ποιησω ωδε for ποιήσωμεν | tr. to σκηνας τρις | μωυση for Μωυσεῖ | ηλια
 for Ἑλείᾳ 6 λαλει for ἀποκριθῇ | ησαν γαρ εκφοβοι for ἐκφοβοι γὰρ
 ἐγένοντο 7 add ἰδου after καὶ¹ | αυτοις for αὐτοῖς | omit ἐγένετο² | add
 λεγουσα after νεφέλης 8 περιβλεπομενοι for περιβλεψάμενοι | αλλα τον
 ιησουν μονον μεθ εαυτων for μεθ' ἐαυτῶν εἰ μὴ τὸν Ἰησοῦν μόνον
 9 καταβαινοντων δε for Καὶ καταβαινόντων | απο for ἐκ¹ | εξηγησονται
 for διηγῆσονται 10 οι δε for καὶ | οταν for τὸ | ἀναστη for ἀναστῆναι
 11 επηρωτησαν for ἐπηρώτων | τι ουν for Ὅτι¹ | ηλιαν for Ἑλείαν
 12 αποκριθεις ειπεν for ἔφη | ηλιας for Ἑλείας | omit μὲν | πρωτος for
 πρῶτον | αποκαβιστανι for ἀποκατιστάνει | εξουθενηθη for ἐξουδενηθῇ
 13 ηδη for καὶ¹ | ηλιας for Ἑλείας | ηλθεν for ἐλήλυθεν | ηθελησαν for
 ἤθελον | αυτω for αὐτόν 14 ἰδον for εἶδαν | omit πολλὸν 16 εαυτους for

αὐτοὺς² 17 ἀποκριθεὶς ἐκ τοῦ οὐλοῦ εἰς εἶπεν αὐτῷ for ἀπεκρίθη αὐτῷ εἰς ἐκ τοῦ οὐλοῦ 18 ἀν for ἐάν | omit αὐτόν² | ἠδυνήθησαν ἐκβαλεῖν αὐτο for ἰσχυσαν 19 καὶ for ὁ δὲ | add ὁ ἰησοῦς before λέγει | ἀπιστε for ἀπιστος: add καὶ διεστραμμένη after it | ἀνεξῶμαι for ἀνέξομαι 20 omit καὶ before ἰδὼν | εὐθεὺς το πνεῦμα for τὸ πνεῦμα εἰθὺς | ἐσπαραξεν for συνεσπάραξεν αὐτόν 21 tr. to αὐτοῦ τον πατέρα | add λεγὼν before Πόσος | ἐξ οὐ for ὡς | παιδοθεν for παιδιόθεν 22 omit καὶ² | tr. to αὐτον εἰς πυρ | ἀλλὰ for ἀλλ' 23 τουτο for τό 24 καὶ εὐθεὺς for εἰθὺς | το πνεῦμα for ὁ πατήρ | παιδαριου for παιδίου | εἶπεν for ἔλεγεν | βοηθήσον for βοήθει 25 συντρεχει for ἐπισυντρέχει | add ὁ before οὐλος | omit τῷ ἀκαθάρτῳ 26 omit τοὺς 27 omit αὐτοῦ | omit καὶ ἀνέστη 28 add προσήλθον αὐτῷ after οἶκον | omit αὐτοῦ² | καὶ ἐπηρωτησαν for ἐπηρώτων | add λεγοντες before Ὅτι 29 add καὶ νηστια after προσευχῇ 30 καὶ ἐκείθεν for Κἀκεῖθεν | παρεπορευοντο for ἐπορεύοντο | γινῶ for γινῶ 31 λέγει for ἔλεγεν | τῇ τρίτῃ ἡμερᾷ ἐγείρεται for μετὰ τρεῖς ἡμέρας ἀναστήσεται 32 ἐρωτησαι for ἐπερωτήσαι 33 διελεχθητε προς εαυτους for διελογίζεσθε 34 add αὐτων after τίς | μῖζον εἰη for μείζων 35 omit καὶ¹ | ἰβ for δώδεκα 36 omit αὐτὸ ἐν | ἐναγκαλισαμενος for ἐναγκαλισάμενος 37 ἐκ for ἐν | παιδιον for παιδίῳ | ἐν for ἐπὶ | δεχται for δέχεται 38 καὶ ἀποκριθεὶς for Ἐφη | add εἶπεν after Ἰωάννης | εἰδομεν for εἶδαμέν | οὐκ ἠκολούθει ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκωλύσαμεν αὐτον for καὶ ἐκωλύομεν αὐτόν, ὅτι οὐκ ἠκολούθει ἡμῖν 39 omit Ἰησοῦς | ἐν for ἐπὶ | δυνησονται for δυνήσεται | omit ταχὺ | tr. to με κακολογεῖν 41 tr. to ἀν γὰρ | add μου after ὀνόματι | χριστος ἐσται for Χριστοῦ ἐστέ 42 μου for τούτων | add εἰς ἐμε after πιστευόντων | omit αὐτῷ | περιεκειτο for περίκειται | μῶλον ονικον for μύλος ὀνικὸς | ἐβλήθη for βέβληται 43 σοὶ ἐστιν for ἐστὶν σε | tr. to εἰς τὴν ζῶην εἰσελθεῖν κυλλον | omit εἰς τὴν γένναν 45 σκανδαλιση for σκανδαλίζῃ | κοψον for ἀπόκοψον | σοὶ ἐστιν for ἐστὶν σε | ἀπελθεῖν for βληθῆναι 47 εἰ for ἐάν | σκανδαλιση for σκανδαλίζῃ | omit σέ² | omit βληθῆναι | add τὴν before γένναν 48 σβεννυεται for σβέννυται 49 ἀλισγηθήσεται for ἀλισθήσεται 50 ἀλα for ἄλας twice | μωραθη for ἀναλον γέννηται | ἀρτυσηται for ἀρτίσετε | ὑμεῖς οὖν ἐν εαυτοῖς ἐχεται for ἔχετε ἐν ἑαυτοῖς

10:1 omit καὶ before πέραν | συνπορευεται for συνπορεύονται | omit πάλιν¹ | οὐλος for οὐλοι 2 οἱ δὲ for Καὶ | tr. to φαρισαῖοι προσελθόντες | ἐπηρωτησαν for ἐπηρώτων | αὐτου first written for αὐτον¹ and changed by 1st hand to αὐτον 4 tr. to μωυσης ἐπετρεψε 5 καὶ ἀποκριθεὶς

ο for ὁ δὲ | omit ὑμῖν 6 ο θεος for αὐτοῦς 7 add και ειπεν before
 ἔνεκεν | εκαστος for ἄνθρωπος | add και προσκολληθησεται προς την
 γυναικα αυτου after μητέρα 8 ουκ for οὐκέτι | tr. to σαρκι μια 9 εξευξεν
 for συνέευξεν 10 εν τη οικεια for εις την οίκian | επηρωτησαν οι
 μαθηται αυτου for οι μαθηται περι τούτου ἐπηρώτων αὐτόν 11, 12 εαν
 απολυση γυνη τον ανδρα αυτης και γαμηση αλλον μοιχεται και
 εαν ανηρ απολυση την γυναικα μοιχεται for *Ὅς ἂν ἀπολύσῃ . . .
 ἄλλον μοιχᾶται 13 tr. to ἀψηται αυτων | επειτιμων for ἐπετί-
 μησαν | τοις προσφερουσιν for αὐτοῖς 14 add επιτειμησας after
 και | tr. to αυτοις ειπεν | εμε for με | των ουρανων for τοῦ θεοῦ 16 εναν-
 καλειαμενος for ἐναγκαλισάμενος | επιτιθει for κατευλόγει τιθεις | add
 και ευλογει αυτα after αὐτά² 17 add ἴδου τις πλουσιος before προσδρα-
 μῶν | omit εις | omit αὐτόν¹ | add λεγων before Διδάσκαλε 19 tr. to μη
 μοιχευσης μη φονευσης | omit Μὴ ἀποστερήσης | add σου after μητέρα
 20 αποκριθεις ειπεν for ἔφη | add τι ὑστερω ετι after μου 21 omit ὁ δὲ |
 ενβλεψας for ἐμβλέψας | add ει θελεις τελιος ειναι before *Ἐν | omit
 τοῖς | ουρανοις for οὐρανῶ | add αρas τον σταυρον σου before δεῦρο
 22 απο του λογου for ἐπὶ τῷ λόγῳ | add απ αυτου after ἀπῆλθεν 24 omit
 πάλιν | add πλουσιον after εἰσελθεῖν 25 τρωμαλιας for τρυμαλιᾶς |
 εἰσελθειν for διελθεῖν | tr. to εις την βασιλειαν του θεου πλουσιον
 26 εαυτους for αὐτόν | δυνησεται for δύναται 27 add δε after ἐμβλέψας |
 add μεν after Παρά¹ | add τουτο before ἀδύνατον | αλλα for ἀλλ¹ | add
 τω before θεῶ¹ | omit παρά³ 28 tr. to αυτω λεγειν ο πετρος | omit
 Ἰδοὺ ἡμεῖς | tr. to παντα αφηκαμεν 29 αποκριθεις ο ιησους ειπεν for
 ἔφη ὁ Ἰησοῦς 30 omit και ἀδελφούς | μητερα for μητέρας 31 omit οι
 32 omit οι δὲ | αυτω for ἐφοβοῦντο | ιβ for δώδεκα 33 omit τοῖς² |
 omit αὐτόν² 34 ενπεξουσιν for ἐμπαίξουσιν | μαστιγωσουσιν αυτον και
 ενπτύσωσιν αυτω for ἐμπτύσουσιν αὐτῷ και μαστιγώσουσιν αὐτόν | add
 αυτον after ἀποκτενοῦσιν | τη τριτη ημερα for μετὰ τρεῖς ἡμέρας
 35 προσελθοντες 1st hand for προσπορεύονται: changed (by 3d hand?)
 to προσηλθον | omit δύο | omit αὐτῷ | θελωμεν for θέλομεν | αν for ἐὰν |
 σε αιτησωμεθα for αἰτήσωμέν σε 36 add με after θέλετε 2d hand |
 ποιησαι for ποιήσω 37 ειπον for εἶπαν | tr. to εκ δεξιων σου | ευωνυμων
 for ἀριστερῶν | βασιλεια της δοξης for δόξη σου 38 add αποκριθεις after
 Ἰησοῦς | αυτω for αὐτοῖς | το αιτισθαι for τί αἰτεῖσθε 39 omit αὐτῷ |
 omit ὁ δὲ Ἰησοῦς ειπεν αὐτοῖς | add μεν after Τὸ¹ 42 ο δε for και | omit
 αὐτοῦς ὁ Ἰησοῦς | ου for οἱ² | omit αὐτῶν³ 43 omit δέ | οστις for ὅς | tr.

to εν ὑμιν μεγαs γενεσθαι 44 ὑμων for ἐν ὑμῖν | add ὑμων before πάντων
 45 λουτρον for λύτρον 46 ἱεριχω for Ἱερευχῶ (-χῶ) twice | omit Βαρτί-
 μαιος | omit προσαίτης | add προσαιτων after ὁδόν 47 ο υιος for Τὶς
 48 omit καὶ ἐπετίμων . . . ἐλέησόν με 49 αὐτον φωνηθῆναι for Φωνή-
 σατε αὐτόν | omit αὐτῷ | θαρρων for Θάρσει 50 αναστας for αναπηδήσας
 51 add λεγει after ἀποκριθεῖς | omit εἶπεν | tr. to θελεις ποιησω σοι |
 ραββουνι for Ῥαββουνεῖ 52 ο δε for καὶ ὁ Ἰησοῦς | ευθεως for εὐθὺς

11:1 ενεγίζουσιν for ἐγγίζουσιν | ελεων for Ἐλαιῶν 2 λεγων for καὶ
 λέγει | κατεναντι κωμην for κώμην τὴν κατέναντι ὑμῶν | ευθεως for εὐθὺς |
 ω for ἐφ' ὃν | tr. to ουπω ουδεις | επικεκαθεικεν for ἐκάθισεν | λυσαντες
 for λύσατε | αγαγετε for καὶ φέρετε 3 omit ποιεῖτε τοῦτο | add οτι
 after εἶπατε | ευθεως for εὐθὺς | αποστελει for ἀποστέλλει | omit πάλιν
 4 απηλθον δε for καὶ ἀπῆλθον 5 τινες δε for καὶ τινες | εστωτων for
 ἐστηκότων 6 ειπον for εἶπαν | add αυτοις after εἶπεν 7 αγουσιν for
 φέρουσιν | omit αὐτῶν | καθίζει for ἐκάθισεν | αυτω for αὐτόν 8 πολλοι
 δε for καὶ πολλοι | omit αὐτῶν | εστρωννουν for ἔστρωσαν | omit ἄλλοι
 δὲ στιβάδας κόνιντες ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν 9 add λεγοντες after ἔκραζον |
 omit Ὡσαννά 10 ειρηνη for Ὡσαννά 11 οφειας for οὐκ ἤδη | ιβ for
 δώδεκα 12 αυριον for ἐπαύριον | εις βηθανιαν for ἀπὸ Βηθανίας 13 tr.
 to απο μακροθεν συκην | add εις αυτην after ἦλθεν | εις αυτην for ἐν
 αὐτῇ | add μονον after φύλλα | ου γαρ ην ο καιρος for ὁ γὰρ καιρὸς οὐκ
 ἦν 14 add ο ιησους after αὐτῇ | tr. to καρπον μηδεις | φαγη for φάγοι |
 ηκουσαν for ἤκουον 15 omit καὶ τοὺς ἀγοράζοντας | ν τω ἱερ of ἐν τῷ
 ἱερῷ 1st hand, in an erasure (of is τα ἱερα?) | add εξεχεεν after
 κολλυβιστῶν 17 λεγων αυτοις for καὶ ἔλεγεν | εποιησατε for πεποιή-
 κατε 19 εγεινετο for ἐγένετο | tr. to εξω της πολεως εξεπορευοντο
 20 εξηρανμενην for ἐξηραμμένην 21 ειδε for ἶδε 22 omit καὶ | add του
 before θεοῦ 23 add γαρ after ἀμήν | omit οτι¹ | αρθηναι for Ἀρθῆναι |
 βληθῆναι for βλήθητι | πιστευση for πιστεῖν | α λεγει for ὁ λαλεῖ
 24 προσευχομενοι for προσεύχεσθε καὶ 25 στηκῆται for στήκετε | ανη
 for ἀφῇ 28 και for ἡ | tr. to ταυτην την εξουσιαν εδωκεν | omit ινα ταῦτα
 ποιῆς 29 add αποκριθεῖς after Ἰησοῦς | επερωτω for ἐπερωτήσω | add
 καγω after ὑμᾶς | omit καὶ¹ | τινι for ποίῳ 30 omit τὸ² | απ for ἐξ¹
 31 αυτους for ἑαυτοὺς | add οτι after λέγοντες | add ημιν after ἐρεῖ |
 omit οὖν 32 αλλ εαν for ἀλλὰ | φοβουμεθα for ἐφοβοῦντο | λαον for
 ὄχλον | παντες for ἅπαντες | ηδισαν for εἶχον | tr. to οτι οντως 33 οιδο-
 μεν for οἶδαμεν 1st hand, changed by 3d to οἰδαμεν | add αποκριθεῖς
 after Ἰησοῦς

12:1 *ἄνθρωπος* *τις* *ἐφύτευσε* *ἀμπελωνα* for *Ἀμπελῶνα ἄνθρωπος ἐφύτευσε* | add *αὐτῷ* after *περιέθηκεν* | *ἐξωρυσεν* for *καὶ ὥρυσεν* | *ἐξεδοτο* for *ἐξέδετο* 2 omit *πρὸς τοὺς γεωργοὺς* | *τοῦ καρποῦ* for *τῶν καρπῶν* 3 *οἱ δὲ* for *καὶ*¹ | add *καὶ ἀπεκτιναν* after *ἔδειραν* 4 omit *πάλιν* | *κεφαλῶσαντες ἀπεστίλαν ἡτιμασμενον* for *ἐκεφαλῶσαν καὶ ἡτίμασαν* 5 add *παλιν* before *ἄλλον* | omit *κάκεινον ἀπέκτειναν* | *τοὺς δὲ* for *οὗς μὲν* | *τοὺς* for *οὗς*² | *ἀποκτινοντες* for *ἀποκτένυντες* 6 *ὕστερον δὲ* for *ἔτι ὕιον ἔχων τὸν* for *εἶχεν, υἱὸν* | add *αὐτοῦ* after *ἀγαπητόν* | omit *αὐτόν* | tr. to *πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἐσχατὸν* | omit *ὅτι* 8 tr. to *αὐτὸν ἀπεκτιναν* | omit *αὐτόν*² 9 add *οὖν* after *τί* 10 *ἀνεγνώκατε* for *ἀνέγνωτε* 12 omit *καὶ ἀφέντες αὐτόν ἀπῆλθαν* 14 *οἱ δὲ* for *καὶ*¹ | *ῥῆξαντο ἐρωτᾶν αὐτὸν ἐν δόλῳ* for *λέγουσιν αὐτῷ* | omit *οὐ*¹ | add *εἶπον οὖν ἡμῖν* after *διδάσκεις* | omit *κῆνσον* 1st hand: supplied by 2d hand 15 add *ὑποκρίται* after *πειράζετε* | *εἰδῶ* for *ἴδῶ* 16 omit *αὐτῷ* 17 *καὶ ἀποκριθεὶς* for *ὁ δὲ Ἰησοῦς* | add *αὐτοῖς* after *εἶπεν* | *ἐθαύμασαν* for *ἐξεθαύμαζον* 18 *ἐπηρώτησαν* for *ἐπηρώτων* 19 *ἐχη* for *καταλίπη* | tr. to *τεκνὸν μὴ ἀφή* | omit *αὐτοῦ*¹ 20 *ἀπέθανεν καὶ* for *ἀποθνήσκων* 21 omit *καὶ*^{1, 3} | *οὐδὲ αὐτὸς ἀφήκεν* for *ἀπέθανεν μὴ καταλιπὼν* 22 tr. to *οἱ ᾧ* (for *ἐπτά*) *καὶ* | omit *καὶ*¹ 23 add *οὖν* after *ἀναστήσει* | tr. to *αὐτῶν τίνος* | *ᾧ* for *ἐπτά* 24 *ἀποκριθεὶς δὲ ὁ ἰησοῦς εἶπεν αὐτοῖς* for *ἔφη αὐτοῖς ὁ Ἰησοῦς* 25 *γαμίζονται* | add *οἱ* before *ἄγγελοι* 26 *εἰ* for *ὅτι* | *ἀνεγνώκατε* for *ἀνέγνωτε* | *τῆς* for *τοῦ* | *ὡς* for *πῶς* | tr. to *ὁ θεὸς λέγων αὐτῷ* | omit *ὁ*² 28 *προελθὼν* for *προσελθὼν* | *ἀκουὼν* for *ἀκούσας* | *ἴδων* for *εἰδὼς* | tr. to *πρωτῇ ἐντολῇ* | omit *πάντων* 29 *ὁ δὲ εἶπεν αὐτῷ* for *ἀπεκρίθη ὁ Ἰησοῦς ὅτι* | *παντῶν πρωτῇ* for *Πρώτῃ ἐστίν* | *Ἰσραὴλ* for *Ἰσραήλ* | omit *εἰς* 30 add *τῆς* before *καρδίας* | add *αὐτῇ πρωτῇ* after *ἰσχύος σου* 31 add *καὶ* before *δευτέρα* | add *ὁμοίως* before *αὕτη* 32 add *καὶ* before *εἶπεν* | *εἰπας* for *εἶπες* | add *θεὸς* after *εἰς* 33 add *τῆς* before *καρδίας* | *κα το* for *καὶ*² | add *σου* after *πλησίον* | *σεαυτὸν* for *ἑαυτόν* | *πλὺν* for *περισσότερόν* | omit *τῶν* 34 omit *αὐτόν* | add *ὅτι* after *αὐτῷ* | tr. to *ἐτολμα αὐτὸν οὐκετι* | *ἐπερωτᾶν* for *ἐπερωτῆσαι* 35 omit *ὁ Ἰησοῦς* | *λέγει* for *ἔλεγεν* | omit *ὁ*² | tr. to *ἐστὶν δαυεὶδ* 36 omit *τῷ*^{1, 2} | add *ὁ* before *Κύριος* | *ἐκθροῦς* for *ἐχθροὺς* 37 *πῶς* for *πόθεν* | tr. to *ὁ υἱὸς αὐτοῦ ἐστὶν* | omit *ὁ* before *πολὺς* 38 tr. to *ἐλέγεν ἐν τῇ διδαχῇ αὐτοῦ* | add *ταῖς* before *στολαῖς* 40 *κατεσθιοντες* for *κατέσθοντες* | omit *τάς* | omit *τῶν* | add *καὶ ὀρφανῶν* after *χρηρῶν* | *οἰτινες* for *οὗτοι* | *περισσὸν* for *περισσότερον* 41 *ἐστὼς ὁ ἰησοῦς* for *καθίσας* | add *παντὰς* after *ἐθεώρει* | add *τὸν* before *χαλκὸν* 43 omit *αὐτοῦ* | *λέγει*

for εἶπεν | omit ὅτι | βεβληκεν for ἔβαλεν | omit τῶν βαλλόντων
 44 περισσευματος for περισσεύοντος | αυτων for αὐτοῖς | omit πάντα ὅσα
 εἶχεν

13:1 omit ἴδε 2 αποκρίθεις for ὁ Ἰησοῦς | ἀφεθῇ οὐδὲ διαλυθῇσεται
 for καταλυθῇ: add after it καὶ δια τριων ημερων αλλος αναστησεται ανευ
 χειρων 3 καθημενου δε for Καὶ καθημένου | ελεων for Ἑλαιῶν 4 omit
 πάντα 5 add καὶ αποκρίθεις αυτοις before ὁ | omit δὲ | omit αὐτοῖς
 6 add ὁ χριστος after εἰμι 8 omit γὰρ | ἐπὶ for ἐπ' | omit ἔσονται² |
 add ταραχαὶ after λιμοί | omit ἀρχὴ ὧδινων ταῦτα 9 omit βλέπετε δὲ
 ὑμεῖς ἑαυτοῖς | καὶ δωσουσιν for παραδώσουσιν 10 add δε after πρῶτον
 11 σταν δε for καὶ σταν | αν for ἂν | ἐκεῖνο for τοῦτο 12 παραδωσει δε
 for καὶ παραδώσει | αναστησονται for ἐπαναστήσονται 13 omit οὗτος
 14 εἰδῆται for ἴδῃτε | στηκον for ἐστηκότα 15 add δε after δ' | add εἰς
 την οικειαν after καταβάτω | εἰσελθετω for εἰσελθάτω | tr. to ἀρε ἐκ της
 οικειας αυτου τι 16 add ων after ἀγρὸν | τα ἱματια for τὸ ἱμάτιον
 17 omit ταῖς² 19 θλίψεις for θλίψις | omit κτίσεως | ης for ἣν 20 omit
 Κύριος 21 εἶδον for Ἴδε twice | κυριος for χριστός 22 add πολλοι
 before ψευδόχριστοι | πλαναν for ἀποπλανῶν | add καὶ before τοὺς
 25 omit ἔσονται | πεσουντε for πίπτοντες | omit αἱ² | τω ουρανῳ 1st
 hand for τοῖς οὐρανοῖς: changed to τοις ουρανοις by 2d hand 26 νεφελη
 for νεφέλαις 27 επισυνστρεψουσιν for ἐπισυνάξει | omit αὐτοῦ | add
 της before γῆς | ακρων ουρανων for ἀκρου οὐρανοῦ 28 omit ἥδη | tr. to
 αυτης ο κλαδος 29 tr. to ταυτα εἰδῃτε 30 add δε after ἀμὴν | εως for
 μέχρῃς οὐ | tr. to παντα ταυτα 31 παρελευσετε for παρελεύσονται | μη
 παρελθωσιν for παρελεύσονται 32 καὶ for ἡ | add οἱ before ἐν 33 add
 δε after βλέπετε | add καὶ προσευχεσθαι after ἀγρυπνεῖτε | add εἰ μη ὁ
 πατηρ καὶ ὁ υἱος after γὰρ | omit ἐστιν 34 ὡςπερ γαρ for ὡς | add καὶ
 before ἐκάστῳ 35 omit ἡ² | μεσανυκτιον for μεσονύκτιον 37 α for ὁ |
 omit λέγω²

14:1 φαρισαιοι for γραμματεῖς | omit ἐν | κρατησοντες for κρατή-
 σαντες 2 δε for γὰρ | tr. to θορυβος εσται 3 γυνη προσηλθεν for
 ἦλθεν γυνή | πολυτιμου for πολυτελοῦς | add καὶ before συντρίψασα | το
 for τὴν 4 add των μαθητων after τινες | add καὶ λεγοντες after ἑαυτοῖς |
 omit τοῦ μύρου 5 ἐδυνατο for ἡδύνατο | omit τοῦτο | tr. to πραθῆναι το
 μυρον | τ for τριακοσίων | ενεβριμουντο for ἐνεβριμῶντο 6 add αυτοις
 after εἶπεν | κοπον for κόπους | add γαρ after καλὸν 7 υμων for ἐαυτῶν |
 omit πάντοτε² 8 εἶχεν for ἔσχεν | tr. to μου το σωμα 9 omit δὲ | add

οτι before δπου | αν for ἐάν 10 add ἴδου after Καί | add ο before Ἰού-
 das | ο ἰσκαριώτης for Ἰσκαριώθ | omit ὁ | ιβ for δώδεκα | tr. to παραδοι
 αυτον | omit αὐτοῖς 13 αποστιλας for ἀποστέλλει | tr. to των μαθητων
 αυτου δυο | omit καὶ² | add εισελθοντων ὑμων before ἀπαντήσει 14 omit
 καὶ | αν for ἐάν | φαγομαι for φάγω 15 αναγιον for ἀνάγαιον | omit
 καὶ² 16 add ετοιμασαι after ἐξήλθον | add αυτου after μαθηται 17 ιβ
 for δώδεκα 18 tr. to ειπεν ο ιησους | ὑμω for ὑμῶν | tr. to με παραδωσει
 19 add οι δε before ἤρξαντο | καθ for κατὰ 20 add αποκριθεις before ειπεν |
 ιβ for δώδεκα | ενβαπτομενος for ἐμβαπτόμενος | omit ἐν 21 omit οτι | add
 παραδιδετε before ὑπάγει 22 omit αὐτῶν | εδιδου for ἔδωκεν | add αυτοις
 after ειπεν | omit ἐστιν 23 add το before ποτήριον | τοις μαθηταις for
 αὐτοῖς 24 add το before τῆς | tr. to ὑπερ πολλων εκχυννομενον: add
 εις αφεσιν αμαρτιων after it 25 omit οὐκέτι 26 ελεων for Ἐλαιῶν
 27 σκανδαλισθησονται first written, then changed to σκανδαλισθησεσθαι
 by 1st hand: add εν εμοι εν τη νυκτι ταυτη after it | σκορπισθησεται
 for διασκορπισθήσονται 28 add εκ νεκρων after με 29 αποκριθεις
 λεγει for εφη | αλ' for ἀλλ' 1st hand, changed to αλλ' by 2d hand
 30 omit σοι | tr. to τη νυκτι ταυτη | omit ἡ δις | αρνηση for ἀπαρνήση
 31 add πετρος after ὁ δὲ | μαλλον περισσως for ἐκπερισσῶς | ελεγεν οτι
 for ἐλάλει | tr. to με δεη 32 εξερχονται for ἔρχονται | γεσημανιν for
 Γεθσημανει 35 επεσεν for ἐπιπτεν | την γην for τῆς γῆς | tr. to ει
 δυνατον εστιν ἵνα 36 add μου after πατήρ | add εστιν after σοι | αλλα
 for ἀλλ' 38 εισελθεται for ἔλθῃτε 40 ὑποστρεψας ευρεν αυτους παλιν
 for πάλιν ἔλθων εὑρεν αὐτοὺς | tr. to οι οφθαλμοι αυτων | καταβαρουμενοι
 for καταβαρυνόμενοι | tr. to αυτω αποκριθωσιν 41 omit τὸ² | add το τελος
 after ἀπέχει | tr. to ἴδου ηλθεν η ωρα: add και after it 43 omit εἰθὺς |
 omit ὁ | ιβ for δώδεκα | add πολυς after οχλος | omit τῶν³·⁴ 44 συσημον
 for σύσσημον | tr. to λεγων αυτοις | αγαγεται for ἀπάγετε 45 ευθεις for
 εἰθὺς | add χαιρε before Ῥαββεὶ 46 επεβαλον for ἐπέβαλαν | αυτων for
 αὐτῶ | εκρατουν for ἐκράτησαν 47 και εις for εἰς δὲ | παρεστωτων for παρε-
 στηκότων | omit τὴν | επεσεν for ἔπαισεν | ωτιον for ὠτάριον 48 συν-
 λαβειν for συλλαβεῖν 49 add των προφητων after αἱ γραφαί 50 τοτε
 οι μαθηται αυτου for καὶ | tr. to παντες εφυγον 51 add εις after Καί |
 tr. to τις νεανισκος | ηκολουθι for συνηκολούθει | omit ἐπὶ γυμνοῦ | οι δε
 νεανισκοι εκρατησαν for καὶ κρατοῦσιν 52 add απ αυτων after ἐφυγεν
 53 add καϊαφαν after ἀρχιερέα | συνπορευονται for συνέρχονται | ο for
 οἱ² first written, then changed to οι by 1st hand 54 ηκολουθι for ἡκο-

λούθησεν | omit καὶ³ 56, 57 omit καὶ ἴσαι αἱ ἁμαρτίαι οὐκ ἦσαν. καὶ
 τινες ἀναστάντες ἐψευδομαρτύρουν κατ' αὐτοῦ 59 tr. to ἡν εἰση 60 omit
 Οὐκ ἀποκρίνη οὐδέν; | σι for τί 61 omit οὐκ | tr. to οὐδεν ἀπεκρίνατο |
 add καὶ before πάλιν | omit ὁ ἀρχιερεὺς | add ἐκ δευτερου after αὐτὸν |
 εὐλογημενου for εὐλογητοῦ 62 add ἀποκριθεὶς after Ἰησοῦς | add αὐτω
 after εἶπεν | τῆς δυναμews for τῶν νεφελῶν 63 add εὐθws before διαρῆξας
 64 add παντες after ἠκούσατε | τὴν βλασφημίαν for τῆς βλασφημίας: add
 του στοματος αὐτου after it | tr. to φαίνεται ὕμν | καὶ for οἱ δὲ | tr. to εἶναι
 ενοχον 65 ἐκπτενι for ἐμπτεύειν | tr. to το προσωπον αὐτου | omit αὐτῷ³ |
 add νυν χριστε τις εστιν ο πεσας σε after Προφήτευσον | ἐλαμβανον for
 ἔλαβον 66 omit τοῦ² | tr. to ἐν τῇ αὐλῇ κατω 67 ἰησου ἡς for ἦσθα
 τοῦ Ἰησοῦ 68 εἰς τὴν ἐξω αὐλὴν for ἐξω εἰς τὸ προαύλιον 69 omit
 πάλιν | παρεστηκοσιν for παρεστῶσιν 70 ἡρνησατο for ἡρνεῖτο | περι-
 εστηκοτες for παρεστῶτες | omit καὶ γὰρ Γαλιλαῖος εἶ 71 ὁμνυει for
 ὁμνῦναι 72 εὐθews for εἰθῆς | ἀναμνησθεις for ἀνεμνήσθη | του ρηματος
 ου for τὸ ῥῆμα ὡς | omit δις | omit καὶ³

15:1 εὐθews for εἰθῆς | add ἐπὶ το before πρῶλ | add των before
 γραμματέων | ἀπηγαγον for ἀπήνεγκαν | αὐτον τω πιλατω for Πει-
 λάτῳ 2 add λεγων after Πειλάτος | εἶπεν for αὐτῷ λέγει 3 add
 αὐτος δε οὐδεν ἀπεκρίνατο after πολλά 4 εἶδε for ἴδε | tr. to σου ποσα
 6 ἴωθει ο ἡγεμων ἀπολυειν for ἀπέλυνεν | ἡτουντο for παρηγοῦντο 7 add
 ποτε after δὲ | βαρναβας for Βαραββᾶς 8 ἀναβοησας for ἀναβᾶς 10 ἡδει
 for ἐγίνωσκεν | παρεδωκαν for παραδεδώκεισαν 11 βαρναβαν for Βαραβ-
 βᾶν 12 omit παλιν | εἶπεν for ἔλεγεν | omit ὃν λέγετε 13-38a [οἱ δὲ
 πάλιν . . . ἐσχίσθη εἰς δύο] lost with the leaf that followed f. 185
 39 παρεστῶς αὐτω for ὁ παρεστηκῶς ἐξ ἐναντίας αὐτοῦ | κραξας for
 οὕτως | tr. to ο ἄνθρωπος οὗτος | tr. to ἡν θεου 40 ἡν for καὶ² | ὡση 1st
 hand for Ἰωσήτος: changed to ἴωση by 2d hand 41 καὶ for αἱ | διηκο-
 ρουσαν for διηκόνουν | omit αἱ 43 ἴωσης for Ἰωσήφ | add ο before απο:
 later dotted by 1st hand for deletion | ἀριμαθειας for Ἀριμαθαίας
 44 τεθνηκεν for ἀπέθανεν 45 παρα for ἀπὸ | σωμα for πτώμα | ἴωση
 for Ἰωσήφ 46 add εὐθews ἡνεγκεν καὶ before καθελὼν | εἰς τὴν σινδονα
 for τῇ σινδόνι | μνημω for μνήματι | add τῆς before πέτρας 47 ἴωση
 μνητηρ for Ἰωσήτος | τιθεται for τέθεται

16:1 omit ἡ² | omit τοῦ² | κα for καὶ³ | εἰσελθουσαι for ἐλθοῦσαι
 2 omit καὶ λίαν | omit τῇ | μνημα for μνημεῖον | add ἐτι before ἀνατεί-
 λαντος 3 ἀποκυλιση for ἀποκυλίσει | απο for ἐκ 4 ἀποκεκυλισται for

ἀνακεκύλισται | tr. to σφοδρα μεγαs 5 θεωρουσιν for εἶδον 6 φοβεισθαι for ἐθαμβεῖσθε | add οἶδα γαρ οτι before Ἰησοῦν | tr. to τον ναζαρηνον ζητῖται | εἰδετε εκει for Ἴδε | add αυτου εστιν after τῶτος 7 add και before εἶπατε | ἴδου προαγω for Προάγει 8 ακουσασαι εξηλθον και for ἐξελλοῦσαι | εσχεν for εἶχεν | φοβος for τρόμος | ειπον for εἶπαν 9 omit πρῶτον 10 omit και κλαῖουσιν 12 εφανερωθ[η ε]ν 13 απηγγελον for ἀπήγγειλαν 14 omit δὲ | omit αὐτοῖς | ιβ for ἑνδεκα | omit ἐκ νεκρῶν 15 κακεινοι απελογουντε λεγοντες οτι ο αιων ουτος της ανομιας και της απιστίας ὑπο τον σαταναν εστιν ο μη εων τα ὑπο των πνευματων ακαθαρτα την αληθειαν του θεου καταλαβεσθαι δυναμιν δια τουτο αποκαλυψον σου την δικαιοσυνην ηδη εκεινοι ελεγον τω χριστω και ο χριστος εκεινοις προσελεγεν οτι πεπληρωται ο ορος των ετων της εξουσιας του σατανα αλλα εγγιζει, αλλα δινα και ὑπερ ων εγω αμαρτησαντων παρεδοθην εις θανατον ἵνα ὑποστρεψωσιν εις την αληθειαν και μηκετι αμαρτησωσιν· ἵνα την εν τω ουρανω πνευματικην και αθαρτον της δικαιοσυνης δοξαν κληρονομησωσιν αλλα for και εἶπεν αὐτοῖς 16 κατακριθεις ου σωθησεται for κατακριθήσεται 17 ταυτα παρακολουθησει for ἀκολουθήσει ταῦτα | add καινες after λαλήσουσιν 18 omit και ἐν ταῖς χερσιν 19 omit οὖν | ιησους χριστος for Ἰησοῦς 20 add αμην after σημείων.—Omit ΑΛΛΩΣ and the Shorter Conclusion.

ευαγγελιον κατα
μαρκον

Below, in a semicursive hand not later than the fifth century:

† χριστε αγιε συ μετα του δουλ[ου σου τιμοθεου] †
και παντων των αυτου †

A different name originally stood at the end of the first line, where ου σου τιμοθεου is written over an erasure. Professor Gregory ascribes the second line of the subscription to this second hand; but of this I am not sure. τιμοθεου is not quite certain: is it possibly σινοθεου (for Σεουθιου)? If so, the original prayer was perhaps for the scribe, and was later changed to one for the local convent and its inmates. At the top of this last page a rude late hand has written [μεγ?]αλου ναws.

The manuscript's omissions of ν-movable are Matt.: καιουσι 5:15, εστι 14:2, εξεστι 22:17, John: εξεστι 5:10, τιμωσι 5:23 (cf. τιμωσει for τιμῶσι² *ibid.*), εορακε 6:46, Luke: ανωθε 1:3 (cf. εστι for ἔσται 1:34), πασι 2:38, ειπε 9:50, προσεφωνησε 23:20, Mark: ειχε, ανετειλε 4:5,

ακουσῶσι 4:16, συνπνιγούσι 4:19, αλυσεῖσι 5:4, ἐκρατήσε 6:17, ἠναγκασε 6:45, ἤθελε 7:24, ἐβαλε 7:33, ἐπετιμήσε 9:25, ἐφώνησε 9:35, ἐπέτρεψε 10:4, ἐγράψε 10:5, φωνοῦσι 10:49, ἐδίδασκε, πασι, ἐθνεσι 11:17, ἀγρευ-
σωσι 12:13, προσεκύλεισε 15:46.¹

In type of text W is curiously heterogeneous, showing three somewhat distinct strata, neutral, Western, and Syrian. Matthew and Luke, chaps. 8-24, are decidedly Syrian in type. John and the early part of Luke (chaps. 1-7) which follows it are neutral, with some interesting Western readings interspersed; e.g., the omission of the Lucan genealogy. The primitive subscription *κατα ἰωαννην* is a further hint of the neutral ancestry of this part of the manuscript. Mark is decidedly Western throughout, and while its readings are often not those of D they are usually of the same general kind as they, and so illustrate Hort's feeling that the Western is as much a textual tendency as a definite textual type.

The paragraph divisions of the manuscript present a good deal of variety. There are first those marked by the paragraphus or by an initial, usually slightly enlarged, projecting into the margin; second, those marked by leaving the line ends vacant; third, those marked by leaving a space of 1 to 2 cm. within the line between paragraphs. Closely related to these are the shorter intervals of from 1 to 3 letters'

¹The excellent facsimile edition makes it possible to supplement Professor Sanders' collation and conclusions in this as well as in some other particulars. To his record of 16 omissions of *ν*-movable (Washington Manuscript of the Gospels, p. 25) the above list adds 14 others. The statement that "the article never has the breathing," p. 18, should be modified to admit the following exceptions: Matt. 2:5; 10:22; 11:23; 12:11. Luke 8:10; 10:37; 14:9; 23:29. Mark 10:20; perhaps also John 1:15, 26; 3:36; 4:46 (these latter in the intrusive quire). The paragraphs marked by blank line-ends ought to have been noted as well as those marked by marginal initials or the paragraphus.

In Matt. 1:2 *α|κωβ'* should be *α|κωβ'*: *κ* is quite plain and begins the line. In 1:17 it is for the second and third uses of *δεκατέσσαρες* that W has *ιδ*. In 4:13 *καφαρναουμ'* was first written, and later changed to *καπερναουμ'* by the 1st hand. *παραθαλασσαν* should of course be *παρα θαλασσαν*, cf. *op. cit.*, p. 53. In 6:14 for *αυτων* the 1st hand first wrote *υμων*: *υτων* is improbable. *ομοια* is written for *δμοια* 20:1. In 20:26 *γενεσθαι* is a correction (4th hand?) probably from *γινεσθαι*. The mark over *ι* in *ικων*, 22:20, is probably a rough breathing intended for *η* just before. In 24:32 it is a *τ* from the 2d hand, not a breathing, that has been erased above *ο*. The first *η* of *ηδη*, 24:32, seems to have been deleted by a point so as to read *δη*. The corrections credited to the manuscript in Matt. 15:8 and 16:25 are not confirmed by the facsimile. In 26:54 *λει* for *δει* should be added. In 27:17 *η* was first omitted, or written *ι*, then supplied, or changed from *ι* to *η*, by the 1st hand. The superscription of John is in the hand that wrote the whole (8th) quire, but was written after the quire was finished, not when it was begun. In John 1:37 *κηκουσαν* should be *κ*,

space, left in the text, usually with the force of the colon or comma. The freedom and variety of this system is its most outstanding feature.

The simple pen and ink ornaments which mark the close of each gospel are less pretentious even than those of Vaticanus, and are most like those of Sinaiticus, but are without its use of red. On the other hand, the ornaments in W, except the one at the end of Mark, have as their central feature a neatly drawn little bird which recalls the stiff little bird-ornament (*paragraphus*?) in the Abusir Timotheus. The impression made by these ornaments as by the reserve in the use of letters even slightly larger than the text is one of great antiquity, that is, of the best period of Greek codices.

The superscriptions of the gospels which are probably from the first hand are in the secondary form *εὐαγγέλιον κατὰ μαρκον* like the superscriptions in Alexandrinus and the subscriptions in Sinaiticus. The subscriptions to Matthew, Luke, and Mark are in the same form, but the subscription to John is in the archaic form *κατὰ ἰωαννην*, like the superscriptions of *ⲚΒ* and the subscriptions of B. This fact interestingly accords with the substantial neutrality of the preceding (John) and following bodies (Luke, chaps. 1-7) of text. The extreme rarity of this form of subscription, which is otherwise confined to B, gives its occurrence in W a high degree of interest. The superscription of John is in the hand which wrote the intrusive quire in which it stands. Its differ-

(i.e. *καὶ ἤκουσαν*. A large capital in the text marks the beginning of a paragraph at 5:1. *κολυμβήθραν* is written for *κολυμβήθραν*, 9:7. On 21:4 the note should read *ἰησους* pro, instead of the sign of omission.

In Luke 4:19 it is unlikely that *τεθρωμενους* was first written and then changed to *τεθραυμενους*: the first writing was doubtless *τεθραμμενους*, influenced by *ανατεθραμμενος* a few lines above. In 5:37 *απολλυται* was first written. In 8:2 *εκβεβληκει* was first written for *εξεληλυθει*. In 9:10 *εποιησεν* for *εποίησαν* should be added. In 9:38 it is above the first *αι* of *δαιμοι* that *ε* has been added. *πῶα*, 10:20, should be read *πνευμα*, not *πνευματα* (*πῶα*); cf. Matt. 8:16, where the 1st hand started to write *πῶα* but at once corrected himself and wrote *πῶα*. *λιθος* of 21:6 has been corrected from *λιθον*, probably by the 1st hand.

In Mark 5:13 W has *πῶα* (*πνευμα*) for *πνεύματα*. In 5:31 *τις μου* has been altered to *τι σου* by the (possibly accidental) erasure of *μ*. In 7:22 *πλεονεξίαι* was first written, then changed by erasure to *πλεονεξία*. W's reading in 7:26 should be printed *συρα φοινίσσα*, not *συραφοινίσσα*. In 8:18 W has *εχεται*, not *εχετε*, for the second *εχοντες*. In 9:49 W's reading should be *αλισγηθησεται* (shall be polluted), not *αλις γηθησεται*. In 13:37 it is the second *λεγω* that is omitted.

There are a few other misprints: *υη* John 20:19; *ρεκνω* (for *ενκνω*) Luke 2:5; *εξηλθ* *εκαὶ* Mark 1:35; *καρφαναουμ* 2:1; *δεδωκα* (for *δωδεκα*) 3:14; *διεσπαρκεναι* 5:4; *ακραιμεινους* 7:26; *εκπαιδοθεν* (for *εκ παιδοθεν*) 9:21; *απομακροθεν* (for *απο μακροθεν*) 11:13.

ent appearance is due to its having been written, naturally enough, after the quire was finished. If the writing of the quire was slowly and irregularly done or the quire lay about unprotected for a time before being finished or at least entitled and put into the gap in W it was made to fill, the rubbing and defacing of the first recto would be explained. The title shows the same strong offprint as the last line of the last verso, immediately after which it was probably written. The relative lateness of this intrusive quire, so strongly suggested by its hand and position, is further confirmed by the large capitals that occasionally appear in its margin and once even in the text (John 5:1); and the evidence of the rulings, which are too wide for the column of writing by 1, 2, or even 3 cm., points in the same direction. There are no running titles in the manuscript.

The Freer Gospels, by reason of its age, importantly reinforces ancient testimony for the various types of text its reflects. In its Syrian parts it stands with Alexandrinus as a second and hardly inferior Greek witness. In its neutral parts, while less pure than B, it has sustained probably no more adulteration than \aleph , with which it shows certain external affinities; and in antiquity it ranks next after these codices among uncial witnesses. In its Western portion it is certainly no less free than D, and with its greater probable age it promises to play an important part in further studies of the Western text.

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WILL INDIA BECOME CHRISTIAN?

Seize upon truth where'er it is found,
Among your friends, among your foes
On Christian or on heathen ground,
The flower's divine where'er it grows,
Neglect the prickles and assume the rose.¹

There are many reasons why India is peculiarly interesting to everybody. It is a historic land. It boasts of the oldest philosophy, outranking Greece and Germany. It is a land rich in varied mythology,

¹ This article is published for the purpose of giving to the readers of the *American Journal of Theology* an example of the conception of Christianity, as compared with their own religion, which is held by many non-Christians in non-Christian lands. The editors conceive its value to lie, not in the correctness of the author's views, but in the information which it gives as to the impression which Christianity has made on the minds of many in Eastern lands. From this point of view we believe it deserves consideration.—EDITORS.

² Sir Isaac Watts, as quoted by Mr. W. H. Boyer, Canton, Illinois.

having the best poets, writers, and philosophers—a land having an “Emerson” at every five miles. It has a race embracing everybody like brothers and sisters, and it has given birth to three of the greatest religions of the world—a race worshipping one God and whose religion, Hinduism, has created a new epoch in the history of the world’s religions. It has captivated the hearts of Paul Deussen, Victor Cousin, Huxley, Sir M. Monier Williams, Max Mueller, and others who have tried to bring before the Western eyes the correct interpretation of Hinduism.

Despite all these things, it is frequently assumed by speakers and writers of the present day that the Hindus are “idolatrous,” that the Hindu religion teaches “pantheism,” that the Hindus are “heathen,” that “India will become a Christian country,” etc. All such statements can be refuted by one who has made a careful and intelligent study of the religious situation both of “heathen” and Christian lands.

First, let us see if Hinduism teaches idolatry. Many of you have heard from the Christian missionaries that the Hindus worship “10,000 gods and goddesses,” that the Hindus use external symbols in offering prayer. About eighteen years ago the late Swami Vivekananda said at the World’s Parliament of Religions at Chicago: “If you ask the very Hindu, who is praying before the so-called idol, if he believes in many gods, his answer will be, ‘There is but one God.’” Every Hindu knows this, however ignorant or superstitious he may appear. He may not be able to explain to you why he feels the need of a symbol before which to pray. These external symbols help to keep undeveloped minds fixed on the Being to whom he prays. The idolatry of India is in no way worse than the idolatry of Christendom. You have temples which you call cathedrals, you have images in churches which are very huge and hideous to our eyes. Why are there so many statues in Catholic churches? Why do you bow down to the statue of the Virgin Mary? Why does a Roman Catholic priest change his vestments three or four times at the time of divine service? Why does he sprinkle holy water on the candle-bearers? Why does he teach “drill” by asking his congregation to stand up and kneel down during the time of service? Why does he count beads? Why do so many images come before the minds of Protestants when they pray? Why do you Christians kneel down before Christ’s statue or picture? Why are there so many crosses hanging on the jackets of the women? Why do so many of you kiss the cross? Why do the people think church to be the best place to eat bread and wine? When a missionary attempts to persuade an ignorant Hindu to accept this sort of Christianity, he answers: “Why

should I give up my religion and accept your bigoted christolatry? Is your worship in any way better than mine?" All such idol-worshipings, both by the Hindus and Christians, are short cuts of undeveloped minds to grasp the highest spiritual truth. In the broader sense of the term, both such Hindus and Christians may be called idolatrous.

Hinduism in its deeper meaning does not teach idolatry. Those who have read either the Vedas, Upanishads, or Gita have come to know that these religious books are in no way inferior to the world's best scriptures. All these books contain "the accumulated treasury of spiritual laws discovered by different persons in different times." The discoverers have formulated rules in worshipping one Almighty Supreme Brahma. We have learned from these books to pray with the greatest concentration of mind. Our prayer is divided into three parts, first meditation, second destruction of self or loss of self, third communion with the Unseen or God. Many of you remember that Christ said: "I and my father are the same." None but a typical Oriental can give its true interpretation. Christ used to meditate; when he was absorbed in thought, he lost himself, and felt God immediately within him; then communication was going on between him and the all-pervading God. Then he said: "I and my father are the same." If you were to go to India you would find many people meditating hour after hour, and feeling God at the same time; this method of praying has become now the spiritual instinct of the Orient.

How does your prayer strike us? You do not meditate so long. You do not concentrate. You finish your prayer within five or ten minutes, no matter whether you are in a church or at your home. You learn the Lord's Prayer and repeat it like a parrot at an unusual time. In one of her lectures a missionary returned from India said: "Not one of every fifteen of the 'Christians' of this country prays earnestly to the Lord and has faith in him and in his prayers."¹ Christ said: "And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free." There is no Savior in the world except the truth. Where will that truth be found? It will be found in the depth of our own hearts. Let us seek within; let us pray without ceasing, and we will get Him. He reigneth in us.

Second, let us see if our religion teaches pantheism. Before proceeding farther the writer wishes to depict the Hindu conception of God. Our God has no form, no shape. He is infinite in his power, glory, and manifestation. He is all-pervading, Almighty God. He can reveal himself at any time and at any place. He was in the past age, he is in the

¹ *Evening Mercury*, Guelph, Ontario, June 28, 1909.

present age, and he will be in the future age. He can be worshiped not only as the Divine Mother but also as a friend, as a child, as a husband. In this way we bring him closer and closer, and make him the closest and dearest to our hearts. He exists in the greatest depth of the ocean as well as in the innermost heart of mankind. He is in me and in you. He is in all knowledge and religion. Perhaps many of you may say: "Is not this pantheism?" We answer: "No, not in any real sense of the word." The Divine Spirit permeates every pore of matter and of humanity and yet is absolutely different from both. There is no death of sparrow or lamb without notice of God.

There is no flight of birds to the evening home that is not directed by the unerring hand of Divine Love. There is no rose in the garden whose bloom and fragrance do not come from the breath of Infinite Beauty. There is no beauty, no wisdom, no faithfulness, no morality and self-sacrifice that is not inspired by Him, the goodness of all the good is a ray of reflection from Him, the greatness of all the great points to His throne on high.¹

If this be pantheism the Hindus are not ashamed of it, because it has been the faith and religious teachings of the most prominent men of the world.

Let us see if we really deserve to be called "heathen." The word "heathen" is generally used by the ministers and missionaries. During the summer of 1910 the writer was attending the Illinois State Methodist Missionary Conference at Havana. There was a very large colored map hanging in the Administration Building in which large parts of India, China, Japan, Africa, and South America were indicated as "heathen lands" with a peculiar color. We have been thus abused and insulted many times by "beef-eating barbarians" who generally confine themselves to their own religion and are not willing to see the good in anything outside of their own Bible. We do not need to defend ourselves against the charge that we are heathen and not civilized. It is sufficient to quote some of your countrymen here:

We English-speaking people [says the Fra, January, 1910] are a race of smootheimers, and acknowledge it. But at times it might be well if we would stop and take our spiritual longitude and latitude, and make a record of our surroundings. As a people we much prefer to teach than to study. For a hundred years and more we have sent missionaries to India, China, Japan, and the South Sea Islands. . . . We have assumed that we were right, and the yellow, brown, and black brothers dead wrong. . . .

¹ P. C. Mozoomdar, *The Oriental Christ*.

Had we sent men to India, Japan, and China to learn, and then come back and report all the possible good that they found, we would today be infinitely better off than we are. But the arrogance and cock-sureness of our attitude has in degree closed the gates of good will against us. . . .

The very word "missionary" is an insult wherever the missionary goes, since it is an assumption of superiority which the man is seldom able to make good. Let us all go to school. Big men are learners to the last.

One of your missionaries, Rev. J. P. Jones, writes in the *Biblical World* (October, 1910, p. 237) from Madura, India:

No people on earth have engaged more, and for a longer time, in religious speculation, or have thought out more patiently and devoutly the relations between God and man than have the people of India; and no one is worthy to be a teacher of those people in divine things who is not familiar with the thoughts of God as they have been revealed in past ages to the sages of that land. . . . It is necessary to know that India has produced some of the highest religious speculations, the profoundest philosophies, and the most remarkable systems of ontology that the world has known. These have been the thought-pabulum and the spiritual nourishment of this great people for millenniums. One should not deal harshly or unsympathetically with these spiritual aspirations and yearnings of that people.

In his book on *The Spirit of the Orient* Professor G. W. Knox (p. 24) says:

But India, China, and Japan were civilized empires when our fathers were barbarians. They have produced all the elements of civilization, highly developed religions and ethical teachings, complex systems of laws, refined philosophies, magnificent architecture and art and literature. Long, long ago they reached the stage our ancestors slowly and laboriously attained millenniums after, in part through the aid of the ancient civilization of the East. . . .

Mr. M. E. Stone, the General Manager of the Associated Press, writes in the *National Geographic Magazine* (December, 1910):

One cannot have forgotten that the Psalms, the Gospels, and the Koran are all of Arabian origin. The inhabitants of Central Arabia have today the oldest liberal government—practically a republic—on earth. And if you go farther afield, to India, and China, and Japan, you shall find a civilization older than history and marvelous in its character. One cannot read that great library of Eastern Sacred writings, edited by Dr. Max Mueller, without being tremendously impressed. . . .

Dr. Max Mueller in his book *What India Can Teach Us* says:

If I were to look over the whole world to find out the country most richly endowed with all the wealth, power, and beauty that nature can bestow—in

some parts a very paradise on earth—I should point to India. If I were asked under what sky the human mind has most fully developed some of its choicest gifts, has most deeply pondered on the greatest problems of life, and has found solutions of some of them which will deserve the attention even of those who have studied Plato and Kant—I should point to India. And if I were to ask myself from what literature we here in Europe, we who have been nurtured almost exclusively on the thoughts of the Greeks and Romans, and of one Semitic race, the Jewish, may draw that corrective which is most wanted in order to make our inner life more perfect, more comprehensive, more universal, in fact more truly human, a life not for this life only, but a transfigured and eternal life—again I should point to India. . . .

The above are all well-chosen quotations and the men who are quoted can be taken as authorities. There is no exaggeration in their statements.

Will India, then, become a Christian country? There are two principal classes of missionaries, the Roman Catholics and Protestants, in India. Both find the greatest difficulty in converting the high-caste and educated Hindus. The two classes are very hostile to one another. The relation between them in India is somewhat like that between a man and a tiger. The two preach entirely different doctrines. And on hearing we wonder that the religion of Christ which comes from heaven above has so many divisions, dogmas, and doctrines. "There must be something wrong in the whole story of the Bible. Let me stay in my own Hindu religion." These missionaries teach us to believe in special creation within six days as described in Genesis. We, like distinguished biologists and scientists, maintain the theory of gradual evolution. We "were Spinozites more than two thousand years before the existence of Spinoza; and Darwinians many centuries before Darwin; and evolutionists many centuries before the doctrine of evolution had been adopted by the scientists."¹

We cannot believe that a newly born baby is a progeny of deadly sin. We cannot believe that Eve came out of a rib of Adam or that the ass of the prophet Balaam spoke in human language, or that the sun stood still at the command of Joshua. We do not understand how the Virgin Mary gave birth to Christ. Can any science prove it? We do not understand how the doctrines of "eternal punishment" and "remission of sins" agree. Such religious theories as the Fall of Man and his Redemption will hardly meet with general acceptance, but we should think that Christianity could proceed without them. The learned

¹ M. Monier Williams, *Brahmanism and Hinduism*.

Hindus read the Bible as well as other religious books of the twin worlds with great care, and do not find anything new to be taken from the Bible. How can a Christian venture to advise the burning of our logical Scriptures and placing faith in his Bible which contains strange, illogical, and irrational statements?

What do we find the religious belief of the American students? We have found that many of them agree with our religious teachings, many of them have the same intellectual difficulty in believing the statements of the Bible. The American college girls¹ say that, "in reality, the shouting of halleluiahs and hosannas to God in the Highest is idolatrous: it is the modern school of Demetrius chorusing, 'Great is Diana of the Ephesians.'" At the University of Chicago it is held that "our sublime theological egotism must be supplanted by a profounder and more inspired faith in humanity. . . ."

College girls accept the teaching that to believe the Bible to be the literal and inspired word of a Deity is to convict the Infinite of ignorance of classic languages, to make him out an uninformed historian and a stranger to scientific truth. They are taught, and they believe, and in turn they teach, that Christianity, as set forth by the orthodox, is a record of colossal and even criminal blundering, for if only a chosen few reach a heaven of happiness, while the untold majority are doomed to an eternity of torment, the creation of the race was more than waste and a stupendous folly. . . .

Once a Christian minister said to me: "Why can't you make Christianity your personal religion?" I answered: "Brother, ours is the universal religion—a religion that embraces everybody, a religion that is free from superstition and bigotry—a religion for the intellectual people, and I have intellectual difficulty in taking Christianity as my personal religion." A Christian lady once said to me: "Did you ever think that Christ is the only Savior of your soul?" After a long discussion she said further: "If you become a Christian we can help you with money, as you say you won't get help from your folks, should you become converted." When I said further that if I became a Christian I would have trouble in getting a Hindu girl for my wife, she said that she could get a girl for me from her home town. Now, just think of her ignorance. There are several such missionaries who entice others and try to convert to Christianity. Oh, how mean is such occupation!

Then there is another side of Christianity—we mean the everyday life of Christians in India and Christendom. Before the Europeans

¹ H. Bolce, *Contemporary Salvation*, pp. 102-4.

came there was very little drinking in India. Now the country is becoming full of drunkards and smokers. There are thousands and thousands of English men and women who cannot pass a single day without a glass of beer or whiskey. Even on steamers going back and forth from Calcutta to London we have noticed them drink. Bishop Hurst quotes the Archdeacon of Bombay as saying: "For every Christian we have made in India, we have made one hundred drunkards." One prominent Swami of New York Vedanta Society writes: "Wherever a Christian missionary has gone a bottle of whiskey or champagne has followed him." Mr. Satsumahyra said in part of his address at the World's Parliament of Religions in 1893 at Chicago: "But there is another side, and that is the goddess of civilization with a bottle of rum in her hand. Oh, that the English had never set foot in India! Oh, that we had never seen a single European face! Oh, that we had never tasted the bitter sweets of your civilization rather than it should make us a nation of drunkards and brutes!"¹

An Englishman has said that English missions are but an attempt to convert Hindus into second-class Englishmen. If by Christian missions we mean an attempt to make Malays and Hindus and Negroes and Indians into second-class Puritans, the less we have of such missions the better.²

Now what did we notice after living in this Christendom? We noticed more than we expected. How often we have seen in the cities of New York and Chicago thousands of men, yes, and women too, walking, walking, walking, all night long, all because of drink. In many cases these too have had good homes and loved ones, but drink has robbed them of all this. In a paper read before the Congregational Club of New York City, Mrs. Josephine Shaw Lowell said: "'The bitter cry of outcast London' which has reached us across the sea, telling of hundreds of thousands in that most Christian of cities living in such filth, misery, ignorance, nameless vice, and unspeakable degradation that all heathendom has not the like of it, shows the condition toward which our own poor folks are daily sinking." On the last Labor Union Day the writer heard one minister make the following statement in the auditorium of the University of Illinois: "Every year 65,000 girls are sent abroad for white slave trade from Chicago." We do not need to speak further about all such evils. Is it not horrible that we should

¹ See *Ecumenical Missionary Conference*, p. 281, 1900.

² *Modern Eloquence*, VII, 9.

receive the gospel from such a Christian race? When we see such degradation of Christian men and women both in and out of this Christendom, we say: "See what a bad fruit their religion bears." Thank God that living among such men and women, struggling with so many trials and temptations, the writer is still a temperate man and hopes to leave behind him an ideal example.

All such quotations and illustrations are sufficient to make clear why an intelligent Hindu cannot give up his powerful, venerable, and strongly organized religion and accept the religion of the Western nations. In his lecture on "East and West," Lord Curzon, the ex-Viceroy of India, said:

I concur, indeed, in the view that the East is unlikely to accept Christianity, for two main reasons. First, the religions of Asia give to it what the pagan mythologies did not give to Europe—namely a definite and intelligible theory of the relations of God to man, which satisfies the spiritual aspirations as well as the day-to-day requirements of the Oriental; and, secondly, the latter sees in the teachings of Christianity hostility to that revived self-consciousness of which I have spoken, and to which he clings as his dearest possession. Even if he had no objection to the dogmatic teaching of Christianity, he would not consent to become a Christian at the cost of ceasing to be an Asiatic. . . .¹

But why shall we not live as typical Orientals or Asiatics instead of Christians? Is not the founder of Christianity an "Oriental"? Is not his native land nearer to India than England and America? Is not his method of living, dressing, praying, fasting, etc., more akin to our nationality than yours? Was not his prominent thought the struggle toward an ideal moral life? Surely, he lived as an ideal man of moral character. Surely, India, every country, will worship him as a "God-man." Surely, India will worship one God in the very same way as he did. Will your missionaries volunteer themselves to preach such a gospel? Then India will gladly receive it, and it will appeal to the deepest ideals of our oriental character.

SATYASARAN SINHA

CALCUTTA, INDIA

¹ *London Times*, January 26, 1911.

RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE

THE EZRA-APOCALYPSE¹

Jewish apocalyptic literature is of itself a fascinating study. From the literary standpoint its features are of genuine interest to the one who reads its pages, while the clear light which it throws on many obscure places in Jewish story has invited the notice of the student. These, however, are not the features which have brought this literature to the place of importance which it occupies today. It has of recent years become a matter of more certain knowledge that no adequate interpretation of the major portion of the New Testament can be attempted with any likelihood of success apart from a consideration of the ideas and influence of this phase of Jewish thought. So the attention of scholars has been compelled, and once compelled has been held.

Among the very excellent work which has been done upon the documents which record this type of thought that of British scholars has taken high place. Much careful and laborious toil must have been given by these men to render possible the production of the two massive volumes on *The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament* which have recently appeared under the editorship of Canon R. H. Charles.

The book under review is a contribution of English scholarship to our knowledge of this field. It deals with chaps. 3-14 of the work now generally known as Fourth Esdras. It was an important task to set before English readers a treatment of this work which could take its place beside that on *The Apocalypse of Baruch* by Mr. Charles, for these two apocalypses represent Jewish thought on these matters at or soon after the time of the writing of some of the most important books of the New Testament. Mr. Box has supplied a rather pressing need.

The attempt is a thoroughgoing one and is marked throughout by careful scholarship. The somewhat confused nomenclature of the various documents bearing the name of Ezra or Esdras receives clear and succinct treatment. A discussion of the various versions in which the Apocalypse is extant follows. These have been made, with the possible exception of the Armenian, from a Greek version which is lost. It is highly probable that the original was composed in Hebrew.

¹ *The Ezra-Apocalypse*. By Rev G. H. Box. London: Isaac Pitman & Sons, 1912. lxxvii+387 pages. 10s. 6d. net.

An interesting part of the author's treatment is that which deals with the sources of the Apocalypse. With due deference to work which has been done by others on this problem, yet in a thoroughly independent and critical spirit, Mr. Box re-examines the data and finds the following sources used wholly or in part: (1) a Salathiel Apocalypse, (2) an Ezra Apocalypse, (3) the Eagle Vision, (4) a Son of Man Vision, (5) an Ezra piece appearing in the fourteenth chapter. The person (R) who compiled the present chapters 3-14 fitted these different elements together and added portions of his own, so that he is a sixth source. It is in connection with R that one wonders if Mr. Box is not attempting too rigid a scheme with his sources. Either R is most catholic and elastic in his eschatological beliefs or he is sadly lacking in ordinary consistency of thought. It is, of course, quite possible that he is either or both. The author evidently feels the need of a word on this point, for he writes: "Such is the scheme of the national eschatology as it was combined in the mind of R. How essentially incompatible the diverse elements of which it is composed really are needs no further demonstration. But R was not a profound thinker, like S, and there is no necessity to try to force his system up to a standard of logical consistency which he neither thought necessary nor strove to attain" (p. lv). We recognize the need of care lest we judge such a one as R by modern standards, and one need not insist on any high degree of consistency, but here more than elsewhere Mr. Box relies on the subjective. This may have been necessary, and in any case the work of the author in this matter of redaction is attractive.

A rather detailed discussion of the eschatology and theology of the book and its sources has been presented by the author. This is assuredly the most important phase of the work for us and it is a pleasure to note the thoroughness and fairness with which Mr. Box has prosecuted his task. The gamut of the types of Jewish eschatology seems almost to be run in these sources—from the predominantly political to the otherworldly and transcendental. The striking similarity of idea between this apocalypse and Paul in more than one case is pointed out, while its relationship to the New Testament in general and its affinities with other apocalyptic literature receive consideration. Of real interest is that part of the treatment which discusses the relation of the ideas of the book to those of rabbinic Judaism. Mr. Box is well qualified to deal with this aspect of the problem, and his readers will be grateful that throughout the book he has presented it to them.

Dr. Sanday writes a prefatory note which merits some consideration. It is written in a spirit so mellow as almost to disarm criticism.

He dissents from the author's dissection of the book and prefers to regard it as proceeding from one writer. The reviewer is not able to agree with this, and is of the opinion that Mr. Box and the others who hold similar views have given us the only clue by which to thread the confusing labyrinth of ideas which meets us in the book. The theory of sources seems to be argued convincingly. The most vulnerable point which Dr. Sanday attacks is that of date. The author makes the date of the Salathiel Apocalypse 100 A.D. and that of the final compilation 120 A.D. Professor Sanday's comment is: "These two dates really coalesce; there is no clear indication that would fit the one and not also fit the other." Twenty years does seem a short time, but apocalyptic thought was very sensitive to circumstances and responded rapidly.

The style and arrangement of the book are to be commended, and the inclusion of the Latin text in the same volume with introduction, translation, and commentary is a convenience.

The author is well acquainted with the work that has previously been done on Fourth Esdras and recognizes its value. He maintains an attitude of independent investigation and does not hesitate to criticize his forerunners nor to advance a different opinion. Perhaps it is too much to expect that he will carry his readers with him in every detail, but the work is a worthy one and will take its place beside the fine volumes with which Mr. Charles has enriched us from time to time. Mr. Box has removed a negligence with regard to this apocalypse which could not have endured much longer without reproach.

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BISHOP WORDSWORTH'S EDITION OF THE VULGATE: ST. PAUL'S EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS¹

It is thirty-five years since the late Bishop of Salisbury planned out his great work on the Vulgate. In the original prospectus Dr. Wordsworth said: "The first and main object of this edition is naturally to restore the text of St. Jerome's version as far as possible and to give students the means of controlling the editor's judgment by an exhibition of the variations of the best MSS." At first the editors were content

¹ *Nouum testamentum Domini nostri Iesu Christi latine, secundum editionem sancti Hieronymi, ad codicum MSS fidem recensuit + Iohannes Wordsworth, S. T. P., Episcopus Sarisburiensis, in operis societatem adsumpto H. I. White, A.M. S. T. P. Partis secundae fasciculus primus, Epistula ad Romanos.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1913. 1 os. 6d. net.

with giving the text of Cod. Brixianus below, and the various readings of the twenty-five or thirty representative Vulgate MSS they had selected for the purpose. But as time went on, they found it necessary to include the readings of the Old Latin versions extant, and subsequently the quotations from the principal Latin Fathers. So now we have a most valuable *apparatus criticus*, in which is set out before us all the evidence of the most representative Vulgate MSS, the earlier Latin versions on which St. Jerome's revision was based, and the evidence of the Latin Fathers as to the text in their time, compared with the readings of the great Greek MSS. All this material is necessary to form a correct judgment of the true Hieronymian text.

The present section containing St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans is more valuable than any of its predecessors. We know less about the Old Latin text of St. Paul's Epistles than that of the Gospels. We are mainly dependent on four bilinguals. Of these one (Codex Sangermanensis) is a copy of another (Codex Claromontanus); and a third (Codex Augiensis) is really a Vulgate text. Imagine what our knowledge of the Gospels would be, if we only had Codex Bezae and Codex Sangallensis. Happily we have numerous quotations in the Fathers from which we can reconstruct the text they used. There is scarcely a verse in the Epistle to the Romans which is not quoted, often many times, by St. Augustine. There are also the commentaries of Ambrosiaster and Sedulius. The Gottweig and Freisingen fragments are consistently like St. Augustine, and the Book of Armagh contains a text similar to Ambrosiaster. There is a distinct difference in rendering between the African and European Fathers, as in the Gospels.

The Vulgate MSS contain a large amount of prefatory matter, which is of very great interest. There are three prefaces which are found in most MSS: "Primum quaeritur," "Romani qui ex Judaeis gentibusque crediderant," and "Romani sunt in partibus Italiae." The first two are combined in a preface beginning "Primum intellegere" in Brit. Mus. Add. 11852 (Cod. Ulmiensis), Cod. Colbertinus, and three other MSS. The "Primum quaeritur" is attributed to St. Jerome in the Spanish and the Theodulphian MSS which seem connected with Spain; but in the Book of Armagh this and the "Romani qui ex Judaeis" are ascribed to Pelagius. It should be noticed, however, that the Book of Armagh attributes the third preface, "Romani sunt in partibus Italiae," also to Pelagius, though it is proved by Dom Donatien de Bruyne to be the work of Marcion.¹ M. Berger says that the preface in question ("Primum

¹ "Prologues bibliques d'Origine Marcionite," *Revue Benedictine*, 1907.

quaeritur") commences with nearly the same words as the Commentary on the Epistles of St. Paul attributed to Pelagius,¹ but that is almost all that the two works have in common. The arguments about the Pauline authorship of the Epistle to the Hebrews in this preface are very similar to those used by St. Jerome in the extract from his *De viris illustribus* which forms the preface in the Vulgate MS Codex Sangermanensis (G).

Besides these three prefaces which are found in most MSS, the Book of Armagh contains another which it calls "Prologus Hilarii in Apostolum." This is really the beginning of the commentary on St. Paul's Epistles which we call Ambrosiaster. Though in later times it was included among the writings of St. Ambrose, St. Augustine quotes it as the work of Hilary. Professor Souter ascribes it to Hilary the Layman.²

The Spanish and Theodulphian MSS contain also a set of ninety Canons, in which the doctrines of St. Paul's Epistles are tabulated, derived from a Priscillianist source. These are preceded by a "Proemium Peregrini Episcopi," who is identified by M. Berger with Bachiarus, but Bachiarus was apparently a monk and not a bishop. In this preface he says the heretical teaching of Priscillian has been emended in the Canons. The numbers in the Canons correspond to the sections in Cod. Cavensis (125 in the Epistle to the Romans). In the Canons the Epistles to the Thessalonians come before Colossians, an order found in many MSS of various types (e.g., Wordsworth's KORZ), but not in those which contain the Priscillianist Canons. The Canons also include the Epistle to the Hebrews. The Theodulphian MSS also contain a preface by Bishop Isidore in which the Epistle to the Colossians comes after Ephesians, the same order as in the Vaudois MS of Zurich and Monza 13.

Another set of prefaces on the order of St. Paul's Epistles appears in various forms in the Theodulphian and Alcuinian recensions. In the former the Epistle to the Hebrews is omitted, in the latter it definitely states "haec in canone non habetur." The Book of Armagh contains the preface but omits the word *non*. The Epistle to the Hebrews is placed before the Pastoral Epistles, the order of the best Greek MSS. In one MS (K) these prefaces are ascribed to St. Jerome.

Lastly in the earliest and best MSS (AFM) there is a "Concordia Epistolarum" by some unknown writer. Like the Priscillianist Canons it gives a series of headings with the references to the different epistles.

¹ Samuel Berger, *Histoire de la Vulgate*. Paris, 1893.

² "Texts and Studies": A. Souter, *A Study of Ambrosiaster*. Cambridge, 1905.

For some reason or other it omits the Epistle to the Romans except in the last; perhaps the earlier headings which contained subjects touched on in that epistle have been lost. It contains no references to the Epistle to the Hebrews. The references correspond to the earliest chapter divisions, that of Amiatinus and Fuldensis.

Several fresh Vulgate MSS are used for the Pauline Epistles. Codex Langobardus (L) is an eighth-century MS, in the Bibliotheque Nationale at Paris (Lat. 335), written in Lombardic characters. The text is akin to Cod. Fuldensis and the Book of Armagh. Codex Monacensis (M), an eighth-century MS formerly at Freisingen, now at Munich (Lat. 6229), is the most valuable of any of the new MSS. The preliminary matter is the same as that contained in Cod. Amiatinus and the text is similar. Codex Oxoniensis (O) is a ninth-century MS written in Saxon characters, now in the Bodleian (Laud. Lat. 108). Codex Reginensis (R) comes from the Vatican (Reg. Lat. 9). It is one of the oldest MSS used, belonging to the seventh century; the text is good and resembles Amiatinus and Sangermanensis. Codex Ulmiensis (U) is one of the Hartmut MSS from St. Gall. It was written in the ninth century; it is now in the British Museum (Add. 11852). Like several other St. Gall MSS, it contains the New Testament without the Gospels. The division into chapters is like the Spanish and Theodulphian MSS but the text is more like the Alcuinian recension. Codex Harleianus (Z) was one of the MSS stolen by Aymont from the Royal Library in Paris, and is now numbered 1772 in the Harleian collection in the British Museum. The writing resembles the MSS of the north of France, and M. Berger supposes that it was written at Corbey or Saint-Vaast. The initial letters and illuminations are by an Irish scribe. Like many other MSS of the eighth and ninth centuries, it is a composite text. In Hebrews it is quite different from the ordinary Vulgate, and in the Catholic Epistles it contains a Spanish text. In the Epistle to the Romans it has been corrected according to the Alcuinian recension.

One more thing is of interest. What light does this edition of the Vulgate throw on the last two chapters of the Epistle to the Romans, and the concluding doxologies? First, all the Old Latin (*d, e, f, g, gue, m, r, t*) and Vulgate MSS contain the last two chapters. Cod. Boernerianus leaves a space at the end of chap. 14, just as in the Gospels the same MS leaves a space at St. John 7:52, before the woman taken in adultery. Both the earliest divisions into chapters (F 23 chapters; AMOZ and the Alcuinian MSS 51), however, seem to show indirectly that at one time the Epistle ended with chap. 14. The last chapter (23) in F corresponds

to Rom., chap. 14. In the other case chapter 50 corresponds to Rom. 14:14-23, and chap. 51 to the concluding doxology (Rom. 16:25-27), though the number LI is put in the margin of Rom. 15:4 in ALMZ. This final doxology is contained in the Latin of the bilinguals except Codex Boernerianus at the end of the Epistle, but it is omitted in the Greek of Codex Augiensis and perhaps by the corrector of Codex Claromontanus. Two Milanese Vulgate MSS mentioned by M. Berger, Mil E 26 *inf* Monza 13, also omit it. It was probably inserted at the end of chap. 14 in Codex Guelpherbytanus. A leaf is missing between Rom. 14:20 and 15:3; but there would have been room for these three verses. Lastly there is no further MS evidence for the omission of *Romae* in Rom. 1:7 beyond Codex Boernerianus.

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STUDIES IN GREEK RELIGION¹

In an earlier work, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*, Miss Harrison gained a reputation for brilliant combinations and clever hypotheses. An idea when it once possesses her mind has no limit to its ramifications and leads to conclusions which are interesting, if not always convincing. Two pregnant concepts underlie the present work. They are the theory of "collective representations," *representations collectives*, promulgated by Durkheim and his associates of the French school of social anthropology, and the idea of *durée*, which she takes from the philosophy of Bergson. The theory of "collective representations," as interpreted by Miss Harrison, calls attention to three essential phases of primitive religion: it is social rather than individual; it is emotional rather than intellectual; it is dynamic rather than static. Religion is a social phenomenon and has its origin in a stage of human development in which man has not become clearly conscious of his own individuality and as yet fails to separate himself sharply from his group.

¹ *Themis: A Study of the Social Origins of Greek Religion*. By Jane Ellen Harrison. With an Excursus on the Ritual Forms Preserved in Greek Tragedy by Professor Gilbert Murray and a Chapter on the Origin of the Olympic Games by Mr. F. M. Cornford. Cambridge: University Press, 1912. xxxii+559 pages.

Four Stages of Greek Religion: Studies Based on a Course of Lectures Delivered in April, 1912, at Columbia University. By Gilbert Murray. New York: Columbia University Press, 1912. 223 pages.

The Higher Aspects of Greek Religion. (The Hibbert Lectures, Second Series.) By L. R. Farnell. London: Williams and Norgate, 1912. 153 pages.

In totemistic societies this "solidarity, or lack of differentiation," extends to certain classes of material objects. "This relation between the human and the non-human group is so close as to be best figured by kinship, unity of blood, and is expressed in terms of actual identity." At this stage there exists neither worship nor concept of deity. "Worship involves conscious segregation of god and worshipper. The very idea of god belongs to a later stage of epistemology, a stage in which a man stands off from his own imagination, looks at it, takes an attitude toward it, sees it as an *object*." According to Miss Harrison the Greeks very early outgrew this totemistic habit of thought, but survivals of it persisted in their ritual and myths. In the second place, primitive religion may be described as emotional rather than intellectual, inasmuch as the mental life in which it arises seems to be "as yet mainly emotional, one of felt relations," and to lack the ability of making distinctions, a power which we associate with knowledge. The idea that religion is dynamic rather than static is expressed most clearly in the last chapter in a discussion of Themis, who stands for morality both in its cruder and in its more highly developed forms. "Themis is herd-instinct, custom, convention slowly crystallized into Law and abstract Right. She is not religion, but she is the stuff of which religion is made. . . . It is not herd-instinct, not the collective conscience, not the social imperative that constitutes religion; it is the emphasis and representation of this collective conscience, this social imperative." The common form of "representation" is the ritual act, called by the Greeks *δρώμενον*, "thing done." "The dromenon in its sacral sense is not merely a thing done, but a thing re-done, or *pre-done* with magical intent." The Hymn of the Kouretes furnishes an example in the magical dance which commemorates the birth of Zeus and "anticipates, in order to magically induce," a new birth in crops and flocks.

The idea of *durée*, "that life which is one, indivisible, and yet ceaselessly changing," is exemplified in the life-history of Demeter and in the cults of a large number of divinities that reflect the growth and decay of plant and animal life. According to Miss Harrison this element of *durée* is essential in religious thought and differentiates Dionysus and other mystery gods from the "non-religious" and artificial Olympians. In a totemistic society this concept may take the form of a belief in reincarnation. "When a man dies he goes back to his totem. He does not cease to be, but he ceases functionally for a time, goes out of sight, by and by to reappear as a new tribesman." How far this concept of *durée* has affected Miss Harrison's thought may be seen from her

personal testimony in the introduction: "I have come to see in religious impulse a new value. It is, I believe, an attempt, instinctive and unconscious, to do what Professor Bergson bids modern philosophy do consciously and with the whole apparatus or science behind it; namely, to apprehend life as one, as indivisible, yet as perennial movement and change."

The book covers a wide range of topics somewhat loosely connected. Among these are thunder-rites, mana, taboo, magic, totemism, sacrament and sacrifice, heroes and daimons. Professor Murray contributes an excursus on "Ritual Forms Preserved in Greek Tragedy"; and Mr. F. M. Cornford, a chapter on "The Origin of the Olympic Games." Miss Harrison sometimes allows her enthusiasm for her theory to warp her interpretation of material; and like many other investigators in this and allied fields, she is inclined to make a principle, which is sound in itself, explain too much.

Professor Murray's book is made up of four essays corresponding to the four chief periods of Greek religion. He has been closely associated with Miss Harrison and in a large measure shares her theories. The book is valuable chiefly for purposes of orientation. The essays taken together present the main movements in Greek religion in their historical setting. The first essay, "Saturnia Regna," deals with the primitive period, "to which our anthropologists and explorers have found parallels in every part of the world." The second essay, "The Olympian Conquest," discusses the origin and religious value of the Olympian gods. Professor Murray finds that the introduction of this new system of deities resulted in three important advances: (1) a moral expurgation which eliminated much that was cruel or obscene in the old tribal rites; (2) the removal in some measure of intellectual confusion by systematizing the old chaos of local divinities into a more orderly pantheon; and (3) the adaptation of religion to the needs of a new social order based upon the city-state instead of the tribe. None of these measures was carried to completion. The third essay, "The Failure of Nerve," outlines the chief features of religious thought during the Hellenistic period. With the failure of the Olympian gods to satisfy the needs of the religious mind, there grew up a belief in Fortune and Fate as controlling powers. Fate became localized in the stars, and escape from their malignant influence was sought in such cults as Orphism and Mithraism. The fourth essay, "The Last Protest," contains "a brief glance at the Pagan reaction of the fourth century, when the old religion . . . raised itself for a last indignant stand against the all-prevailing deniers of the gods."

A large part of the essay is devoted to the discussion of the treatise of Sallustius, *About the Gods and the World*, which is appended in translation.

Dr. Farnell discusses a phase of Greek religion that has received less attention since the coming of the anthropologists; namely, the practical, or rather the potential, value of this religion as a social and moral force. After his introductory sketch, in which he gives a discriminating account of "the general features and origins of Greek religion," he directs his attention mainly to the historical period. His work is characterized by a commendable caution in statement and a fine sense of the difference between fact and theory. The center of family religion, he tells us, was the hearth, round which the family was bound together by a system of duties and morals. Marriage was a religious ceremony consecrated to Zeus and Hera and "in some sense a sacrament or mystery." "For the protection of other sides of family life the Greek polytheism was richly equipped, and no other religion was ever more deeply concerned with the consecration of family duties." The religious life of the larger groups was concerned with the cults of heroes and ancestors, real or imaginary, and with the preservation of "the purity of civic blood from alien admixture." In a number of instances a temple seems to have formed the nucleus of a growing community and to have furnished a religious bond for the life of the city. No department of political life was closed to religion. "The law-courts and the market-places, the council chamber and the town hall were consecrated places and under the charge of certain deities. Important acts of state were accompanied by sacrifice; the religious oath was administered to magistrates, jurymen, and other officials; the admission of the youth into the ranks of citizens was a solemn religious ceremony." While the power of religion was felt most strongly within the confines of the family, the tribe, and the city-state, its influence extended beyond these limits. This is seen in the sanctity of treaties and of pledges given to aliens, in the sanctity of the person of heralds and ambassadors, in the protection of aliens, and in the recognition of the duty of hospitality. A fully developed personal religion in distinction from the common participation in the cults of the family and state arises only where the religious life is free from the fetters of clan and tribe. Such freedom was found in the Eleusinian mysteries, which were open to initiates from the whole Hellenic world and in the Orphic brotherhoods, which offered their communion to Greek and barbarian alike.

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A NEW MONOGRAPH ON THE WISDOM OF SOLOMON

Peculiar interest attaches to the wisdom of Solomon both because of its value as a source of information regarding Hellenistic Judaism and because of the influence which the book is supposed to have exerted upon Paul. A wide range of questions connected with the origin and interpretation of this document has been discussed in a recent monograph by Focke.¹ After surveying the literature of the subject, he deals at length with the problem of literary origins. The book is found to consist of two originally independent sections: (1) chaps. 1-5 and (2) chaps. 6-19. This division is supported by various data. Part I has no interest in σοφία, while this is one of the chief topics in Part II; in the former God distinguishes only the pious and the godless, in the latter his interest is in Israelites versus non-Israelites; one section looks to the life beyond for blessings, the other is more concerned with the problems of this life; the two parts are distinguished by different types of eschatology, the former being realistic and the latter spiritualistic; the internal evidence of the first section shows its provenance to have been Palestine, while that of the second is Egypt (Alexandria); in the first Hebrew parallelism prevails, in the second there is some attempt at the outset to maintain this literary form, but it almost entirely disappears toward the close; there is also a contrast in the formulas and names applied to the Deity, as well as in general vocabulary; syntactical and rhetorical differences are also observed. Yet the two parts have so much in common linguistically that the present Greek text is held to be the work of a single hand. The difficulty of the situation is solved by positing an original Hebrew for Part I and making its translator the author of Part II. The argument for a Hebrew original is not worked out so completely as one could wish. Three instances of alleged mistranslation—none of them strictly new—are noted. In 5:7 ἐνεπλήσθημεν τριβύς κτλ is declared to be impossible Greek and to be due to the translator's mistaking נְמִלֵּאנִי for נְלִאֲנִי (from לֵאדָה). Again, ἐλεγχθήσεται in 1:5 is due to a misreading of דַּוִּיכָח for the correct דַּוִּיכִי, which ought to have been rendered ἐλέγξαι. Lastly, the ὡς νεότητι of 2:6 is traced to an original בְּנִעְרִים the first letter of which the translator wrongly read as נ. In addition to these instances of mistranslation, chaps. 1-5 are said to contain many Hebraisms, but the evidences are not given. The reader is referred to Siegfried's

¹ *Die Entstehung der Weisheit Salomos: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des jüdischen Hellenismus.* Von Friedrich Focke. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1913. 132 pages. M. 4. 80.

translation (in Kautzsch's edition) for the data. Part I, on the basis of the sharp controversy it betrays between Sadducees and Pharisees, is dated in the reign of Alexander Jannaeus, more specifically in the years 88-86 B.C. The translation of this document, and the composition of Part II followed almost immediately. The occasion was a severe persecution of the Jews such as took place under Ptolemy Lathyrus in 88-87 B.C.

Our author thinks the Hellenistic elements in the book have been greatly overrated. It owed no such extensive debt to Greek philosophy as E. Pfeiderer, Moriz Friedländer, and others have imagined. The common opinion that the author of wisdom was a precursor of Philo in a school of Judaeo-Alexandrian philosophy of religion is emphatically denied. On the most essential points the two had nothing in common, and Philo had no forerunner as he had no successor. The writer of Wisdom did, however, have many points of close contact with the world of his day. While his conception of *σοφία* is not derived from Greek philosophy, it may be colored by a similar usage in the popular Egyptian Mysteries. And in this work—as also often in Philo—these heathen cults were tacitly or openly condemned (e.g., Wisd. 14:23 ff.; cf. 12:4 ff.). So also the style of address known as the Cynic-Stoic Diatribe is sometimes employed, after the custom of the time, in polemic against orgiastic cults of the heathen religions. On the other hand, Solomon is made to play a part not dissimilar to that of the hierophant in the Mysteries.

As for Paul's debt to Wisdom, so generally believed to have been firmly established by Grafe, Focke finds no substantial basis for such an opinion. He considers Grafe's positions point by point only to reject them almost *in toto*.

On the whole Focke's contribution is very suggestive, if not always convincing. It opens up some interesting and important problems particularly in respect to the historical and religious background. A more thoroughgoing discussion of several of these questions would have been in order.

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A PRAGMATIC VINDICATION OF CHRISTIANITY¹

The six discourses here published were delivered in 1912 as the eighth series of Angus Lectures before the Baptist Theological College at Regent's Park, London. His main thesis Mr. Glover thus formulates:

¹ *The Christian Tradition and Its Verification*. By T. R. Glover. New York: Macmillan, 1913. xiv+229 pages. \$1.25 net.

"In all modern study the emphasis falls on verification—on insistent reference to fact that can be tested and relied on. No other method is going to show the significance and value of the Christian religion—that greatest of all our traditions. Experience alone will tell us what it means."

The first lecture sets forth the "Challenge to Verification." In these days the trail of the pragmatic is over all thinking, and conditions the approach to every science, natural, social, economic, historical, religious. "O taste and see!" is the challenge issued by every thesis we would verify, even "that the Lord is good." How else are men to assure themselves concerning the claims of the Christian society, whose ecclesiastical fiat has become inoperative? The church of today exists as the hither end of an age-long historic tradition, and has no meaning save as related to the continuity of its past; this Christian tradition itself, in the second lecture, is set forth in its relation, successively, to the non-Christian world, where it becomes manifest by contrast, to the Christian church where the tradition actually operates, and to the historical Jesus, its source and moving power. In lecture three the church itself takes the stand, and the significance of its witness is estimated. Here it is, the greatest organization in human history, past or present, weak, fallible, often in error, sometimes criminally so, and the greater for these very defects, since it triumphs so signally over them. The church holds its main doctrines on the experience of men and on the observed sequences of life. It has been the subject of every attack of the intellect and of brute violence and has but stood the firmer. Philosophies, foes or friends of the church, have come and gone, and the church has not been finally committed to any one, because, with Aristotle, she "sets the fact before the explanation." The church has stood consistently for the serious nature of moral evil, the inexorability of law, and the supreme value of the human soul. These, along with their culmination in Jesus as the revealing of God in man, are for Mr. Glover the church's main doctrines, and she has held them because they have responded in all ages to the test of experience. In view of these convictions, the church "is the one body in all the world incapable of despair"; it has emancipated the will, it has given a strange and unconquerable joy, it has been a power second to no other in shaping human life.

The early church comes to expression in the fourth lecture. Its very literature is a phenomenon which requires explanation, being quite obviously the overflow of a notable experience. Critics of Christianity too often pass unreflectingly over this problem; the letters of Paul, for

example, cry aloud that something had happened in the life of the man that wrote them. What was it? And why? Only as we try to enter into his experience can we know. So is the rest of early Christian writing simply the precipitate of experience, and this experience needs examination. "Before we decide as to the final truth of what they said, we must know to the full, and from within, the evidence from which they spoke, and the experience which gave them their premisses." Lectures five and six deal with the person of Jesus, as it has dominated Christian history and presents itself for our estimation today. The purifying power of that great personality wherever it has touched human life even indirectly is of itself of compelling significance. In his name veritable demons have been cast out, and the old obsessions of occultism and cruelty and uncleanness no longer oppress men's souls in the guise of religious observance. Moreover, since "Christ died for every man," the life of every man has been given a sacredness no other historic influence has been able to bestow. Jesus is the bulwark of democracy; Channing's "one sublime idea" of the dignity and worth of the human soul is fundamental in the Christian gospel. Women, children, slaves are given by Jesus and his church a human status nowhere else afforded them in the ancient world. Devotion to him has been the mainspring of the noblest living and the most self-sacrificing service of others; it has induced soundness of mind, it has glorified suffering and been a ceaseless fountain of joy and hope. He who said, "By their fruits shall ye know them," need not shrink from meeting his own test. Critics who deny his historic existence or the originality of his teachings only enhance the wonder of his name. "If the sublime ethic, the altruism, and so forth, are all in Judaism, then the real value is somewhere else." Jesus' personality "is the force that historically has transformed the thoughts of men, their standards, and their life. The old world to which he came has become new; the Lamb of God has taken away already much of the sin of the world." Let us become acquainted with the actual Jesus of the Gospels, let us come with some historical imagination and genuine sympathy with religion and its sense of the infinite to sit in judgment on this man. If we do this, it is likely to be true "that where we started as critics, we end as disciples—and are glad of it."

Thus closes the last of these lectures, which can be more fairly reviewed by this brief résumé than by criticism. They are good to read; they must have been better to hear. Their form is that of the spoken word, and there is some natural iteration; their appeal is enhanced by a felicity of diction and a wealth of singularly apt illustrative quotation

and anecdote. Since the book deals with tradition and not with dogma, it is no fault that it does not contribute to dogmatic finality. That it is rarely suggestive and stimulating every reader will gratefully attest.

CLAYTON R. BOWEN

MEADVILLE THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL

ISLAM AS A MISSIONARY RELIGION¹

Writers on Islam are usually so busy pointing out the defects in the character and teachings of Mohammed and in predicting the downfall of his religion that they fail to ask themselves why it is that Mohammedanism has spread over so many lands and among so many races. If this question happens to be raised by them, the ready answer is that Islam was spread by the sword. But the serious student of history and of missions knows that Islam has spread and is spreading rapidly today, far beyond the utmost limits ever reached by Moslem arms. Professor Arnold has given us a new edition of his book on Moslem missions. A few sentences from the introduction will indicate what the author regarded as his task.

And at the outset the reader should clearly understand that this work is not intended to be a history of Muhammadan persecutions but of Muhammadan missions—it does not aim at chronicling the instances of forced conversions which may be found scattered up and down the pages of Muhammadan histories. European writers have taken such care to accentuate these, that there is no fear of their being forgotten, and they do not strictly come within the province of a history of missions. In a history of Christian missions we should naturally expect to hear more of the labors of St. Liudger and St. Willehad among the pagan Saxons than of the baptisms that Charlemagne forced them to undergo at the point of the sword. . . . Both in Christianity and Islam there have been at all times earnest souls to whom their religion has been the supreme reality of their lives, and this absorbing interest in matters of the spirit has found expression in that zeal for the communication of cherished truths and for the domination of doctrines and systems they have deemed perfect, which constitutes the vivifying force of missionary movements—and there have likewise been those without the pale, who have responded to their appeal and have embraced the new faith with a like fervor.

In a word, Islam was carried, and is being carried, to the Mongols and Tartars of Asia, to the numerous races of India and the Farther East, to the tribes of the Malay Archipelago, to the Negroes of Africa,

¹ *The Preaching of Islam, a History of the Propagation of the Muslim Faith* (2d ed.). By T. W. Arnold. New York: Scribner, 1913. xvi+467 pages. \$3.75.

not by the bearers of the sword, but by the bearers of merchandise, who, while exchanging their wares, have found time, seven days in the week, to invite those who are not of the faith to accept the one God and his prophet. Of course, these men are labeled bigots and fanatics. But let us remember that while they were spreading their faith, the traders from Christian lands were spreading rum and disease among the backward races of the globe.

A reading of this book is bound to raise the question whether Christian missionaries would not profit enormously by a careful study of the spread of Islam.

D. D. LUCKENBILL

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RECENT POPULAR DISCUSSIONS OF RELIGIOUS PROBLEMS

Apparently all the problems of apologetics are not yet solved, or if they have been solved to the satisfaction of the apologists, there is a large body of thoughtful people who are either unenlightened or else unconvinced. Readers who keep abreast of this literature recognize an undiminished activity in this field. It is not so much that old material is threshed over—although this is true—as that rapid advances in science and philosophy force the apologist to take account of these and to show their bearing on the fundamental realities of the Christian faith. The approach to this task may be along the line of science, or philosophy, or theology. Professor Simpson¹ has in mind those who find it difficult to reconcile the inherent spirituality of nature with some of the results of modern thought. All the topics treated occupy just now the focus of attention and interest—principles of biology, evolution, natural selection, variation, heredity, environment, and evolution as related to a directive factor, to creation, mentality, morality, evil, and immortality. Upon the matters which are purely scientific, one feels that he speaks with authentic knowledge. On the other hand, where he touches ethics or questions distinctively theological, if he appears to draw more upon others for his material, he is to be congratulated on the choice of those on whom he relies. The chapter on "The Influence of Science upon Religious Thought" is of special value; the same may be said of the two chapters on the principles of biology as describing the characteristics of living things. One who could take his view of miracles would be relieved of the general objections raised against

¹ *The Spiritual Interpretation of Nature*. By J. Y. Simpson. New York and London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1913. xv+383 pages. \$1.50 net.

them. Conditional immortality is suggested as the outcome of the ethical process of life.

In *The Philosophy of Faith*¹ such fundamental subjects are presented as truth, virtue, freedom, optimism, beauty, and highest good. Truth which reports itself in knowledge is resolved into what is generally accepted and obviously indispensable to everyone. Virtue is disinterested goodness which conduces to the greatest amount of general happiness—the final and efficient cause of the world's existence. Freedom is defined as the determinations of all volitions by one's own motives and preferences. From the text that "Beauty is the creator of the world" we have a profound and glowing presentation of the idea which is traced back to God, the source of all. The final essay treats of the reasons for our belief in God as the principle of unity in nature, the source of truth and beauty, and of the ideal good in personality. In these pages both Plato and Aristotle live again. The author outlines a philosophy of voluntary belief, critical and also constructive in the formation and development of convictions. He maintains that we have a right to assume that the world from first cause to last end is essentially congruous, that in the process of inquiry and conviction we verify this assumption not by pure reason but by experience in which beliefs are subservient to moral aims, and that in this task character is rightfully determinative.

Theology is always more dependent upon science than science is upon theology. The term "natural theology," which appeared to have been dissolved in apologetics or the philosophy of religion, has returned under the auspices of Dr. Newman Smyth who is convinced that in reaching a reasonable religious faith we cannot dispense with some theology of nature.² His material is all the ascertained facts of science; he seeks the meaning of things through every ascertained fact of nature. His method is to extend thought out into the unknown in the lines which have been already found valid in experience. Fundamental to this is the basis provided by physical science, general biology, and modern psychology. In the light of Christ as the final fact of nature we may interpret the psycho-physical preparation for his advent, the potentials of matter, life, animal intelligence, and humanity—the ideational energy immanent in personal beings—the secret of divinity at the heart of the

¹ *The Philosophy of Faith: An Enquiry.* By Bertram Brewster. New York: Longmans, Green & Co. 201 pages. \$1.20 net.

² *Constructive Natural Theology.* By Newman Smyth. New York: Scribner, 1913. ix+123 pages. \$1.00 net.

world. This issues in a scientific type of spiritual mindedness. The lectures are a sort of John the Baptist in anticipation of a larger work on personality as a fact in nature. While the material here treated is confessedly fragmentary, the fundamental thesis is valid, viz., that generally received working theories of science shall be provisionally recognized in theology. Professor Simpson's book noticed above illustrates the contention for which Dr. Smyth stands. His suggestion that students in preparation for the Christian ministry should include at least general biology in their training is well taken.

Leaving apologetics, we come to a fresh statement of Christian theology¹ intended primarily for classes in colleges, Young Men's Christian Associations, Sunday schools, and similar groups. The point of view is that of advanced scholarship and pragmatism. Two tests of faith are proposed—reasonableness, and tendency to make men righteous. Much is assumed, and many positions are simply stated with few or no reasons assigned, as would have to be the case in a book where but two hundred and twenty pages are allotted for the direct presentation. If the final proof of faith lies in its value, then it is enough to show that value. As long as the use of the book is restricted to those for whom it was written, it should prove helpful. Those who are for the first time asking what they may believe, or who are perplexed by the many voices with contradictory or incoherent messages, or who cannot be expected to make an extended study of the essential truth of historic Christianity, will find here a simple and intelligible answer to the need. Others who seek for a mature and adequate discussion of the questions involved will come upon many helpful suggestions, but will have to look elsewhere for the light they require.

Mr. de Bury² advocates a conception of worship which shall bring about a reunion of Christendom. He believes this may be secured by a revival of primitive Christianity, i.e., by one living and continuous act of communion in the present person of the living Savior. This involves faith or the submission of the understanding to Christ, conversion or surrender of the will to Christ, and worship, by which understanding and will, and even the guilt-laden bodily *substratum* of the self, are brought into communion with the person of the risen Christ. The

¹ *Christian Faith for Men of Today*. By E. A. Cook. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1913. xiii+260 pages. \$1.25 net.

² *The Mystical Personality of the Church*. A Study in the Original Realism of Christ's Religion. By Richard de Bury. London and New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1913. xxiii+88 pages. 2s. 6d.

essential reality in Christ's life, death, and resurrection was worship or the rendering of the being of man to God. Since souls have a capacity for an interlocking relation with one another, when Christ's disciples render their lives to God in union with him, there is created a collective spiritual or "mystical" personality—the extension of Christ's personal life, in which his disciples share with him the eternal life. This is a study in realism; the meaning of the church's relation to Christ is translated into terms of substance, the meaning of the Christian life is gathered up into worship, and worship is conceived of as culminating in the Eucharist. The book will appeal to those who delight to find cryptic references in religious words, those who are trying to revive an outworn realism, and those who seek through liturgy to realize the Christian ideal. It is, however, becoming ever more clear that the unity of Christendom is to be reached, if at all, by the ethical path, that is, by social service.

Among the many recent books on immortality spanning the stretch from primitive faiths to theistic and Christian belief and even agnosticism, Mr. Haynes's vigorous and somewhat unconventional work deserves recognition.¹ He first offers a sketch of the soul in savage religions, largely based on Tylor and Crawley, the beliefs of Egypt, Greece, and Rome, Christian conceptions of immortality till the time of Kant, and philosophical and religious views of the nineteenth century. He then turns to science, psychical research, and spiritualism to ascertain their attitude toward this question, and closes with a discussion of the current arguments and ethical considerations by which the customary beliefs are supported. He confesses that he has himself lost belief and even hope of personal immortality. Arguments which have been long unquestioned, taken for granted, or presented with emotional fluency by preachers and religious writers are here sharply challenged for their credentials, and the sufficiency of one after another is placed in doubt. Many readers will feel that the author is unduly pessimistic, that he is unsympathetic and unnecessarily rough in handling cherished Christian convictions, and they will not accept all his criticism of the reasons for their faith, or his estimate of such writers as Wordsworth, Tennyson, and Browning concerning their advocacy of immortality. If, however, his readers are as frank as Mr. Haynes is, they will be forced to admit that, if belief in personal survival after death is to endure, unless they can adduce more cogent arguments than those on which they have

¹ *The Belief in Personal Immortality*. By E. S. P. Haynes. New York: Putnam, 1913. ix+184 pp. \$1.25.

been accustomed to rely, they will have to take refuge in something other than a rational basis for their faith. This is a live book and will provoke thought.

CLARENCE A. BECKWITH

CHICAGO THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

RECENT SUGGESTIONS AS TO MODERN RELIGIOUS RECONSTRUCTION

It is becoming evident to an increasing number of thoughtful men in our day that modern civilization is facing a profound crisis. The religious ideas and the moral theories which for centuries have ruled men with almost axiomatic acceptance have begun to be subject to such serious questionings that they are losing their power; while as yet no strong spiritual interpretation corresponding to the modern demands of thought has come to take the place of the older sanctions. Three recent books are inspired by this general problem, and offer three different solutions. The first is devoted to the situation in the Lutheran church in Germany,¹ and asks what present-day theology ought to do to help solve the present confusing problem. The second is the utterance of a German philosopher,² who keenly feels the spiritual power of the older religious ideals, and who would fain make possible something similar in terms of our modern psychological thinking. The third program is put forth by an American,³ who is fluently conversant with the results of recent studies in the history of religion, and who portrays the problem of the present in terms of the conflict between two different "spirits"—the Aryan and the Semitic.

Professor Herrmann addresses himself to the crisis which is apparent in the Lutheran church in Germany, and which is felt more or less acutely in every Protestant country. That crisis is due to the tension brought about by a feeling of hostility between conservative evangelical faith and thoroughgoing scientific investigation. Herrmann feels that both sides in the controversy have real interests at stake. On the one hand,

¹ *Die mit der Theologie verknüpfte Not der evangelischen Kirche und ihre Ueberwindung.* Von Wilhelm Herrmann. Tübingen: Mohr, 1913. 44 pages. M. o. 50. (Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher. IV Reihe, 21 Heft.)

² *Ethics and Modern Thought: A Theory of Their Relations.* The Deems Lectures delivered in 1913 at New York University. By Rudolf Eucken. New York: Putnam, 1913. 127 pages. \$1.00.

³ *The Christian Reconstruction of Life.* By Charles Henry Dickinson. New York: Macmillan, 1913. ix+327 pages. \$1.50.

evangelical faith is right in its insistence that it would be disastrous to substitute mere science for religion. But on the other hand, scholarship is right in insisting that a faith which fears rigorous criticism is really on an insecure foundation. How is the theology of the present day to do justice to both interests? It must grant complete freedom to scientific investigation. To attempt to prescribe to scholars the theological conclusions which they must reach is both aggravating and futile. Conclusions must be judged by their scientific value, not by their doctrinal content. But while thus leaving scientific endeavors entirely free, Herrmann would insist that Christian faith is kindled and maintained only by a direct contact of the believing soul with the inner life of the historical Jesus, in which one finds the revelation of God's redeeming love. In answer to the query whether recent historical investigation does not make us entirely uncertain as to the exact content of the inner life of Jesus, Herrmann replies that the historian cannot forbid the Christian to make the experiment of trying to attain a sympathetic appreciation of the New Testament picture of Jesus. Such an experiment, he believes, will give to one an inner experience of being touched so convincingly by divine power, that one cares little what the historian may say. One is thus delivered both from the orthodox demand that one shall affirm certain specific doctrines, and from the rationalistic demand that one shall affirm only what has been intellectually demonstrated. It is the task of theology thus to vindicate the autonomy and the positive creative dynamic of Christian faith.

Eucken's lectures, delivered at New York University last winter, reiterate the ever-recurring central message of this baffling, but stimulating, prophet-philosopher. He calls attention to the disintegration of our modern life because the older religious and moral ideals have come to seem unreal, while the newer ideals are too utilitarian and too devoid of a profound spiritual meaning to give satisfaction. In spite of the difficulties which are inevitable in the older faith in a transcendent God, that faith had a vigor and a carrying power which the morality of mere work or of social endeavor lacks. The primary task of ethics today is to vindicate the dignity of the spiritual life of man in the face of an apparently indifferent natural order. The incontrovertible fact that the cosmic order, when interpreted without the aid of religion, appears to be indifferent to man's ideals makes it certain that a merely "natural" morality will be contending against too great odds to be able to prevail. We must first of all establish the fact of an "independent spiritual life," which can be attained only by a radical negation of natu-

ralism, and a psychological crisis which brings a sort of regeneration of the soul. It may then be discovered that the heroic affirmation of a spiritual life for which mere naturalism made no place leads to the certainty that an "absolute spiritual life" is working in and through the aspiring soul. The dignity of man is thus established and new courage is furnished for the moral tasks of life. Religion is thus the indispensable ally of genuine morality. The reader of Eucken's argument will, as usual, be left with very general phrases in which to express the content of this spiritual philosophy; but it is sufficiently in harmony with the traditional Christian conception of a religiously grounded ethics to win wide approval from those who already appreciate the power of religion. Whether it can be made concrete enough to do service in the actual solution of our problems is another question. At any rate it is refreshing to have this idealistic prophetic voice furnish a balance over against the present somewhat prosaic methods of investigating spiritual problems.

Mr. Dickinson's book bears an attractive title, and attempts a somewhat ambitious, but alluring, task. To furnish a program for the "Christian reconstruction of modern life" requires one to know both what Christianity is and what modern life is. As to the latter, Mr. Dickinson disposes of the matter with a theory which is made to bear the weight of a vast amount of Emersonian rhetoric throughout the book. He contends that our present culture is not a homogeneous civilization, but that it represents the results of centuries of warfare between two hostile principles—the Aryan spirit of world-conquest and the Semitic spirit of world-transcendence. Our present age with its sciences and its inventions is peculiarly enamored of the Aryan ideal of world-conquest; but the Semitic and Christian ideal of the transcendent value of the soul will not allow men to rest in ease and comfort, surrounded by mere earthly blessings. The central message of the book is in the author's attempt to give to Jesus an interpretation which will fit him to be the object of a world-transcending faith for men of today. He recognizes that the older categories of supernaturalism are discredited by our modern world-view. Jesus cannot be interpreted in terms of the Nicene Christology. We find his true nature in his devotion to his task, in which he lived subject to all the limitations of any concrete individual of his age. Nevertheless, in his fidelity to his task he constantly realized the power of God to lift up men and to give them the victory over the world. In his faith we may find the means of initiation into a similar faith of our own, in which God will become a

triumphant force. God thus realized is not the mere immanent cosmic energy, as the Hellenic-Aryan spirit would make him. He is rather "the spiritual God in whom spiritual manhood lives and moves and attains its being." "God is the God of the task. This ascription is ultimate in its unlimited elasticity. God is apprehended as incipiently as we apprehend our spiritual being, which is our spiritual conquest" (p. 283). "To ask what God is as outside of the task, before it or beyond it, is a question without meaning, for we find nothing outside the task. Our knowledge of God advances as our accomplishment of the task advances" (p. 284). The somewhat oracular style of the discussion prevents the reader from getting into very close quarters with the ideas, and makes the task of criticism difficult. But it is interesting to find that the Ritschlian basis of faith, which has usually stopped with a Kantian dualism, is here shown to be capable of expansion into a Fichtean ethical mysticism. That there is more religious dynamic in the ethico-religious appreciation of the human Jesus than has usually been assumed is evident from the discussions of Herrmann and of Dickinson. The three books here noticed indicate that the religious spirit which has animated Christianity is far from being decadent. They even suggest that we may be on the eve of a new revelation of its inexhaustible vigor.

GERALD BIRNEY SMITH

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HÖFFDING'S HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY¹

Starting nearly three decades ago with the translation of Dr. Höffding's psychology which had a wide circulation, and adding as we come along the translations of his *Ethics*, his *Philosophy of Religion*, his *History of Modern Philosophy*, and his *Philosophic Problems*, one is probably safe in saying that the author has had a larger circle of readers than any other living continental writer on philosophy, and the present volume is sure to extend the circle. It possesses, in characteristic degree, the orderliness of exposition, the clearness of style, and the way of driving directly at the center of problems with which Professor Höffding's readers are familiar.

In the introduction we get the author's conception of the subject-matter of the history of philosophy: "It consists in the efforts which individual thinkers have made to explain or perchance to solve the ulti-

¹ *Brief History of Modern Philosophy*. By Harold Höffding. Translation by Charles F. Sanders. New York: Macmillan, 1912. x+324 pages. \$1.50 net.

mate problems of knowledge and being." Modern philosophy has been especially concerned with four great problems: the psychological problem; the problem of knowledge; the problem of evaluation—ethical and religious; and the problem of cosmology or metaphysics.

Some readers may possibly take this introduction as a promise that these problems will be kept pretty consistently to the fore, constituting a frame on which the material of the volume is to be organized. In this they will be disappointed, and perhaps any attempt at such a presentation would have difficulty in avoiding what our neo-realist friends call "the fallacy of pseudo-simplicity." On the other hand, it is equally difficult to cover as much ground and to present individually so many writers in a volume of this compass and avoid being "fragmentary."

Criticism of comparative emphasis in a history of philosophy is likely to be futile. However, by this time and especially from Dr. Höffding who was a speaker at the St. Louis Congress, one might expect less provincialism than Continental writers on philosophy have hitherto exhibited. It is surprising, not to say disappointing, therefore, to find that, except for the appearance of the name of Pierce as the author of the term "pragmatism," James is the only American writer who is noticed. Such names as Royce, Dewey, and Watson are not even mentioned. And a pretense to even the most fleeting paragraph on pragmatism with no reference to the contributions of Dewey in America and Schiller in England only shows how apparently incurable is the myopia which afflicts most Continental writers on philosophy. I say "writers on philosophy," for in the fields of science and politics such continued indifference to the disease would soon prove fatal; while in the more speculative field where the necessity for checking up results is not so immediate the malady may linger indefinitely.

The work of the translator is well done, and despite an *n* for an *m* in the page-heading (p. 297) the publishers have made an attractive volume.

A. W. MOORE

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

SOCIAL RELIGION AS A HISTORICAL PROBLEM

Mr. Nearing's book, *Social Religion*,¹ will perhaps be one of the "sources" used by future critical scholarship in support of the thesis that the first half of the twentieth century was one of those great,

¹ *Social Religion: An Interpretation of Christianity in Terms of Modern Life.* By Scott Nearing, Ph.D. New York: Macmillan, 1913. xx+227 pages. \$1.00 net.

creative epochs in which vast multitudes graduate from one set of ideas to another cycle of conceptions without really knowing how they do it. Aside from its practical religious and educational value—which is not inconsiderable—the book would have no other interest for scientific theologians.

Mr. Nearing says that he has “studied the New Testament with great care”; and he comes before us to give “the result of that study” (p. xiii). His conclusion is, virtually, that the gospel is a program for the reform of specific abuses in today’s life. There is nothing mysterious, recondite, or indirect in the way in which his mind operates: here are certain social problems all around us; and the New Testament is a chart for the solution of the problems. It is apparently in this sense that he holds the New Testament to be “one of the most valuable books within the reach of the social scientist.” Valuable, not because it puts materials before the scientist which it is his duty to envisage in relation to a historical process, but because it gives us absolute criteria for sitting in judgment on the process.

If we accept the author’s own definition of the terms in which he describes his research, there can be no question that Mr. Nearing has studied the New Testament with great care. The only way to treat the large and growing literature of this kind is to treat it seriously. It is pervaded by real earnestness and ethical passion. The book before us is written with a desire to be helpful. Nevertheless, all works of which this is a type must be judged by the canons of criticism which have been slowly reached by modern scholarship. The book is really a treatise on contemporary social problems. The author has studied the New Testament in its English dress, not in view of the fact that it is a translation of a series of ancient Greek documents which must be examined with reference to the age when they were written, and with reference to the more ancient Hebrew documents to which they so frequently allude. In other words, he does not reckon with the process of higher criticism now going on in the realms of Old and New Testament research.

Having entered this *caveat*, we make haste to say that the volume is decidedly worth while. The tendency which it represents has now become so powerful in Protestantism, and is breaking forth in so many unexpected places, that the future may well belong to it. The chapters entitled “The Haggard Man,” “The Motherless Girl,” “The Factory Child,” “Devouring Widows’ Houses,” “The Curse of Enforced Idleness,” etc., are luminous presentations of facts which we all ought to know.

LOUIS WALLIS

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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION

Some years ago the works on Psychology of Religion were written on the basis of introspective accounts by modern Christians of their own religious experience. Such data having manifest limitations, further attempts were made to deal with the subject genetically, the significance of religion being found in its beginnings. So we have a number of works from the standpoint of anthropology using the data of the most recent investigations among the less civilized peoples. Stratton¹ has attempted a different approach from either of these in his recent volume in the Muirhead Library of Philosophy. He discusses some of the more significant features of religion as they have appeared anywhere among men without much concern about the historical process. It is enough that they are manifestations of the religious spirit and so help toward an understanding of what religion really is. He makes use of the more primitive religions as they are presented in the older works of Tylor and Frazer, lays particularly under contribution the canonical writings of the great religions of the world, ancient and modern, and includes the historical manifestations of those religions in individual thought and conduct.

As soon as one studies religion in this broad way the most divergent results are, of course, attained. A significant principle is found, which seems of the essence of the religious attitude, but straightway in some other religion its opposite appears. Some feeling seems to be central in religion but elsewhere is the very contrary feeling. Certain modes of action seem very important, but another religion has none of them. A specific thought element seems to belong to the religious consciousness, as, for instance, the idea of God, but some great people reject it altogether. Stratton considers this contradiction the most characteristic fact in religion, and the very means by which we may best understand those attitudes of men which have come to have that collective name. He devotes three out of the four parts of his book to an elaborate presentation of these conflicts, dividing them conveniently into those of Feeling, Conduct, and Thought. This discussion is in the main descriptive and is carried out with excellent discrimination.

The main interest for the student of the psychology of religion is in the constructive work of the brief fourth part of this book. What is the essence of the religion that has appeared in such contradictory

¹ *Psychology of the Religious Life*. By George Malcolm Stratton. New York: Macmillan, 1911. ix+376 pages. \$2.75 net.

manifestations? Stratton finds it in the Idealizing Act. Man as an idealizing being has cravings and appreciations which "include sensuous pleasure and the love of action, together with the curiosity for causes, the need of logical sufficiency, the delight in beauty, the sense of the importance of the family, of larger human unions and the lordship and magistracy which accompany these, and finally of the golden gifts of friendship." Out of these, or some of them, grows his sense of the Best. And religion may be defined as "man's whole bearing toward what seems to him the Best or Greatest—where 'best' is used in a sense neither in nor out of morality, and 'greatest' is confined to no particular region." If this might seem too large for primitive religion, Stratton would say that in primitive man we have not religion proper, but rather attitudes (e.g., animism) from which religion develops. Indeed religion only appears when man has come to some appreciation of "a complemental world of conscious beings." And if here we have the contradiction of non-theistic Buddhism and of philosophical rejection of the idea of divine personality, Stratton would still find in these an "objectless reverence" with all of human character at the back of the rejection.

This foundation of religion in the idealizing act enables Stratton to take issue with the theory that religion is essentially a phase of social consciousness. It derives so largely from the primitive impulses of curiosity, desire to see the cause of change, and interest in change itself, that to identify it definitely with social feeling is only confusing.

Stratton is especially interesting when he drops the rôle of psychologist to take that of advocate and sketches a standard religion. It is practically the resolution of all the antagonisms by conserving the best in each, for "religious motives like muscles work best in opposition." When he carries this to the extent that Triune monotheism preserves the better elements in polytheism one wonders whether he has become a special pleader.

In the final discussion on the search for reality Stratton ably maintains that truth is not to be derived alone from philosophy and science but that religion itself may have a part in the discovery, the fundamental affirmations of the religious consciousness being as valid as those of scientific thought. And he adds, what should always close an essay in the psychology of religion, that we may believe "that something corresponding to our idea of the Best has an interest in the gradual awakening of its own image and desire in men."

It may be said that some religious psychology seems to be discussing antiquated aspects of human consciousness that may once have had an

existence, while this book at least seems to be concerned with experiences which a religious man recognizes as akin to his own.

THEODORE GERALD SOARES

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

BRIEF MENTION

OLD TESTAMENT

GUNKEL, H. *Reden und Aufsätze*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1913. viii+192 pages. M. 4. 80.

This is a collection of addresses and articles that have already been seen in various journals, where they were widely scattered and inaccessible to the public as a whole. They were well worth republication in this form. The eleven topics treated are: (1) Bernhard Stade, (2) The Aim and Method of Old Testament Interpretation, (3) The Fundamental Problem of Israelitish Literary History, (4) Samson, (5) Ruth, (6) The Psalms, (7) The Final Hope of the Psalmists, (8) Egyptian Parallels to the Old Testament, (9) Egyptian Songs of Thanksgiving, (10) Jensen's Gilgamesh-Epic, (11) The Odes of Solomon. The range of interest is thus very wide; but there is no unity binding the essays together. The discussions are semi-popular in style and are calculated to make clear to the public at large the attitude of Gunkel toward the interpretation of the Old Testament. The paper on Stade, his teacher, is a discriminating eulogy doing credit alike to teacher and scholar. The second essay states the methodology of the *religionsgeschichtliche* school of which Gunkel is a leader, and the remaining discussions supply illustrations of the methods as they work out.

Die Mischna: Text, Uebersetzung und ausführliche Erklärung. Giessen, Töpelmann, 1913.

WINDFUHR, WALTER. *IV Seder. Nezikin*: 1 Traktat. Baba qamma ("Erste Pforte" des Civilrechts). viii+96 pages. M. 4. 80.

MEINHOLD, JOHANNES. *II Seder. Mo'ed*: 5 Traktat. Joma (Der Versöhnungstag). iv+83 pages. M. 4. 30.

ALBRECHT, KARL. *I Seder. Zeraim*: 9 Traktat. Challa (Teighebe). iv+48 pages. M. 2. 40.

HOLTZMANN, OSCAR. *V Seder. Qodaschim*: 10 Traktat. Middot (von den Massen des Tempels). viii+112 pages. M. 6.

In Christian circles the chief interest of the Mishna lies in its theological features. Now and then there are tracts which are valuable for cultural purposes, and others which appeal to jurists. The first tract in the series published this year is chiefly of juridical value. The author has followed the methods described in this Journal (January, 1913, pp. 119 ff.), and has employed, as the basis of his work, Goldschmidt's edition of the Babylonian Talmud (1906), the Hamburg MS, No. 165, Lowe's Cambridge text (1883) of the Mishna upon which the Palestinian Talmud rests, and Strack's photolithographic reproduction (1912) of the Munich MS of the Talmud, No. 95. The name of the tract, "Nezikin" ("damages") covers three "gates," this

being only the first of the three. As a whole the main divisions of the tract presuppose the provisions of the Torah and the enforcement of those provisions. The notes reveal careful investigation, on the part of the author, of the minute specifications of rabbinic law and the history of their application down through Jewish literature.

The Mishnic "day of atonement" is specified in detail in Meinhold's contribution to the series. The sources of this theme in the Old Testament in P are recited and briefly discussed, as a comparison or contrast or basis of the material supplied in the tract on the "day." His conclusion is that the day of atonement was born out of the earnest penitence of the post-exilic church. Cult-cleanliness, which the prophet Ezekiel had so highly prized, was to that body just as important as moral cleanliness. Out of the desire to enforce such regulations, each new year was opened with a fundamental cleansing of the temple and the church. As a means to this end there were enforced a fast and cessation from work, and thereafter the complete ceremony of the Levitical law. Now the tract *Joma* ("Day") specifies in wearisome detail the whole process of observance of the day of atonement down to the time of the destruction of the temple and the city. The tract dates certainly from not later than 200 A.D. and most likely quite soon after the destruction of the temple in 70 A.D.

The basis of the text printed in this tract is the Naples edition of the Mishna (1492), and that of Venice (1606); also the MSS: Codices Berlin Orient. 567 4^{to}, Berlin Orient. 567 fol., Hamburg 18 fol., Munich No. 95 (Strack's edition of 1912), Cambridge (Lowe's edition, 1883), and the Kaufmann codex. Such variations as are noteworthy are found in the *Textkritischen Anhang* to the tract. The printed text is not simply one but rather a combination of several of the sources above mentioned. The fuller information given in the combined form fully justifies the author's method.

Albrecht's *Challa* is based on the Kaufmann text, Lowe's Cambridge text, Hamburg MS No. 18, Goldschmidt's edition of the Bamberg text (Venice, 1520-23), Codex Hebr. Bibl. *Monacensis* No. 95, the Naples edition of 1492, and the parallel texts in the Tosephta. The notes are full and complete, going so far as to quote similar words and customs current in Arabic and in Greek life. For a study of the rights and duties of the temple officials in the period of the composition of this tract—somewhere about 170-190 A.D.—this little document is indispensable.

The *Middot* is an exception to the usual character of these tracts. It has to do with the measurements of the temple at Jerusalem. It is rather haggadic than halachic in its main features. Its author was probably a scribe, who drew his picture of the temple mainly from the Bible. He maintained as did the scribes in general that the biblical representation of the tabernacle, of Solomon's temple, and the temple of Ezekiel, practically united to form one homogeneous plan. Even Herod's temple was in the main a realization of the biblical requirements.

The author devotes about thirty pages of the introduction to an examination of the passages of Josephus which mention the temple of his day. He points out the agreements and disagreements between Ezekiel, the Mishna, and Josephus, and discovers in the end that the figures of the last remain an unsolved riddle.

As the basis of the text printed here the author used the Berlin MS Or. qu. 570 as printed by J. Fromer (Breslau, 1898), Lowe's Cambridge text (1883), the Kaufmann codex in Budapest, Strack's edition (1912) of the Munich MS, and the *editio princeps* of the Mishna (Naples, 1492).

The notes are particularly rich in terms that explain the architectural and ritual character of the temple, drawn from every available source. The text-critical supple-

ment cites the most important variations found in the texts used as the bases of that printed in the tract. Every future discussion of the measurements of the temple must take account of Holtzmann's contribution in this tract.

NAUMANN, WEIGAND. *Untersuchungen über den apokryphen Jeremiasbrief.* (Beiheft zur Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft, XXV.) Giessen: Töpelmann, 1913. 53 pages. M. 2. 20.

The pseudepigraphical letter of Jeremiah, although brief, is brimful of difficulties for the interpreter. Naumann's investigation covers its relation to Babylonian images of the gods, to priests, to cult, and to the weakness of these divinities. He takes splendid advantage of recent researches in the Babylonian field, and concludes that the letter does not contain a polemic either against Greek or Egyptian or polytheistic reverence for the gods in general but is aimed wholly against Babylonian idol worship; that the author of it knew exactly the Babylonian cult of the gods, the religious conceptions of the Babylonians, and Babylonian culture in general. There are evidences that the letter was translated, but such evidence is not strong enough to prove that the letter was originally written in Hebrew or a Semitic tongue. This treatment would be much more satisfactory to the reader if it contained the Greek text of the old letter which it discusses.

JOHNS, C. H. W. *Ancient Babylonia.* (Cambridge Manuals of Science and Literature, No. 51.) Cambridge: The University Press; New York: Putnam, 1913. vii+148 pages. 40 cents net.

Ancient Babylonia was a small country, an island, as it were, between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. Its great cities were located there and from these centers it extended its sway far and wide. Its early population was either a mixture or a conglomerate of Sumerian and Semite. Johns's volume is packed with information, bristles with bits of early history, and is understandable to one who is well acquainted with the periods covered. But the book is too bony, too much mere outlines, for the man who does not know ancient history. To present Nûr-adad, Sin-idinnam, and Kudur-Mabug and their reigns, on one page (p. 67) of a work designed for a layman in the subject is enough to discourage any reader and to drive him to works that are really written for a layman. It is a serious mistake to publish a work so condensed as this, when it could be expanded so as to present a most fascinating and attractive history of those ancient times.

SCHLATTER, A. *Die hebräischen Namen bei Josephus.* (Beiträge zur Förderung christlicher Theologie. 17 Jahrgang, Heft 3 and 4.) Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1913. 132 pages. M. 3. 60.

The variations between the personal-names of Josephus and the Old Testament, give us an instructive insight into linguistic equivalents of Hebrew and Greek in the first century. Schlatter confines his study to personal-names as more faithful exponents, on the whole, of the methods of transliteration in vogue at that day than place-names could be. The editions upon which he bases his investigations are those of Niese and Destinon. The fact that the transmission of the text of Josephus has introduced some alterations increases the complexity of Schlatter's problem. In dealing with the variant forms of the texts he laid down two rules: (1) if two forms of

a name appear, one the Hebrew and the other the Septuagint, the Hebrew is attributed to Josephus and the Septuagint is cut out; (2) if the names are not inflected they have been adopted or worked over. The application of the rules is interrupted by the fact that Josephus himself, from the time of the Judges on, has made an increasing use of the Septuagint and its forms of the personal-names. An examination of the 123 pages of Hebrew personal-names with their Greek equivalents in Josephus and the Septuagint is a fascinating linguistic study which reveals some considerable irregularity in the methods of transliteration of that day.

MERCER, SAMUEL A. B. *Extra-Biblical Sources for Hebrew and Jewish History*. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1913. xiv+210 pages. \$1.50 net.

The importance of the Egyptian, Babylonian-Assyrian, and other "extra-Biblical" documents for any adequate understanding of Hebrew history is becoming universally recognized and almost every year brings forth another sourcebook. To the materials usually found in such works Professor Mercer has added extensive selections from Greek and Latin writers. These will make the study of the Jewish period less tedious. The notes and explanatory introductions to the different groups of sources are sufficiently full to make it clear to the reader wherein the given sources are supposed to augment or throw light upon the biblical records. This cannot be said of some sourcebooks. The work should prove a very useful handbook to the student of Hebrew and Jewish history.

NEW TESTAMENT AND PATRISTICS

JACQUIER, E. *La Crédibilité des Évangiles*. Paris: J. Gabalda, 1913. 91 pages. Fr. 1.

Here are printed two lectures, given in February and March of 1913, before the Catholic faculty of theology in Lyons, by the Abbé Jacquier, Professor of Holy Scripture in that institution. They are simple and clear statements of the faith of the church, by a scholar familiar with the questionings of the "adversaries of Christianity, Jews and pagans of old, rationalists of today." These rationalistic critics are the chief objects of the writer's apologetic, though the vagaries of Drews come in for brief comment. The Gospels (also Acts and Paul's letters, in their degree) reproduce without alteration the apostolic *catechesis*, which, being formed in the period immediately succeeding Jesus' resurrection, reports faithfully the details of his life and teaching. The gospel narratives, critically examined, bear all the marks of credibility. The text of the Gospels is now fixed in its integrity; "moreover, the Vulgate, declared authentic by the Council of Trent, furnishes us the text of the Gospels approved by the church. We can affirm, then, that we possess the Gospels in the form in which they left the hands of their authors."

These positions are clearly argued, and points are often well taken. The lectures were doubtless helpful to Catholic hearers who wished a reaffirmation of the church's position, even if they make no contribution to the needs of a wider public or to the better understanding of the Gospels.

BACON, B. W. *The Making of the New Testament*. (Home University Library No. 50.) New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1912. vi+256 pages. \$0.50.

Professor Bacon has produced a compact sketch of New Testament canonization and introduction. The latter subject is treated under three heads: the literature of

the apostle, of the catechist and prophet, and of the theologian. To the first of these are referred the letters of Paul and some of the catholic epistles. To the second belong the Synoptic Gospels and the Apocalypse. The third deals mainly with the Fourth Gospel. Professor Bacon's views on these matters are well known, and have already been given in more elaborate works. He presents them here freed as far as possible from technical detail and wrought into a systematic and readable sketch. Professor Bacon's historical studies are at once learned and brilliant. But it is not quite accurate to say that the *Oxyrhynchus Logia papyrus* "discovered in 1897" was "superscribed 'These are the . . . words which Jesus the living Lord spoke'"; it is the fragment found in 1903 that is thus entitled. Something like a chart of the development of New Testament literature might have been a helpful addition to the work.

KENYON, SIR FREDERIC G. *Handbook to the Textual Criticism of the New Testament*. 2d ed. With sixteen facsimiles. London: Macmillan, 1912. xiii+381 pages. 5s. net.

Kenyon's *Handbook*, published in 1901, has proved an ideal book to put into the hands of students of the New Testament text. It is gratifying to see it appear in this second edition, offered at a reduced price, and embodying much of the progress made in the study in the course of the past ten years. One could have wished that the recent contention as to the late (seventh century) date of the Bohairic version had been dealt with, and the new facsimile edition of Codex Boernerianus (1909) might well have been mentioned (p. 104). Slight inaccuracies in the first edition have in some instances been left uncorrected; the title under which the *Logia* were published was *Λογια Ιησου*, not *Logia Christi* (p. 21); the facsimile of Augiensis in the *Palaeographical Society* volumes is i, 127, not i, 80 (p. 103); the second manuscript of the Arabic Diatessaron is generally understood to be in the library of the Propaganda, not of the Vatican (p. 149); if Sir Frederic means to correct this impression, it should be done more explicitly. It is cause for regret that von Soden's new edition of the New Testament text and the recent editions of the Freer Gospels had not appeared when this edition was prepared; the author's views upon these important matters would have given added interest to this excellent book.

BLUNT, A. W. F. *Faith and the New Testament*. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1912. viii+116 pages. 2s. net.

This book is composed of lectures which were delivered before a branch of the Church Reading Society. They are addressed to such readers as wish to pursue introductory study to the New Testament unhampered by technical and scholastic discussion. For such a purpose the work is admirably adapted. The problem to which it addresses itself is the discovery of a historical basis for Christian belief. To this end the processes by which the books of the New Testament came into being and later became canonized are traced. The conclusion reached is that there is a sufficient historic quantum for reasonable faith. The greater part of the work is done with a frankness and a free play of the historical spirit that is highly creditable. As a popular statement of the facts with which it deals it is deserving of commendation. The chapter on "Church and New Testament," in which the author shifts his ground from that of a scientific historian to that of a churchman, is one which will evoke criticism and dissent from some readers. But the facts that the author is an Anglican vicar and that the chapter was addressed primarily to a society in that communion

explain and perhaps justify the attitude assumed. It is an interesting and should be a very useful book.

BEEET, J. AGAR. *The New Testament*. 2d ed. London: Chas. H. Kelly, 1912. vii+160 pages. 1s. 6d. net.

The volume under consideration is a revised and enlarged edition of a work which appeared first in 1909. It is a popular Introduction to the New Testament and sets forth many facts in that field of study in a simple, clear, and straightforward manner. In this respect it can render a service of which the more technical works on Introduction are incapable. There are, however, some features which leave much to be desired. The title "The New Testament" is misleading and only the subtitle on the fly-leaf conveys any idea of the contents. But a much more serious objection is the failure to consider in any adequate way the problems of New Testament Introduction. Many of these are the points on which readers of such a volume should have and desire the facts. Such are the Synoptic Problem, the Fourth Gospel, the Pastoral Epistles. Difficulties are sometimes ignored and at other times the question is begged. It is assumed that the ideas of the Fourth Gospel furnish the clue to Paulinism, but the possibility of the influence being in the contrary direction receives scant or no consideration from the author. A chapter on "Modern Opinions" is added in which respects are paid to Drs. Moffatt, Swete, and Westcott. The discussion is inadequate and some may think that it should be more thoroughly done or not undertaken. There is room for improvement in sentence structure, notably on pp. 61 and 63 where some collocations of words exist without verbs. The work will be of use in the presentation of certain facts, but a greater freedom from presuppositions and a more patient consideration of some matters would have aided in the production of a better book.

LAKE, KIRSOPP. *The Apostolic Fathers*. With an English Translation. Vol. II. The Shepherd of Hermas, Martyrdom of Polycarp, Epistle to Diognetus. (Loeb Library.) New York: Macmillan, 1913. 396 pages. \$1. 50.

This volume completes Professor Lake's very convenient and attractive edition of the Apostolic Fathers, the first volume of which appeared in 1912 (cf. this Journal, XVII, 477). In his text of Hermas, Professor Lake takes full account of the more recently discovered papyrus authorities, while his own edition of the Athos manuscript of Hermas insures the first-hand character of his work on that extensive document. Indeed, throughout the work the touch is that of an accomplished scholar. There are indeed some slight editorial inconsistencies, such as it is almost impossible to avoid. The biblical books are referred to by abbreviations, sometimes English, sometimes Latin (Mk., Mc., Luk., Lc., Jam., Jac., Jo., Joh.). *Θαψις* (p. 64) is usually *Θαψις*. The *δια τῆ* of Vol. I gives way to the less modern *διὰ τῆ*. *Ἰσοῦ* (p. 22) once replaces the more usual *Ἰσοῦ*. Oxyrhynchus is usually misspelled. It was for Crusius (not Crucius) that the earliest known copy of the Strassburg manuscript of Diognetus was made, nor is it quite true that Gebhardt's edition of 1878 contains "the fullest account of these manuscripts" (p. 349); the Crusius copy is not mentioned by Gebhardt in that work, and seems to have come to light only after his edition appeared, when Neumann reported it to Harnack, sending him a collation of it November 23, 1879. But in general Professor Lake's introductions are accurate, concise, and helpful. He has done an important and timely service in the preparation of these volumes. There are good indices.

GOODSPEED, EDGAR J. *Index Apologeticus sive Clavis Justini Martyris Operum Aliorumque Apologetarum Pristinorum*. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1912. viii+300 pages. M. 7.

Professor Edgar J. Goodspeed of the University of Chicago, who has been steadily increasing the obligations under which scholarship lies to him, has added to them by the publication of an Index to the writings of the Apologists. Six years ago Professor Goodspeed published his *Index Patristicus*, and the present volume addresses itself to a similar task for another portion of pre-Catholic literature. The documents included are the fragment of Quadratus found in Eusebius, the Greek fragments of Aristides, the *Apology* of Justin with its appendix, better known as the *Second Apology*, Justin's *Dialogue with Trypho*, Tatian's *Address to the Greeks*, the fragments of Melito which Eusebius has preserved, and the *Supplicatio pro Christianis* of Athenagoras. The year 180 A.D. is the date which determines the documents to be considered and the writing of Theophilus *Ad Autolyicum* is excluded as coming after that time. Dr. Goodspeed was aided in the preparation of the Index by four of his students of whose assistance acknowledgment is made. The best available texts have been used and a valuable feature of the work is the addition of the variant readings of the chief manuscripts. The chapter and paragraph divisions of certain editors have been followed for the various documents where such divisions had been made; but for Tatian and Athenagoras, where no such assistance was available, divisions of one hundred words each have been made for convenience of reference.

The work has been done with that accuracy, care, and thoroughness which Professor Goodspeed has led us to expect from him. It is important for a clearer understanding of pre-Catholic days that such tasks should be undertaken. To the philologist and lexicographer the work is of great value. The convenience of such an index in tracing the history of terms is appreciated most by those who have essayed the task without such assistance. Of no less value is the aid it offers in the discovery, and the verification of such discovery, of the chief ideas with which the Apologists dealt. The writer ventures to suggest that an interesting comparison of these ideas might be made with those of the New Testament and patristic literature on the one hand and those of early Catholic literature on the other. Unfortunately no index of the latter is yet available.

It is gratifying to have the author's promise of a critical text of the Apologists in the near future. This is a work the need of which has been felt for a considerable time. In the hands of Dr. Goodspeed it will receive the attention it merits and students of early Christian literature will find surer ground on which to stand while pursuing still further the investigation of the problems of that fascinating yet tantalizingly elusive period.

CHURCH HISTORY

TAYLOR, H. O. *Ancient Ideals: A Study of Intellectual and Spiritual Growth from Early Times to the Establishment of Christianity*. Vol. I, xi+461; Vol. II, v+430 pages. New York: Macmillan, 1913. \$5.00 net.

This second edition is, with a few verbal changes, only a reprint of the first edition published in 1896. The volumes aim to make a historical survey of the mental and spiritual growth of mankind from earliest times down to the second century A.D. The culture of the more ancient civilizations is treated rather briefly. More attention is given to the Greek and Roman periods, while Judaism and Christianity are

also considered at some length. The main thesis of the work is that all positive and valid elements of previous life and thought are comprised in Christianity, which is thus a synthesis of all ideals, the "absolute self-fulfilment along the lines of high desire." Apart from this apologetic interest these volumes make interesting and profitable reading for one who has a general interest in the subject. They present in popular form much valuable information.

KOETSCHAU, PAUL. *Origenes Werke*. Fünfter Band. *De Principiis* (IIEPI APXON) ("Die Griechischen Christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte"). Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1913. clviii+423 pages. M. 20.

Like Bidez's edition of *Philostorgius*, dealt with in the October issue of this Journal, this edition of Origen's most important dogmatic work, IIEPI APXON, or *De Principiis* in the Latin, is brought out under the auspices of the Prussian Royal Academy and constitutes the twenty-second volume in their series of the Greek Christian authors. As in the case of *Philostorgius*, the original of Origen's work has been lost. For its reconstruction, however, the materials are better. In various Greek writers, considerable portions have been preserved; this is particularly true of the last two books (III, IV) of which approximately the half of each has been preserved. Furthermore, there exist small fragments of an accurate translation of the Latin by Jerome, and several entire copies of a free and inaccurate Latin translation by Rufinus. It is a revised edition of this translation of Rufinus that constitutes the major portion of the present text; into the body of this are inserted the fragments of the Greek original where such exist. The fragments of Jerome's translation are given in the footnotes.

The present edition of the IIEPI APXON makes notable advances over that of the Benedictine, Delarue, which appeared at Paris in 1773. Delarue was the first to publish the Greek fragments and those of Jerome. He did not have the assistance, however, of one important group of manuscripts. It is chiefly by virtue of his use of these that Dr. Koetschau has been enabled to give a considerably fuller and better text of Rufinus' translation. By his own computation he has been enabled to supply 405 small and 33 large gaps in Delarue's text of Rufinus. The introduction is largely taken up with descriptions of the manuscripts and discussion of their history and relationship.

FOUQUERAY, HENRI. *Histoire de la Compagnie de Jésus en France des origines à la suppression (1528-1762)*. Tome II, *La Ligue et le bannissement (1575-1604)*. Paris: Picard, 1913. viii+738 pages. Fr. 12.

In the preface to this continuation of his detailed treatment of the Jesuits in France, M. Fouqueray says that he has nothing of serious importance to say against the Jesuits. He has found certain *individuals* "imprudent," "unskilful," "extreme," "carried away by excessive zeal from the paths of their vocation," "but in the actions to be imputed to the body of the Company, in the official decisions, . . . we have met neither imprudence, nor an undertaking that was out of place, neither *intrigues*, nor ambition, nor anything of that which calumny has *invented*." After reading this statement one does not look forward to an informing and impartial treatment, at least of the political activities of the Jesuits. That the Jesuit house at Paris was used for

the secret meetings of the League, that the "Committee of Catholic Safety" was inspired by Pigenat, the provincial of the society, that the aim of the League was to prevent the accession of the legitimate heir to the throne, that in general the Jesuits took an enthusiastic share in the League's work, it is needless to say do not in the view of our author implicate the Jesuits as a body in *intrigue*. It is clear to his mind, furthermore, that Guignard, rector of the Jesuit College at Paris, in 1594, when Jean Chastel attempted to assassinate Henry IV, was guilty of having written only certain "notes and dissertations" on political matters "which he had examined as moralist as had also every theologian of his time." From this statement one would hardly gather that these moralizing dissertations "cast the most violent abuse on Henry and demanded his death" as McCabe in his accurate *History of the Jesuits* says (p. 123). After such illustrations the quality of M. Fouqueray's work needs no further demonstration. While it contains considerable information with regard to the educational, charitable, and missionary work of the Jesuits in France, it is not the book to which one would turn to gain an accurate conception of what the Jesuits stood for in the life of France during this period. Far rather would one turn to the briefer account in the more general history of McCabe just cited.

STOECKIUS, HERMANN. *Die Reiseordnung der Gesellschaft Jesu im XVI. Jahrhundert* ("Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften." Stiftung Heinrich Lanz, Philosophische-historische Klasse, Jahrgang 1912. 2. Abhandlung). Eingegangen am 24. Februar 1912. Vorgelegt von H. Schubert. Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1912. 42 pages. M. 1. 50.

In this study the author attempts to sketch in as full a manner as possible the conditions under which various kinds of journeys were undertaken by the Jesuits. From the letters of instruction issued to the Jesuits about to travel, from other rules and regulations, the author draws a picture of the way in which the Jesuits were supposed to travel. He emphasizes the fact, however, that his picture is only an *ideal* picture, and that his materials have not enabled him to discover whether or not the reality corresponds to the ideal.

STOECKIUS, HERMANN. *Parma und die päpstliche Bestätigung der Gesellschaft Jesu 1540*. ("Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften." Stiftung Heinrich Lanz, Philosophische-historische Klasse, Jahrgang 1913. 6. Abhandlung). Eingegangen am 19. April 1913. Vorgelegt von H. Schubert. Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1913. 46 pages. M. 1. 60.

This study brings to light a few details in connection with the somewhat extended process by which Ignatius and his companions finally won papal recognition of their society. It adds a detail or two to what we already know about Guidiccioni's opposition to the confirmation of the society, but does not succeed in explaining satisfactorily the reasons for his action as a whole. Its chief contribution consists in the numerous details it gives with regard to the interest in the Jesuits displayed by the officials of Parma and their efforts at Rome to secure confirmation of the society.

Newman's Apologia pro vita sua—1864 and 1865. (Oxford edition.) London: Henry Frowde, 1913. xxx+528 pages. 2s. 6d.

The *Apologia* for many reasons is of perennial interest. This edition is preceded by Newman's and Kingsley's pamphlets and an introduction of 25 pages by Wilfrid Ward. It is followed by an appendix of 88 pages containing Newman's answer in detail to Kingsley's accusations. The correspondence shows the beginning, the development, and the climax of the course of events that led to the publication of the *Apologia*. This climax was reached when Kingsley published his pamphlet entitled, "What, then, does Dr. Newman mean?" It should also be mentioned that the differences between the text of 1864 and 1865 are given. It will be remembered that the controversy centered about Kingsley's quotation from Newman's *Sermons on the Theory of Religious Belief*. "It is not more than a hyperbole to say that, in certain cases, a lie is the nearest approach to truth."

The reader is fortunate in having under one cover about all the material for reaching his own conclusions in regard to this interesting and not perfectly easy debate.

Papers of the American Society of Church History. Second series, Vol. I. Edited by Samuel Macauley Jackson, Secretary. New York: Putnam, 1913. vi+158 pages. \$3.00.

This collection of papers contains a wide range of discussions, from a comparison of Basil and Jerome, and the letters of Einhard translated, and annotated, to such a modern subject as: "Tendency toward Centralization among American Congregationalists and Baptists." The student of church history cannot afford to overlook this volume.

SCHUBERT, ERNST. *Die evangelische Predigt im Revolutionsjahr 1848.* Giessen: Töpelmann, 1913. 180 pages. M. 4.80.

The year 1848 was a year of revolutions. The revolutionary spirit first broke out in France. It went like lightning all over Europe. Nowhere was it more intense or insistent than in Germany. There was a vigorous and determined antagonism between the people and their rulers. The slogan was German unity. The time was at hand for the beginning of constitutional government. There were numerous uprisings. Berlin was barricaded, and everywhere the outlook was threatening.

Now what was the contribution of contemporary German preachers to this movement? It is the purpose of Dr. Schubert to tell us, and to throw some light on the problem of the true relation of preaching to its own times. About eighty leading preachers expressed themselves on the course of events. Some were extremely rationalistic and optimistic, others were extremely orthodox and pessimistic, still others took a middle ground. Numerous passages from the sermons are quoted, and from these the reader can catch the living moving spirit of this critical and spirited time. The volume makes an important collection of sources that have hitherto, so far as the present reviewer knows, been neglected, and sources, too, without which it would be quite impossible fully to interpret this epoch-making year, in the European struggle for civil liberty.

Taking this as a basis, the author raises the question: Should the preacher discuss in the pulpit contemporary political and social issues? Yes, because if he does not his preaching is sure to be wide of the mark. The past had its own problems, but these

problems can at best only contribute elements to the problems of the present. It is the business or function of the preacher to interpret his age to itself. But he must never become a partisan. He must rather in the true spirit of the gospel arise far above all parties, and from his vantage ground see the strength and weakness in each one, and lead his people to an understanding of, and obedience to, the principles that underlie them collectively.

MODERN ISSUES

BORNHAUSEN, KARL. *Das Studium der Religion, Theologie und Kirchen Nordamerikas in Deutschland*. [Hefte der theologischen Amerika-Bibliothek. Heft 1.]. Giessen: Töpelmann, 1913. 44 pages.

This little monograph is the first instalment of a somewhat extended study of religious and theological conditions in this country made by the author during a visit to the United States in 1911. Impressed with the lack of materials in German universities for a study of American theology and American religious movements, he has established at the University of Marburg a *Theologische Amerika-Bibliothek*, in which he is endeavoring to collect as large a number of publications as possible bearing on the religious and theological conditions of this country. In the present *Heft*, he gives a brief summary of his observations of American theology, American ecclesiastical organization, and American religious ideals.

As to theology, he finds that there is not much for Germany to learn from us. We are still in the process of shaking off the bonds of denominationalism, and have not yet gained that sense of scientific freedom which alone can give to theological study permanent value. In so far as theology has emancipated itself, it has done so largely under the influence of German scholarship. In the realm of ethics, however, a sensitiveness to modern social problems has occasioned more fruitful work dominated by distinctively American influences. The daring empirical investigations stimulated by the late Professor William James in the realm of the psychology of religion are recognized as constituting an important contribution, although Bornhausen deplores the too hasty, superficial way in which the new psychology is often exploited by popular writers. It is pre-eminently in the field of comparative religion that American scholarship has made its largest contribution, especially in its study of primitive religions and in its collection of sources.

In the realm of church organization, the American genius has worked out results of great interest to Germans, because here there is not the dependence on German ideals which characterizes the study of theology. "It must be regretfully admitted that our knowledge of the ecclesiastical conditions in America is so meager that to some extent we conceive utterly grotesque pictures of what we suppose to be ecclesiastical anarchy" (p. 25). As a matter of fact, Bornhausen contends that American churches are working out the problem of a democratic organization which shall be efficient. In the movement toward church unity he sees the possibility of the development of a genuinely national *Volkskirche*. This practical movement is more influential than any mere theoretical theology in loosening the rigidity of denominational traditions. Incidentally Bornhausen deplores the extreme conservatism of American Lutheranism, which is preventing it from making any significant contribution to the development of typical American religion.

The religion of the American people presents many interesting characteristics.

The frank and positive religious activities in our colleges and universities, the vigorous life of Young Men's Christian Associations, the attachment of students to work in settlements, and the student volunteer movement are all evidences of the strong religious idealism in institutions of learning. In particular, Bornhausen commends the interest in missions as an indication that American Christianity is seriously preparing itself for those broader world-wide problems which provincial traditionalism is impotent to meet. A pragmatic interpretation of religion enables the American student to make an easy transition to the new problems without a violent crisis. In the realm of social and industrial problems, the individualism of American life throws greater responsibility on the individual than is the case in Germany. Hence the keen agitation of social problems, and the eagerness of churches and religious organizations to engage in social welfare work.

This characterization of our religious situation by a sympathetic observer will be widely read and pondered. The succeeding contributions from his pen on the subject will be awaited with interest. A translation of this essay has been published in the *Harvard Theological Review* (October, 1913) and is thus available for those who do not read German.

SIMMS, P. MARION. *What Must the Church Do to Be Saved?* New York: Revell, 1913. 324 pages. \$1.50.

The author of this book is a Presbyterian minister in an Iowa town, on whose heart the weaknesses and shortcomings of our divided American Protestantism are laid as a great burden. With the intensity of strong conviction he reviews in successive chapters the familiar facts which make up what he calls "the discreditable situation within the church": the weakness of its "unchristian divisions" in the face of the problems confronting it at home and abroad; "the appalling situation in the country church"; "the absurdity of creed subscription"; "the abuse of ecclesiastical authority"; "the continued decline of candidates for the ministry"; and "the inadequacy of ministers' salaries." He insists that "the unity of Protestantism offers the only solution" for these problems; feels that church federation is at best only a helpful, and can never be a sufficient, remedy; and considers "the only possible basis for the unity of Protestantism" to be "a basis of loyalty to Jesus Christ and of mutual toleration among Christians in all nonessentials, a basis that allows the largest possible room for diversity." The thoughtful student of the problems involved in church unity will find little in the book that is new to him, and the hopeful Christian may be inclined to feel that the author has set forth simply the church's liabilities without adequate emphasis on its assets; but the average church-member, particularly if he be complacent or blindly optimistic, will find the book a sharp and disturbing statement of the more familiar problems and difficulties of the modern American church, and an earnest appeal for their solution by an organically united Protestantism.

MACFARLAND, CHARLES S. (editor). *Christian Unity at Work.* The Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America in quadrennial session at Chicago. New York: Federal Council of the Church of Christ in America, 1912. 222 pages. \$1.00 net.

This volume of the reports and addresses presented to the last convention of the Federal Council of Churches, which met in Chicago in 1912, contains material both for satisfaction with the substantial progress toward Christian unity which has been made

in the last four years, and for inspiration for its future advance. Among the addresses, that of the incoming president of the Council, Professor Shailer Mathews, of Professor Rauschenbusch, and especially of Professor Edward A. Steiner on "The Church and the Future of Humanity," stand out notably in the reading as they did in the hearing. Most valuable and encouraging of all, however, are the reports on what has actually been accomplished thus far in promoting co-operation among the different Christian forces. The reports of the committees on home and foreign missions both show how rapidly the churches are learning to work together as they advance their lines at home and abroad, and how strong is the reflex influence of this missionary co-operation on the attitude of the churches themselves toward unity. Perhaps the most notable part of the entire volume is the report of the Commission on the Church and Social Service, not only in its substantial statement of actual progress, but in its brave direction of attention to the next steps in Christianizing the social order, and in its inspiring statement of our Christian purpose and duty to make "the kingdoms of this world—the kingdom of our Lord."

LE ROY, EDOUARD. *The New Philosophy of Henri Bergson*. Translated from the French by Vincent Benson. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1913. x+235 pages. \$1.25.

The author of this interpretation of Bergson's philosophy has a reputation for original philosophical work of his own, but is a great admirer of Bergson. The nucleus of this discussion appeared in the *Revue des deux mondes* in February, 1913. M. Le Roy has chosen to set forth the new philosophy under two main heads, "Method" and "Teaching," following the main discussion by eight chapters on special points. It is questionable whether one who had not already read Bergson himself would follow intelligently the rather discursive treatment. The author is so thoroughly familiar himself with Bergson's works that he fails to realize the need of giving an objectively systematic and elementary account of the content of the philosophy which he is discussing. His comments on the matter really presuppose too much to make them valuable to the novice. On the other hand, since he professedly attempts merely an exposition and not a critique, his work is of comparatively slight value to those who are philosophically initiated. Apart from its pedagogical defect, the book is an interesting presentation of the main phases of Bergson's thought.

PERIODICAL LITERATURE

"The Visitation of the Province of Canterbury in 1559" (C. G. Bayne in *English Historical Review*, XXVIII [October, 1913], 636).

This article is a record of the proceedings of the commissioners who carried out the royal visitation in the province of Canterbury in 1559, which was the first step toward giving practical effect to the "Alteration of Religion" enacted by the Parliament of that year. It treats of the personnel of the commission, recording their progress through the southwestern, southeastern, midland, western, and eastern circuits of the province. It gives a detailed account of their dealings with the various cathedral chapters and church wardens of the province and is interesting in showing in many instances the actual transformation of churches from Romanism to the

church of Elizabeth. A valuable appendix gives a list of the commissioners, accounts and inventories of church wardens, and the official records of many of the cases that came before the commission.

"Charles I and Rome" (A. O. Meyer in the *American Historical Review*, XIX [1913], 13-26).

The author aims to show that the predominance in Charles of Latin racial characteristics gives the clue to the friction between him and his people. His aestheticism, his *Italianate* leanings put him in sympathy with much of the atmosphere of the Roman church. He holds that, while Charles "never seriously contemplated becoming a convert or restoring the Church of Rome in any of his kingdoms," his great idea was "reunion with Rome, but on equal terms, not in the way of submission."

"Le Cardinal de Noailles et l'administration du diocèse de Paris (1695-1729)" (Marcel Fosseyeaux, in *Revue historique* [November-December, 1913]).

A study which gets its importance from the use of documents preserved in the archives of Public Assistance, composed of accounts, personal papers, annotations of the ecclesiastical courts, and the most various fragments, left by Cardinal Noailles, which have never before been made the object of any investigation.

The author has devoted special attention to the interesting epoch and career of Noailles, and published during the year 1913, in *Bibliographie Moderne*, an "Inventaire sommaire des papiers du Cardinal de Noailles conservés aux archives de l'assistance publique."

In this first instalment the author deals with matters of minor significance, in which only the historical antiquary or the specialist would be interested, such as, "The Functions and Titles of the Archbishop of Paris," "The Archbishopal Palace," and "The Discipline of the Clergy."

"Influence of the Clergy, and of Religious and Sectarian Forces, on the American Revolution" (C. H. Van Tyne in the *American Historical Review*, XIX, 1 [October, 1913], 44-64).

This article deals to some extent with the theories underlying the Revolution but chiefly with the part played by the preachers of the Calvinistic denominations in arousing opposition to absolute authority and in helping to make clear and cogent the philosophy of resistance and liberty. "The Bible was raked with a fine Calvinistic comb for every quotation seeming to give sanction for resistance to Great Britain." Histories of the period have neglected the preacher and cultivated the politician. This study shows how cogent and persuasive might be the eloquence of the preacher. The author is not content with the economic sources and causes of the revolutionary movement. He finds them inadequate. His discussion is buttressed with quotation and shored up with references at every point and angle, the result of able and thoughtful research. "Conflicting political ideas, and not tea or taxes, caused the American secession from the British empire, and the Puritan clergy had a large part in planting the predominant American political ideas which were antagonistic to those dominant in England." In addition to the part the clergy played in furnishing fire and ammunition for the conflict, they added to the heat of the controversy by fierce opposition to Catholicism, which in their minds was favored dangerously by the Quebec Act.

"Miracles and Christianity" (G. W. Wade in the *Hibbert Journal*, XII, No. 1 [October, 1913], 162-73).

The article referred to is in answer to the conservative theologians who contend that a non-miraculous Christianity is inconsistent with the belief in a personal spirit as the Maker and Absolute Controller of Nature, and that belief in miracles is the only safeguard against materialism. The author reviews the considerations which tend to show that the only miracles of Christ with historic foundations are the cure of mental diseases and such physical maladies as could be effected through the influence of mind, and then ventures the answer that in the triumph of the human mind over matter and of the human spirit over the animal passions, history affords evidence of an agency of a free, intelligent, and moral divine power and that the proof of God's "aliveness" comes also from the influence of great personalities in the sphere of morality and religion. Supreme and unique among these as a source of illumination and inspiration has been the personality of Jesus. In comparison with the momentous factor of his example and teachings, the miracles attributed to him must appear secondary in importance. "When the chief objections felt by science are now reinforced by doubts arising from criticism, it seems unwise to lay stress on miracles as the chief bulwark against materialism." Belief in the activity of the divine Spirit is most effectively defended by pointing to spiritual activities mediated through men, the best of whom have ever ascribed all the good in them to a source other than themselves.

"Wider den Pietismus" (Reinhard Liebe in *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, XXIII [1913], 279-353).

The distrust which a normal Lutheran feels toward religious movements with exaggerated emotional aspects is a well-known phenomenon. That a German theological periodical of high scientific standing should devote an entire number to an attack against pietism is evidence of great intensity of feeling on the subject. Dr. Liebe prefaces his critique by stating that the present reactionary forces in control of the state church are counting on the support of pietism. He therefore proceeds to expose the weaknesses of this type of religion. By declaring that many leaders of pietism have been only "half-pietists," he is able to define pietism in terms of the most objectionable features of revival theology and practice. Intellectual narrowness, a love for the fantastic in theology, a deliberate and effective use of "mob-psychology," a zeal for propaganda, and a tendency to pathological interpretations of religion mark thoroughgoing pietism. Dr. Liebe admits the great religious power of the movement; but he feels it to be so dangerous to the spiritual health of Germany that he proposes a cessation of the policy of tolerance on the part of liberal theology. Not the least interesting aspect of the article is the passionate feeling of the author, emerging in rhetorical passages of singular eloquence.

"The Peril of a Safe Theology" (Herbert Alden Youtz in the *Harvard Theological Review*, VI [1913], 451-60).

Professor Youtz raises the pertinent question as to the moral consequences of safety devices on the persons who trust to such mechanical means rather than to their own vigilance. He finds that a "faith" which is not a courageous venture is lacking in moral virility. The demand for a "standardized" theology is one which

should be resisted by all who care for a vigorous religion. A "safe" theology is ineffective in dealing with the problems of modern missionary activity, modern social efforts, and modern church life.

"What Is the Christian Religion?" (Douglas Clyde Macintosh in the *Harvard Theological Review*, VII, No. 1 [January, 1914], 16-46).

In reply to an article by Professor B. B. Warfield, in which modern liberalism was characterized as "Christless Christianity" and was thus declared to be essentially un-Christian, Professor Macintosh undertakes to defend the rights of a "new Christianity" which shall preserve the "essentials" of the old without its irrationalities. He asserts that "essential" Christianity must be historical, must be directed toward the true ideal, must be freed from irrationalities, and must possess inherent dynamic to persist when irrationalities are removed. Modern critical science pronounces irrational the realistic supernaturalism to which traditional orthodoxy adheres. If this is essential Christianity, its essence is bad. But the real core of Christianity is the experience of deliverance from sin through the superhuman spiritual power revealed in Christ. So long as this *experience* is a verified fact, the essentials of Christianity will remain, no matter what criticism may say concerning the historicity of Jesus or the tenability of orthodox doctrine. Faith in a Christlike God, and the living of a Christlike life through the power of this faith may be a possession of the New Christianity no less than of orthodoxy. For the modern age Christianity must be thus defined, or else we shall be compelled to acknowledge that essential Christianity is irrational and therefore unworthy to command our allegiance. But when formulated in its "new" aspects, it is still found to cherish the figure of Jesus as the real norm of religious faith. It is not "Christless."

"The Transmission of the Gospel" (D. S. Margoliouth in the *Expositor*, Eighth Series, No. 37 [January, 1914], pp. 61-72).

The writer's first conclusion is that the Greek copy of the First Gospel is fundamentally a translation of the same Gospel in Syriac preserved in the Lewesian text, and that there are to be detected three layers, viz., a Hebrew, a Syriac, and a Greek. The evidence for the original Hebrew is found where Matthew has preserved the Syriac. For example in Matt. 27:46 the supposed quotation in Greek of the actual words of the Savior are only quotations from a Syriac translation of an original Hebrew. Again, from the preservation of Syriac words in Mark where the Greek of Matthew does not have them the deduction is made that the author of Mark had access to the Syriac translation of the earliest Gospel. From a consideration of 7:11 (Greek) and its parallel in Matthew, both examined in the light of the Mishnah, the further conclusion is drawn that the order for Mark is (1) an original Hebrew Gospel; (2) Semisian Syriac; (3) Greek of Matthew; (4) Greek of Mark.

"Les Buchers et les Auto-da-Fé de l'Inquisition depuis le Moyen Age" (Ch. Moeller in the *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique* [October, 1913], 723-51).

In criticizing Lea's thesis (*History of the Inquisition of the Middle Ages*, 1888) that the inquisition was due to the corruption of the church, the writer takes occasion to show that fire as a punishment for heresy had been resorted to in several instances prior to the time of the Inquisition. He does not think (vs. Lea) that Frederick II in ordaining (1224) fire as the punishment for heresy was making parade of an affected zeal for orthodoxy in order to gain favor among his subjects. He shows that a prece-

dent for burning had been established by Diocletian in 287 and applied successively by Justinian II, Leo the Iconoclast, and Alexis. He notes, moreover, that even in Germany the *Sachsenspiegel* prescribed burning as the penalty for heresy. Nor should we fail to notice that Catharism with its extreme asceticism which jeopardized even the institution of the family (Lea) ran foul of public sentiment. "Perhaps it was to satisfy the thirst for popular vengeance that Frederick II ordained the burning alive of victims *in conspectu populi*."

In discussing the Auto-da-Fé the writer finds himself in almost complete accord with Lea, commending especially his conservative and discriminating estimate of the comparatively small number of inquisitorial victims. His discussion is valuable inasmuch as it gives us considerable information about the Inquisition which Lea's book does not contain.

"The Sources of Medieval Political Theory and Its Connection with Medieval Politics" (A. J. Carlyle in the *American Historical Review*, XIX [1913], 1-12).

Mr. Carlyle finds the sources in "the traditional and literary inheritance from the philosophical schools of the ancient world" as absorbed and passed on by the Church Fathers; in the influence of Christianity; in "the actual temper and concrete facts of mediaeval society." From the last two sources came new and permanently important elements of life as well as of theory. In the church was embodied "the new form of the conception of individuality or personality," "the principle that there are elements in human life which . . . must forever stand outside of the control of the political organization." Toward the victory of these ideas the church contributed by fighting for "the great principle of the freedom of the spiritual society." From the Middle Ages, largely through the agency of feudalism, came the "contractual theory of political authority," "the conception of political liberty as being in its essence nothing else than the self-government of the community," and a permanent form in the method of representative government.

"Archbishop Peckham and Pluralities" (W. T. Waugh in *English Historical Review* [October, 1913], 625).

This article deals with the administration, by Archbishop Peckham of Canterbury, of the Papal decree or *Multa*, 1215, and the constitution of Ottobon, 1268, against the holding of pluralities. Peckham, through the Council of Reading, 1279, published the Constitution "Audistis" for the enforcement in England of the foregoing legislation, by which he enacted that any pluralist was to be deprived of all but the last benefice he had received, and should he attempt to keep any of the others he should lose all and be ineligible for promotion, and, further, whoever in the future should obtain two or more benefices without special dispensation should suffer not only the loss of all, but excommunication as well.

A century and a half later William Lyndwood in his Constitution "Provinciale" characterized Peckham's constitution as illegal and has left the impression that he was influenced to undue mercy at the instance of his suffragans in this zeal for the liberties of the English church.

The object of this writer is to reveal Peckham as an obedient son of the Papacy, understanding perfectly the will of Pope Nicholas III, exercising his power in England with justifiable discretion, and fulfilling at least the spirit if not the exact letter of the "*Ius Commune*."

BOOKS RECEIVED

The more important books in this list will be reviewed at length

OLD TESTAMENT

- Buttenwieser, Moses. The Prophets of Israel, from the Eighth to the Fifth Century: Their Faith and Their Message. New York: Macmillan, 1914. xxii+350 pages. \$2.00 net.
- Gressmann, H. Die Schriften des Alten Testaments: 26-28 Lieferung. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht, 1913. 201 pages. M. 3.
- Hölscher, G. Die Profeten. Untersuchungen zur Religionsgeschichte Israels. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1914. viii+486 pages. M. 9.
- Jastrow, Morris. Hebrew and Babylonian Traditions. The Haskell Lectures delivered at Oberlin College in 1913, and since revised and enlarged. New York: Scribner, 1914. xv+376 pages. \$2.50 net.
- König, Eduard. Das Antisemitische Hauptdogma. Bonn: Marcus u. Weber, 1914. 64 pages. M. 1.50.
- Macalister, R. A. Stewart. The Philistines, Their History and Civilization (The British Academy). The Schweich Lectures, 1911. London: Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, 1913. vi+136 pages. 3s. net.
- Mezzacasa, Giacomo. Il Libro dei Proverbi di Salomone: Studio critico sulle Aggiunte Greco-Alessandrine. Rome: Max Bretschneider, 1913. xii+203 pages. L. 6.50.
- Murillo, L. El Genesis, precedido de una introduccion al Pentateuco. Rome: Bretschneider, 1913. xxiv+872 pages. L. 9.60.
- Smith, Henry Preserved. The Religion of Israel: An Historical Study. New York: Scribner, 1914. x+369 pages. \$2.50 net.

NEW TESTAMENT AND PATRISTICS

- Aner, Karl. Aus den Briefen des Paulus nach Korinth. (Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher.) 6 Reihe, 1 Heft. Tübingen: Mohr, 1913. 56 pages. M. 0.40.
- Fonck, Leopoldo. I miracoli del Signore nel Santo Vangelo, spiegati esegeticamente e praticamente. Volume

- primo. I miracoli nella natura, Traduzione di Luigi Rossi-Di-Lucca. Rome: Max Bretschneider, 1914. xxviii+644 pages. L. 4.50. (Christus, lux Mundi, Parte IV, Vol. I).
- Grapin, Émile. Eusèbe histoire ecclésiastique. Livres IX-X sur les Martyrs de Palestine (Textes et documents publiés sous la direction de Hemmer et LeJay). Paris: Picard, 1913. lxxxvi+541 pages. Fr. 6.
- Gronau, Karl. Poseidonios und die jüdisch-christliche Genesisexegese. Leipzig: Teubner, 1914. viii+313 pages. M. 12.
- Headlam, A. C. St. Paul and Christianity. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1913. xv+214 pages. \$1.25 net.
- Heitnüller, W. Jesus. Tübingen: Mohr, 1913. vii+184 pages. M. 2.
- Jackson, H. Latimer. The Eschatology of Jesus. New York: Macmillan, 1913. xi+374 pages. \$1.50.
- Kittel, Gerhard. Die Oden Salomos überarbeitet oder einheitlich? Mit 2 Beilagen: I. Bibliographie der Oden Salomos; II. Syrische Konkordanz der Oden Salomos. (Beiträge zur Wissenschaft vom Alten Testament, herausgegeben von Rudolf Kittel. Heft 16.) Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1914. 180 pages.
- Martin, Alfred W. The Life of Jesus in the Light of the Higher Criticism. New York and London: Appleton, 1913. vi+280 pages. \$1.50 net.
- Moffat, James. The New Testament: A New Translation. New York and London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1913. x+327 pages. \$1.50 net.
- Monnier, Henri. La mission historique de Jésus. Deuxième édition, revue et corrigée. Paris: Fischbacher, 1914. xi+383 pages. Fr. 5.
- Muntz, W. S. Rome, St. Paul, and the Early Church: The Influence of Roman Law on St. Paul's Teaching and Phraseology and on the Development of the Church. Milwaukee: The Young Churchman Co., 1913. xvi+227 pages.
- Porter, Samuel J. The Twelve-gemmed Crown: Christ in Hebrews. Boston:

- Sherman, French & Co., 1913. 155 pages. \$1.20.
- Rackl, Michael. Die Christologie des heiligen Ignatius von Antiochien. Nebst einer Voruntersuchung: Die Echtheit der sieben ignatianischen Briefe verteidigt gegen Daniel Völter. Freiburg: Herder, 1914. xxxii+416 pages. \$2.20.
- Ramsay, Sir W. M. The Teaching of Paul in Terms of the Present Day. The Deems Lectures in New York University. London and New York: Hodder and Stoughton, 1913. xi+450 pages. 12s.
- Schweitzer, Albert. Die psychiatrische Beurteilung Jesu. Darstellung und Kritik. Tübingen: Mohr, 1913. vii+46 pages. M. \$1.50.
- Sonderabdruck aus Wilhelm von Christs griechische Litteraturgeschichte. V. Aufl., II. Bd., II Hälfte, neu bearbeitet von Wilhelm Schmid und Otto Stählin. Die christliche griechische Litteratur. München: Oskar Beck, 1913. iv+907+1246 pages.
- Watkins, C. H. Der Kampf des Paulus um Galatien. Eine Untersuchung. Tübingen: Mohr, 1913. vi+121 pages. M. 3.
- eran Publication Society, 1913. 583 pages.
- Meyer, Arnold. Das Weihnachtsfest: seine Entstehung und Entwicklung. Tübingen: Mohr, 1913. ix+148 pages. M. 3.60.
- Morin, Germain. L'ideal monastique et la vie chrétienne des premiers jours. Deuxième édition. Paris: Beauchesne; Oxford: Parker & Son, 1914. 228 pages. Fr. 2.50; 2s. net.
- Petrich, Hermann. Paul Gerhardt. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des deutschen Geistes auf Grund neuer Forschungen und Funde. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1914. xiv+360 pages. M. 6.
- Schairer, I. Das religiöse Volksleben am Ausgang des Mittelalters nach Augsburger Quellen. (Beiträge zur Kulturgeschichte des Mittelalters und der Renaissance.) Herausgegeben von Walter Goetz. Heft 13. Leipzig: Teubner, 1914. viii+136 pages. M. 4.
- Simpson, W. J. Sparrow. Non-communicating Attendance. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1913. 266 pages. \$1.60.
- Storr, Vernon F. The Development of English Theology in the Nineteenth Century, 1800-1860. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1913. viii+486 pages. \$3.50.
- Vedder, Henry C. The Reformation in Germany. New York: Macmillan, 1914. xlix+466 pages. \$3.00 net.

CHURCH HISTORY

- Boehmer, H. Luther im Lichte der neueren Forschung. Dritte Auflage. Leipzig: Teubner, 1914. vi+170 pages.
- Boggis, R. J. E. Praying for the Dead, Being an Historical Review of the Practice. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1913. xiv+272 pages. \$1.25 net.
- Buchwald, Georg. Doctor Martin Luther. Ein Lebensbild für das deutsche Haus. Zweite vermehrte und verbesserte Auflage mit zahlreichen Abbildungen im Text und auf 16 Tafeln nach Kunstwerken der Zeit. Leipzig: Teubner, 1914. x+515 pages. M. 8.
- de Ghellinck, J. Le mouvement théologique du XII^e siècle. Études, recherches et documents. Paris: Lecoq, 1913. ix+409 pages. Fr. 7.50.
- Good, James I. History of the Swiss Reformed Church Since the Reformation. Philadelphia: Publication and Sunday School Board of the Reformed Church in the U.S., 1913. xii+504 pages.
- Luther's Correspondence and Other Contemporary Letters. Translated and edited by Preserved Smith. Vol. I, 1507-1521. Philadelphia: The Luth-
- erian Publication Society, 1913. 583 pages.
- Meyer, Arnold. Das Weihnachtsfest: seine Entstehung und Entwicklung. Tübingen: Mohr, 1913. ix+148 pages. M. 3.60.
- Morin, Germain. L'ideal monastique et la vie chrétienne des premiers jours. Deuxième édition. Paris: Beauchesne; Oxford: Parker & Son, 1914. 228 pages. Fr. 2.50; 2s. net.
- Petrich, Hermann. Paul Gerhardt. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des deutschen Geistes auf Grund neuer Forschungen und Funde. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1914. xiv+360 pages. M. 6.
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- Simpson, W. J. Sparrow. Non-communicating Attendance. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1913. 266 pages. \$1.60.
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- Vedder, Henry C. The Reformation in Germany. New York: Macmillan, 1914. xlix+466 pages. \$3.00 net.

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- Briggs, Charles Augustus. Theological Symbolics (International Theological Library). New York: Scribner, 1914. x+429 pages. \$2.50.
- Denio, Francis B. The Supreme Need. New York: Revell, 1913. 238 pages. \$1.00.
- Fuchs, Emil. Ewiges Leben. (Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher. V. Reihe. 12. Heft.) Tübingen: Mohr, 1913. M. 50.
- Garvie, Alfred E. A Handbook of Christian Apologetics. New York: Scribner, 1913. xiii+241 pages. \$0.75.
- Herrmann, W. Ethik. 5. Auflage. (Grundriss der theologischen Wissenschaften.) Tübingen: Mohr, 1913. xv+237 pages. M. 4.50.
- Hill, Arthur C. Shall We Do without Jesus? New York and London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1913. xii+304 pages. \$1.50 net.
- Janvier, M. A. Exposition de la morale catholique. Morale spéciale, III, l'Espérance, Conférences et retraite,

- Carême, 1913. Paris: Lethielleux, 1913. 343 pages. Fr. 4.
- Knox, R. A. *Some Loose Stones, Being a Consideration of Certain Tendencies in Modern Theology, Illustrated by Reference to the Book Called "Foundations."* New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1913. xxiv+233 pages. \$1.35 net.
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THE NEW CHRISTIANITY AND WORLD-CONVERSION

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"This is a decisive hour for Christian missions. . . . Nothing less than the adequacy of Christianity as a world religion is on trial." These words of that well-known statesman-general of militant Christianity the world over, John R. Mott, indorsed by his nineteen distinguished fellow-commissioners, are to be found in the report of Commission Number One, on "Carrying the Gospel to All the Non-Christian World," presented for discussion at the remarkable World Missionary Conference which met in Edinburgh four years ago. The present article is written to express the conviction that the old Christianity, that is, Christianity in its traditional form, is not adequate, and that only what may be called a new Christianity can prove itself adequate to be the religion of the world. There has been growing up in our midst what some may choose to call a new religion, but what may be less sensationally and more correctly styled a new Christianity, which has at least a good fighting chance of becoming the religion of the world. The world-situation is such, however, that the older Christianity, borne down by its traditional impedimenta, no longer has even a fighting chance.

It is a considerable fraction of a generation now since the Student Volunteer Movement adopted as its watchword "The Evangelization of the World in This Generation." In his little

book published during the closing year of the nineteenth century and devoted to the exposition and defense of this watchword, Mr. Mott is at some pains to distinguish world-evangelization from world-conversion and also from world-Christianization. The evangelization of the world in this generation means, he says,

to give all men an adequate opportunity to know Jesus Christ as their Savior, and to become his real disciples. . . . It does not mean the conversion of the world within the generation. Our part consists in bringing the gospel to bear on unsaved men. The results are with the men whom we would reach, and with the spirit of God. We have no warrant for believing that all who have the gospel preached unto them will accept it. . . . It does not signify the Christianization of the world, if by that is meant the permeating of the world with Christian ideas and the dominance of the principles of Christian civilization in all parts of the world. If one may judge by history, that would require centuries.

To this program and to these distinctions one may very safely give a general assent, especially in view of two further points explicitly insisted upon in the context. One of these is that the program does not involve support of any special eschatological theory, as, for example, the premillennial view of the coming of Christ. The other point is, in effect, that the evangelization must be pedagogical. The Christian religion must be *taught*; it is not always enough simply to "*tell* the old, old story." These provisos we consider important. One has a right to refuse to be interested in what often passes for world-evangelization, viz., the preaching of the gospel "for a witness" to all nations, with the idea that without the conversion of any but a comparatively small number of individuals, and without any appreciable Christianization of the social order at all, "then shall the end come." There is cause for congratulation that it is with no such pessimistic expectation that typical and leading Christian propagandists today look forward to the results of world-evangelization. Of the thought and spirit of those associated with the Student Volunteer Movement in particular, such an interpretation of the significance of their undertaking would be an utter misrepresentation, an unrecognizable caricature.

But still, we would insist, making due allowance for the reformation of the conception of world-evangelization, if the Christian propaganda is justifiable at all, it is not this world-evangelization

that we must chiefly think of, or regard as the end; the end is world-Christianization, ultimately, and proximately, world-conversion. Except for the sake of world-conversion, world-evangelization is meaningless. Except upon the basis of world-conversion, world-Christianization is impossible. The fundamental and really practical question, therefore, is whether, or under what conditions, the conversion of the world to Christianity is possible, and an end that Christians may rationally work for. It is to this question that we shall devote our attention.

When this question as to the prospects for the conversion of the world to Christianity is raised, it will not do for us to fall back upon an uncritical optimism. There are obstacles in the way which are growing greater rather than less. One of these is emphasized by John R. Mott. He says:

The transition to Christianity is not so natural now as it was formerly. The non-Christian religions are recognizing their own inadequacy, are accordingly attempting to adapt themselves to the new conditions, and are manifesting increased activity, enterprise, and aggressiveness. Efforts are being put forth to regain and strengthen their influence over classes which have been slipping from their grasp and to extend their sway over peoples who have hitherto not been reached by them. These efforts are, unfortunately, succeeding to a great degree, and many are thus being kept away from Christianity who were open to receive it.¹

It would be a fairly debatable question, perhaps, whether the reformations and revivals within the non-Christian religions are so unmixed an evil, even from the standpoint of the interest in world-conversion to Christianity, as Mr. Mott seems to think. These counter-movements greatly complicate the problem, no doubt; but they make it almost inevitable that any Christianity which is to win the world must be Christianity refined in the fires of criticism, Christianity at its highest and best. But this leads us to speak of what seems, from all accounts, to be a more serious handicap to the conversion of the world to the older Christianity than the activity of non-Christian religions, viz., the irrational and unscientific elements so intricately involved in the Christian message as it is commonly presented by the missionary. Even without this handicap, the case would be problematic enough, for while the Christian

¹ *The Decisive Hour of Christian Missions*, pp. 49-50.

religion in its essence is calculated to meet the deepest needs of the human spirit, it makes at the same time the greatest demands upon the moral will, so that a whole-hearted Christian decision is seldom made without struggle. But when genuine intellectual difficulties also stand in the way of conversion, an excuse is furnished for refusal or delay, sufficient in most cases to lead to a final rejection of the Christian faith.

We would, of course, admit that among all peoples there are always vast numbers to whom the presence of irrational and unscientific elements in the missionary's message present no special intellectual difficulty. They are those who are low in the scale of intellectual ability, or interest, or independence, or education. Hitherto on the mission field it has been from this class that conversions to Christianity have principally come. Indeed, missionaries as a rule soon acquiesce in this state of affairs, regarding it as an expression of the will of God, and find solace for themselves, in view of their failure to reach the intelligent and educated, in the words of the similarly defeated apostle: "Not many wise after the flesh are called, but God hath chosen the foolish things of the world, that he might put to shame them that are wise, that no flesh should glory before God." Perhaps no one has put the case for submission to the prevailing order more strongly than Dr. J. P. Jones, of Madura, India, when he says: "It is no disgrace to Christianity, indeed it is its glory, that it has, for the last two thousand years, first reached and transformed the lower strata of society, and has passed on through such to the highest, in its influence and potency."¹ But the point is just this, that at the present moment, when Christianity ought to be beginning to reap great harvests from among the cultured, it finds them more alienated and inaccessible than formerly, and that on intellectual grounds. The parallel between the present situation and the early days of Christianity is perhaps not quite so close as Dr. Jones would have us suppose. After Paul, Christianity soon came to be interpreted in such accord with the best philosophy of the day that it was able, on its merits as a vital moral religion, to win its way among the intellectual leaders of the day, with comparatively little objection on rational grounds. In

¹ Quoted by Mott, *op. cit.*, p. 116.

the history of modern missions we cannot be said to have entered as yet upon any corresponding stage, and whether we may reasonably expect to do so, or not, is the question which ought to give us concern.

Before proceeding farther, however, it may be well to examine more carefully the present situation in comparison with that which confronted early Christianity, with a view to gaining suggestions for the solution of our modern missionary problem. A comparative study reveals numerous and striking similarities of circumstance. In comparing antecedents we may go back as far as the time of the prophets in the one case and as far as the Protestant Reformation in the other. As contact with surrounding peoples of alien faiths had tempted the people of Israel and Judah to lapse from their more strict but stereotyped traditional religion, and to take up in liberal spirit various idolatrous practices, so the Renaissance, opening up to mediaeval Europe through the ancient classics the ideas and appreciations of the old pagan culture, led to humanism, with its alienation from the traditions, dogmas, and practices of the church, even the highest ecclesiastical officers becoming first secret doubters, then hypocritical timeservers, and at last openly corrupt and the corrupters of the people. In the former crisis the Hebrew prophets arose; in the latter, the Protestant reformers. As the main results of the prophetic revival were retained, formally at least, in the legalistic Judaism which followed, so Protestant orthodoxy undertook to preserve what had been produced by the Reformation. Then, again, as there appeared two mutually antagonistic movements in Judaism, the one liberal and bringing the national religion under the influence of the surrounding Hellenic culture, the other conservative, intensifying the national faith and hope by means of apocalyptic visions and eschatological predictions, so it was in the later instance. Two opposing tendencies were manifested, the one in deism and rationalism, the other in pietism and the evangelical revival. Moreover, as "it was the narrow Jews who insisted on proselytism,"¹ so it was from the conservative but fervently evangelical movement, which had broken down the

¹ F. C. Porter, art. "Proselyte" in *Hastings' Dictionary of the Bible*, with reference to Josephus, *Vita*, XXIII, xxxi.

rigidity of the old Calvinism, that the modern missionary movement originated.¹ And still the parallelism holds. In their missionary efforts Jewish proselytism and Judaizing Christianity were confronted by an imposing intellectual culture developed under the influence of Greek philosophy, in the light of which certain features of Judaism and of that primitive Christianity which was still essentially Jewish necessarily appeared barbaric and irrational—"to the Greek, foolishness." In consequence of this, instead of a world-conversion to these Jewish forms of religion several unexpected results followed. In the first place, certain decadent gentile religions were galvanized into new life and gained many converts. Moreover, there arose, under the influence of current philosophy, some vigorous new religions, the most important of which was neo-Platonism. And, finally, most unexpectedly and yet not unnaturally, by some supposed converts the new religion was so over-Hellenized, as in Gnosticism, that very little of the original was retained in either doctrine or spirit. Now each of these elements of the earlier situation has its counterpart in that which confronts the Christian missionary today. Corresponding to the Greek philosophical culture we have the influence of modern science, in the light of which much that has been associated with the older Christianity seems hopelessly discredited. For example, a missionary to Japan tells us that among educated Japanese "the impression prevails that the missionary is behind the times with his reading and studies, and that the Christianity which he teaches is no longer believed in the West."² Corresponding to the revived and the new religions of the earlier period we have revivals and reformations of Buddhism, Vedantism, Shintoism, and Islam; and as new religions, Bahaism, Tenrikyo, new varieties of Hinduism, our own Christian Science, Theosophy, and many others. Finally, corresponding to Gnosticism we have the over-Brahmanized or ultra-pantheistic form into which Christianity has been cast in that religious philosophy which claims to be the consummation of what

¹ It is instructive to remember that it was Andrew Fuller, who, after the Wesleyan revival, had led the English Baptists out of their hyper-Calvinism, who was also most intimately associated with Carey in the inception of the foreign missionary movement.

² *Report of the World Missionary Conference, 1910*, IV, "The Missionary Message," p. 114.

was dimly foreshadowed by historic Christianity, viz., monistic or absolute idealism.

But in the midst of the conflicting forces of the early centuries there emerged and developed the new religion, which was vital enough, and finally became, for the thought of the time, rational enough, to survive in the competitive struggle and to become the religion of the known world. The Christianity to which the Western world was converted may be regarded as having been, in a sense, a new Judaism, vitalized by the spiritual experience of its great prophetic leaders, Jesus above all, and rationalized into universality for that day by a host of thinkers from Philo the Jew to John of Damascus. Our present-day problem, then, is to find the equivalent in our own situation to the vital, rationalized Christianity which triumphed over all competitors in the early centuries of our era. It is a problem in the "rule of three": to find a religion related to the older Christianity today as the Christianity which won the Western world was related to the older Judaism. As Hellenized Christianity was a new and universal Judaism, rational to the philosophical thought of an earlier day, so the religion which is to convert the world today must be, we may surmise, a new and universal Christianity, rational to the critical thought of a scientific age.

We must now pass from generalities to a discussion in more specific terms. It has for some time been the fashion for the more broad-minded missionaries to make vague admissions as to the necessity of modifying Christianity as we have known it, in order to adapt it to the needs of the mission field. Commonly it has been said that we must not insist upon the "Western" elements in our religion. For example, in Volume III of the Edinburgh Conference reports, which deals with Christian education, it is maintained that "the success of Christian missions will not be achieved by Westernizing or Europeanizing the East, . . . but by contributing to the development of an oriental type of Christianity, or as many oriental types as the varieties of national life shall demand."¹ This may mean much or little. As Dr. Murray, of Japan, writes: "The idea of Christianity perplexing native converts by the Western

¹ *Op. cit.*, 264.

forms is a good deal overdone by theorists."¹ And Dr. Imbrie, also of Japan, has this to say: "There are those who hold that the Christianity of Japan will be quite a different thing from that of the West. But, when it comes to definiteness of statement, what is said amounts practically to this, that the Christianity of Japan will retain the ethical elements and dispense with the supernatural."²

An examination of the objections most persistently made on intellectual grounds by intelligent and well-educated non-Christians against the Christian religion as it has been presented to them, shows that it is chiefly with the miracles, the older view of the atonement, and the orthodox doctrines of the person of Christ and of the Trinity that difficulty is felt. Goldwin Smith once made the statement that the Old Testament was a millstone about the neck of Christianity; but now, thanks to the higher criticism, as missionaries are themselves at length assuring us, this is no longer the case on the mission field. It is not the Old Testament that is the millstone about the neck of Christianity, but the old supernaturalism, the old evangelicalism, and the old orthodoxy. This has been frankly reported by leading missionaries in large numbers.

First, as to *the old Christian supernaturalism*. In general the more primitive and uneducated peoples have no more difficulty with stories of the miraculous than children have with fairy tales. The one exception is that animists, as Johannes Warneck tells us, cannot accept the idea of the resurrection of the body, for the reason that, according to their theory, at death the soul enters into other men or animals as vital power, while the spirit goes into practical non-existence as a mere phantom in the lower world; there is nothing left, therefore, to reanimate the dead body.³ The uneducated Chinese are commonly devil-worshipers and grossly superstitious. Among the educated, however, there is strong skeptical opposition to stories of the miraculous. Several leading missionaries report that the biblical miracles, particularly the stories of the virgin birth and the resurrection of Christ, are obstacles to the acceptance of

¹ *Report of the World Missionary Conference, 1910*, IV, III, 120.

² *Op. cit.*, IV, 121.

³ *Op. cit.*, IV, 33-34.

Christianity by scholars.¹ Among the educated Japanese, doctrines involving the miraculous or supernatural are "denied or treated with contempt as mere superstitions." The impression is very widespread that in the West, because of its conflict with science, Christianity is quite discredited. Baron Tsuzuki sums up the situation in these words:

That, in spite of the best efforts of missionaries, Christianity does not make a marked progress here is simply due to the fact that the higher and educated classes are not prone and receptive to the miraculous and supernatural. How can it be otherwise when Western missionaries preach us blind faith in the sanctity of the Bible, and the consequent acceptance of all the miracles contained therein, while Western teachers and professors preach us the supremacy of reason, the necessity of scrutiny, and disbelief of anything supernatural.²

To the typical educated Hindu, stories of physical miracle are not impressive. This is not necessarily because they are felt to be incredible, but rather because they can have for him no religious value.³ As Keshab Chundar Sen said to Dr. R. A. Hume, thirty years ago, the Hindus as a whole will never care as to whether or not the body of Jesus rose from the dead;⁴ their interest is in the eternal reality of the spirit.

Now it will not do to dismiss this united protest against the traditional idea of the supernatural and miraculous as being due to mere perversity of heart. It is intellectually honest, and it is not unreasonable. Take, for instance, a miracle story that is commonly said to be especially well authenticated, the story of the feeding of the five thousand. How shall we regard it if we are to be reasonable and to retain our intellectual self-respect? Shall we say that barley grew after it was ground into flour and baked into bread, and that fishes multiplied after they were not only dead, but cooked and broken into fragments? Or shall we say that perhaps Jesus and his disciples gave to the hungry multitude all the food that they themselves had, and that others, following their example, as the baskets were passed around, gave from their own provisions what they did not need for themselves, with the result

¹ *Ibid.*, IV, 44, 63.

² *Op. cit.*, IV, 86-87; 111-12.

³ *Ibid.*, IV, 188.

⁴ Hume, *Missions from the Modern View*, p. 207.

that, after all had eaten and had enough, there was still some food left over? Then the element of the marvelous and supernatural would appear as something that had been introduced through misinterpretation or exaggeration in the telling. Or perhaps—to offer a second natural explanation as an alternative—the story of the miraculous feeding of the multitude is a transformation into miracle story of what was originally one of the parables of Jesus—the parable of the Bread of Life. This view of the narrative would be similar to what is now a widely accepted explanation of the legend of the apparently so un-“Christlike” miracle of the cursing of the fig-tree, that it arose as a not unnatural transformation of the parable of the Fig-Tree, which we also have in the gospel story. Which way of explaining the story is the more rational and scientific? Is it not clear that those who are interested in the propagation of the essentials of the Christian religion must be reasonable if they are to win well-informed and reasonable men? And does not this mean that Christianity must revise its attitude toward the miraculous and supernatural, or else resign itself to continuing for a time as the religion of some of the unscientific and superstitious only, with the prospect of finally disappearing when all classes and nations shall have come under the influence of scientific modes of thought?

But it is not the older supernaturalism alone that is criticized; there are widespread and persistent objections to *the older Christian evangelicalism* also. Among the uncultured animistic peoples, with their childlike credulity and mental confusion, the reaction to the story of God’s vicarious punishment of his sinless Son is, as might be expected, various. Some accept it without hesitation; others, also without hesitation, reject it.¹ Among the Chinese and Japanese there is the usual difficulty with the traditional doctrine of the cross.² Mohammedans also have their objections.³ But it is from the Hindus, with their idea of redemption as something to be accomplished in and through the individual’s experience of mystical union with the Supreme Being, that the strongest protests against the older Christian evangelicalism are heard. To begin with, much

¹ *Report of the World Missionary Conference, 1910*, IV, 32.

² *Ibid.*, IV, 59, 113.

³ *Ibid.*, IV, 136.

opposition to the Christian faith is aroused, we are told, "by the insistence on the doctrine of eternal punishment, which was a prominent characteristic of the preaching of missionaries a generation ago, and still characterizes the teaching of a certain number."¹ It is not that the Hindus disbelieve in future retribution. On the contrary, they "have a keen sense of retributive justice." Indeed, it is this which accounts not only for their objection to the traditional Christian doctrine of future punishment, but also for their objection to the "plan of salvation" of the older Christian evangelicalism. They have "great difficulty in believing that the death of another, although he be an incarnation of God, can in any degree mitigate the consequences of human action." Several missionaries, in reporting for the Edinburgh Conference, spoke of the "harm done to the Christian cause in India by the crude representation of the sacrifice of Christ." Indeed, the prevailing testimony was to the effect that "forensic views of the atoning death of Christ do not attract, but rather repel, the Indian mind, and that this repulsion is by no means confined to those whose minds are held captive by the Karma system."² But the Hindu objection to the older Christian evangelicalism goes deeper still. As the Bishop of Lahore writes: "History is of course to the Hindu caviare, and a faith presented to him as based on facts of history, out of which directly arise its fundamental truths, is at the outset seriously handicapped." Several other missionaries mention the same difficulty. T. E. Slater writes:

To the Hindu it seems impossible to find a sure foundation for the eternal truths of religion in the accidents or incidents of time. History belongs to the realm of the unreal and illusory; and the unreal and the evanescent are not worth recording. "Is it possible," they ask, "that our faith in God should be made to depend upon the veracity of a historical fact occurring many centuries ago; and that our salvation should be staked upon it?"

"The only reality to the Indian mind is spiritual life," writes F. W. Steintal; "facts are but casual phenomena. A thought is of more value than a fact, an illustration as valid as an argument." Another writes: "To seek the foundation of the whole world's

¹ *Ibid.*, IV, 193-94.

² *Op. cit.*, IV, 168, 191; cf. p. 315.

salvation in a particular fact nineteen hundred years ago, is an absurdity and arrogance against the religious life of the world, and is looked upon as an expression of the gross and unspiritual way in which the materialistic West deals with spiritual matters." It is not Christ as historic fact that impresses the Hindu, but the Christ-ideal.¹

Now what shall we say to these honest criticisms of our traditional Christian "plan of salvation"? To refer first to the theory of substitutionary atonement, or vicarious punishment, instead of insisting, as some missionary boards do, that all candidates for the foreign field should assent to that interpretation of the death of Christ, would it not be more reasonable if they were to reject as *disqualified* for missionary service any whose intellectual endowments and moral sensibilities were such that they could see no sufficient reason for revising traditional Christianity at this point? Was it not made clear enough by the Socinians—to go no farther back—that there can be no just punishment where there is no guilt, and that a transfer of guilt from the sinner to the innocent is impossible, inconceivable? It is not necessary, in order to escape from the poverty of the positive doctrine of the Socinians, that we should close our eyes to the positive value of their negative work.

And even with reference to the depreciation of the religious function of the historical, the Hindu is not in unmitigated error. To insist that we cannot know God except through the medium of historical facts, which facts in turn we also know only mediately, is to say that we cannot know God directly at all, and to leave religious faith to the tender mercies of historical criticism. We must teach the Hindu to make a religious use of history, and above all, of the historic personality of Jesus; but we ourselves must learn to use history as not abusing it—to use it as a stepping-stone toward, not as a substitute for, direct knowledge of God.

But it is not only against the older Christian supernaturalism and the older Christian evangelicalism that weighty objections are encountered on the foreign field; there are objections against what we may call *the older Christian orthodoxy*, in the narrower sense of

¹ *Op. cit.*, IV, 166-67, 188.

the word, i.e., the Trinitarian and christological dogmas as formulated by the "orthodox" Greek church, and accepted in traditional fashion by Western Christendom, Roman Catholic and Protestant. Among the Chinese there is great opposition to the idea of the divinity of Christ. This is reported by several missionaries, and a Chinese Christian, C. T. Wang, writes:

The thing that has awakened the greatest opposition is the necessity of accepting Christ as divine. I have not met one student who has found, or has attempted to find, a fault with Christianity or in the life of Christ, but it is an everyday experience to hear students argue that it is unnecessary to consider Jesus as divine."¹

The Japanese also very commonly object to the doctrine of the deity of Christ.² The Hindus, on the other hand, are quite prepared to give Christ a place among the gods;³ but this, of course, is not the Christian idea. Popular, polytheistic Hinduism would say Christ is a god among millions of gods; philosophical Hindus, Vedantists, would say that the true Self in Christ, like the true Self in every man, is the One and Only Supreme Being. Among Moslems not only is the divinity, or deity, of Christ utterly repugnant to their conception of the unity and transcendence of God; even the thought of God as having a begotten Son, crassly as they interpret this relationship, is condemned as blasphemy. It is also from Mohammedans, of course, that the strongest protests come against the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. Others have felt the difficulty, to be sure, some even of the Japanese Christians having been led to express doubt as to this dogma.⁴ But the Moslem is especially insistent that Trinitarianism means tritheism, and hence a relapse into that polytheism from which Mohammed rescued his followers. Some of the missionaries therefore "desire very cordially a careful restatement of the doctrine of the Trinity, so as to throw into prominence the unity of the Godhead, and thus to meet this reproach."⁵ Moslems persistently fail to appreciate, or refuse to accept as real, the monotheism of Christianity.⁶

¹ *Op. cit.*, IV, 63; cf. p. 44.

² *Report of the World Missionary Conference*, IV, 87.

³ *Ibid.*, IV, 193.

⁵ *Ibid.*, IV, 135.

⁴ *Ibid.*, IV, 113.

⁶ *Ibid.*, IV, 242.

Now here again it cannot be said that the objections raised by non-Christians are altogether unreasonable. The old orthodoxy is no more beyond criticism than the old supernaturalism or the old evangelicalism. So far as the deity of Christ is concerned, while reserving the right to express in another connection the heartiest agreement with the Christian appreciation of the unique religious function and value of the person of Christ, we would unhesitatingly pronounce intellectually and religiously absurd the dogma that the historic person, Jesus, who worshiped, and recognized his dependence upon, the one and only God, was or is himself God. As for the doctrine of the Trinity, that is to be understood as an ingenious and, on the whole, historically serviceable makeshift. It is best appreciated in the light of its origin. As introductory to our evaluation of this historic formula we cannot do better than quote a paragraph from a recent work by Professor B. W. Bacon:¹

The literature of the New Testament must be understood historically if understood at all. It must be understood as the product, we might almost say the precipitate, of the greatest period in the history of religion. It represents the meeting and mutual adjustment of *two fundamental and complementary conceptions of religion*. The antithesis is not merely that between the particularism of the Jew and the universalism of the Gentile. It is *an antithesis of the social ideal of Law and Prophets against the individual ideal of personal redemption through union with the divine Spirit, which lay at the heart of all vital Hellenistic religious thought in this period of the Empire*. Christianity as we know it, the religion of humanity as it has come to be, the ultimate world-religion as we believe it is destined to be, *is a resultant of these two factors, Semitic and Aryan, the social and the individual ideal*. Its canonized literature represents the combination. On the one side the social ideal is predominant. It perpetuates the gospel of Jesus in the form of Matthean and Petrine tradition, supplemented by apocalypse, which tradition attaches conjecturally to the name of John. The goal it seeks is the Kingdom of God, righteousness and peace on earth as in heaven. On the other side the individual ideal predominates. It perpetuates the gospel about Jesus in the form of the Pauline and Johannine doctrine of his person, regarded as the norm and type of spiritual life. The goal it seeks is personal immortality by moral fellowship with God. Its faith is sonship, by participation in the divine nature, without limitation in time, without loss of individual identity. Both types of gospel are justified in claiming to emanate from Jesus of Nazareth; but neither without the other can claim to fully represent the significance of his spirit and life.

¹ *The Making of the New Testament*, pp. 247-48. The italics, except in the latter half of the quotation, are mine.

We would make here what is practically the same distinction, calling the two types of religion combined in Christianity (the Jewish and the Hellenic), after their predominant characteristic, practical and mystical religion respectively. We would have it remembered, however, that while practical religion *may* become metaphysical, and while mystical religion *may* become moral, practical religion, as it develops in rationality through experience, *must* become moral, and mystical religion, as it develops in rationality through meditation upon the world of non-mystical experience, *must* become metaphysical. In its beginnings Christianity was already highly moral, but only implicitly metaphysical. Its progressive rational adaptation to a Greek environment made it necessary that its implicit metaphysical basis should be gradually made explicit. This task was bravely undertaken by the Greek church, with the Trinitarian theology as the final result. Now it is possible for us to see, in the perspective of history, that what the Greek theologians were really feeling after, religiously, was the undiminished conservation of the values of both the practical and the mystical elements of Christianity. But this was a difficult undertaking. There is, in appearance at least, a flat contradiction between the theology demanded by moral, practical religion, and that suggested by a highly developed mystical religion. Practical religion seeks an almighty, supramundane, personal God; growing in rationality and morality, it issues in ethical monotheism. Mysticism has ordinarily claimed to have an intuitive certainty as to the immanence, particularly in that mystical experience itself, of a seemingly impersonal, or better, superpersonal Divine Being, or Absolute. The problem for the early theologians was how to retain the belief in the personal transcendent God of providence and judgment demanded by moral, practical religion, and at the same time hold to the immanence of the seemingly superpersonal Divine Substance or Ultimate Reality within human experience—above all in the person of Christianity's Founder, but also in a special measure in the religious experience of the Christian. The Trinitarian theologians are to be appreciated more unreservedly for what they attempted than for what they achieved. What they really did was a clumsy enough performance. Their way of syn-

thesizing the demands of practical religion with the intuitions of mystical religion was little more than to add the two together. Practical religion had one transcendent, personal God—the Father Almighty, Lord of heaven and earth. Mystical religion had a transcendent, superpersonal divine Essence or Substance, a supreme manifestation of the Divine in the historic Founder of the religion, and a continued manifestation of the Divine in Christian religious experience. Now the Divine, according to mystical religion, was eternal; and according to practical religion, personal. The Divine Presence manifested in Christ was therefore to be regarded as an Eternal Person, as was also the Divine Presence manifested in Christian religious experience. An inventory of the total assets of Christian faith would have contained the following items: a superpersonal Divine Substance or Essence, and three eternal Divine Persons, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. The first Person was the contribution of Jewish religion; the second and third Persons, as well as the superpersonal Absolute, stood in closest affiliation with the Hellenic consciousness. The one Substance and the three Persons were taken together as constituting the Godhead, the form of monotheism being retained by regarding the Persons as hypostases or substances of the one ultimate Substance. By means of the Platonic idea of the universal as the ultimately real, there was imparted, for the Greek philosopher, an appearance of rationality and even of profundity to this Trinitarian monotheism. But when the dogma was imported into Western Christendom, the Greek philosophy was left behind; consequently acceptance of the now unintelligible formula had to be enforced by external authority with threats of eternal punishment for the unbeliever.

Is it any wonder, then, that the Mohammedan fails to see the point when we insist that our Trinitarian faith is still monotheistic? Not that we would justify his position as against the faith of the Christian. What the Greek fathers attempted, we must attempt, viz., to hold together the values of moral, practical religion and those of philosophical, mystical religion; but their solution we need not accept. The Mohammedan, however, does not even appreciate the problem. His religion is a reversion to Judaism. But while Islam, originally Semitic, like Judaism, is fundamentally a

practical religion, Hindu religion, Aryan, like the Greek, is fundamentally mystical. Christianity, a blend of Semitic and Aryan religion, is both practical and mystical. Hinduism and Islam have long contended for the possession of India, but each is too one-sided fully to meet the religious needs of a mystical people in a practical age. If Christians did but fully realize where the strength of their own religion lies, they would undertake the reconstruction of their doctrine of God so as to conserve thereby and mediate to the non-Christian world the values of a religion that is both practical and philosophical, both mystical and moral.

Our interpretation, then, of the present crisis in Christian missions, to which Mr. Mott refers in such emphatic language, is simply this: Just as in Christian lands multitudes have been or are being alienated from the older Christianity on grounds of scientific knowledge and rational reflection, so among non-Christian peoples, with the progress of science and intellectual independence multitudes have already passed, or in increasing numbers are rapidly passing, beyond the possibility of being converted to the older Christianity. China and Japan, with their hunger and thirst after the results and method of modern science, will never be converted to the older Christian supernaturalism. India, with her genius for rational speculation, will never be converted to the older Christian evangelicalism. The followers of Mohammed, with their zeal for monotheistic faith, will never as a body, or even in considerable numbers, be converted to the older Christian orthodoxy. Nor is it rational to work for such conversions.

It is not that we would justify the rejection of Christianity. Those who will have nothing to do with Christianity, simply because of certain unscientific and irrational elements that have come to be associated with it during the course of its history, are themselves acting in a way that is neither scientific nor rational, nor for their own true welfare. China and Japan are rapidly becoming, not simply agnostic, but atheistic and materialistic; and already the inevitable lowering of moral ideals can be noticed. India, in rejecting the Christian evangel, is shutting herself off from the experience of *moral* redemption. The followers of Mohammed, in rejecting the Christian Trinity have at the same time practically

denied themselves the revelation-value of the person of Christ, and the normative value of the Christ-ideal for religious experience and moral conduct. What the Chinese and Japanese most need in Christianity is closely associated with that to which they object most strenuously, viz., its supernaturalism. The same thing is true of the Hindus with reference to Christian evangelicalism, and of the Moslems with reference to Christian orthodoxy. These peoples are to blame for their lack of discrimination. If they are scientific and rational enough to be able to detect intellectual defects in the older Christianity, they ought also to be discerning enough to appreciate its essential soundness and inherent strength.

But still more is the missionary to be blamed when he fails—as he often does—to help or encourage the non-Christian or the convert to make this discrimination. We read of doctrines as discredited as that of the guilt of original sin, and creeds as antiquated as the Thirty-nine Articles, being imposed upon the native Christians as tests of Christian faith; and there are not a few complaints to the effect that independence of thought on the part of converts is suppressed rather than encouraged by missionaries in general.¹ Such ultraconservatism in the present crisis is simply suicidal. Learners must be allowed to be honestly radical from the beginning, if we would have them truly conservative in the end.

¹ *Report of the World Missionary Conference, 1910*, II, 260-63; III, 263; IV, 203.

[To be concluded in October]

MUST DOGMATICS FOREGO ONTOLOGY?

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Neither the word "dogmatics" nor the word "ontology" is much in favor in these days. "Dogmatics" suggests the intrusion of ecclesiastical authority into the work of determining truth, and the making of arbitrary assumptions, which must not be criticized. "Ontology" suggests cutting loose from the facts of experience, indulging in barren speculation, attempting flights of thought in a vacuum. Why consider the relation of two such subjects as these? Must the House of Lords forego heraldry? Where is the progressive of such unnatural feeling as to insist upon that? Why, then, should not dogmatics occupy itself with ontology? Many will be inclined to say: By all means, let these two obsolete disciplines consort together as they will! They are the cast-off cowl and wig of human learning. Let them hang together peacefully in the same closet!

But in spite of their unfortunate associations, these terms are hard to dispense with. They are still useful as code words, if nothing more. They may be taken as economical symbols for important intellectual transactions—to be used until some better substitutes are provided. Translating these code terms into longer expressions, we may state our question as follows: Must the intellectual interpretation of the Christian religion forego all philosophical theories as to the ultimate nature of existence?

Such being the theme upon which the editors of the *Journal* have requested a discussion, it must be recognized to be a vital one, growing out of present movements of thought. For there is unmistakably a widespread desire for a new intellectual grasp on the Christian religion. Criticism has liberated theological thinking, history has gathered much new material concerning Christianity, the urgent problems of our time cause men to realize afresh their need for a vital faith; but many feel that they still lack a firm hold

on the essence of Christianity and on its meaning for the present day. We have a right to expect that this want will not be left entirely unsatisfied, and to look for a new period of vigorously constructive theological thinking.

But we ought also to note that, contemporaneous with this new impulse to theology, there is a new impulse to fresh philosophical theories about the ultimate nature of existence. The several sciences have been so diligently and fruitfully cultivated that old points of view are proving inadequate and new schools of scientific thought are arising, like neo-vitalism in biology—and even new sciences, like physical chemistry—and our conceptions of matter, of energy, of life, of mind, and of evolution, biological and cosmic, are undergoing radical re-examination and important changes. The consequence is a strange perturbation in the field of metaphysics. The balance of power in metaphysical matters is threatened by the new forces entering the field as the result of revolutions and democratic movements in various parts of the intellectual world. The triple alliance between absolute idealism, epistemology, and logic is menaced. The triple entente between empiricism, agnosticism, and universal parallelism seems to be falling apart. All the ultimate questions have been reopened, and metaphysics and ontology are commanding such attention as has not been given them for two generations.

Now our question is: Ought these two fresh interests—the theological and the speculative—to keep apart? Should the only relation between them be a careful delimitation of boundaries? Or might each be stimulated and made more fruitful by being in active relation to the other, and by some measure of interchange of results?

Before proceeding to the discussion of this question, however, I wish to guard against a narrowing of its scope. It would not be profitable to become involved in debate about the subdivisions of theology. One might say that ontology must be foregone by dogmatics, but on the other hand that it must be made use of in apologetics or a philosophy of the Christian religion. However that may be, let us keep to the broader question of how the task of the Christian theologian, taken as a whole, is related to ontology.

Should the Christian theologian, in undertaking to give the most adequate intellectual interpretation of Christianity to this present time, enter the field of ontology, or seek assistance from it?

I

First of all, let us remind ourselves of the situation which gives rise to this question. The question has its origin in the influence of the Ritschlian theology among us. When Ritschl laid down the requirement that metaphysics must be excluded from theology, he referred more specifically to ontology, and to a metaphysical cosmology which is essentially the same as ontology. Metaphysics in the sense of a theory of knowledge he desired to retain, but metaphysics in the ontological sense he rejected.¹ And the same position is held by the thoroughgoing Ritschlian today. Now Ritschlianism is the most fruitful movement of our time in the field of systematic theology. And on precisely this point of turning aside from ontology it has voiced a widespread impulse in modern religious thought. The clear-cut declaration that in matters theological ontology was irrelevant brought relief and a sense of liberation to many. They felt that such a declaration showed how faith might throw off much that had been burdensome, and be left free to emphasize the vital things in religion. There is probably no liberal theology in this country that does not owe some quickening influence to Ritschlianism, and in such influence the reaction against ontology usually has played a part. Hence the idea that dogmatics, or theology in general, should forego ontology has become pretty well naturalized among our habits of thought.

But in order to realize more fully the strength of the contention that dogmatics should exclude ontology, we shall do well to recall some of the causes which led Ritschl himself to put forth this contention. That Ritschl had a great work to do for theology few will be disposed to deny. That work may be characterized as the setting forth of the ethical religion which he saw in the historic Christ as the essence of Christianity and as the supreme saving force for the modern world. But in carrying out this task Ritschl found himself in opposition to three great contemporary tendencies

¹ *Theologie und Metaphysik*, 1st ed. (1881), pp. 7 and 38.

in Christianity—confessionalism, Hegelianism, and pietism. Over against these tendencies he emphasized the fact that Christianity was a question of personal experience rather than of dogma, that the experience was determined by a revelation which could not be sublimated into speculative terms, that the revelation was given with absolute sufficiency in the historic Christ and could not be transcended by mystical experience, and that the appropriation of Christ by faith meant a life of moral freedom and loving, self-sacrificing service. The three tendencies named, being themselves to a large extent diverse, reacted against Ritschl, each in its characteristic way. But one point they had in common. They all considered that dogmatics must be in alliance with ontology, and they all found Ritschl's teaching wanting in this important respect. Thus to a remarkable degree Ritschl's defense of the ethical religion revealed in the historic Christ appears to have been bound up with his rejection of ontology.

But let us note more particularly why Ritschl found that the question of ontology formed the center of the opposition between himself and contemporary theological tendencies which in many respects were so different in character. First of all we should recall that Ritschl used the terms "metaphysics" and "ontology" in a very special, though well-authorized, sense. Metaphysics, in so far as it is fully equivalent to ontology, he defined in the same way as did Aristotle, that is, as the discipline which investigates the universal grounds of all being, and which therefore leaves out of account the distinction between nature and spirit.¹ (Metaphysics, in the other sense in which Ritschl rejected it, namely, as cosmology, also ignores the distinction between nature and spirit; hence the term "ontology" may be taken as representative of that against which Ritschl reacts in metaphysics.) According to these definitions, as Ritschl pointed out, ontology is a priori incapable of dealing with reality in its concrete fulness, and therefore an entirely inadequate form of knowledge, so far as the spiritual world is concerned. The higher worth in the realm of spiritual reality, he contended, belonged to "psychological and ethical modes of

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 6. *Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, Vol. III, 4th ed., p. 16 (Eng. trans., p. 16).

judgment." At the same time he observed the tendency of metaphysics, or ontology, to subordinate all other knowledge to itself, because it dealt with reality in general by a priori methods. Hence he felt that theology could suffer only by an alliance with ontology.

Ritschl's attack upon confessionalism for an unwarranted use of ontology, or of a priori metaphysics, was directed first against its use of natural theology, and particularly against the employing of the traditional arguments for the existence of God. He rejected these arguments, because, at best, they could only establish a unitary world-ground.¹ But this idea of a world-ground, he insisted, falls far short of the all-important distinction between nature and spirit. It cannot possibly lead us to the God whom we know in Christ. But because these arguments are made the foundation of revelation, and because they purport to be an a priori demonstration, they actually obscure the true nature of religious knowledge and tend to empty the idea of God of its Christian meaning.

Further, Ritschl attacked the use which confessionalism made of ontology in a series of Christian doctrines. He protested against the doctrine of the two natures in Christ, on the ground that it directly prevented men from recognizing the divinity of Jesus' actual, historical, human life itself. He likewise set aside the doctrine of kenosis, for the reason that it only allowed one to think that the historical Jesus *partook* of deity, instead of enabling one to recognize that his historical life itself was divine.² The same abandonment of the ontology of the confessionalists is implicit in his attitude toward the doctrine of the Trinity, when he says that the threefold name of God—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—is to be applied to God's revelation of himself; and again in the instance of the Holy Spirit, when he says that the Spirit is the power of God enabling us to appropriate the revelation of the Father through his Son.³ Finally, the confusions of the doctrine of original sin—reducible to the debate as to whether sin pertains to the substance

¹ *Theologie und Metaphysik*, p. 11. *Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, p. 17 (Eng. trans., p. 17).

² *Theologie und Metaphysik*, p. 57. *Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, pp. 385, 386 (Eng. trans., pp. 407, 408).

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 260, 444 (Eng. trans., pp. 273, 471-2).

of man or his qualities (accidents)—are attributed by Ritschl to the intrusions of ontology into Christian doctrine.¹

In addition, then, to natural theology, Ritschl rejected the piecemeal use of ontology in the field of Christian revelation. He felt that the invoking of ontology to support certain supernatural elements of the Christian tradition beclouded and curtailed the essence of Christian truth. The ethical religion revealed in Jesus was hampered and suppressed rather than served by such a process. The ontology by which men sought to explain the ethical value of Jesus tended to diminish that value. The natural theology designed to furnish a foundation for the Christian faith in God tended to substitute for that faith an idea of God less than Christian. Hence theology must forego ontology in order that the revelation of God in the historical Jesus might not suffer obscuration or curtailment.

Ritschl's opposition to the Hegelian influence in theology was likewise expressed by his rejection of ontology, but his criticism of the Hegelian ontology was somewhat different from his criticism upon the ontology of confessionalism. Ritschl saw in the Hegelian conception of the Absolute something that tended to foster a type of religious consciousness altogether different from the Christian. For example, in his *Theologie und Metaphysik* he bursts out: "The Absolute! how elevated that sounds! I still recall, though but dimly, that the word occupied me in my youth, when the Hegelian terminology threatened to draw me too into its vortex. It is long since then, and the word has become strange to me to such an extent that I find in it no far-reaching thought whatever."² And then, citing the equivalent expressions used to explain the term "Absolute"—"Being-through-itself, Being-in-itself, Being-for-itself"—he insists that an experience of God nourished by such a conception might be that of the Brahmin, or of the mystic in Islam and in the Christian Church, but not that of the Christian in believing relation to the Heavenly Father revealed in Jesus. The conceptions of love and of personality cannot be attached to the Absolute, and without these conceptions one cannot have the Christian type of communion with God.

¹ *Theologie und Metaphysik*, p. 52.

² Pp. 15, 18. Cf. *Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, p. 201 (Eng. trans., p. 211).

This very same substitution of another type of religious consciousness for the really Christian was what Ritschl found had taken place in the instance of pietism. And here again ontology was made instrumental to the damaging result. Often, certainly, the special instrument was the idea of the Absolute just indicated. But Ritschl also traced the errors of pietism to an ontology of the soul. The ontological conception of the soul, he showed, leads to the thought that one's most real and genuine self is something apart from, and behind, one's dominant sentiment, purpose, and will. The sentiments and the will belong to the soul's manifestations. Its real being lies deeper. It is this deeper and more real self which was made by certain theologians the seat of the *unio mystica* between believers and Christ.¹ Thus again it is an ontological doctrine which is brought in to give to mystical experience a higher authority and a greater reality than is accorded to the moral activities of the soul. But the idea that there is some other aspect of the soul which is more real than the moral will was abhorrent to Ritschl. And to his mind the redemption and full development of the moral will through the revelation of God in the historical Jesus was the essence of the Christian experience. Hence once more he felt that the defense of ethical religion made necessary the rejection of ontology in the work of dogmatics.

In brief, Ritschl found the ethical religion revealed in Christ to be obscured and curtailed by the subordination of revelation to the a priori demonstrations of natural theology and by the piecemeal ontology of confessionalism, through which certain supernatural elements of the Christian tradition were exalted above its historical and ethical content. He also found ethical religion to be displaced by philosophy and by mysticism, through the identification of God with the Hegelian idea of the Absolute and through ontological ideas of the soul. Thus the complete rejection of ontology in dogmatics appeared to him indispensable, if the ethical content of historic Christianity were to be interpreted in its full power.

But there was a second aspect of the work of Ritschl that must receive some emphasis before we turn to consider what his position on the points in question means for us today. I have character-

¹ *Theologie und Metaphysik*, pp. 22-24.

ized his work as that of setting forth the ethical religion which he saw in the historic Christ as the essence of Christianity and as the supreme saving force for the modern world. The first aspect of his work, then, was the recovery of the ethical religion given in Jesus, and the second aspect was the interpreting of this religion given in Jesus as that by which the needs of the modern world are supremely met. We need briefly to recall the means by which Ritschl sought to effect this second part of his task.

Ritschl's means of setting Christianity in relation to the modern world consisted in bringing out its social, empirical, and historical character. By interpreting the kingdom of God as the moral organization of society, and man's divine vocation as work and service in this divinely purposed society, he put Christianity in contact with the social aspiration of the time. By setting forth the inward aspect of Christianity as an experience of freedom and of mastery over this world of mechanical law—an experience which to the one who has it is sufficient evidence of the supreme reality of the spiritual world—he brought Christianity to bear upon the problem of life created by the modern world of thought. By dwelling upon the historical nature of Christianity, and making theological thought "Christocentric," he secured a test for the subjective experience of men without appealing to ontological reasoning.

The general effect of this adjustment to the modern world upon theology was to range it with the empirical sciences. That is to say, theology was no longer "dogmatics" in the strict sense of the term, for it no longer dealt in the *a priori* demonstrations of ontology nor in the dictates of absolute supernatural authority, but it established its truths by an appeal to inward experience, to facts of history, and to moral and social values. This meant that, in a general way, theology was brought into accord with the whole positivistic spirit of the time, which was turning away from Hegelian metaphysics to the study of facts and was becoming preoccupied with the special sciences. Ritschl, however, was not one to make a full identification between the method of natural science and that needed in theology. His distinction between nature and spirit was too radical for that. To his thought theology was concerned

primarily with the personalities and spiritual processes of Christian history, and with interpreting these as founded directly in eternal spiritual reality. This was a circle of ideas that was completely ruled out from the realm of knowledge by the scheme of sciences worked out by positivism. Ritschl therefore had need of some principle other than those of external authority and ontological speculation which would enable him to define the realm and the method belonging to theology, and to determine their relation to the realm and method of the natural sciences. This need he met by his familiar theory of value-judgments.

The point of importance for this discussion is the bearing of the theory of value-judgments on Ritschl's rejection of ontology. It is here that matters become complicated, and we find that even the course of true thought never runs quite smooth. Ritschl made theology distinct from the other sciences by the doctrine that it was limited to the realm of independent value-judgments, in contrast to the judgments of causation with which theoretical knowledge is concerned. He set theology again in relation with the other sciences by one supreme value-judgment, namely, by the doctrine that only the Christian idea of God could comprehend in unity the knowledge of nature and that of man's spirit.¹ By these two doctrines—the one formed more under the guidance of Kant, the other due more to Lotze—Ritschl seemed to be able, without the aid of ontology, to give theology a philosophical status.

At the same time, however, Ritschl was making use of a theory of being—attributed to Lotze in contrast to Kant—according to which "a thing" was not to be thought of as something apart from its effects upon us, nor as a hidden thing-in-itself, of which we can know only the phenomenon, but as the cause, purpose, and law actively manifest in these effects themselves. And this conception was not confined to the material thing, but was carried over and applied to man's spirit. This becomes evident when we remember Ritschl's insistence that man's moral disposition and will constitute his real self in the fullest sense of the term.² Clearly, without this insistence that the moral will is the genuine self, the value-

¹ *Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, pp. 214, 215 (Eng. trans. pp. 225, 226).

² *Theologie und Metaphysik*, pp. 23-28.

judgments to which the moral experience of this self leads would lose the reality and authority which Ritschl claimed for them. In other words, Ritschl's interpretation of theology, by which he would relate it to the rest of our world of thought, distinctly rests upon an ontology.

How far, then, shall we take Ritschl as a guide upon the question as to what should be the relation of the interpretation of Christianity to ultimate theories of existence? His rejection of ontology has seemed to be an important part of his modern appeal, and to have been bound up with his defense of the ethical religion revealed in Jesus, and yet not to have been carried through with full consistency. It should aid us in securing a positive answer to the question of our theme if we ask to what extent the positions which have been reviewed are valid.

II

It will be well, in considering the validity of Ritschl's attitude toward ontology for the theology of the present, to deal separately with the two aspects of his work already indicated. First, then, we should consider his rejection of ontology as he sought—over against confessionism, Hegelianism, and pietism—to defend the ethical religion which he saw revealed in Jesus.

The conditions by which Ritschl's opposition to confessionism was determined have been greatly modified by the increasing, and now quite general, abandonment of the method of authority in theology. The rise of the new scientific positive theology in Germany signalizes this change, and the extending influence of this tendency is seen in such writers as Principal Forsyth.¹ The significance of this change is that conservative theology as well as the liberal type now makes its fundamental appeal to religious experience—the difference being that the liberal finds that this appeal requires a thoroughgoing reconstruction of theology, while the conservative holds that the full Christian experience validates the principal ideas of traditional theology. As a result we now have no natural theology in the older sense of the term. For the older natural theology was framed to furnish a general substructure for

¹ Cf. *The Person and Place of Jesus Christ*.

a theology whose special contents rested on authority. And both the natural theology and the claims of authority were supposed to be capable of complete establishment in advance of any religious experience. Hence the general acceptance of the appeal to experience as fundamental means a change, in one important respect, from the situation which led Ritschl to reject ontology.

But, under another aspect, the issue which Ritschl defined in opposition to confessionalism still continues. There is still a disposition to introduce a special ontology for the central supernatural elements of the Christian tradition. This disposition appears frequently in the discussion of miracles, for only the miracles of a certain narrow period—those of the gospels—are the objects of prime concern. But naturally the most important manifestation of this tendency relates to the person of Christ.

The most significant writers who thus introduce a special ontology for Christ are not, it is true, to be called confessionalists. They freely criticize the doctrines of the historic creeds in many ways. They have set aside the principle of external authority, and for their introduction of ontology they seek a basis in experience. Their attitude has been given clear-cut expression in some of the latest theological literature. Thus Professor Mackintosh, in *The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ*, holds that we need a metaphysic for the interpretation of Christ, but he characterizes this as the "implied metaphysic" of the Christian experience, a "metaphysic of the conscience." He says: "There will always be a metaphysic in theology, but it is the implicit metaphysic of faith, moving ever within the sphere of conscience." His grounds for a special ontology for Christ are the unique, transcendent worth which we find in Jesus' moral character and religious consciousness. But he urges: "Between the ethical and the metaphysical view of Christ, then, there is no final antagonism." And he concludes that, in our most exalted ethical estimate of Christ, "we have affirmed his ontological unity with God in a sense generically different from that which is predicable of man as man."¹

A similar transition from what Christ is for our experience to a special ontology of him is to be noted in Principal Garvie's

¹ Pp. viii, 302-5.

Handbook of Christian Apologetics, and here we find ontology appealed to in the support of New Testament miracles as well as of Christ's moral and religious uniqueness. This author writes—contrasting his own position with that of Harnack: “The denial of miracles and the avoidance of metaphysics evidently go together. To admit the reality of the miracles would raise a problem about the person of Christ which would demand a metaphysical solution. To account for the uniqueness of Christ's filial consciousness the inadequacy of any psychology of even the religious consciousness would need to be recognized; and the inquirer would be forced into a metaphysical path.” The end of this metaphysical path, for Principal Garvie, is the recognition of Jesus as a “supernatural person,” and a doctrine of the Trinity which is essential as well as economic, namely, “the perfect organic society of Father, Son, and Spirit.” (This expression of the idea of Trinity, in the view of Dr. Garvie, may be thought of as equivalent to “the perfect social personality of the one God.”¹)

Now what is to be said of the application of a special ontology to Christ when it is done in this new way, namely, as something that grows logically out of our unique estimate of his worth? I cannot but feel that it is open to the same objection as that which underlay Ritschl's opposition to the special ontology of Christ in the older form. That objection is that such a special ontology obscures and impairs the ethical religion revealed in Jesus. This result occurs for two reasons. In the first place, a special ontology of Christ diminishes the saving significance of Jesus' moral and religious uniqueness. Jesus becomes Savior, not because of the influence of his filial consciousness upon us as a spiritual dynamic, but because of his separate ontological relation to the Father. Jesus' moral and religious supremacy is not trusted to be by itself adequate for bringing men into an experience of salvation. The consequence of this is that men are hindered in the recognition that salvation is a purely moral and religious experience. The thought that salvation is, at least in part, something objectively wrought by Christ, remains here as a lingering and hampering idea. But while Jesus was on earth it was the influence of his personality

¹ Pp. 107, 112-13, 159-60.

and character that made him a Savior, and it is the rediscovery of this kind of saviorhood which has proved a new gospel to such wide circles in our day.

The second reason against a special ontology of Christ is that it reduces Christianity's power to establish an ethical interpretation of the universe. If the unique moral and spiritual worth of Jesus must be "accounted for" by a special ontology, then the significance of that unique moral and spiritual worth as a revelation of the spiritual capacity of mankind is enormously diminished. And this shrinkage of the spiritual capacity of mankind means in turn a vast shrinkage in the evidence for any resident spiritual force in the universe. Thus, unless one reverts to the principle of an external authority for Christ in respect to the unseen, on the ground of the ontological uniqueness ascribed to him, one must find that Christianity's strongest means of giving the universe an ethical interpretation has been lost.

The demand that theology take up the speculative task once more, that it should not hold back from metaphysics and ontology, is not infrequently heard in these days. But the demand has many meanings. And one of its meanings is that an ontology not applied elsewhere may be specially invoked to support the main supernatural features of the Christian tradition. The injurious effect of this use of ontology I believe to have been sufficiently shown. Hence our first conclusion should be: Dogmatics must forego ontology so far as it consists of the special introduction of ontological theories at critical points in favor of traditional supernaturalism, inasmuch as such a use of ontology is inimical to ethical religion.

Ritschl's opposition to Hegelianism centered in his conviction that Hegel's idea of the Absolute could not promote the Christian type of religious experience, but could sustain only an oriental mysticism, inasmuch as the idea of the Absolute is incompatible with the thought of God as love and as a personality. Now, in the recent work entitled *Foundations*, written by seven Oxford scholars, the closing essay, by W. H. Moberly, is directed toward establishing a position which is just the reverse of Ritschl's. Hence the

central positions of this essay will furnish a convenient means of testing the validity of Ritschl's attitude for present thought.

Mr. Moberly's essay treats of "God and the Absolute," and his object is to show that the idea of the Absolute affords the necessary philosophical basis for the Christian conception of God and is by no means inconsistent with that conception. He begins by rejecting "the demonstrative method" of establishing the idea of God, and insists that in approaching this idea one must start with experience. But then he undertakes, by "the critical method," to show that "the necessary presupposition of all experience" is the Absolute.¹ Now it should be pointed out at once that those characteristics of ontology against which Ritschl protested are present in this procedure. True, instead of *being* in general we now have *experience* in general, but this experience is primarily the knowing process as such, and so does not take definite account of the conditions of moral and religious experience. True, too, instead of the demonstrative method we now have the critical analysis of experience, but the results of this analysis are set up as having a priori validity, and hence they work as inexorable limits upon any claims from the special realms of ethics and religion.

But let us note the results reached by Mr. Moberly in the philosophical part of his discussion. They are in general the results of the absolutist type of philosophy. The Infinite Being is an All-inclusive Consciousness in which every item of empirical reality must find its place—and apparently this all-inclusiveness applies to every item of past and future reality as well, time not being thought to pertain to the Absolute as a whole.² Moreover, it is argued that goodness must be affirmed of the Absolute, because such an affirmation is a postulate of our moral consciousness, just as the rationality of the Absolute is a postulate of our intellect. This moral postulate Mr. Moberly defends by urging that "pure thought is not the best instrument for the apprehension of all kinds of truth," and that our moral and emotional demands must be considered in forming a judgment as to whether or not the Absolute is good. The goodness of the Absolute, however, has to be squared with the timeless all-inclusiveness in which all the evil of the world

¹ Pp. 432-3, 478.

² Pp. 452-3, 478-9.

must have an inalienable share. Hence the conclusion is reached "that evil is somehow 'appearance.'"¹

But after working out his philosophical results Mr. Moberly goes on to show that the Absolute may be conceived of as personal, as Christian thought requires. Though this seems to the foremost exponents of absolutism an impossible combination of ideas, Mr. Moberly urges that the difficulty lies in an undue fixity and exclusiveness in our conception of personality, which we allow to be formed by our lower ranges of experience. When, on the contrary, we consult experience in its higher ranges—for example, self-forgetting service and mystical communion—we see how the boundaries of selfhood cease to be impervious, and how one life becomes inclusive of another. The validity of these considerations is maintained by acknowledging "the claim of moral and religious experience to a *pre-eminent* and *determining* place in the experience of the race as a whole."²

Now this principle, which is similar to that used in arguing that the Absolute is good, is a most important one, but it is introduced too late. Moral and religious experience are to be given a pre-eminent and determining place in questions about the Absolute, but such a place they cannot have, because of the a priori doctrine of the Absolute previously worked out. Mr. Moberly has separated his discussions of the goodness and of the personality of the Absolute and so has brought about an unreal simplification of his problem. The problem is to show how the Absolute may be thought of as a moral personality, and the problem is made insoluble by making the Absolute not only all-inclusive of present reality, but also of future reality, inasmuch as time does not pertain to the being of the Absolute as such. Now a moral personality which is not actively and creatively working out purposes of good is merely a fictitious and contradictory idea. If all future reality is present to the Absolute, then creative and purposeful activity is eliminated from his being. The blow of the sculptured boxer, however strained his muscles, has no force in it, because it is eternally struck. The purposes of a timeless Absolute have no creative moral force in them, because they are eternally realized.

¹ Pp. 472-7.

² P. 494 (*italics mine*).

Mr. Moberly's attempt to give moral and religious experience a pre-eminent and determining place in the interpretation of ultimate reality is defeated by the fact that he previously has worked out an ontology having a priori validity. This ontology, because of its a priori character, gets the pre-eminent and determining place, and as a consequence the claims of moral and religious experience are unwittingly sacrificed. This failure to re-establish a vital relation between the conception of the Absolute and the Christian idea of God tends to vindicate Ritschl's opposition to Hegelianism, together with the grounds upon which that opposition rested. It gives renewed evidence that an a priori ontology is a menace to the ethical religion revealed in Jesus. Hence we are led to a second conclusion: Dogmatics must forego any ontology which claims a priori validity, because such an ontology deprives moral and religious experience of even a co-ordinate place with the processes of the intellect in solving our ultimate problems.

Ritschl's rejection of ontology was due also in part, as we have seen, to his opposition to pietism. The unsympathetic attitude toward mysticism which this opposition manifested is one of the features of Ritschl's position that is most often and most justly criticized. But it should not escape our attention that the new appreciation which mysticism is receiving at the present time is due more to its psychological than to its ontological significance. The psychology of religion, emphasizing mysticism as one of the great types of spiritual functioning, nevertheless leaves the determining of its relative place in life to the ethical point of view, whereas the theoretical union of mysticism and ontology always results in the view that our highest spiritual experience transcends ethics, and leads to such strained historical judgments as that the religious experience of Jesus was essentially mystical.¹ The ontology, however, with which mysticism is theoretically united, is not so much a special ontology of the soul, such as Ritschl finds his opponents introducing, as it is simply the doctrine of the Absolute itself. Thus the danger to ethical religion which Ritschl saw in an

¹ "The few points on which we can rely, the few episodes which did certainly occur in a determined order, in the historical life of Jesus, are just those which indicate the kind of growth, and kind of experience, most characteristic of the mystic life."—*The Mystic Way*, by Evelyn Underhill, 1913.

alliance between mysticism and ontology is but a special instance of the danger just emphasized as lurking in any a priori ontology.

So far, then, as the first aspect of Ritschl's work—the recovery of the ethical religion revealed in Jesus—is concerned, the changes in the approach to theological questions have not altered the validity of his rejection of ontology in the sense in which he used the term. Dogmatics must still forego the special introduction of ontology in support of the chief features of traditional supernaturalism, and also must forego a priori ontology in general, if it is to be the interpreter of the ethical religion which has its source in the personality and work of Jesus.

III

But there remains to be considered the second aspect of Ritschl's work, in which he sought to set forth the religion of Jesus as the supreme saving power for the modern world. We have seen that the carrying through of the principles by which he endeavored to accomplish this task led him to separate theology from the other sciences by means of the theory of value-judgments, and then to attempt an adjustment of theology to the rest of knowledge again by one supreme value-judgment. And we saw that the theory of value-judgments itself was really made to rest on an ontology. Are we, then, to approve this reintroduction of ontology by Ritschl, and ought we to recognize that there is an ontology, different from the forms of it just shown to be injurious in theology, which is required by our present intellectual situation?

The followers of Ritschl have been free to recognize an inconsistency in his attitude toward metaphysics, but their efforts toward removing this inconsistency have been almost wholly in the direction of a more complete ruling-out of anything that pertained to the metaphysical realm. This more consistent elimination of the metaphysical has been accomplished by various methods. With Herrmann the strict Kantian theory of knowledge has been the means. Thus we find him maintaining that theology and philosophy have only one task in common: "The separation of the convictions conditioned on our practical nature, in the domain of which lie the genuine theological problems, from the realm of

theoretical knowledge."¹ But those who have been neo-Kantians in their theory of knowledge, like Reischle, though emphasizing more than Herrmann the need for unity in our life of thought, still have dwelt upon the necessary limitation of all theoretical knowledge to phenomena—which means that no theoretical knowledge, not to mention metaphysics, can be of service in the interpretation of religion.² And even Kaftan, who in harmony with his more positivistic theory of knowledge makes peace between philosophy and theology by showing that philosophy in reality is always a product of the practical reason—even Kaftan has no thought that there may be an ontology which is serviceable to theology.³ Indeed, we may say that the distinctly Ritschlian school has regarded this reintroduction of ontology by Ritschl, together with certain features of his theory of knowledge, as not only an inconsistency, but also a mistake.

But certain younger theologians, who in varying degrees belong to the Ritschlian movement, have taken a different attitude on the general question of theology and metaphysics. For example, we find Wobbermin insisting upon a "theological metaphysics," which must be placed in scientific relation to metaphysics in general. And with a view to the working out of such a metaphysics he transforms the familiar cry "back to Kant" into a new watchword, "from Kant forward." Indeed, he declares that one who confronts the task of defending the Christian faith in God in a scientific and philosophical way should not appeal to Kant and his philosophy in general; and he finds that in the motives and tendencies underlying the traditional proofs of the existence of God there are permanently valid elements of truth.⁴ So also Troeltsch, who is much indebted to the Ritschlians though he has left their ranks, holds that dogmatics must be a presentation of the thought-content of faith upon the basis of a scientific philosophy of religion; and at the same time he maintains that it is necessary for the scientific

¹ *Die Religion im Verhältnis zum Weltkennen und zur Sittlichkeit*, p. ix.

² *Leitsätze der christlichen Glaubenslehre*, pp. 15, 16.

³ Cf. his essay, *Das Christentum und die Philosophie*.

⁴ Cf. Wobbermin's *Theologie und Metaphysik*, pp. 115-22; and his *Der christliche Gottesglaube in seinem Verhältnis zur heutigen Philosophie und Naturwissenschaft*, pp. 46-47, and throughout.

treatment of religion to be given a broad basis through an ontological interpretation of the processes of our soul-life.¹

Now an ontological interpretation of soul-life is precisely what Ritschl, in dependence upon Lotze, actually had, although such an interpretation was quite inconsistent with the dualism between theoretical knowledge and religious knowledge which he worked out under the guidance of Kant. This inconsistency was a radical one, and those who feel that Ritschl has revitalized modern theology must seek to remove it. The older Ritschlians sought to remove the inconsistency by a more thoroughgoing elimination of ontology. The younger theologians in the sphere of the Ritschlian influence are aiming to remove it by a more extended use of ontology, and to this end are changing the Kantian theory of knowledge so far as they deem necessary. Which course will prove most fruitful for modern theology?

We have seen that Ritschl rendered a great service along the line of our theme by rejecting on the one hand all special supernaturalistic ontology, and on the other all a priori ontology of whatever sort. By so doing he liberated the ethical religion of Jesus and made it the central theme of theology. But, further, I would urge that this ethical religion itself requires an ontology, if only it be of an empirical type, and if only it be used not to isolate the most transcendent facts of Christian history but to relate them to the rest of our experience. Should this contention commend itself as valid, we should have to say that Ritschl's reintroduction of ontology was to his credit, even though it was inconsistent, and that the younger theologians are right, as contrasted with the older Ritschlians, in removing the Kantian embargo from ontology, so far as it relates to dogmatics.

Three considerations are of especial importance in showing that dogmatics has need of an ontology of the empirical type. First of all, religion is inseparable from the sense of the genuineness of its experience as a valid interpretation of reality. It must believe that the objects of faith belong in the fullest sense to the realm of actuality. Though religion engages so largely the emotional side

¹ Cf. the article "Dogmatik" in *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*; and *Die Absolutheit der Religion und die Religionsgeschichte*, 2d ed., 1912, p. xvi.

of man's nature, it cannot restrict itself, as art can, to a good that is merely a matter of subjective appreciation. Though it is most intimately bound up with the moral life, it cannot leave its ideals to be grounded solely upon the human conscience or to be worked out solely by human effort. Rather, religion affirms the unity of subjective and objective good, and the interrelation of human and superhuman moral forces. And these affirmations it finds to be verified in the experience of the religious man.

This being true, it becomes the function of theology to test the conviction of the validity of religious experience and the reality of its objects, showing to what forms of thought and life this conviction most truly applies, and relating it to the fundamental convictions of the other departments of our experience. Now the Ritschlian theology has attempted to perform this function by insisting upon the intrinsic authority of the religious experience itself, and by setting such limits to our scientific knowledge as would prevent the intrinsic authority of religious experience from being impugned. And doubtless this was the very procedure necessary, as over against an *a priori* ontology. But when the authority of religious experience is defended by sharply separating it from the rest of knowledge, then reality becomes divided up into two realms, each of which has its claim to full reality somewhat impaired by the presence of the other; and what is more important, religion loses the full right of entering effectively into the world as science portrays it, and of bringing its truth to bear upon the facts of that world. Thus theology runs the danger of weakening instead of strengthening the sense of reality natural to religion. Most assuredly this immediate sense of reality which religion has is often sufficient unto itself. But if there is need for any reflective interpretation of religion at all, such an interpretation should serve to vindicate this immediate sense of reality against the attacks upon it which inevitably will come.

But the danger of which I speak may be avoided through a frankly ontological interpretation of religion, so soon as it is recognized that ontology is not necessarily an *a priori* discipline, which, if taken account of at all, will prove a Procrustean bed for religion. Now as a matter of fact the idea of an empirical ontology is well

on the way toward good and regular standing in philosophy. In the article "Ontology" in the *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology* Professor Dewey concludes: "Thus ontology is no longer the general theory of being, distinct from its special forms; it is the theory of the known reality as distinct from the theory of the process of knowing." Clearly, an ontology which takes account of the special forms of reality and which seeks to be a theory of known reality will be essentially empirical in its nature. Such an ontology, then, can accord to religious experience the right of being an independent contributor to our understanding of reality as a whole. Thus religious facts may be admitted on a level with other facts, which is all that should be asked for them, and religious experience may be placed in direct relation with other experience, which is the very thing that religious faith should most welcome. On such a basis the validity of religious experience may hope for vindication in such a manner as not to rob that validity of its practical worth.

The second and third considerations affecting the relation between dogmatics and ontology are intimately bound up with the first, but they involve certain added elements which must not escape special emphasis. The second consideration, then, is that, in giving the universe an ethical interpretation, religious faith requires verification from the realm of scientific facts. Hence theology should not represent its ethical interpretation as something conferred upon the universe by religion, but should adopt as its working hypothesis that much in the realm of scientific fact will be found to meet such an interpretation half-way. This can be done, however, only upon the basis of an ontology such as is described above in the phrase, "a theory of the known reality."

This need for ontology will become perfectly evident when we recall how Ritschl sought to accomplish the ethical interpretation of the universe. He first, by his rejection of ontology, separated theoretical knowledge and religious knowledge, so that they were in two different planes which would slip by each other. Then he insisted that strictly theoretical knowledge never could gain any ultimate interpretation of the universe whatsoever, and thus he opened the way for the introduction of the ethical interpretation

which Christianity affords. But the transition taking place from the idea that ontology must be a priori to the idea that it may be empirical, indicates that the arguments which were supposed to limit theoretical knowledge to phenomena have lost their force. Not a few thinkers now are proceeding directly from special sciences to ontological theory. It becomes necessary, therefore, for theology again to enter the field of ontological theories in the faith that it will there gain important support, provided always that the principles employed are empirical.

The third consideration requiring an active relation between theology and ontology is that the ethical religion of Jesus seeks not only to interpret existing reality, but to shape future reality. This motive arises from the place given to personality in our religion. The Christian religion gives to personality an eternal worth, and it does so by providing that each soul shall share in God's eternal life of active, self-giving love. It is not possible to give full meaning to the ethical nature of Christianity except as one unites the thought of God's love with the thought of his present creative activity, and then interprets the filial life of man as an active constructive one, in which man is given the place of a co-worker with God in forming a world that shall be really and fully an expression of God's loving will.

In other words, the deepest motives of Christianity cannot be given full expression without an ontological interpretation of experience in which full reality shall be given to evolution as a cosmic process and to human personality, and in which each shall be shown to be really contributory to the other. Our personality, in the sense of our active moral life, must not be left by our intellectual theories as a shadow of some unknowable self, and evolution must not be left as a mechanical process, which leads up to personality only by accident, and upon which personality can exert no real shaping influence. It is the *faith* of Christianity that our personalities have an eternal place in the life of God, and that the processes of cosmic evolution are pervaded by God's purpose and power, and theology must be willing to enter upon the work of vindicating this faith by taking its place on a level with the other sciences and with general philosophy, on the basis of an empirical

ontology which is simply a theory of the reality known through the different aspects of our experience.

Our inquiry has been sufficient, I hope, to make evident that the Ritschlian insistence upon the abandonment of ontology by dogmatics was made in the interests of ethical religion and was a real forward step in its development, but that the value of this insistence arose from the fact that ethical religion was being limited by an *a priori* ontology, which came in as a higher authority than religious experience, and by the invoking of a special ontology to give support to certain supernatural elements of Christian tradition. But beyond this we have seen how certain dangers resulting from the rejection of all ontology, and the consequent isolation of religious truth, may be overcome. For we have found that by turning to empirical ontology three great religious interests may be more adequately served: the sense of the reality of religious experience may be better defended; new support for the ethical interpretation of the universe may be hoped for; and the faith that moral personality is a constructive factor in the universe may be justified. It therefore will best serve the cause of ethical religion if the further development of theology and the present movements toward new theories of the ultimate nature of reality can be brought into a relation of mutual co-operation.

THE FORMULATION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL ARTICLES OF FAITH

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The articles of the Christian faith, as they appear in formulated creedal statements, are the product now of devotion to Christ and now of zeal for the church.¹ How far, in the motive of zeal for the church, the element of pure piety was active and how far hierarchal and partisan ambition, it is not easy if at all possible exactly to determine. They have an experimental, a philosophical, and an ecclesiastical aspect; now one element predominates, now another. At first, articles of faith were the spontaneous expression of an inward religious impulse from within the church. They were statements of Christian experience. Later, they were the answer which councils gave to heretical views, constructed in the heat of doctrinal controversy between parties, both calling themselves Christians. Later still, after the fall of the Roman Empire, they were the assertion of a priestly system, grown strong and dominant in Western Europe, whose strength was contemporary with the decadence of scriptural study and missionary effort. At a still later time, the sixteenth century, they were the protest which the Protestant Reformers, strictly brought up in the ritual of the church, based on the study of the Scriptures, or the deliverance of the Roman communion in the Tridentine and Vatican standards.

It was inevitable that sooner or later the scheme handed down by the apostles should be made the subject of codification and also of analytic inquiry. A handy compendium of leading Christian beliefs would be likely to be an early requirement of the churches scattered from Jerusalem to Spain. A pattern for such a compendium was furnished in the Ten Commandments and the Lord's Prayer. Such a compendium of principles would serve a practical

¹ The substance of this article was presented in a paper read by the writer at the Council of the Reformed Churches, held in Aberdeen, Scotland, June 18-27, 1913.

purpose in view of the missionary obligation resting upon the churches. And, as the age of the apostles receded and the churches became scattered over an ever-widening area, such a compendium seemed to be a necessity for the very perpetuation of the churches as sound parts of the body of Christ, and became a canon of faith. As for the analytic inquiry of the teachings and facts of the gospel, it followed from the very constitution of the human intellect, which strives to systematize according to the law of natural sequence, and also from the infinite importance and mysterious nature of the themes propounded by Christianity. These themes invited discussion and called forth expression in carefully constructed statements. In formulating articles, the churches were following a method emphasized by Paul. The apostle laid stress upon forms of sound words. To the generation next after the apostles, the totality of revealed truth presented itself a good deal as does an extended landscape offered suddenly to the view. Its beauty and sweep are realized at the first glance. Only later are the constituent parts of field and forest, hill and valley, studied in their individual extent and their relations one to the other.

As the formulation of articles of the faith was inevitable, so the process was also gradual. As a matter of fact, a formal code of creedal articles preceded the authoritative collection of the books of the New Testament into a canon. Later, in its conflict with paganism and paganizing elements within its own boundaries, the church felt the necessity of extending the compass of these fundamental statements and defining them with precision. The first generation of the second century, including such men as Clement of Rome, Ignatius, and Polycarp, by the circumstances of their time and by reason of their continuing expectation of the near return of Christ, felt a simple statement of leading facts sufficient. Later generations, beginning with Justin Martyr, the first Christian philosopher, Origen, and the practical Tertullian, compelled by the opposition with which the Rule of Faith was confronted, and in view of their own training—by a double necessity from within and without—were led on to analysis and definition. But even if there had been no doctrinal controversies, there would have been Christian creeds.

1. Our oldest code of articles, the Apostles' Creed, dating back to the early half of the second century, constitutes the first group.¹ It is quite probable that it was the Rule of Faith and the Rule of Truth on which Irenaeus and Tertullian laid so much stress. The baptismal formulas, used by the older churches, are perhaps as old as any of the literature of the sub-Apostolic age and these formulas seem to have contained not only the essence of the Apostles' Creed but, with a few exceptions, the very articles as we now have them. The exceptions do not affect the body of the Christian faith. Before the year 400, as we know from Rufinus and the *Explanatio Ambrosii*, this creed was believed to have emanated from the apostles. Rufinus even declared that it was carried by Peter to Rome. By the seventh century each of the clauses had been assigned to one of the apostles. This construction remained the common belief until it was questioned by Laurentius Valla, just before the age of the Reformation. The ten English Articles—*Articles to stablyshe Christen quietnes and unity*, 1536—still spoke of it “as made by the apostles” and as being “the common creed which every man useth.”

If not all the clauses of this venerable summary of Christian belief, certainly most of them can be found in the writings of Paul. Adolf Seeberg, in his stimulating treatise, the *Catechism of Primitive Christianity*, gives plausible though not sufficient grounds for the opinion that a formulated creed existed in the Apostolic age and was used by Paul. Much stress was laid by Paul upon “his gospel,” upon the “form of faith” to which the Roman Christians became obedient, and upon “the confession” believers made with their mouth, the confession of which Christ, according to the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews, is the apostle and high priest.

The Apostles' Creed was developed from within by a warm impulse of devotion. It was an experience of the heart before it was a verbal expression. It was a response to the revelation made through Christ. No general council, no ecclesiastical rulers brought

¹ This seems to be the almost unanimous decision of scholars. Harnack says it is to be unhesitatingly carried back to 150 or earlier. Loofs, *Symbolik*, p. 26; Kunze, *The Apostles' Creed and the New Testament*, English translation, pp. 72, 78, and others are inclined to take it back to 130 or 140. Kattenbusch, II, 8, and Loofs, p. 8, are of the opinion that Tertullian regarded it as apostolic, and Kunze, p. 135, ascribes the same opinion to Irenaeus.

it into being. It was born under no outward pressure. It was the spontaneous confession of the believing soul. "Whom do ye say that I am?" This was the question every believer had faced. "What think ye of Christ?" This was the fundamental question every inquirer had to answer. The Apostles' Creed was the response to these questions. It is the out-flowering of Peter's confession: "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God." It became a program for the heathen who were thinking of becoming Christians. Its clauses formed the pledge which catechumens gave on entering the church. It served as a manual for their instruction in preparing for that event. But before it became a missionary manual it was a formula of individual devotion and, for that reason, a bond of union between the churches of Asia Minor, Rome, Egypt, Lybia, and Spain, and, as Irenaeus states, in localities in Germany to which the Rule of Faith was already transmitted in his time. As the fish was a symbol of Christ and his salvation, a sign of recognition among Christians, inscribed on pavements and house-walls, so the Creed was a pass-word of the common faith the churches had in Christ. Had it been intended to be a statement of abstract doctrines, it would have begun with the clause: "I believe that God is the Father Almighty," and not with the clause: "I believe in God the Father Almighty." Use and antiquity imparted sacredness to its articles. They were not to be committed to writing. Augustine treated the Creed as a sort of talisman. To him it was the "*regula fidei, brevis et grandis, brevis numero verborum, grandis pondere sententiarum.*"

Its threefold division follows the model of the baptismal formula and conforms to the order of Paul's treatment in the first chapter of Ephesians and Peter's treatment in the opening paragraph of his first epistle. It is the order of Justin Martyr who, describing the Lord's Supper, said: "The president receives bread and a cup with water and wine and offers prayer, glory, and thanks to the Father of all, through the name of the Son, and the Holy Spirit for these gifts." It is not unlikely that Tertullian was referring to it in his words, "*Ter mergitatur, amplius aliquid respondentis quam dominus in evangelio determinavit*": "We are immersed thrice, using a longer formula than the Lord fixed in the gospel."

In this symbol simplicity is combined with comprehensiveness. Its statements are of historic facts without speculative setting. They draw from the profoundest mystery of our religion. Yet there is nothing polemic about them. The Creed grew up before metaphysical speculation and controversy started in the church and has no marks of the conflict over Gnosticism and its vagaries. "It contains," as Dr. Philip Schaff in his *Creeds of Christendom* said, "all the fundamental articles of the Christian faith necessary to salvation in the form of facts, in simple scriptural language, in the most natural order of revelation, from God and the creation down to the resurrection and the life everlasting." But few as the articles are, Waterland nevertheless pronounced the Creed "peccant in excess."

Another feature of this creedal summary is that it contains nothing for which Scripture cannot be easily found. On the other hand, it is notable by its omissions. It is not an exhaustive summary of what the church at one time or another has regarded as fundamental. It has no reference to the authority of Scripture or to justification by faith, although the form of profession—"I believe in"—might by an effort be construed as involving justification by faith. There is no mention of the sacraments and what is called sacramental grace. And there is not the remotest reference to the priesthood and the papacy, certainly a most radical defect in view of the deliverances of Boniface VIII and Pius IX, pronouncing submission to the supreme pontiff necessary to salvation for every creature, and the pope the infallible teacher in all questions pertaining to faith and morals. McGiffert's original and plausible suggestion that the Creed has an apologetic character and was in part an answer to Marcion and his heresy is accepted by Krüger. But Loofs (p. 14) finds no evidence that its articles were affected by the conflict with Gnosticism, and Kunze (pp. 84, 88) takes the same position, pronouncing it pre-gnostic and not anti-gnostic. Harnack (article in Herzog) defines its purpose "as instruction in Christianity as distinguished from Judaism and Paganism."

2. In passing to the second group of creedal articles, we come to the Nicene period, and enter into an atmosphere charged with

theological refinement and dialectic subtlety. This period gave birth to the precise metaphysical definitions of the deity of Christ and of his person after the incarnation. These definitions were accepted without question by the Reformers and still belong to the fundamental theology of the Christian churches. In the last work which proceeded from Dr. Briggs's pen, that scholar says: "A church that does not adhere to the Nicene Creed cannot be recognized as a Christian church."

From Ignatius and Polycarp to 325 is a long stretch. What a contrast between the scene described in the words "suffered under Pontius Pilate," and the vision of Constantine at the Milvian bridge! The age of martyrdom was passed. The church was triumphant, but the church was rent with theological controversy and strife. Teachings proceeding from Lucian and the Antiochian school and the changing statements of Origen, leaving doubt as to whether he believed the Son to be coessential with the Father or subordinate to the Father—these prepared the way for the unrest and doctrinal strife of the fourth and succeeding centuries. Arius was deposed by local Egyptian councils. Hosius, sent out by Constantine, returned with the report that the disturbance in Christendom was as deep-seated as it was widespread. Three Christian centuries had elapsed. What should be the faith of Christendom about Christ? To settle this question, the Nicene Council was convened by the emperor. In his opening address he pleaded with assembled bishops to hasten and define the true doctrine, that the Christian churches might have peace, for to him, as he said, theological strife was more alarming and painful than any other kind of war.

The Athanasian formula, which prevailed, went far in the realm of exposition when it defined Christ to be "the only begotten, begotten of the Father before all worlds, light of light, very God of very God, begotten not made, of the same substance with the Father, by whom all things were made." The change from the method of the early Creed was very great. A statement of facts gave way to a definition, cut and polished with philosophical precision. Language is used which is not in the Scriptures. Yet the Trinity is scriptural and to the Scriptures Athanasius made

his appeal.¹ As the great Alexandrian confessed, he himself did not understand the mystery of the Trinity, but much less could he evade it with the Scriptures open before him.

The Nicene formula fosters a metaphysical mood. It lays stress on intellectual assent rather than personal devotion. Its metaphysical exactness still awakens admiration and its careful definition seemed to be demanded by the controversy in which Christendom was involved. It might have been fatal if Christian thought had not grappled with the question presented in the fourth century and settled it with precision once for all. Indeed, the strife over a letter at Nice was not useless. The adoption of the word *homoousion* has kept the church steadfast in its confession of Jesus Christ as the Son of God, who for us men and for our salvation became man. The fortunes of Christianity, as the unique revelation from God, was wrapped up in the formula chosen. Had that council followed Arius, the church might long ago have ceased to exalt Christ as God's Son and the Savior of men.

The words of Carlyle, as reported by Mr. Froude, are a notable testimony to the importance of the Nicene definition. Froude says:

He made one remark that is worthy of recording. In earlier years he had spoken contemptuously of the Athanasian controversy—of the Christian world being torn to pieces over a diphthong—and he would ring the changes in broad Annandale on the *homoousion* and the *homoiousion*. He now told me that he perceived Christianity itself to be at stake. If the Arians had won, Christianity would have dwindled away to a legend.

At the same time, it was most ominous that, together with such conscientious theological precision, there was manifested a spirit of intolerance out of all accord with the teaching of Him who said, "Other sheep I have which are not of this fold." To the eminent theological leader of the Nicene period, all who differ from the Nicene formula were as dogs and wolves and worse, and this spirit soon carried the triumphant party far beyond the words of Athanasius to deeds of physical violence, even to the burning of

Gwatkin says: "Athanasius' works are one continuous appeal to Scripture. . . . On one side the Arian doctrine was a mass of presumptuous theorizing, supported by alternate scraps of obsolete traditionalism and uncritical textmongering, on the other it was a lifeless system of unscriptural pride and hard unlovingness and therefore Arianism perished."—*Studies of Arianism*, pp. 44, 266.

heretics, the Priscillianists, in 385. The history of the old church councils is blotted with the combination of orthodoxy in statement with qualities of heart the very opposite of Christian love. Sometimes we do not wonder at the condemnation Gregory Nazianzen pronounced against all church synods.

The judgment, pronounced upon the action of the Council at Nice, must be repeated with reference to the statement constructed at the Council of Chalcedon in 451, only with more emphasis. Called together by Marcian as a measure to allay theological strife, it formulated the statement which Christendom has adopted, that Christ after his incarnation was one person with two natures, "cosubstantial with the Father as to his Godhead and cosubstantial with us as to his manhood, known in two natures, without confusion, without conversion, without severance, and without division." This statement accords with the presentation of our Lord's personality in the New Testament, and the statement, as a metaphysical production, is almost unmatched in ecclesiastical literature. The church was quick to make the acceptance of these two studied formulas of the deity and the person of Christ the test of Christian communion. They did splendid service in keeping Christendom to the highest view of Christ, but it is tempting to ascribe the stagnation of theological thought in the Eastern church to the imposition of their exacting terminology. Subscription to the very letter of conciliar doctrinal decrees continued, for centuries, to be the test of orthodoxy and the measure of Christian character. It is explicitly demanded by the Athanasian Creed: "He that will be saved must thus think of the Trinity." In this statement, this creed made salvation depend upon the acceptance of its very words. The time was bound to come when the inconsistency of such demands would be felt in the light of Christ's affirmation concerning his own words: "Whosoever heareth these sayings of mine and doeth them I will liken him unto a wise man."

3. The third group of authoritative Christian articles belongs to the Middle Ages. The church then lorded it over Western Europe with both swords. The priest was the arbiter of this world and the next. By excommunication and the tribunal of the inquisition, all who dissented from the dogmas of the church were excluded

from the benefits of the spiritual kingdom and, like clippers of coin, hurried prematurely out of the world. "Who presumes to doubt," wrote Thomas à Becket to the clergy of England, "that the priests of God are the fathers and masters of kings, princes and all the faithful!"

The distinctive articles which we associate with the mediaeval church had their roots far back in Christian antiquity and came into authoritative recognition gradually and almost imperceptibly. They were taken for granted in the deliverances of popes and the discussions of the Schoolmen. Only one of these dogmas was perfectly defined at an ecumenical council, the doctrine of transubstantiation, at the Fourth Lateran, 1215. They are the authority of the papacy over both realms, the priesthood with prerogative to open and shut the kingdom of heaven, the efficacy of the sacrifice of the mass for living and dead, sacramental grace, according to which, sacraments, like medicines, contain and confer grace, and the theory of the church as the company of the baptized, presided over by a body of teachers in the apostolic succession and monopolizing the deposit of true teaching, outside of which there is no salvation.

This mighty system, by exalting priestcraft, obscured Christ's words, "Come unto me." It both fostered sincere religious devotion and encouraged superstition. Worldly aims and theocratic ambition gained the day in proportion as ignorance prevailed among the laity, and the pages of God's Word were unknown. It made little difference whether or not people knew that there was such a book, so only they were passive to the rules of the priest and received the sacramental grace he was supposed to have authority to confer. Caesar of Heisterbach, in the thirteenth century, was expressing the opinion of his age, when he compared the papacy to the sun, bishops to the stars, the clergy to the day, and the laity to the night. For the mediatorial office of Christ were substituted the person of the priest and the supplication of Mary, who was queen of mercy, as Christ was king of justice.

The church, so pope and Schoolman boldly asserted, was an institution of divine appointment, the civil power being the creation of human ambition and violence. The sacerdotium, appointed

to be overlord over princes and nations, had authority to enforce its will by anathema and interdict, by deposing princes and stirring up popular revolt against them. This claim, finding its baldest assertion in the *Unam Sanctam* of Boniface VIII, that the two swords are in the power of the pope, was reaffirmed as the last utterance of the mediaeval papacy, by Leo X, the year the Protestant Reformation broke out.

In his reply to Boniface VIII, Philip IV of France advanced the principle, which was to be emphasized in modern times, that the church is composed of laymen as well as clerics. In his *Address to the German Nobility*, Luther set it forth in clear terms. For all practical purposes the church was a small body of hierarchs, a self-perpetuating aristocracy ruling in Rome. The so-called voice of the church was the decree of this body. Against this usurpation of prerogative, Wyclif used his pen and voice. By Holy Church, he said "they understand prelates and priests, monks and canons and friars, all that have the tonsure, all that have crowns, though they live ever so accursedly in defiance of God's law." Wicked pontiffs the Oxford Reformer called anti-Christ's and, like Dante, he consigned them to perdition. Transubstantiation he pronounced contrary to Scripture as well as contrary to the observation of the senses. The church he defined as the body of the elect, and preaching the chief function of the priesthood. The Scriptures are the *fides christiana*, the book of life; they are the whole truth. To withhold them from the laity is the fundamental sin. But Wyclif was a heretic and his bones were dug up by the order of the Council of Constance and burnt. The mediaeval system was reaffirmed by the Council of Ferrara-Florence.

To the faithful Roman Catholic of today the Middle Ages are the seed-plot of theology and genuine piety. The religious rest and moral excellence, alleged to have reigned then, Pius X's encyclicals have been holding up as the ideal condition, over against the unrest and uncertainty for which the freedom of modern thought is charged as being responsible in church and society. But over the system of mediaeval theology, as over all systems of theology constructed by man, Wyclif's words stand like a drawn sword: "In the end the truth will conquer." No generation is bound by

the doctrinal statements of its predecessors. Church councils have erred. Churches have erred. That was a fundamental proposition of the Thirty-nine Articles and other confessions of the Reformation period as it had been the statement of Luther in 1521. Great theologians have erred. The New Testament alone is binding—the New Testament as men are guided by the Holy Spirit to interpret it.

4. The fourth group of articles of faith emerged in the sixteenth century. The Protestant Reformation was a reproclamation of the gospel. Once more men looked away from ordinances and drank from the fountain of a free salvation; from the human priest and heard the words of Christ: "My kingdom is not of this world." To the church's treasury of merit Luther opposed the holy gospel of the glory and grace of God. His assertions he based upon the study of the Scriptures and upon inward experience.

The Scriptures, which had been read without restriction by laymen in the first centuries, were again offered to the people. Luther's words at Worms asserted this supreme authority: "Unless I am persuaded from the Scriptures and by clear arguments I will not recant, for my conscience is bound in the Word of God." "In the Scriptures," so the Scotch Confession of 1560 runs, "all things necessary to be believed for the salvation of mankind is sufficiently expressed."

Justification by faith, the second principle of the Reformation, involving for the soul the right of immediate access to God and also the assurance of personal salvation, rendered priestly mediation outside of Christ superfluous. To Protestants nothing seems more strange than the utter failure of Catholic historians and controversialists to find significance in Luther's struggle for peace in the convent. In cases, they ignore it altogether. Arrived at the head of the Scala Sancta, the Augustinian monk heard the still small voice saying to him that his devotion and the Pater Nosters he had repeated at every step were worthless.

These two articles, the final authority of the Bible and justification by faith, are inwrought into the thinking of the Protestant world. They vindicate for the individual the right to think for himself and to decide his own destiny by dealing directly with

Christ. Modern thought and culture are indebted to the Reformation for this liberty more than they are always ready to acknowledge.

5. The fifth group of articles of faith belongs to the official statements of the Roman Catholic communion in the last four centuries, and more especially as they are found in the Tridentine and Vatican standards.

The Council of Trent, made up almost exclusively of Italian and Spanish bishops, defined the Roman belief as against Protestantism, reasserting the dogmas held in the Middle Ages without adding to them. The two dogmas it left undefined, the dogmas of the immaculate conception and papal infallibility, were solemnly fixed by the encyclical of Pius IX in 1854 and by the Vatican Council of 1870. These have become an essential part of the dogmatic teaching of the Roman communion, and all who wilfully deny them are heretics, cut off from the body of Christ.

In defining Mary's exemption from all taint of original sin, the subtle doctor Duns Scotus was honored to the disparagement of St. Bernard and Thomas Aquinas. The chief Scripture proofs are from the Canticles and Jeremiah—passages which by all principles of sound exegesis can have no reference to her whatever—and Jerome's mistranslated passage in the third chapter of Genesis. The last three popes agree in adoring Mary. The fulsome predicates affirmed of her by Alphonso da Liguori were accepted by Pius IX, who made Alphonso a doctor of the church, an act calling forth Döllinger's most vigorous protest. Leo XIII appealed to her intercession, as the all-sufficient means of securing the triumph of truth over error. Pius X has called her the spouse of the Holy Spirit.¹ By the dogma of 1854, all who deny Mary's sinlessness are declared to make shipwreck of the faith.

¹ On the fiftieth anniversary of the declaration of the dogma of the immaculate conception, 1904, Pius X sent out a circular letter in which he makes the following astounding use of Scripture to substantiate Mary's glory: "Already Adam saw her in the distance as the destroyer of the serpent's head and, at the sight of her, dried up his tears over the curse which had struck him. Noah thought of her in the saving ark and Abraham when he was stopped from sacrificing his son; Jacob saw her as the ladder on which the angels ascended and descended. Moses recognized her in the burning bush. David greeted her as he danced and sang at the return of the ark. Elijah recognized her in the cloud which arose out of the sea."

As for the doctrine of the papacy, the *Tridentine Profession of Faith* requires the priest "to swear allegiance to the bishop of Rome, successor to St. Peter, prince of the apostles and vicar of Jesus Christ." He is the visible head of the church. In him the Vatican dogma concentrates all authority in Christ's kingdom on earth. He is amenable to no tribunal but God himself. When he speaks in his official capacity of matters of doctrine or morals, he speaks as God. A pope may be guilty of almost every crime, like Alexander VI, and yet he is infallible. He may establish or sanction the office of the inquisition, as did Innocent III and Sixtus IV. He may preach a crusade against the Waldenses and Hussites and solemnly insist upon the flames as a proper punishment for witches, and yet he is infallible. He may distinctly declare the burning of heretics to be according to the will of the Holy Spirit as did Leo X in his bull against Luther. By virtue of the power committed to St. Peter and St. Paul, he may declare Magna Charta forever null and void; and, by a decree, also perpetually valid, divide the western continent between Spain and Portugal, and yet he is infallible. He may set himself over kings and princes, and release subjects from their oath of allegiance, as did Gregory VII, Innocent III, and Innocent IV, and as did Pius V, when he deposed Elizabeth from the English throne, and declared that the pope of Rome was the head over all peoples and all kingdoms¹—and yet he is infallible. He may, as did Clement VI, in his bull against Louis the Bavarian, fill his fulmination with all the curses possible to conceive, invoking upon his enemy blindness and madness, the wrath of God in this world and the next, and calling upon the earth to open and swallow him up—and yet he is infallible. He may declare that it was altogether necessary for salvation that every soul be subject to the pope, as did Boniface VIII, and yet he is infallible. He may pronounce a passage of Scripture genuine, as Leo XIII did I John 5:7, and he is infallible, though the critical learning of the world declare it ungenuine. Yea, as in these last years, Pius X may order in every diocese the establishment of a vigilance committee with inquisitorial powers, sitting in secret,

¹ Quoting in full, Jer. 1:9, the passage Gregory VII delighted to quote in justification of the enormous claims of the papacy.

and charged with the duty to spy out and snuff out all sparks of disobedience to the papal utterances, and at the same time oblige all bishops every three years on oath to certify that the committees have been active and that no spark of heresy exists within the bounds of their sees.

The new crusade now being waged by the papacy for Mediaevalism against Modernism has called forth strong protest from within the Catholic communion, although its volume is insignificant as compared with the general submission to papal leadership. The opposition of Döllinger and the able body of scholars who joined him did not call forth a large following and it is possible that the utterances of such scholars as Koch, Schnitzer, and Loisy will not secure more than passing notice from Catholics. However, it is gratifying that, moved by love of the truth, competent scholars dare to face excommunication in speaking out their convictions. In his last monograph, *Der Modernismus*, Schnitzer of Munich, resisting the papal charge that the paths of Modernism lead to atheism, has represented Catholicism as covered with a mass of mediaeval rubbish. He insists upon applying the principles of historical criticism to the study of the Bible and church creeds, and upon making a clear distinction between the church and the hierarchy. He also repudiates the constraint put upon freedom of thought by dictation from the church. If Christianity is to survive in civilized lands, the Johannine church of the spirit must replace the Petrine church of the flesh.

6. In examining the five groups of formulated articles, with reference to the present mind of Western Christendom, it must be felt how heartily the vast mass of its constituency can unite in repeating the venerable rule of faith once ascribed to the apostles. Nevertheless, even the Apostles' Creed lacks the express statement of the element which belongs to life and conduct as distinct from a state of mind. The present tendency in Protestant Christendom is in the direction of nurturing a disposition of heart rather than of insisting on articles stated in a prescriptive form. Valuable and necessary as creeds must always be as statements of the church's intellectual belief, the spirit is almost gone among Protestants which is expressed in the Ten Articles already quoted, which,

speaking of the three ancient creeds, declare that whosoever being taught does not accept all their articles "cannot be the very members of Christ and his espoused, the church, but be very infidels or heretics and members of the devil, with whom they shall perpetually be damned." The church's life depends upon something deeper than correct statements of the nature, work, and teachings of Christ. It depends upon Christ himself. Precise formulations concerning the fundamental matters plainly taught in the Scriptures will unite the church and not divide it. But centuries of history prove that it may be possible to give unqualified assent to them and yet miss what seems to be the deeper meaning of Christ's words when he said: "Whosoever shall confess me before men, him will I also confess before my Father which is in heaven."

The study of church history also shows that articles, precisely formulated, have not sufficed to keep the church from stagnation in life, or from spiritual pride and worldly aims. German mysticism before the Reformation was a protest against all three. There have been bad Calvinists and good popes, proud monks and gentle Puritans, haughty churchmen and devout heretics. As among the Quakers, where formulated articles have been least insisted upon or not at all, piety has flourished and efforts abounded to check social evils and promote the goodness and well-being of mankind. On the other hand, the assurance of dogmatic rectitude has often been combined with unlovely intolerance and bitter controversy. So it was in the period of conflict over the deity of Christ and his person in the ancient church. So it was in the dreary and unedifying doctrinal discussions in Protestant lands, following the period of the Reformers, from Germany, with Colovius as a leading figure, to Holland and Great Britain. There is a large and essential element which it is difficult adequately to inclose within the phraseology of a formulated creed. This element is involved in such words as those of our Lord: "Not every one that saith unto me Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven but he that doeth the will of my Father which is in heaven." It finds expression in the words of the apostle when he exclaimed: "It is no longer I that live but Christ liveth in me."

That which is the surest criterion of a Christian profession must be the chief condition of mutual ecclesiastical recognition. And

this is devotion to Christ, in spirit and in daily living. Richard Baxter was on the right path when he proposed as the basis of Christian union the Ten Commandments, the Lord's Prayer, and the Apostles' Creed. These demand agreement in moral obedience, in worship, and in doctrinal assent, though it must not be forgotten that the Apostles' Creed was a liturgical act rather than a doctrinal composition. The glory of the Apostles' Creed is that it magnifies the person of Christ. It is attachment to him which will fill the world with love and carry the kingdom of God everywhere. To quote the words of Dr. Philip Schaff, in his address opening the series of Pan-Presbyterian Councils in Edinburgh, 1877, "The central doctrine around which all others cluster is not justification by faith, nor election and reprobation, nor the mode of the eucharistic presence, but the great mystery of God manifest in the flesh." Devotion to Christ will show itself in love of man for his fellow-man. Christian love is as much an article of faith as is the deity of Christ. The New Testament asserts the one as frequently as it does the other and Christ, as presented in the Gospel of John, makes love central in his requirements. It is quite possible to deduce this holy requirement from the expression "the communion of saints," but the Apostles' Creed does not expressly state it. Neither the Decrees of Trent nor the Augsburg Confession contain among their articles any distinctive chapter on the duty of love going out in what is now termed "service" and philanthropy and tolerance and missionary effort. The Westminster Confession in its chapter on the communion of saints comes somewhat nearer to it by insisting upon "the union in love . . . of those who in every place call upon the name of the Lord Jesus." But the Confession goes no farther in express terms. That holy passion to whose praise Paul devotes a prolonged paragraph in writing to the Corinthian church, and "which vaunteth not itself, is not puffed up," and "thinketh no evil," has not yet found full and equal expression in any creed of Christendom as a requirement of Christian character at the side of the intellectual articles of belief. Nor has the consuming purpose to relieve the temporal sorrows of men and to make known to all the power of the gospel unto salvation.

Love is the article of articles. It is the most excellent gift. When it is confessed as the bond of perfectness it will soften the

creedal division of Christendom and break down denominational barriers. It will beget the tolerant spirit which Cromwell commended to the Scotch Assembly when he wrote: "I beseech you in the bowels of Christ, think it possible you may be mistaken." The Christian world is struggling today in the effort to exalt devotion to Christ as the main thing. It need not depart from the essential statements of its historic creeds. But it is struggling to prove this devotion in life and gracious service. It knows this is the chief thing it is called upon to do. That which constituted the power and the abiding element in Channing's influence was that he magnified the person of Christ as the friend of sinners and the dispenser of miraculous help to the suffering and that he demanded a warm devotion of heart to him. Nowhere does this appear more attractively than in the catechism in which he embodied the "elements of religion and morality." Channing's renunciation of the venerable formulas of the church we may forget and are willing to forgive, for we must love him for his effort to start a warm current of Christian feeling in the church for Christ and for men.

Devotion to Christ means communion with the mind of Christ. And as we approach him as he is set before us in the pages of the New Testament, we shall be filled with his spirit, which was the spirit of holiness and doing good. This element the framers of our creeds understood. They recognized its supreme importance but they failed to give to it concrete expression in their articles. Right views on the deity of Christ and his incarnation and death, on justification by faith and the last judgment, might well be expected to issue in an all-around Christian life, but it has been proved that doctrines may be converted into frigid formulas and assent to them with the mouth be unaccompanied by warmth of heart going out in love and service. As between the two, assent to a precise form of articles and a warm devotion to Christ, if a choice is to be made, the church today is coming more and more to prefer the latter; and in this fact lies the assurance of the growing unity of Christendom.

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH

III. ΠΝΕΥΜΑ, ΨΥΧΗ, AND ΣΑΡΞ IN GREEK WRITERS FROM EPICURUS TO ARIUS DIDYMUS

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Before presenting the testimony of the post-Aristotelian witnesses to the use of πνεῦμα, ψυχή, and σὰρξ, it will be expedient to examine the views of some of their predecessors by whom they were in all probability largely influenced, and to present in addition to the material bearing upon their use of the words under consideration (*American Journal of Theology*, October, 1913¹) some further evidence concerning their fundamental philosophical notions.

Anaximenes, who wrote about the middle of the sixth century B.C., declared that just as our soul which is air controls us (or holds us together), so πνεῦμα καὶ ἀήρ encompass the whole world. According to Diogenes Laertius,² Anaximenes made air and the infinite (space) the first principle of things. Plutarch and Stobaeus,³ commenting in almost identical words on the fact that Anaximenes uses the words πνεῦμα and ἀήρ synonymously, declare that he is in error in ascribing all things to one source, since it is necessary to assume an active cause as well as a substance, just as we must have both silver and a silversmith.

¹ To the names of those who were mentioned in that article as having rendered assistance in the assembling and interpreting of the ancient material, it is a pleasure now to add that of Mr. Arthur W. Slaten, Fellow in the New Testament Department of the University of Chicago.

² Diog. Laert. ii. 1 (Diels, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, p. 17): Οὗτος [᾿Αναξίμενης] ἀρχὴν ἀέρα εἶπε καὶ τὸ ἀπειρον.

³ Stob. *Ecl.* i. 10, 12 (Diels, *Doxographi Graeci*, p. 278): ᾿Αναξίμενης Εὐρυστράτου Μιλήσιος ἀρχὴν τῶν ὄντων ἀέρα ἀπεφώνητο, ἐκ γὰρ τούτου πάντα γίνεσθαι καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν πάλιν ἀναλῦεσθαι. οἷον ἡ ψυχὴ, φησί, ἢ ἡμετέρα ἀήρ οὕσα συγκρατεῖ ἡμᾶς, καὶ ὅλον τὸν κόσμον πνεῦμα καὶ ἀήρ περιέχει. λέγεται δὲ συνωνύμως ἀήρ καὶ πνεῦμα. ἀμαρτάνει δὲ ἐξ ἀπλοῦ καὶ μορειδοῦς ἀέρος καὶ πνεύματος δοκῶν συνεστάναι τὰ ζῷα· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἀρχὴν μίαν [ἢ] τὴν ὅλην τῶν ὄντων ὑποστήναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν αἰτίων χρὴ ὑποτιθέναι· οἷον ἀργυρος οὐκ ἀρκεῖ πρὸς τὸ ἑκπωμα γενέσθαι, εἰὰν μὴ τὸ ποιοῦν ᾗ, τοῦτέστιν ὁ ἀργυροκόπος.

Cicero¹ says that Anaximenes made air God. If so, then, since Anaximenes used *πνεῦμα* and *ἀήρ* synonymously, we are very near, even at this early period, to an identification of *πνεῦμα* and God. Anaximenes, however, is a monist and his one substance is material, and Cicero's testimony, unconfirmed by that of an earlier writer, is perhaps an interpretation rather than a quotation. Moreover, from a lexicographical point of view it is important to observe that we have no testimony that Anaximenes used the predicate God of *πνεῦμα* or *πνεῦμα* of God. It is the air which Cicero says he called God.²

Empedocles, writing nearly a century later than Anaximenes, rejected the monistic interpretation of the universe and referred all existence to four "roots," fire, water, earth, and air (*ἥερ*), the latter of endless height. These are continually uniting and separating again, love being the force that brings them together, and strife or hate that which separates them.³ For air he frequently uses the term "aether" (Adam, *Religious Teachers of Greece*, pp. 244 ff.), but not, so far as appears, *πνεῦμα*. The six elements, fire, water, earth, air, love, and hate, are all eternal, yet also all corporeal. Empedocles believes in God or in gods (he sometimes uses the singular, sometimes the plural); but as he deifies the four material elements, as well as love and hate, it is evident that his belief in God does not significantly modify the general materialism of his view of the world. He does not seem to have employed the word *πνεῦμα* in reference to the air or to either of the active powers love and hate.

Heraclitus, a contemporary of Empedocles, was like Anaximenes, a monist, but found the origin of all things in fire, of which all other things are variant forms and to which all return after the Conflagration. All things become what they are according to fate or necessity (Simplicius, *Phys.* 23. 33, in Diels, *Vorsok.*, p. 58; Diog. Laert. ix. 7). According to Aristotle (*De an.* i. 405a, 25), Heraclitus

¹ Cicero *De nat. deor.* i. 10. 26: post Anaximenes aëra deum statuit eumque gigni esseque immensum et infinitum, etc.

² Stob. *Ecl.* i. 12 (Diels, *Dox.*, p. 284), says that Xenophanes made earth the first principle of all things, quoting him as follows: *ἐκ γῆς γὰρ τὰ πάντα καὶ εἰς γῆν τὰ πάντα τελευτᾷ*. But the *τὰ πάντα* is possibly to be taken with considerable reservation.

³ Diels, *Vorsokrat.*, p. 177, fr. 17, l. 15.

also said that the origin of all things is soul ($\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$), from which it may be inferred that the primitive fire had in itself the principle of intelligence; and with this in turn agrees the doctrine ascribed to him by Diogenes Laertius that all things are full of souls and demons and that no one can possibly find out the limits of the soul (cf. Pfeiderer, *Philosophie des Heraclit*, pp. 192-98).

Anaxagoras, born before Empedocles, but writing a little later (about 450), found the creative power in the universe in $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$, and the passive element in an infinite number of original particles or seeds. He thus agreed with Empedocles in rejecting the monistic theory, but presented a simpler and more self-consistent view of things than his. The term $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$ apparently played no part in his theories.¹

Diogenes of Apollonia, a contemporary of Anaxagoras and Empedocles, returned to the monism of Anaximenes, maintaining that the phenomena of birth and interaction of things cannot be explained except on the hypothesis of their ultimate unity.

In my opinion all things are produced from the same source [by change] and are the same. And this is manifest. For of the things that are now in this world earth and air [$\delta\eta\rho$] and water, and whatever else is visible in the world, if of these any one were different from another, that is, different in its own nature, instead of undergoing numerous transformations and changes while still remaining really the same, they could not be mixed together, nor could one either help or harm another, nor could any plant spring out of the earth, nor could an animal or anything else be born, if these were not so constituted as to be the same. But all these things arising by change from the same [substance] become now one thing, now another, and return again to the same [Diels, *Vorsokrat.*, p. 334, B 2].

This one substance he maintains is intelligent.

For without intelligence such a division of things would not be possible as to have proper measures of all things, of winter and summer, night and day, rain and wind and pleasant weather [Diels, *Vorsokrat.*, p. 335, B 3].

Besides these things, then, are these strong proofs. For men and the other animals, breathing, live by the air [$\delta\eta\rho$]. And this is to them soul [$\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$] and intelligence [$\nu\acute{o}\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$], as will be shown clearly in this writing, and if this be taken, they die and intelligence ceases [Diels, *Vorsokrat.*, p. 335, B 4].

And it seems to me that that which has the intelligence is that which is called by men the air [$\delta\delta\delta\eta\rho$], and that by it all men are governed and control

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 293-323.

all things. For to me it seems itself to be God, and to go everywhere and to dispose all things and to be in everything. And there is nothing whatever that does not share in it, and yet nothing that is different from another thing shares in it in the same way as that other, but there are many forms both of the air itself and of its intelligence. For it has many modes of existence, being both warmer and colder, drier and wetter, more stable and with swifter motion, and many other differences there are, and boundless variations of taste and color. But of all animals the soul [*ψυχή*] is the same, air warmer than that outside in which we are, yet far colder than that which is near the sun [Diels, *Vorsokrat.*, p. 335, B 5].

In the view of Diogenes, therefore, the ultimate principle of existence is a substance, air, which we, with our modern definitions of things, would consider material, and which he himself so defined, describing it as warmer or colder, wetter or drier, and comparing it in temperature with the air outside of us; yet, on the other hand, he ascribed to this substance intelligence, omnipresence, and omnipotence. The human soul he regarded as a portion of the total universal substance. His name for it was *ἀήρ*, and apparently he never called it *πνεῦμα*.

Democritus, a younger contemporary of Diogenes, was an atomist, who affirmed that soul and mind, *ψυχή* and *νοῦς*, were identical, and consisted of material atoms, resembling the atoms of fire. His doctrine of God is not easy to discover. Cicero says that he called the atoms of mind (*principia mentis*) God, and Stobaeus that he found mind, which is God, in the sphere-shaped fire. Probably, therefore, as Zeller maintains, he meant by God neither a personal being nor a single being at all, but simply the ultimate soul-stuff out of which reason eventually arises.¹

¹ See Adam, *Religious Teachers*, p. 268; Aristotle i. 405a. 9 ff., quoted in Diels, *Vorsokrat.*, p. 369; Cicero *De nat. deor.* i. 43. 120. We should scarcely need to refer to Democritus, but for the passage ascribed to him by Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* vi. 168, quoted in Diels, *Vorsokrat.*, p. 394, 3: *καὶ ὁ Δημόκριτος ὁμοίως ποιητῆς δὲ ὅσα μὲν ἂν γράφῃ μετ' ἐνθουσιασμοῦ καὶ ἱεροῦ πνεύματος, καλὰ κάρτα ἐστίν*: "And Democritus likewise says that whatever things a poet writes with inspiration and sacred spirit, are sure to be beautiful."

From all that we know of Democritus it would seem that he could have no place in his philosophy for a *λεπὸν πνεῦμα*. If Clement is not in error in ascribing the words to him, one would have to suppose that Democritus is here employing for the moment language out of harmony with his general scheme of things, and using the word in a popular sense. Even thus, however, the passage would vouch for a use of *λεπὸν πνεῦμα* in the time of Democritus. But the absence of any other evidence for such a

So far, then, as the evidence which we have been able to uncover shows, in the fifth and sixth centuries B.C., before the days of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, the idea had already been advanced that the ultimate source of all things is air, which was conceived on the one side as a material something, yet to which, on the other, was ascribed intelligence and power. By some this was said to be God, and of this the human soul was said to be composed.

On the other hand, it is to be noted that πνεῦμα was also often used in the sense of air, and Xenophanes had said even in the sixth century that the ψυχή was πνεῦμα (*American Journal of Theology*, October, 1913, p. 570); yet none of the pre-Socratic writers seems, taking the next step, to have used πνεῦμα for the ultimate basis of things or to have said distinctly that God was πνεῦμα or πνεῦμα God.

Aristotle adopted from the Ionic philosophers the doctrine of the four elements (στοιχεῖα), earth, water, air, and fire, corresponding to the dry and the wet, the cold and the hot. He added, however, a fifth, the aether, which fills celestial spheres.¹ But the elements were not in Aristotle's view sufficient to account for the universe. They, the four at least, are matter, ὕλη, and inert, and constitute the passive element. The active power is God, the Creator, who acts upon matter according to his own plan and for

conception or usage in this period and the fact that the language comes to us through a Christian author writing centuries later make another explanation more probable. A comparison of the language which Plutarch quotes from Epicharmus with that which Clement ascribes to him (see *American Journal of Theology*, October, 1913, p. 569, where the passages are treated as distinct sayings of Epicharmus) strongly suggests that Clement and Plutarch are quoting the same passage and that Clement's phraseology is in part a Christianizing paraphrase of Epicharmus. It is not improbable that a similar thing has happened in his quotation from Democritus. In Dio Chrysostom 36.1 (Περὶ Ὀμήρου) occurs the statement: 'Ὁ μὲν Δημόκριτος περὶ Ὀμήρου φησὶν οὕτως: 'Ὁμηρος φύσεως λαχὼν θεαζούσης ἐπέων κόσμον ἐτεκτὴνατο παντοίων' ὥς οὐκ ἐνὶ ἀνευ θεας καὶ δαίμονας φύσεως οὕτω καλὰ καὶ σοφὰ ἔπη ἐργάσασθαι. It is possible, not to say highly probable, that Dio and Clement (*Strom.* vi. 168) are quoting from the same passage and that Dio, uninfluenced by Christian ideas, reflects the terminology of Democritus more accurately than Clement, and in particular that the words καὶ ἱεροῦ πνεύματος are paraphrastic rather than literal. On the basis of this passage alone it would be unsafe to conclude that the expression ἱερὸν πνεῦμα was used by Democritus or that it was current in his day. The expression θεῖον πνεῦμα in the pseudo-Platonic dialogue, *Axiochus*, will be discussed later.

¹ Arnold, *Roman Stoicism*, p. 60, who, however, cites no evidence from Aristotle.

the achievement of his own purpose. It is from Aristotle that the conception of the inertness, deadness of matter, received its chief impulse.

But Aristotle also had much to say concerning *πνεῦμα*, by which he meant, in general, air (*ἀήρ*) in motion, or breath. But, as we have seen (*American Journal of Theology*, October, 1913, p. 572), in one notable passage he says that *πνεῦμα* is used of the substance, vital and generative (*ἐμψυχος καὶ γόνιμος*), which is in all plants and animals, and permeates all things. Just how this statement is to be adjusted to his doctrine that the *ψυχή* is an entelechy, or, as we may very freely translate it, a function, of the body, having no existence apart from it, and, on the other hand, to his doctrine of the four or five elements, is not clear. Remembering the previous use of *ἀήρ* and *πνεῦμα* as synonymous terms, and recalling Plato's apparent distinction between *ἀήρ* and *πνεῦμα*, the latter denoting the former in motion, we might be disposed to think that Aristotle meant by *πνεῦμα* one of the four elements, *ἀήρ*, but *ἀήρ* in a special form or condition. And recalling that Aristotle ascribed soul, *ψυχή*, to plants and animals, as he here does *πνεῦμα*, we should be disposed to think that he would agree to Xenophanes' assertion that the *ψυχή* is *πνεῦμα*, meaning by *πνεῦμα*, however, not mere transitory breath, but vital soul-stuff. Nor in view of the irreconcilable differences in Aristotle's doctrine of the *νοῦς* and the *ψυχή* are these discrepancies in his idea of the *ψυχή* and the *πνεῦμα* too great to be ascribed to him. Yet we must also reckon with the possibility that in speaking of *πνεῦμα*, the universal vital and generative substance, he was describing the doctrine of some contemporary rather than his own. What we clearly know, then, is that in Aristotle's day *πνεῦμα* was used by someone of vital and generative soul-stuff; or perhaps we should say life-stuff, since it is in all plants and animals, a sort of soul-protoplasm.

But it must not be overlooked that Aristotle speaks of this *πνεῦμα* as permeating all things. If this language be taken at its face value, then he or the writers whose doctrine he is here reporting made *πνεῦμα*—vital and generative—the informing principle of all things. This is pan-pneumatism, though not, perhaps, pantheism. For neither do those whom Aristotle is quoting, if quoting he is,

nor Aristotle himself say either that πνεῦμα is God, or that God is πνεῦμα.

With this rapid survey of pre-Aristotelian theories of the ultimate substance of things before us, and recalling the exhibit of the usage in classical writers of πνεῦμα, ψυχή, and σὰρξ (*American Journal of Theology*, October, 1913, pp. 563-98), we may proceed to a general classification of the usage of these words in the post-Aristotelian Greek writers to the beginning of the first century A.D.

I. ΠΝΕΥΜΑ

1. Wind, whether a gentle breeze or blast.

Polyb. *Hist.* i. 44. 4: μὴ σὺν τοῖς πολεμίοις ὑπὸ τῆς βίας τοῦ πνεύματος συγκατενέχθωσιν.

Lest they should be carried along with the enemy by the force of the wind.

See also Epicurus¹ *Epist.* ii. 100 (occurring several times), 105, 106, 115; Polyb.² *Hist.* i. 48. 5, 8; 60. 6; x. 10. 4; Dion. Hal.² i. 15. 39; 52. 54; 72. 53.

2. Air, tenuity rather than motion being the chief characteristic thought of.

Polyb. *Hist.* xxiv. 8 d: Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ κομίσαντες αὐτὸν εἰς τὸν καλούμενον θησαυρὸν, οἴκημα κατὰγειον οὔτε πνεῦμα λαμβάνον οὔτε φῶς ἐξώθεν, οὔτε θύρας ἔχον . . . ἐνταῦθα κατέθεντο.

Bringing him into the so-called treasury, which was a subterranean chamber which received neither air nor light from without and which had no doors . . . there they set him down. [See also Epicur. *Epist.* i. 63, cited below under Epicurus.]

Kindred with this sense, being rather an extension of application than a change of meaning, is the use of πνεῦμα inclusively to denote gas, air, aether in Pseudo-Hippocrates, *Περὶ Φυσῶν* (ed. Littré, Vol. VI, p. 94), which perhaps belongs to this period: Πνεύματα δὲ τὰ μὲν ἐν τοῖσι σώμασι φύσαι καλέονται, τὰ δὲ ἔξω τῶν σωμάτων ἀήρ. . . . ἅπαν γὰρ τὸ μεταξὺ γῆς τε καὶ οὐρανοῦ πνεύματος ἐμπλεὲς ἐστίν. . . . Ἄλλὰ μὴν ἡλίου τε καὶ σελήνης καὶ ἀστρων ὁδὸς διὰ τοῦ πνεύματος ἐστίν.

¹ Usener, *Epicurea* (Leipzig, 1887).

² In *Scriptorum Graecorum Bibliotheca* (Paris, 1839-85).

3. In a distinctly vital sense, signifying breath of life (loss of which is death), or life, or, even more generally, the primeval principle or basis of life, soul-stuff.

Polyb. *Hist.* xiii. 1a. 2: ἀποπον γὰρ εἶναι πολεμοῦντας μὲν καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα προΐεσθαι χάριν τῆς τῶν τέκνων ἀσφαλείας, βουλευομένους δὲ μηδὲνα ποιεῖσθαι λόγον τοῦ μετὰ ταῦτα χρόνου.

He said it was absurd to wage war and to yield up their very life-breath for the sake of their children's safety, and yet when taking counsel to take no account of the future.

On a similar passage in Pseudo-Demos. *Declam. fun.*, see under *ψυχή*, 1, below. Cf. also Plut. *De primo frig.* 2. 5: οἱ δὲ Στωικοὶ καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα λέγουσιν ἐν τοῖς σώμασι τῶν βρεφῶν τῇ περιψύξει στομοῦσθαι, καὶ μεταβάλλον ἐκ φύσεως γίνεσθαι ψυχὴν (cited in Zeller, *Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics*, p. 213).

By metonymy, energy, vigor, forcefulness.

Dion. Hal. (Usener and Rademacher, *Dionysii Hal. Opuscula*, I, 170): ἀψυχός ἐστιν ἡ διάλεκτος αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐ παθητικὴ πνεύματός τε, οὐ μάλιστα δεῖ τοῖς ἐναγωνίοις λόγοις, ἐλαχίστην ἔχουσα μοῖραν.

Lifeless is his speech and both unimpassioned and almost devoid of energy, which is pre-eminently necessary to forensic discourse.

The parallelism of the two expressions ἀψυχος and πνεύματος ἐλαχίστην ἔχουσα μοῖραν seems to imply that in the latter part of the first century B.C. *ψυχή* and *πνεῦμα*, both having the meaning life, could both be used by metonymy for energy (of speech). It does not follow, nor is there evidence to show that *πνεῦμα* was at this time used as an individualizing name for the human soul.

4) A demon.

Dion. Hal. i. 31. 28: τὰς μὲν γὰρ ῥῥῶδες καλοῦσι Ῥωμαῖοι κάρμενα, τὴν δὲ γυναῖκα ταύτην ὁμολογοῦσι δαιμονίῳ πνεύματι κατὰσχετον γενομένην τὰ μέλλοντα συμβαίνειν τῷ πλήθει δι' ῥῥῶδης προλέγειν.

The Romans call the odes *carmina*, and confess that this woman being possessed by a demonic spirit foretells to the multitudes by an ode the things that are to happen.

This usage is attested by LXX (I Sam. 16:23; I Kings 22:21, etc.) for an earlier period than Dion. Hal., and it is quite possible

that it was current among non-Jewish as well as among Jewish Greek writers; but the example quoted above is the earliest instance that the present investigation has discovered in non-Jewish Greek literature.

II. ψυχή

1. Life, loss of which is death, sometimes of lower animals but usually of men.

Polyb. *Hist.* v. 34. 10: ὁ δὲ προειρημένος βασιλεὺς ὀλιγώρως ἕκαστα τούτων χειρίζων διὰ τοὺς ἀπρεπεῖς ἔρωτας καὶ τὰς ἀλόγους καὶ συνεχεῖς μέθας, εἰκότως ἐν πάνυ βραχεὶ χρόνῳ καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἅμα καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐπιβούλους εὗρε καὶ πλείους.

The afore-mentioned king, managing each of these neglectfully on account of indecent amours and senseless and continual debauches, naturally found in a very short time many plots both against his life and against his throne.

By a double metonymy ψυχή is used to denote the source of the joy of life, or of what is good in life.

Ps.-Dem.¹ *Declam. fun.* 24: δοκεῖ δὲ μοί τις ἂν εἰπὼν ὡς ἡ τῶνδε τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀρετὴ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἦν ψυχὴ τάληθες εἰπεῖν. ἅμα γὰρ τὰ τε τούτων πνεύματ' ἀπηλλάγη τῶν οἰκείων σωματῶν, καὶ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀξίωμ' ἀνῆρηται.

It seems to me, indeed, that if one should say that the valor of such men was the soul of Greece one would speak truly, for at the same time that the breaths of these men departed from their bodies the reputation of Greece was destroyed.

2. A shade, the soul of man existing after death or departing from the body in death.

Ar. *Did. Fr. phys.* 39 (cf. Eus. *P.E.* xv. 20, Diels, *Dox.*, p. 471): Εἶναι δὲ ψυχὴν ἐν τῷ δλω φασίν, ὃ καλοῦσιν αἰθέρα καὶ ἀέρα κύκλῳ περὶ τὴν γῆν καὶ θάλασσαν καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἀναθυμιάσεις· τὰς δὲ λοιπὰς ψυχὰς προσπεφυκέναι ταύτῃ, ὅσαι τε ἐν ζώοις εἰσὶ καὶ ὅσαι ἐν τῷ περιέχοντι· διαμένειν γὰρ ἐκεῖ τὰς τῶν ἀποθανόντων ψυχὰς. ἔνιοι δὲ τὴν μὲν τοῦ δλου αἰτίδιον τὰς δὲ λοιπὰς συμμίγνυσθαι ἐπὶ τελευτῇ εἰς ἐκείνην. ἔχειν δὲ πᾶσαν ψυχὴν ἡγεμονικόν τι ἐν αὐτῇ, ὃ δὴ ζωὴ καὶ αἰσθησίς ἐστι καὶ ὁρμή.

¹ *Scrip. Gr. Bib.*

They say there is a soul in the universe, which [universe] they call aether and air in a circle¹ round about the earth and the sea, and there are exhalations from these. And the other [individual] souls cling to this [universal soul], both such as are in living creatures and such as are in the surrounding region. For there the souls of the dead live on. Some hold that the soul of the universe is eternal and that the others are finally united to it. And every soul, they hold, has a ruling part in itself, which is life and perception and impulse.

Cf. also Diog. Laert. vii. 79.

3. Soul, as a constituent element of man's nature; the human mind in the larger sense of the word as the seat of emotion, will, thought, and character. Sometimes applied with similar force to living animals in general, and even to the universe.

a) Applied to men.

Epicur. *Epist.* fr. 200: ἀφυσιολόγητον μηδὲν ἡγοῦ βούσης τῆς σαρκὸς βοᾶν τὴν ψυχὴν. σαρκὸς δὲ φωνή· μὴ πεινῆν, μὴ διψῆν, μὴ ῥιγοῦν. καὶ ταῦτα τῇ ψυχῇ χαλεπὸν μὲν κωλύσαι, ἐπισφαλὲς δὲ παρακοῦσαι τῆς παραγγειλάσης φύσεως αὐτῇ διὰ τῆς προσφυοῦς αὐτῇ αὐταρκείας καθ' ἡμέραν.

Regard it as nothing inexplicable that the soul cries out when the flesh cries. And the voice of the flesh is not to be hungry, not to be thirsty, not to be cold. And it is difficult for the soul to prevent these things [i.e., hunger, thirst, and cold], and it is perilous for it day after day to disregard the commands of nature through the exercise of that autonomy which is inherent in it [the soul].

Note the intimate relation of soul and flesh (=body), but also the autonomy ascribed to the soul.

Theocr. xvi. 24: ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ψυχᾷ, τὸ δὲ καὶ τιμὴ δοῦναι ἀόζων.

But a part [of your money] to your own desire and a part to one of the servants give.

Polyb. *Hist.* iii. 81. 3: οὕτω χρή καὶ τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῶν ὅλων προεστώτας σκοπεῖν, οὐχ ὅπου τι τοῦ σώματος γυμνόν, ἀλλὰ ποῦ τῆς ψυχῆς εὐχείρωτόν τι παραφαίνεται τοῦ τῶν ἐναντίων ἡγεμόνος.

It behooves commanders to notice, not where some part of the body is exposed, but where some part of the mind of the leader of the opposing forces appears easy to overcome.

¹ The text is corrupt here.

Polyb. *Hist.* iii. 87. 3: ἀνεκτήσατο δὲ τὰ τε σώματα καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν ἀνδρῶν.

He revived both the bodies and the souls of the men.

Polyb. *Hist.* xx. 4. 7: ἀλλ' ὀρμήσαντες πρὸς εὐωχίαν καὶ μέθας, οὐ μόνον τοῖς σώμασιν ἐξελεύθησαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς.

But being eager for feasting and carousals they became enfeebled not only in body but also in mind.

See also Epicur. *Phys.* 314; *Sent.* 69, 81 (Wotke, *Wiener Studien*, X); *Epist.* iii. 122, 128 (*passim*), 132 (*bis*); *Ethica* 417, 425 (Usener, pp. 59, 62, 161); Theocr. viii. 35; Polyb. *Hist.* i. 15. 7; 32. 8; 35. 5; 75. 3; 81. 6, 7; 87. 1; ii. 20. 5; 23. 7; 30. 7; 53. 3; iii. 9. 7; 12. 5; 63. 1; 81. 3; 87. 3; 90. 4; iv. 21. 4; 54. 3; vi. 24. 9; vii. 16. 4; viii. 5. 3; 9. 7; ix. 22. 1, 6; x. 7. 2; 14. 12; 19. 5; 22. 6; xii. 12b. 2; 23. 2, 5; xiii. 2. 1, 2; 3. 3; 5. 5; xiv. 6. 8; 8. 8; xv. 4. 12; 16. 4; xvi. 5. 7; xx. 4. 6; 7. 4; 10. 9; xxii. 8. 8; xxv. 9. 2; xxvi. 3. 11; xxvii. 10. 2; xxviii. 17a. 2; xxix. 6. 9, 13, 14, 15; *Fr. Gram.* 91. Cf. Plut. *Non posse suav.* 3, p. 1088 (Usener, p. 281); Stob. *Floril.* vi. 50 (Usener, p. 284); Dion. Hal. i. 1. 13, 33; 38. 34; ii. 20. 45; 28. 47; 68. 50; iii. 12. 28; 13. 27; 19. 34; 21. 44; 21. 8 (p. 145).

b) Soul is ascribed to the lower animals.

Ar. Did. *Fr. phys.* 39 (cited in Eus. *P.E.* xv. 20; see Diels, *Dox.*, p. 471): τὰς δὲ τῶν ἀφρόνων καὶ ἀλόγων ζώων ψυχὰς συναπόλυσθαι τοῖς σώμασιν.

But the souls of the senseless and irrational animals perish with their bodies.

c) Soul is also ascribed to the universe. See Ar. Did. *Fr. phys.* 39, cited under 2 above.

4. By metonymy, the vital or conscious element in man standing for the man himself, ψυχή is used with the meaning "person."

Polyb. *Hist.* vi. 48. 4: ἐκατέρων δὲ τούτων ὁμοῦ συνδραμόντων εἰς μίαν ψυχὴν ἢ πόλιν.

Each of these [virtues] being combined in one person or one city.

See also perhaps Epicurus *Eth.* 488 (Usener, p. 306); Dion. Hal. iii. 30. 11.

III. ΣΑΡΞ

1. The soft muscular portion of the body. Instances doubtless occurred in this period, though the present study has not discovered one.

2. By synechdoche *σάρξ* (also in the plural) denotes the body, or is qualitatively applied to any part of the body, without distinction of flesh, skin, and bones.

Epicur. *Sent.* iv: οὐ χρονίζει τὸ ἀλγοῦν συνεχῶς ἐν τῇ σαρκί, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἄκρον τὸν ἐλάχιστον χρόνον παρέστι, τὸ δὲ μόνον ὑπερτεῖνον τὸ ἡδόμενον κατὰ σάρκα οὐ πολλὰς ἡμέρας συμβαίνει. αἱ δὲ πολυχρόνιοι τῶν ἀρρωστίων πλεονάζον ἔχουσι τὸ ἡδόμενον ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ ἢ περ τὸ ἀλγοῦν.

Pain does not last continuously in the flesh; but its climax continues a very short time, and that degree which only just outweighs the pleasure in the flesh exists not many days, and in long-continued illnesses the pleasure is more than the pain.

See also Epicur. *Sent.* xviii, xx (*bis*)¹; li²; *Eth.* 408.

With this general exhibit of the usage of this period before us, we may now pass to consider the views of particular schools of thought.

EPICURUS AND THE EPICUREANS

Epicurus was born in 341 B.C., and entered upon his work as a teacher of philosophy while Aristotle was still living. But he was far from being a disciple of Aristotle, or of his great predecessors, Socrates and Plato. In the fundamental features of his philosophy he was rather a follower of Democritus.

The following passages will suffice to show those elements of his thought with which we are most concerned:

Epist. i. 39-41: ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἐστὶ <σώματα καὶ τόπος>· σώματα μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἔστιν, αὕτη ἡ αἰσθησις ἐπὶ πάντων μαρτυρεῖ, καθ' ἣν ἀναγκαῖον τὸ ἔδηλον τῷ λογισμῷ τεκμαίρεσθαι, ὥσπερ προεῖπον. τόπος δὲ εἰ μὴ ἦν, ὃν κενὸν καὶ χώραν καὶ ἀναφή φύσιν ὀνομάζομεν, οὐκ ἂν εἶχε

¹ Usener, *Epicurea* (Leipzig, 1887).

² Wotke, *Wiener Studien*, X.

τὰ σώματα ὅπου ἦν οὐδὲ δι' οὗ ἐκινεῖτο, καθάπερ φαίνεται κινούμενα. παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐθὲν οὐδ' ἐπινοηθῆναι δύναται οὔτε περιληπτικῶς οὔτε ἀναλόγως τοῖς περιληπτοῖς, ὅσα καθ' ὅλας φύσεις λαμβάνομεν καὶ μὴ ὡς τὰ τούτων συμπτώματα ἢ συμβεβηκότα λέγομεν. καὶ μὴν καὶ τῶν σωμάτων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ συγκρίσεις, τὰ δ' ἐξ ὧν αἱ συγκρίσεις πεποίηται· ταῦτα δὲ ἐστὶν ἄτομα καὶ ἀμετάβλητα, εἴπερ μὴ μέλλει πάντα εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν φθαρήσεσθαι ἀλλ' ἰσχύειν τι ὑπομένειν ἐν τοῖς διαλύσεσι τῶν συγκρίσεων, πλήρη τὴν φύσιν ὄντα, οὐκ ἔχοντα ὅπῃ ἢ ὅπως διαλυθήσεται. ὥστε τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀτόμους ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι σωμάτων φύσεις [Usener, p. 6].

But the universe consists of bodies and place. For that it is bodies common-sense itself testifies, and by this it is necessary that whatever is obscure should be attested to the reason, as I have said before. But if there were no space, which we call also empty, and place and intangible existence, bodies would not have where to be, or through which to move, whereas it is evident that they do move. And aside from these nothing can be known either by apprehension or by analogy with things that can be apprehended. We are speaking of things that we receive according to their whole natures and not of the essential attributes or accidental qualities of these. And indeed of the bodies, some are compounds and some are the things of which the compounds are made. And the latter are atoms and are unchangeable, if so be all things are not to be turned by destruction into non-existence but have strength to continue to be something in the dissolution of the compounds, being full in respect to their nature, there being no means or method by which they can be dissolved. So that the first beginnings must be indivisible, corporeal entities.¹

Epist. i. 63-65: Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα δεῖ συνορᾶν ἀναφέροντα ἐπὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰ πάθη (οὕτω γὰρ ἡ βεβαιότατη πίστις ἔσται), ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ σώμα ἐστὶ λεπτομερὲς πᾶρ' ὅλον τὸ ἄθροισμα παρεσπαρμένον, προσεμφερέστατον δὲ πνεύματι θερμοῦ τινα κρᾶσιν ἔχοντι καὶ πῇ μὲν τούτῳ προσεμφέρεις, πῇ δὲ τούτῳ, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ [read: δέ του] μέρους πολλὴν παραλλαγὴν ἐιληφός τῇ λεπτομερείᾳ καὶ αὐτῶν τούτων, συμπαθὲς δὲ τούτῳ μᾶλλον καὶ τῷ λοιπῷ ἄθροισματι· τοῦτο δὲ πᾶν αἱ δυνάμεις τῆς ψυχῆς διήγον καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ αἱ εὐκίνησιν καὶ αἱ διανοήσεις καὶ ὧν στερόμενοι θνήσκουσιν. καὶ μὴν καὶ ὅτι ἔχει ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τὴν πλείστην αἰτίαν, δεῖ κατέχειν· οὐ μὴν εἰλήφει ἂν ταύτην, εἰ μὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ λοιποῦ ἄθροισματος ἐστεγάζετό πως. τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἄθροισμα παρασκευάσαν ἐκείνῃ τὴν αἰτίαν ταύτην μετέιληφε καὶ αὐτὸ τοιούτου συμπτώματος

¹ Cf. Hicks, *Stoics and Epicureans*, p. 220.

παρ' ἐκείνης, οὐ μέντοι πάντων ὧν ἐκείνη κέκταται· διὸ ἀπαλλαγείσης τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἔχει τὴν αἴσθησιν. οὐ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ταύτην ἐκέκτητο τὴν δύναμιν, ἀλλ' ἕτερον ἡμα συγγεγεννημένον αὐτῷ παρεσκεύαζεν, ὃ διὰ τῆς συντελεσθείσης περὶ αὐτὸ δυνάμεως κατὰ τὴν κίνησιν σύμπτωμα αἰσθητικὸν εὐθὺς ἀποτελοῦν ἑαυτῷ ἀπεδίδου κατὰ τὴν ὁμοῦρησιν καὶ συμπάθειαν καὶ ἐκείνῳ, καθά περ εἶπον. διὸ δὴ καὶ ἐνυπάρχουσα ἡ ψυχὴ οὐδέποτε ἄλλου τινὸς μέρους ἀπηλλαγμένου ἀναισθητήσῃ· ἀλλ' ἂν καὶ ταύτης ξυναπόληται τοῦ στεγάζοντος λυθέντος εἰ θ' ὅλου εἰ τε καὶ μέρους τινός, ἐάν περ διαμένη ἔξει τὴν αἴσθησιν' [Usener, p. 19].

And it is necessary after these things to take a comprehensive view of things that refer to the sensations and the feelings (for thus will the firmest confidence arise), because the soul is a body composed of fine particles, scattered through the whole organism, most like to air [*πνεύματι*], having a certain mixture of heat, in some ways resembling this and in some ways that, and in one part endowed with extreme mobility by reason of the fineness of the particles of which it is composed, and responsive especially to this part, but also to the remainder of the organism. And the powers of the soul pervade all this organism and so also do the feelings and the emotions and the thoughts, and all those things being deprived of which we die. And that it is the soul that chiefly has the power of sensation, it is necessary also to hold. Yet it would not have obtained this power if it had not been somehow protected by the remainder of the organism. But the remainder of the organism having given to it [the soul] this power received also itself from it [the soul] a share of such property, yet not of all of which it [the soul] is possessed. Therefore when the soul departs the organism has no power of sensation. For it did not itself possess the power in itself, but another born with it imparted it to it, for this other [the soul] through the power that is generated in its environment immediately producing a capacity for sensation by motion, imparted it also to the other, as was possible because of their coterminousness and sympathy, as I have said. Therefore while the soul exists it will never cease to be sensitive, because some other part is taken away. But whatever of it perishes along with the destruction of that which covers it, whether it be the whole or some part that is destroyed, if it but remain it will have the power of sensation.²

Plut. *Epit.* i. 3 (Diels, *Dox.*, p. 285): 'Ἐπίκουρος . . . ἀρχὰς εἶναι τῶν ὄντων σώματα λόγῳ θεωρητά, ἀμέτοχα κενοῦ, ἀγέννητα, ἀδι-ἀφθαρτα, [τὰ] οὔτε θραυσθῆναι δυνάμενα οὔτε ἀλλοιωθῆναι.

Epicurus said that the principles of things are bodies perceptible to reason non-spatial, unoriginated, indestructible, incapable either of being broken down or of being altered.

² Cf. Hicks, *Stoics and Epicureans*, p. 264.

Hippolyt. *Phil.* 22 (Diels, *Dox.*, p. 571): 'Επίκουρος δὲ σχεδὸν ἐναντίαν πᾶσι δόξαν ἔθετο, ἀρχὰς μὲν τῶν ὄλων ὑπέθετο ἀτόμους καὶ κενόν, κενὸν μὲν οἷον τόπον τῶν ἐσομένων, ἀτόμους δὲ τὴν ὕλην, ἐξ ἧς τὰ πάντα. ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἀτόμων συνελθουσῶν γενέσθαι καὶ τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς πάντα καὶ ζῶα καὶ ἄλλα, ὥς μηδὲν μήτε συνεστάναι, εἰ μὴ ἐκ τῶν ἀτόμων εἴη. . . . τὰς δὲ ψυχὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων λύεσθαι ἅμα τοῖς σώμασιν, ὥσπερ καὶ συγγενᾶσθαι αὐτοῖς τίθεται. αἷμα γὰρ αὐτὰς εἶναι, οὐ ἐξελθόντος ἢ τραπέντος ἀπόλλυσθαι ὄλον τὸν ἄνθρωπον.

Epicurus, however, lays down an opinion opposed to nearly all others. He assumes the principles of all things to be atoms and space; space is the place of things that are to exist, and atoms are the matter from which all things [are made]. And from the concurrence of the atoms come into existence both God and the principles, and all the things in them, both living and otherwise, so that nothing either comes into existence or continues to exist unless it be from the atoms. . . . And the souls of men perish along with their bodies just as, he holds, they were also born with them. For they are themselves blood, which if it departs or is changed the whole man is destroyed.

These passages bring out the central elements of Epicurus' system of thought. The ultimate realities of existence are atoms, space, and motion. Bodies are either these atoms, themselves unchangeable and indestructible, or the compounds of these. Other than bodies and space there are no existences. And the only incorporeal thing is space.

Epicurus makes frequent mention of the *ψυχή*, often in association with, and in distinction from, *σῶμα*; *ψυχή* and *σῶμα* together constituting man. But *ψυχή* is no exception to the general principle that everything but space is corporeal; for it also is a body composed of fine particles, dispersed all over the organism, most closely resembling wind (or air), having a certain admixture of heat.¹ Those, therefore, that say that the body is incorporeal talk foolishly.² What he meant by the predicate *σῶμα* is apparently expressed with essential correctness in the statement of Plutarch that Epicurus ascribed to body not only size and shape, as Democritus

¹ Cf. also Aëtius iv. 4. 6, p. 390 D (Plut. iv. 4. 3), cited by Usener, p. 217: *Επίκουρος διμερῇ τὴν ψυχὴν, τὸ μὲν λογικὸν ἔχουσαν ἐν τῷ θώρακι καθιδρυμένην, τὸ δὲ ἄλογον καθ' ὅλην τὴν σύγκρισιν τοῦ σώματος διεσπαρμένην.*

² *Loc. cit. med.*

did, but also weight.¹ According to Aëtius, the Epicureans did not ascribe souls to the plants.²

Πνεῦμα Epicurus seems commonly to have used in the sense of "air," "breath," or "wind."³ Nor does he use the term in any specifically different sense when he says that the soul resembles breath (or wind) with a certain admixture of heat (πνεύματι θερμοῦ τινα κράσιν ἔχοντι),⁴ or when, according to Aëtius, quoted by Plutarch and Stobaeus,⁴ he says that "the soul is a mixture of four things, one that is of fire-like quality, and one air-like, and one wind-like (πνευματικός), and the fourth a certain unnamable something, in which is the power of sensation, and of these four the πνεῦμα produces motion, and the ἀήρ quiet, and the θερμόν the apparent heat of the body, and the unnamable element, the power of sensation that is in us, for in none of the named elements is there sensation."⁵ By its mention of the fourth unnamed element in which is contained the power of perception, this statement might seem at first sight to ascribe to the soul an element of immateriality. But the unequivocal and repeated assertion that nothing except space is incorporeal and that all bodies are atoms or composed of atoms compels the conclusion that even the fourth element is corporeal, though, no doubt, of the finest and most impalpable matter. And this in turn emphasizes the materiality of the element πνεῦμα, for while to the unnamed element, itself corporeal, is ascribed perception, to the πνεῦμα motion only is imputed.

¹ Usener, p. 196, ll. 1 ff.; cf. *Epist.* i. 54. where Epicurus says expressly that the atoms have none of the qualities of visible things except shape and weight and size. See also *Gram. Byz.*, cited by Usener, p. 222.

² Plut., cited by Usener, p. 216: οἱ Στωικοὶ δὲ καὶ Ἐπικούρειοι οὐκ ἔμψυχα (τὰ φυτὰ). τινὰ γὰρ ψυχῆς ὀρμητικῆς εἶναι καὶ ἐπιθυμητικῆς, τινὰ δὲ καὶ λογικῆς. τὰ δὲ φυτὰ αὐτομάτως πῶς κινεῖσθαι, οὐ διὰ ψυχῆς. But the latter part of the statement is probably Stoic rather than Epicurean.

³ Usener, pp. 44-49, *passim*.

⁴ Usener, p. 19, ll. 18 f.

⁵ Usener, p. 218, ll. 20 ff. Brieger, *Epikurs Lehre von der Seele*, contends (pp. 9 ff.) that Epicurus' fourth element was "Geist." But he seems to mean by this only that to this element Epicurus ascribes the attributes of "spirit." He adduces, at any rate, no linguistic evidence that Epicurus called the fourth element πνεῦμα. In fact, as shown above, Epicurus expressly distinguished the fourth element, which furnishes the power of sensation, from the πνεῦμα.

The soul, composed of the most impalpable elements, is held together by the coarser elements that make up the body, and at death perishes as completely as the body, indeed, by its nature is more quickly dissipated.

Σῶμα is, as indicated above, used in a broader and a narrower sense. As a general philosophic term it signifies that which has extension and weight, and is applicable as a predicate to all existences except space. See *Epic. Epist.* i. 39-41, in Usener, pp. 6 f.; Hicks, p. 220; also *Epist.* i. 68, in Usener, p. 22. In the narrower sense it is a complementary term to ψυχή, denoting the tangible and visible element of man. See *Epist.* iii. 127-31, in Usener, pp. 62 ff.; Hicks, p. 170.

Σάρες is with Epicurus most commonly a synonym for σῶμα in the narrower sense, viz., as complementary to the ψυχή; though for some reason he seemed to prefer to use σάρες with διάνοια and σῶμα with ψυχή.¹ The σάρες has no ethical significance; for, in the first place, the line between good and bad runs not between the σάρες and the ψυχή, but across the experiences of both, and between pain and pleasure; and secondly, this distinction itself is not ethical but hedonistic. It is true that Epicurus assigned a higher value to the pleasures of the mind than to those of the body,² but this was not an antithesis but a gradation, and even thus not of things ethical but of pleasures. If the usage of Epicurus contributed in any way to the development of an ethical sense of the word σάρες, it must have been, not because he himself or his followers made σάρες the root of evil, but in part because he, first apparently of Greek writers, used it as a familiar substitute for σῶμα, and in part because his opponents, recoiling from his hedonism and ascribing to him not wholly unjustly the doctrine that ultimately all pleasure is a thing of the flesh, recoiled also from this term, flesh, as an evil thing.

Ψυχή differs therefore from σάρες and σῶμα in two respects. First, as in Greek writers generally, σῶμα and σάρες are phenomenal terms, ψυχή primarily a functional term. The σῶμα is a visible, tangible, ponderable entity. The ψυχή is the name, inherited by

¹ *Sent.* iv, xviii, xx; Usener, pp. 72 ff.; Hicks, pp. 185 ff.

² See especially *Sent.* xx.

Epicurus from his predecessors and more or less foreign to his philosophy, but too convenient to be altogether dispensed with, for that in man by virtue of which he feels, perceives, acts. It is true that by ascribing to the body also feeling, and by making the *ψυχή* also corporeal, the distinction between *ψυχή* and *σῶμα* is made less sharp than in previous writers. Yet it remains that *ψυχή* carries with itself, as a part of its definition, the power of perception—the affirmation of corporeality not being reached by analysis of the meaning of the word, but affirmed as a dogma by the Epicureans—while, on the other hand, *σῶμα* by definition has size, shape, and weight, and the ascription of psychical functions to it is a synthetic, not an analytic, judgment. The two terms differ, in the second place, in that, while the *ψυχή* is *σῶμα*, in the sense that it is composed of atoms, and has the essential qualities of a *σῶμα*, yet it is composed of finer particles than those that compose the *σῶμα* in the narrower sense, i.e., the *σάρξ*.

We find no trace in Epicurus of *πνεῦμα* as a predicate of God, though such an affirmation would really have been less inconsistent with the fundamentals of his philosophy than his assertion that the gods are imperishable. For while as an atomist he might have found room for gods composed of pneumatic atoms, he could not consistently explain why they should not, like men, eventually perish by dissolution.

Among the influential followers of Epicurus was Metrodorus (330–203). He was perhaps even more unequivocal than Epicurus in his assertions that the seat of pleasure was in the flesh, and perhaps used *σάρξ* as the synonym of *σῶμα* more freely. But the quotations which we have from his writings are so brief as to indicate with certainty no more than that he was in essential agreement in doctrine and use of words with Epicurus. Thus while Plutarch (*Non posse suav.* 4, 6, pp. 1089 D, 1090 f.) ascribes to Epicurus the doctrine that the healthy condition of the flesh (*σάρξ*) and the firm expectation of this give the highest and surest joy to those who are able to reason, Clement of Alexandria (*Strom.* ii. 131) imputes to Metrodorus the question: What good of the soul (*ψυχή*) is there other than a healthy condition of the flesh and the firm expectation of it? But Plutarch also says (*Adv. Colot.* 30, p. 1125 B) that Metrodorus

says that all the good and wise and excellent devices of the soul (*ψυχή*) exist for the sake of the pleasure that is according to the flesh (*τῆς κατὰ σάρκα ἡδονῆς ἕνεκα*) and the hope of the same, and every work is vain which does not contribute to this end.

In another passage (*Non posse suav.* 3, p. 1087 D) Plutarch ascribes the same words to Metrodorus but substitutes belly (*γαστήρ*) for flesh (*σάρξ*). These differences warn us not too confidently to deduce from later writers exact conclusions as to the vocabulary and verbal usage of either Epicurus or Metrodorus. See Koerte, "*Metrodori Epicurei Fragmenta*," in *Jahrbücher für Philologie*, Suppl. Band 17 (Leipzig, 1890), pp. 531-97; especially pp. 540 ff.

That the Epicureans did not differ widely among themselves in usage may be inferred with some degree of confidence from the fact that in the first century B.C. Lucretius is still in essential agreement with his master Epicurus. His chief peculiarity is that he introduces a distinction between *animus* and *anima*, covering by these terms what Epicurus expressed by *ψυχή* alone. The following extracts from the third book of his great poem will sufficiently illustrate his view (*De rerum natura* iii):

Now I say that mind [*animus*] and soul [*anima*] are held in union one with the other, and form of themselves a single nature, but that the head, as it were, and lord in the whole body is the reason [*consilium*], which we call mind [*animus*] or understanding [*mens*], and it is firmly seated in the middle region of the breast. For here it is that fear and terror throb, around these parts are soothing joys; here then is the understanding [*mens*] and the mind [*animus*]. The rest of the soul [*anima*], spread abroad throughout the body, obeys and is moved at the will and inclination of the understanding [*mens*]. . . .

This same reasoning shows that the nature of mind and soul is bodily. For when it is seen to push on the limbs, to pluck the body from sleep, to change the countenance, and to guide and turn the whole man—none of which things we see can come to pass without touch, nor touch in its turn without body—must we not allow that mind and soul are formed of bodily nature? Moreover, you see that our mind suffers along with the body, and shares its feelings together in the body. If the shuddering shock of a weapon, driven within and laying bare bones and sinews, does not reach the life, yet faintness follows, and a pleasant swooning to the ground, and a turmoil of mind which comes to pass on the ground, and from time to time, as it were, a hesitating will to rise. Therefore it must needs be that the nature of the mind is bodily, since it is distressed by the blow of bodily weapons.

Now of what kind of body this mind is, and of what parts it is formed, I will go on to give account to you in my discourse. First of all I say that it is very fine in texture, and is made and formed of very tiny particles. That this is so, if you give attention, you may be able to learn from this. Nothing is seen to come to pass so swiftly as what the mind pictures to itself coming to pass and starts to do itself. Therefore the mind bestirs itself more quickly than any of the things whose nature is manifest for all to see. But because it is so very nimble, it is bound to be formed of exceeding round and exceeding tiny seeds, so that its particles may be able to move when smitten by a little impulse. For so water moves and oscillates at the slightest impulse, seeing it is formed of little particles, quick to roll. . . .

This fact, too, declares the nature of the mind, of how thin a texture it is formed, and in how small a place it might be contained, could it be gathered in a mass; that as soon as the unruffled peace of death has laid hold on a man, and the nature of mind and soul has passed away, you could discern nothing there, that sight or weight can test, stolen from the entire body; death preserves all save the feeling of life, and some warm heat. And so it must needs be that the whole soul is made of very tiny seeds, and is linked on throughout veins, flesh, and sinews; inasmuch as, when it is all already gone from the whole body, yet the outer contour of the limbs is preserved unbroken, nor is a jot of weight wanting. . . .

Nevertheless we must not think that this nature is simple. For it is a certain thin breath that deserts the dying, mingled with heat, and heat moreover draws air with it; nor indeed is there any heat that has not air too mixed with it. For because its nature is rare, it must needs be that many first-beginnings of air move about in it. Already then we have found the nature of the soul to be triple; and yet all these things are not enough to create sensation, since the mind does not admit that any of these can create the motions that bring sensation [or the thoughts of the mind]. It must needs be then that some fourth nature, too, be added to these. But it is altogether without name; than it there exists nothing more nimble, nothing more fine, nor made of smaller or smoother particles. It first sends abroad the motions that bring sensation among the limbs: for it is first stirred, being made up of small shapes; then heat receives the motions and the hidden power of wind, and then air; then all things are set moving, the blood receives the shock and all the flesh feels the thrill; last of all it passes to the bones and marrow, be it pleasure or the heat of opposite kind. Yet not for naught can pain pierce thus far within, nor any biting ill pass through, but that all things are so disordered that there is no more place for life, and the parts of the soul scatter abroad through all pores of the body. But for the most part a limit is set to these motions, as it were, on the surface of the body: and by this means we avail to keep our life [Bailey's translation, pp. 110-14, *passim*].

[To be concluded in October]

RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE

WORKS ON THE HISTORY OF RELIGION

In this young science the student is no longer obliged to complain of the dearth of material. He is more likely to suffer from the embarrassment of riches, and may be reminded of the old danger of not seeing the wood for the trees. Evidence may be found in the group of books now on the reviewer's table, they being only a fragment of what has recently come from the press. Some of these frankly profess to give us observed phenomena only; others aspire to show the laws of development according to which religious experience has gradually disengaged itself from the heterogeneous matter with which in the earlier stages of civilization it is inextricably mixed.

Material for the religion of uncivilized peoples is given us in the pamphlet of Dr. Meinhof.¹ This opens a new series of the *Religions-geschichtliches Lesebuch*. The original work published under that name included selections from the various sacred books of the world. The present series assumes that religious material may be found in the folklore of peoples which have not yet a written literature. The specimens before us do in fact throw light upon the thinking of the savage. There is a rude attempt at a cosmogony, telling how God or a god created man and woman, and gave them speckled cows. The gift was withdrawn when men began to kill the animals. The only religious element in the story is the intimation that the cows are sacred and to kill them is a crime. The tales, like fairy stories elsewhere, are concerned with dragons and dragon-slayers, with men who are transformed into beasts, with witchcraft, magic, and ordeals. Parallel to European usage is the application of torture to persons accused of witchcraft in order to extort a confession. The line between magic and religion is faintly marked as among other peoples at this stage of culture. There is evidence, however, of worship of ancestors, of the worship of serpents, and of totemism. Rites which may be called religious are performed at the completion of a new house, at the beginning of harvest, and at the circumcision of the young men, although in all these cases the intention is to drive away the

¹ *Religionen der schriftlosen Völker Afrikas*. Von Carl Meinhof. Tübingen: Mohr, 1913. 46 pages. M. 1.20.

demons quite as much as to propitiate the divinities. There is a prayer recited at the time of sacrifice, however, in which the divinity is addressed as the "man in heaven." The phenomena are similar to what we find in other regions, and cannot be called new. But it is convenient to have them attested from native sources and in this form.

Savage beliefs concerning the state of the dead are treated at great length by Dr. Frazer in his Gifford Lectures.¹ The author's method is well known from his other works. We find here the same wealth of material and also the same insistence upon his own agnosticism. After an introductory lecture on method, in which he defines this department of science as the embryology of religion, he takes up the savage view of death, showing that among many peoples death is not regarded as a necessary phenomenon of earthly existence, but is always attributed to some external agency, either a malignant spirit or a human sorcerer. In the regions treated in this volume there seems also to prevail the belief that the soul does not perish at the death of the body but survives it, at least for a considerable time. The attempt to conciliate the ghosts is the logical result, and this, as is shown, leads in many cases to religion in the form of ancestor worship. It is impossible in a mere book notice to give an idea of the abundant material here presented to view. Lagarde used to say that he was simply the carter who brought building materials for those who should erect the building. Dr. Frazer is certainly one of the most industrious of our carters.

Among the attempts to popularize the results of the study of religion the *Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher* deserve a prominent place. One of these is before us in Professor Stübe's *Confucius*.² In limited compass but with admirable clearness the author sums up for us what is known of the great teacher. We look upon the picture of a typical Chinese with his conservatism, his practical sense, his love of tradition, and his evaluation of the social order: "A man of moral power and independent will combined with a clear judgment and an acute though well-balanced understanding." How far he may be classed with the great religious leaders and whether he should not be ranked as a "mere moralist" is still under debate. The truth seems to be that in religion as in other

¹ *The Belief in Immortality and the Worship of the Dead*. By J. G. Frazer. Vol. I. "The Belief among the Aborigines of Australia, the Torres Straits Islands, New Guinea and Melanesia." The Gifford Lectures, St. Andrews, 1911-12. London and New York: Macmillan, 1913. \$3.00.

² *Confucius*. Von Dr. R. Stübe. (*Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher*, III. Reihe, 15. Heft.) Tübingen: Mohr, 1913, 40 pages. M. 1.50.

things he accepted the great tradition of his people. Speculation was far from his thoughts. To this very fact he owes his influence among the Chinese, an influence which recent revolutions do not seem to have diminished.

The book of Professor Moulton is not quite what the title leads one to expect.¹ It is not a discussion of the relation of the historic religions to the idea of religion or to the universal religion. Nor is it what its second title claims, that is, a study of the science of religion pure and applied, unless we understand by the words the study of the bearing of the science of religion on the work of Christian missions. What an attentive reading of the book suggests is that the author fears lest the study of religion may in some way hinder the missionary in his work, perhaps by cooling the zeal of his supporters at home. He expresses the hope that his lectures "may have disarmed some of the very natural prejudice which may exist among Christian people when confronted with theories of the origin of religion appearing to them to leave out the supernatural." No doubt there is room for a careful study of the effect of the comparative study of religion on missionary methods, and in what this author says many things may help to clear up the confusion of thought on this subject. It is unfortunate, however, that at the very outset of the book we find inaccuracies which make the reader think that the writer has not given sufficient attention to his facts. For example, he confuses two separate works when he states that W. B. Smith has republished his *Vorchristliche Jesus* under the title *Ecce Deus*. On the next page Professor Drews is located at Jena instead of Karlsruhe. These are slips which one may call trifling, but it is by such that a man is apt to be judged. More serious is the question whether the author is sympathetic in his interpretation of ancient thought. He says, for example, that the disciples of John the Baptist after confessing their sins were plunged into the waters of the Jordan, far away from any holy place made with hands, "to assure them that even as they had washed away the uncleanness of the body so would God cleanse the guilt of the penitent soul." Where does Professor Moulton get this light on the mind of John the Baptist? Is it not much more in accord with ancient Jewish thought to suppose that the great preacher attributed efficacy to the *opus operatum*? Or, again, when the institution of the Supper by Jesus is called "an acted parable" is not the realism of ancient conceptions ignored? Certainly the author of the Fourth Gospel had much

¹ *Religions and Religion: A Study of the Science of Religion Pure and Applied.* By James Hope Moulton. New York: Methodist Book Concern. 212 pages. \$1.25.

more than an acted parable in mind when he spoke of eating the flesh and drinking the blood of the Son of Man. In making these criticisms I do not wish to underrate the religious warmth which finds expression in these lectures, and which will doubtless favorably impress many readers.

Of larger scope than any of the books yet noticed is the work of the late Professor von Orelli, the second edition of a book which is already known to workers in this field.¹ The author's theological position is also well known, but has not disagreeably influenced his presentation. Occasionally we seem to detect a survival from the time when it was supposed that traces of a primitive revelation, monotheistic in character, could be found among almost all nations. Traditional ideas show themselves in the mention of the remarkable oracle of Noah, father of the nations, according to which the Indo-European nations (Japhet) should spread abroad in the earth, whilst the Semites (Shem) should possess their revealed God as their most precious inheritance.

Since no man can be a specialist in all departments the writer of a book of this kind must depend largely upon the labors of others, and this author seems to have made diligent and judicious use of the literature at his command. Where he ventures on comparative study on his own account he is not always happy, as where he affirms that the God of heaven held among the primitive Aryans the same dominant place which the God of heaven possessed among Semites, and also among the Chinese. Unfortunate is the attempt to bring the sacredness of the cow among the Hindoos into comparison with the red heifer of the Levitical system. The most serious question raised by the book concerns the order of arrangement. This is, to be sure, one of the most difficult problems with which our science has to deal. Can we find a logical order in which to treat the religions of the world, so as to discover a progress from higher to lower? Professor von Orelli evidently thinks not. He is prejudiced against all evolutionary theories, and does not believe that the phenomena which we observe among uncivilized races represent primitive religion. His own arrangement of the various religions therefore makes no attempt at a progressive order, but follows what he supposes to be the accepted ethnological scheme, taking up first the Turanians, then the Hamites, followed by the Semites (including Israel, Christianity, which, however, is passed over with a mere mention, and Islam). Then comes

¹ *Allgemeine Religionsgeschichte*. Von Conrad von Orelli. Zweite Auflage in zwei Bänden. Bonn: Marcus und Weber, 1913. Published in parts, 2 Marks each. Vol. II, viii+478 pages.

the Indo-Germanic family, followed by Africans, American Indians, and the inhabitants of Australia and the islands of the Pacific. That this order is neither logical nor historic must be evident. The religion of the uncivilized Mongols and Tartars is interjected between those of the Chinese and Japanese. And by leaving the religions of Africa and Australia to the last the author debars himself from understanding many survivals of earlier ideas and rites which are found even in the higher forms of religion. In such a religion as that of the Greeks, for example, much light might have been had from such a book as Miss Harrison's *Prolegomena*, to which we find no reference whatever.

The high expectations with which we approach any work of Professor Moore are fully met by the one before us.¹ The purpose is clearly stated at the beginning: "In the presentation of the several religions, to show their relation to race and physical environment and to national life and civilization, to trace their history and to discover the causes of progress and decline and the influences which have affected them from without." I know of no work which so thoroughly accomplishes these objects as this one. It combines abundant learning with philosophic breadth of view and both with sympathetic insight.

By grouping these nine religions in one volume and reserving Judaism, Christianity, and Islam for separate treatment the author probably intends us to accept the fundamental classification of religions under the three heads of polydemonism, polytheism, and monotheism. He leaves at one side the religions of uncivilized peoples, since they require a different method. Whether the polytheistic religions he portrays form a graded sequence from lower to higher he does not tell us. But it is not without significance that certain survivals from prehistoric faith and ritual are more in evidence in China than elsewhere, and on any evolutionary theory it is appropriate to begin with this religion. And on the same theory the culmination may appropriately be reached with the Roman religion. At the same time we are not allowed to forget that striking resemblances are found in those regions most remote from each other. Thus in regard to the functions of the gods, "the religion of China strikingly resembles that of Rome; for a practical people it is enough to know what the gods do and what their worshippers have to do to secure their favor, without trying to imagine what they are like." A similar parallel is pointed out in connection with the claim of the

¹ *History of Religions*. By George Foot Moore. Vol. I, China, Japan, Egypt, Babylonia, Assyria, India, Persia, Greece, Rome. ("The International Theological Library.") New York: Scribner, 1913. xiv+637 pages. \$2.50.

Japanese emperor to be manifest deity, where we are reminded that Antiochus IV assumed the title of Epiphanes to express the same claim. The semiannual days of purification in Japan are parallel to Ezekiel's semiannual days of atonement. In the ritualistic development of Buddhism "a supernatural virtue is attributed to the performance of the ritual as in all high churches." These resemblances, which are in no case the result of borrowing, testify to the unity of religious thinking among the most diverse peoples. Did space allow I might quote numerous sentences which by calling attention to such parallels throw a vivid light upon this unity of man's religious experience. For these the reader must go to the book itself. And also for what is perhaps of even greater value, that is, the sympathetic treatment of the great religious leaders, Confucius, Buddha, Zoroaster, Plato, to mention only the most conspicuous.

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THE EXCAVATION OF BABYLON

Few cities have stirred the imagination of men as has Babylon. For almost two thousand years this city was either the political or cultural center of Western Asia. To the Hebrews, Babylon was "the glory of kingdoms, the beauty of the Chaldeans' pride" (Isa. 13:19). The size of Babylon was proverbial in classical antiquity. When the disgruntled Athenian Peisthetairus (in the comedy) left his country and sought his fortune among the birds, he recommended to them the construction of

a rampart, impregnably strong,
Enormous in thickness, enormously long;
Bigger than Babylon; solid and tall,
With bricks and bitumen, a wonderful wall,
(Aristophanes, *Birds*, 552 f.)

from which, as a center, they would be able to regain their empire and freedom. We are all familiar with Herodotus' interest in, and descriptions of, Babylon and the Babylonians. Upon the forehead of the "scarlet woman" the Christian seer saw written: "Mystery, Babylon the Great, the Mother of Harlots and of the Abominations of the Earth" (Rev. 17:5).

When the Assyrian army was overthrown, Nineveh fell, to rise no more; even the site of the city was forgotten until modern times. Babylon, on the other hand, fell before invading hosts of Hittites, Assyrians, and Persians, but always rose again from her ruins. At the

beginning of our era the city had almost disappeared, but even "as late as the close of the tenth century Ibn Hauqal refers to Babel as 'a small village'" (Hilprecht, *Explorations in Bible Lands*, p. 13). The "Tower of Babel" (which, however, was probably not on the site of the ancient Babylon, but at Birs, the ancient Borsippa, or some other mound) was visited by Benjamin of Tudela, a learned Spanish Jew of the twelfth century, by Marco Polo and many other travelers. With the nineteenth century began the scientific interest in the ruins of Babylon, soon to be followed by excavations. Among those who labored here may be mentioned Rich (1811), Layard (1850), Oppert (1852-54), Rassam (1878-79). On March 26, 1899, the Germans began the scientific excavation of the site under the directorship of Robert Koldewey and in connection with the Deutschen Orient-Gesellschaft. Some idea of the magnitude of this task may be gained from a statement in the preface to the excavator's semi-popular book on the results of the excavations up to the spring of 1912.¹ "Since the beginning of our excavations at Babylon there has been accomplished up to the present time (spring of 1912) only about one-half of the work which it is necessary or at least desirable to do, in spite of the fact that there have been employed daily, summer and winter, from 200 to 250 workmen."

Although it well deserves it, it is not probable that this work will be translated into English, and it seems best, therefore, to make this notice more of a résumé than a review. Stress will be laid upon the light which the excavations have thrown upon the history, life, and religion of the Babylonians rather than upon architectural and topographical results.

That the site of Babylon was inhabited in prehistoric times is shown by the stone implements found in the ruins. These include paleolithic "saws" of flint and obsidian, stone axes, hammer-heads, etc. Of so-called neolithic remains, only one arrow-head was found. Similarly at Farah and Surgul no neolithic remains came to light. These objects point to a time before the fifth millennium before Christ. Owing to the higher water level of modern times, the excavations could not be pushed into the lowest strata. The earliest accessible ruins date from the time of the First Dynasty, 2225-1926 B.C., and lie in that part of the mound called by the Arabs *Merkes*, that is "metropolis." Here, then, we have the city of the days of Hammurabi.

¹ *Das wieder erstehende Babylon.* Die bisherigen Ergebnisse der deutschen Ausgrabungen. Von Robert Koldewey. 2. Auflage. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1913. vii+328 pages. M. 15.

Although they are not as regular as in some modern cities, the streets of ancient Babylon were usually fairly straight—a point noticed by Herodotus (i. 180), and crossed at right angles. They ran about 16 degrees west of astronomical north, and the same number of degrees north of east. The same orientation was found in the case of the procession streets, the inner city walls, and all of the temples, including Esagila (see below). With the exception of the procession streets, the streets were not usually paved.

The Babylonian private house consisted of a main room running along the south end of, and opening into, an open court. Everything else varied according to circumstances. The number and arrangement of additional rooms vary; smaller courts with adjoining rooms may be added to the complex; but the court and main room are always the essential part of the house. Columns do not appear either in the courts or houses until the time when Greek influence begins to be felt. The houses were always built of sun-dried mud bricks resting upon foundations of burnt brick. The walls of the houses of the time of Hammurabi were not very thick, but they increase in thickness until the time when Babylon reached her zenith under the neo-Babylonian empire. It was in this period, as well as in the Persian and Greek epochs following, that the city was most thickly populated. In contrast to the older period when gardens were common, the houses now stand huddled close together along the narrow streets. Of the intervening strata, that of the time of Merodach-baladin, Bel-nadin-shum, etc. (ca. 1400–1300 B.C.), shows ruins of houses whose walls approached those of the neo-Babylonian period in thickness, but the city was not crowded as in the later period. The ruins of the houses of the Hammurabi age show the marks of destruction by fire, doubtless the work of the invading Hittites (see the January number of this *Journal*, p. 29). In Parthian times, thin-walled houses were scattered at a considerable distance from each other over the site of the older city.

Of the *Kleinfunde*, most of which were found in the *Merkes* area, that is, the main residential section of the city throughout her history, some deserve special mention. First come the cuneiform tablets, which were found in the different strata from the upper, Greek and Persian, to that containing the ruins of the Hammurabi period. Most of the oldest tablets (those from the Hammurabi period), as well as many from the later epochs, fall into the category of commercial documents. Many of the letters were found with their clay envelopes unbroken. Why so large a percentage of letters were never opened in antiquity remains a puzzle.

Of the non-commercial documents the "Omen-tablets" form the largest group. Except in the case of the largest ones, the tablets seem to have been stored in earthen pots. But even after the business transactions recorded in these documents had been brought to a close, the tablets were not thrown away. The Babylonians seem to have felt a certain reverence for that which was written, and consequently, when their preservation was no longer necessary for business reasons, they gathered together the canceled or broken tablets and carefully buried them in caches in the streets or in their houses, thus preserving them for scholars of the twentieth century.

Vases, pots, bowls, and flasks of all descriptions have been found. Glazed ware as well as glass beads were common from the earliest to the latest times. Koldewey calls attention to the fact that at Farah beads of this kind go back beyond the fourth millennium B.C. He sees no Egyptian influence until the Sargonid period (*ca.* 700 B.C.). Toys made out of clay, spinning whorls of clay or stone, small terra-cotta ships with some animal (probably the *Sirrush* or dragon) lying in them, hand-mills, in all periods consisting of a flat slab of basalt over which was drawn a small rubbing-stone, also of basalt, constitute some of the more important smaller finds. The Babylonian lamp consisted of a fairly high, wheel-turned bowl to which was attached a long, curved, hand-made spout, the finished product looking somewhat like a bedroom slipper with the toe turned up. The later specimens are glazed. Very few Babylonian weapons have been preserved. Only a few short swords, knives, and flat lance-blades of bronze were found. A goodly number of arrow-heads came to light near the walls and fortifications. The older arrow-head was a three-edged piece of bronze which was fitted over the end of the arrow-shaft. In the graves, especially, were found large quantities of beads—of glass, agate, onyx, crystal, amethyst, etc. In the Sargonid and neo-Babylonian periods the Babylonian artisan had developed a remarkable finesse, cutting minute figures of animals—toads, turtles, etc., or human heads—upon very small pieces of polished agate or other stone. Bracelets and anklets of bronze, silver, or iron are numerous. Frequently from three to five pairs of anklets are found on the bones of the lower limbs of burials. Earrings of gold or silver, safety-pins (*fibulae*) of bronze are common. But finger-rings are not common before the Persian period, when they begin to supplant the seal-cylinder, so characteristic of the Babylonian civilization. Little stone tablets with inscriptions and drawings upon them served as amulets. No coins appear until the time of Darius. Charred remains of grain (and date-seeds) have

been found in considerable quantities, but await further study by specialists to determine the different species. Fishbones in large quantities are scattered throughout the ruins, including the lower jaw of a species of carp which is still found in the Euphrates today. Bones of sheep, cattle, domestic fowls, pigeons, etc., are common. The frequent occurrence of the ankle-bones of sheep, as well as bronze casts of them, would indicate that the Babylonians, like the Romans, used these in games. The tusk of the wild boar, with a hole bored in one end, was probably used as an ornament—for the harness, perhaps. These finds give us a welcome insight into the daily lives of the ancient Babylonians. A special study of the images (more than 6,000, including fragments, to date) found at Babylon will undoubtedly throw much light upon the religion, especially the popular religion, of the Babylonians. Before the final word on the walls, fortifications, temples, and procession streets, there remains to be said a word about Babylonian burials.

The Babylonians buried their dead along the city walls, in the streets, or in any spot not occupied at the time by a dwelling. The graves were sunk from 1 to 2 meters into the earth. The lowest strata (time of Hammurabi and successors) contain no sarcophagi. The bodies were laid directly into the earth: at most they were wrapped in a reed mat or walled in by a few mud bricks. The corpse is almost always stretched at full length, and often lies in such a position as to create the impression that it was buried in the attitude and place in which life had left it. Above these burials are those in which the body was packed, usually in a sitting posture, into a coffin made of two large earthenware pots joined mouth to mouth. Above these, again, are found clay sarcophagi of different shapes into which the corpse was placed in the so-called "Hocker" or "Stülper" positions. In the upper, Greek and Parthian, strata, the sarcophagi are brick-walled graves into which were placed wooden coffins with the dead. The ornaments usually worn during life were buried with the dead. In addition numerous earthenware vessels—cups and basins in particular—were deposited in the grave. Few weapons were found buried with the dead; which is not surprising when we remember the peaceful character of the Babylonians. Only a few seals and seal-cylinders were found with burials. Evidently these were handed on to be used by the next generation.

The excavations enable us to trace the growth of Babylon from a comparatively small city in Hammurabi's day to the colossal city of Nebuchadrezzar (604-561 B.C.) and his successors, the city which made such an impression upon Herodotus. However, we cannot go into

details. While he admits the possibility of a wall of such dimensions, Koldewey does not believe that the figures given by Herodotus are correct, but thinks the 480 stadia give the distance *around* the city instead of the *length of a side*. The outer city wall (built by Nebuchadrezzar) consisted of a mud-brick wall 7 meters in thickness, with another wall 12 meters in front of it, built of burnt brick and 7.8 meters thick. Directly in front of this latter wall stood a moat-wall, also of burnt brick, 3.3 meters in thickness. Beyond lay the moat, which has not yet been excavated. Upon the mud-brick wall arose towers (8.37 meters wide) at intervals of about 50 meters. This will give some idea of the colossal nature of the fortifications of the neo-Babylonian city.

Some idea of the size of the great temple of Marduk, Esagila, will be obtained from the following figures: The temple was rectangular in form; its north front measuring 79.30, its east front 85.80 meters. Inside was a court 31.30 by 37.60 meters. To the west lay the main cella, that of Marduk, but this has not yet been excavated. Lack of space will not permit us to mention even the names of the other temples, the palaces, gates, and procession streets of the ancient city.

While Babylon's crumbling walls of brick and adobe must seem mean to the archaeologist who comes from Greece or Egypt, where the temples of marble or granite are so imposing and beautiful even in their ruins, nevertheless the excavations are making it clear that the grand scale upon which her walls, gates, palaces, and temples were built did not constitute Babylon's only claim to magnificence. One cannot study the bulls and dragons which adorned the enameled walls of the Ishtar gate, or the magnificent lions (originally about 120 in number) which guarded the procession street called Aibur-shabum, without feeling that the Babylonians of the later days, at least, had developed a high form of art, even if it is different from that of Greece or Egypt.

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HEBREW AND BABYLONIAN TRADITIONS

Professor Jastrow is one of the sanest and most industrious of the writers on Babylonian subjects, and his long researches into the various phases of Babylonian religion have made him the foremost authority upon this subject. One takes up his book on *Hebrew and Babylonian Traditions*,¹ therefore, with peculiar interest, an interest that is height-

¹ *Hebrew and Babylonian Traditions*. The Haskell Lectures delivered at Oberlin College in 1913, and since revised and enlarged. By Morris Jastrow, Jr., Ph.D. New York: Scribner, 1914. xviii+376 pages. \$2.50.

ened by the pan-Babylonian controversy of recent years. The book fully meets the reader's expectations. It is a sane, reverent, scientific treatment of the subject, happy throughout both in its method and its spirit. Its results, too, are most reassuring. It deserves to be placed beside Hehn's *Biblische und babylonische Gottesidee*.¹ The two works together effectually dispose of the extravagant claims of the pan-Babylonians.

Jastrow begins his book with a sketch of the relations between the Hebrews and Babylonians, and then devotes an interesting chapter to each of the following topics: "The Hebrew and Babylonian Accounts of the Creation"; "The Hebrew and Babylonian Sabbath"; "The Hebrew and Babylonian Views of Life after Death"; and "Hebrew and Babylonian Ethics." An appendix of considerable length is devoted to "Hebrew and Babylonian Accounts of the Deluge."

Each chapter begins with a clear and impartial statement of the early views of each of the two peoples on the topic in hand as these views are expressed in their respective literatures. The subsequent development of opinion on the matter in each nation is then traced in the same impartial way. It is found that the opinions of the two peoples on each of the topics discussed started from much the same standpoint. At the beginning they were very near together, but in each case the Hebrew view, as time went on, became more ethical, and was made the vehicle of expressing a lofty faith in the one God and in his intimate relation to human affairs. In no case is such an ethical or lofty turn given to the development of Babylonian thought. The whole forms an impressive proof of the unique quality of Israel's religious insight, which we call inspiration.

Perhaps the chapter which will win the assent of the reader most slowly is the chapter on the Sabbath, though here the author's views are but a development of those expressed by him in this *Journal*² in 1898. This development has been caused by the discovery of a text which informs us that the Babylonian *Shabbatum* was the fifteenth of the month, or the day of the full moon. Jastrow holds that the waning of the moon was in Babylonia a time of anxiety, and that the people were especially anxious to propitiate their gods before entering upon it. He finds several passages of the Old Testament (II Kings 4:23; Amos 8:5; Hos. 2:13; Isa. 1:13; Ezek. 46:1) in which the feast of the New Moon and the Sabbath are classed together, and thinks that the Sabbath in

¹ Reviewed in the *American Journal of Theology*, XVII (1913), 417 f.

² II, 312 f.

Israel also began as a festival connected with the full moon. Its original character as presented by Jastrow now is much the same as that presented by him sixteen years ago, though in tracing its later development (and it is traced in outline down to the present time) the author does full justice to the value of the Sabbath as it was finally understood.

The book is well printed. Few typographical errors have been noticed. One of these (p. 161, note) places the victory of Judas Macabaeus over Nicanor in 160 instead of 161 B.C.

Naturally in such a work one must differ from the author here and there on minor points, but these are surprisingly few. The whole discussion is so sane and persuasive that the conclusions for the most part commend themselves. The style is clear and the book interesting. It should be widely read.

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THE RELIGION OF ISRAEL

This volume by H. P. Smith¹ constitutes a fitting companion to its author's earlier *Old Testament History*, in the "International Theological Library." The religion of Israel was so closely enmeshed in the political history of Israel that to write a history of the one necessarily involves the record of a large part of the other. Consequently, since Professor Smith has not materially changed his views since the appearance of his *History* in 1903, the student familiar with the latter will find relatively little that is new in the present work. But it is an admirable presentation of its author's views and represents also in the main the position of the majority of historical students of Hebrew religion at the present time. Anyone wishing to know, in general, what the result of historical criticism is upon the interpretation of Hebrew religion may well be referred to this book for his answer. Such a book was greatly needed. There is no other work in English upon this subject, of a comprehensive character, that approaches it in value. Professor Smith has been one of the pioneers of biblical scholarship among us, has worked hard and suffered much for the cause, and deserves the highest praise for his service. This book, like his preceding *History* and his commentary on Samuel in the "International Critical" series, warrants the bestowal of such praise in full measure.

¹ *The Religion of Israel. An Historical Study.* By H. P. Smith. New York: Scribner, 1914. x+370 pages. \$2.50.

The analysis of Israel's religious development first offered by Marti is here utilized, viz., (1) nomadic religion, (2) agricultural religion, (3) prophetism, (4) legalism. There is much suggestiveness and value in this. But this may not be taken too strictly. It is becoming quite clear that the settlement of the Hebrews in Canaan was a long-drawn-out process, lasting from at least as early as the Tell-el-Amarna period, and probably even earlier, to the days of David. This means that the two stages of culture, nomadic and agricultural, were represented on the soil of Canaan by different sections or groups of Hebrews for two or three centuries. As earlier settlers became farmers, new supplies of nomads were coming in from time to time; so that there was never any sharp line of demarkation between the two nor any definite point of time at which the one ceased to be and the other began. If this be granted, the question of the precise time at which Hebrew legislation took form becomes more complex. The Covenant Code, for example, may represent the social progress of generations upon the soil of Canaan prior to the "conquest." If so, how long after said "conquest" was it necessary to wait for the formulation or codification of this law? This is but part of a larger question: Does the tradition that the religion of Israel, including its law, practically originated with Moses, need revision? How does it come that, with Hebrews in Canaan generations before Moses, no recognition of their achievements—political, social, or religious—has been recorded? These are problems that still await solution.

No man can expect to command assent to all the opinions he expresses upon so difficult and so complex a subject as this. Hence, the liberty of expressing dissent from some conclusions may be indulged in without calling in question the great value of Professor Smith's work. The Kenite hypothesis is still held to here despite the many attacks upon it. It may well be that no better explanation of early Yahwism is yet available; but that is not sufficient reason for holding to an inadequate one. Explanation often has to await the discovery of new facts. Professor Smith holds that the Baalim were expelled from Israel by the ninth century B.C. He consequently accepts the common explanation of Hosea's language about them as due to the fact that the local Yahwehs were no better than Baalim. But this seems to fail to do justice to Hosea's language. Furthermore, the religion of the Assuan papyri from the fifth century B.C. shows such a full and free recognition and worship of other gods as well as Yahweh in Israel that it seems very improbable that as early as the ninth century B.C. the independent Baalim were

eliminated. It is noticeable that Professor Smith makes no use of these papyri and the valuable materials they offer in illustration of the stage of religious progress achieved in Israel up to the exilic period. Sometimes our author is too chary of explanations. For example, on p. 135, the phrase in Amos 1:3-5 is rendered "I will not turn back." This is impossible on the basis of the Massoretic text; but no indication is given of any emendation.

Professor Smith's pages are not burdened with references to literature or extensive notes. Little attention is paid in his pages to variant views. His aim is rather to state his own position clearly and strongly, and this he does successfully. The book reads well and will well repay reading and study.

A new work by Hölscher¹ is another history of prophecy. It is organized into six chapters. These deal with (1) ecstasy and vision, (2) the older manticism, (3) ecstatic prophecy, (4) Yahwism and prophecy, (5) the great prophets, (6) the origin of the prophetic books. Almost one-fourth of the volume is given to introductory questions concerning the nature of prophetic phenomena, such as vision, trance, dreams, and hypnotism. Here much very useful material is brought together for comparison. The general effect of this is to take such phenomena out of the isolation in which they are commonly placed and to put them in a category of experiences such as are common to men. This is the most useful portion of the book. It takes principles well known to students of psychology and applies them to the interpretation of the prophetic mind. The prophet is thus brought much nearer to the comprehension of the modern man.

To put all of the great prophets into one chapter is something of an undertaking. But it is accomplished by a rigid exclusion of much that we expect to find in any adequate treatment. The whole matter of the literary criticism of the prophetic writings is treated in the final chapter. This is separating the criticism from the historical interpretation in a way that is detrimental to both. The conclusions presented in the exposition of the messages of the great prophets are those generally held. There is little new. Among some of the views held which are less widely accepted than the most, we may mention the claim that Isaiah did not prophesy deliverance from Sennacherib's army, but quite the opposite.

¹ *Die Profeten. Untersuchungen zur Religionsgeschichte Israels.* By G. Hölscher. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1914. viii+486 pages. M. 9.

This conclusion seems well grounded. Hölscher is right, too, in protesting against the common interpretation of the Deuteronomic reform as one forced upon the priests by the prophetic party, or as a compromise. The priests themselves were sharers in the religious and ethical progress of the times and should not be robbed of the credit for instituting reforms within their own sphere. Indeed, it is very doubtful whether the contemporary prophets took any interest in the reform or built any hopes upon it. A frank expression of doubt regarding the genuineness of the prophecies in the Book of Ezekiel of a glorious future is a reflection of such recent studies as those of Hermann upon that book. The author of Isa., chaps. 40-55, is made to have lived in Egypt—a very doubtful conclusion. Malachi's reference to the pure worship of Yahweh among the heathen nations is still regarded as a recognition of the universality of true religion, though since the discovery that the Jews at Assuan had their own temple it has often been suggested that Malachi was referring to the worship of Yahweh by the exiled Jews. The Tiglath-pileser of 745 B.C. is now known to have been the fourth king by that name and not the third. The objectionable element in Hosea's marriage to Gomer is disposed of by the easy expedient of dropping 1:2b as a gloss and treating chap. 3 as an imaginative, unhistorical record of Hosea's family life. By such procedure anything may be proved.

The book contains much useful material and makes many good suggestions. Such work is necessary now in preparation for the rewriting of the history of prophecy that must come at no distant date. The main criticism of this piece of work is that it keeps too close to the beaten track. Not sufficient heed is given to such influences as are suggested by the fact of the existence of Semitic prophecy, by the revelations of the Assuan papyri, and by the new interpretation of eschatology furnished by Gunkel and Gressmann. The use of some literature other than that of German origin would have broadened the author's outlook.

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THE JEWISH-CHRISTIAN GOSPELS

It has long been a matter of common knowledge among scholars in the fields of New Testament and early church history that a problem of rather more than ordinary elusiveness arose from a number of patristic references to gospels in the Hebrew language or used by Jewish-Christian communities. From Papias and Irenaeus to Epiphanius and Jerome

they meet us in the most vague and apparently inconsistent forms. It is "the Hebrew Gospel," "The Gospel according to the Hebrews," "The Gospel of the Nazarenes," "The Gospel according to the Ebionites," "the original Matthew," and so forth. The statement of Papias links all these more or less closely to the first canonical gospel. What are the facts regarding the documents to which reference is thus made? Are they separate gospels or one? Are any two confused? Are they apocryphal, or copies in the Hebrew language of one or more of our canonical gospels? Where did they arise? Who were their readers? These and other difficult questions emerge, and possibly the only point of which unanimity can be predicated is that these were gospels closely related to communities of Christian Jews. To the solution of such problems is the book¹ under review devoted.

In the first section of the work Schmidtke presents some fresh material relative to the whole matter. Thirty-six MSS of the gospels have peculiar inscriptions of which one may be given as an example: Εὐαγγέλιον κατὰ Ματθαῖον · ἐγράφη καὶ ἀντεβλήθη ἐκ τῶν ἐν Ἱεροσολύμοις παλαιῶν ἀντιγράφων τῶν ἐν τῷ ἁγίῳ ὄρει ἀποκειμένων ἐν στίχοις βφιδ, κεφαλαίοις τνε. These MSS are representatives of the I recension, following the textual history and nomenclature of von Soden. The peculiarities justify the designation of the text as the Zion text. It arose between the years 370 and 500 A.D. In addition to these inscriptions the author brings forward a number of scholia, on Matthew which he discovered in the Cloister τῆς Παναγίας τῆς Εἰκοσιφοινίσσης. The significance of these for our problem can be seen from the one quoted. It is a scholion on Matt. 4:5: Τὸ Ἰουδαϊκὸν οὐκ ἔχει εἰς τὴν ἁγίαν πόλιν, ἀλλ' ἐν Ἱερουσαλήμ. An examination of them leads to the conclusion that the variants are drawn from a commentary on Matthew written by Apollinaris of Laodicea. The importance of this conclusion does not appear until later, when the work of Apollinaris is placed in relation to the whole problem.

After collecting all the references to the Jewish-Christian gospels Schmidtke proceeds to his problem, which evidently has a bearing in two directions: the identity of the documents to which reference is made and the circles in and for which they were produced.

¹ *Neue Fragmente und Untersuchungen zu den judenchristlichen Evangelien, ein Beitrag zur Literatur und Geschichte der Judenchristen.* (Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur, 3 Reihe, 7 Band, Heft 1.) Von Alfred Schmidtke. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1911. viii+302 pages. M. 10.

The Aramaic revision of Matthew (NE) which the Nazarenes possessed is examined on the basis of the available evidence, and attention is given to the relations and method of the father who supplies it. Papias receives short shrift. A review of his statement produces the following sentence: "Folglich berührt das papianische Zeugnis auf einem Irrtum." The evidence of Eusebius regarding Hegesippus and others, and that of Epiphanius is acutely analyzed. The place of Apollinaris of Laodicea in this whole matter is discussed and he is shown to be of remarkable importance. He is the source of the references in Epiphanius and in Jerome to the documents under consideration. He is the middle term between NE and these fathers. The conclusion reached regarding this NE is that it was entirely a mistake to identify it with the original of Matthew, for the fact that Matthew was originally written in Greek is established. It is probable that Papias referred to NE in his famous passage. The NE is a "targumlike" translation of the canonical Matthew into the Syriac (or Aramaic) language but in Hebrew characters. It arose before 150 A.D., among the Jewish-Christians in Beröa of Coele Syria, a group which grew up in the earliest Catholic church but existed as a separate group bearing the name "Nazarenes," at least until the second half of the fourth century. It is in no way to be identified with the Gospel according to the Hebrews (HE). This latter is the so-called Gospel of the Ebionites; that is, of the actual (not the gnostic) Ebionites (EE). It was composed in Greek and stood in some special relationship to the canonical Matthew. Nor are these gospels to be confused with the Gospel of the Twelve because this gospel bears the special marks of the national Syrian Gnostics. A sharp distinction must be made between the Ebionites, the Elkesaites, and the Nazarenes. Much of the confusion which Epiphanius exhibits between the first two can be traced to his use of Elkesaite sources and to wrong combinations. The Ebionites had no special gospel bearing their name.

The work manifests throughout a fine knowledge of the sources and a power of keen historical appraisal. With care and thoroughness the evidence is examined and weighed with the whole situation in view which confronted the father who furnishes it. Especially good is the treatment of Epiphanius where the reliable statements are separated from those which rest on confusion, misunderstanding, and lack of information. In places the treatment of Jerome is severe, but Schmidtke gives reasons for his severity. The discussion of the relation of Apollinaris of Laodicea is interesting. In point of scholarship the work is worthy.

The importance of the book lies in the following directions: the acute investigation of the Zion text and its connection with Apollinaris of Laodicea, the conclusions reached as to the origin, identity, or separateness of the various gospels to which reference is made, and the contribution which it makes to our knowledge of the various Jewish-Christian bodies in the early centuries of our era. With the scanty means at his disposal the author has led us not a little distance toward a solution of questions of considerable significance for the apprehension of early Christian history.

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JEWISH WORKS ON JUDAISM

Of the books here assembled for review¹ three deal with certain aspects of Jewish religion and the other treats an important phase in the history of the Jewish people. The accusation which Christians sometimes bring against Judaism, particularly in its older form, is that the latter was a barren formalism without vital inner religious power. Jews have denied this charge on many occasions. Abelson's two volumes are written to refute again this accusation against the Jews and to demonstrate that they have always cultivated a deep mystical religious experience. In his first volume he studies at length the idea of divine immanence in the talmudic literature from earliest times down to the eleventh century. Although for convenience' sake attention is restricted to this narrower field, we are told that even in the Old Testament on the one hand and in the cabalistic literature of mediaeval times on the other there is the same dominant mystical note: "The Jewish soul has never ceased to find a solace, such as the mere world cannot give, in the realized joys of the nearness of God." As over against similar claims made for Christianity by its adherents, the author seeks to demonstrate that the Judaism of talmudic times was a truly empirical religion emphasizing immediate experience of God, who is not far off but in close contact with

¹ *The Immanence of God in Rabbinical Literature*. By J. Abelson. New York: Macmillan, 1912. xii+387 pages. \$3.00.

Jewish Mysticism. By J. Abelson. London: Bell, 1913. ix+184 pages. 2s. 6d.

Judaism and St. Paul: Two Essays. By C. G. Montefiore, London: Goschen, 1914. 240 pages. 2s. 6d.

Les Juifs dans l'empire romain: Leur condition juridique, économique et sociale. Par Jean Juster. 2 vols. Paris: Geuthner, 1914. xviii+510 and viii+338 pages. Fr. 36.

men. While the author admits that Judaism makes much of God's transcendence, still we are told that the Jewish teachers did not neglect the doctrine of immanence. The chief forms in which God's presence is displayed are the Shechinah and the Holy Spirit. A vast number of citations are collected in connection with these terms to prove "that rabbinic theology is deeply ingrained with a mystical element. The quintessential feature of all mysticism—the belief in the immanence of God—is a characteristic of the rabbinic Judaism" (p. 278). In the light of this conclusion the volume sums up finally the rabbinic conception of God, of sin and evil, of prayer, and the compatibility of mysticism with rabbinic theology. Whether the author has made out his point or not depends altogether upon one's understanding of the talmudic passages cited as proof-texts. While the experiential element in Jewish religion has undoubtedly at times been grossly underrated by opponents, on the other hand it seems to us that the present author in his zeal for his cause has overrated this feature. His smaller work on *Jewish Mysticism* is written in a similar vein but it deals mainly with the Cabala.

Montefiore, the well-known champion of Jewish liberalism, again shows himself capable of appreciating the religious worth of New Testament literature. He finds much to admire even in Paul, although the apostle by his criticism of contemporary legalism has made himself pre-eminently *persona non grata* to most Jews. Montefiore treats his subject in two parts. In the first part he examines the genesis and character of Paul's religion and, in the second, the use which the liberal Jew may make of the Pauline writings. The author contends that Paul's religion, previous to his adoption of Christianity, was not typical of Palestinian Judaism and so his criticisms of the religion he abandoned are not a true index to the pure Jewish faith of that day. On the contrary, Paul was a product of Hellenistic Judaism which was "poorer, colder, less satisfying, and more pessimistic" than Palestinian rabbinism. To Paul the near rabbinic God, who longs to forgive his erring children at the first sign of repentance, was quite unknown (p. 127). This interpretation of Palestinian Judaism is admitted, however, to be quite supposititious. Under the second main topic of the book, Paul's value is rated highly. There are, to be sure, many things in his writings that the modern liberal Jew must reject, not merely because he is a Jew, but because he lives in a modern world. The apostle's pessimism, his Christology, much in his conception of sin, his ideas about the Law, his doctrine of divine wrath, his demonology, his anthropology and eschatology must all be abandoned. Still there is something left to admire. His moral ideal, his

faith in God, his emphasis upon love, and his insistence upon inwardness in religion are all thought to be worthy of emulation.

Juster, "avocat à la cour d'appel" in Paris, goes very thoroughly into the subject of the legal, economic, and social status of the Jews within the Roman Empire. His work opens with a 180-page study of the sources—literary, monumental, and juridical. A section on the Diaspora names, with detailed citation of authorities, the various places where the presence of Jews is mentioned. The number in the empire before the war of 70 A.D. is estimated to have been between six and seven million. Following these introductory matters is first a short chapter on the privileges of the Jews and then a long discussion of the Jewish cult—its political status, the gathering of proselytes, the relation to Christians, and the protection which the Jewish religion was granted. Chap. iii deals with the general organization of Jews within the empire and chap. iv with the local organization. Then come several brief chapters including the civic status, private statute, marriage, divorce, "capacité de fait," contracts, property laws, slaves, wills, and inheritance laws. The subject of Jewish jurisdiction is investigated at much greater length. The work closes with brief chapters on costume, name, tribes (in the Roman sense), public entertainments, right of suffrage, public charges, and economic situation. Such, in brief, is the ground covered. The author's method is that of the statistician, consequently he has produced a work of reference rather than one for popular reading. A prodigious amount of information is packed in the numerous footnotes, which on an average occupy at least three-quarters of every page. This feature alone would make the volumes indispensable to every student of the imperial period, whether interested primarily in Judaism or in Christianity or in the general history of the time. But the absence of an index is an unpardonable defect, notwithstanding the lengthy analytical table of contents.

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THE SYNOPTIC PROBLEM

Haupt's important contribution to the study of synoptic origins¹ gives evidence of most painstaking detailed examination of the entire text of the first three gospels. To test its conclusions effectively would

¹ *Worte Jesu und Gemeindeüberlieferung. Eine Untersuchung zur Quellengeschichte der Synopse.* (Windisch's *Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament.* Heft 3.) Von Walther Haupt. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1913. 263 pages. M. 7.50.

require a discussion of nearly the same length. But from its closely written pages, where no word is superfluous, emerges the following general picture of the successive steps in the first-century literary process which produced our Synoptics.

1. A written sketch of Jerusalem-memories, covering the last two days of Jesus' career.

2. A similar sketch of Galilean-memories, covering the period from John the Baptist's appearance to Jesus' prediction of his passion and his departure for the last Passover.

3. The earliest complete narrative, made by putting 1 and 2 together, the passion predictions being the connecting link. This is narrative, without discourse material, and is the source of all later narratives. It existed in many recensions, and suffered many changes and additions. Like 1 and 2, it originated in Palestine, and before the middle of the first century.

4. The *Grundbericht* (G) or source-narrative embodied in Mark and used later by his fellow-synoptists. This narrative is still without discourse, and develops on the basis of the *Stammberecht* (3), but is no longer an objective rendering of tradition. It is dominated throughout by the concern to demonstrate Jesus' messiahship. "History is thus corrected by dogmatics"; new material is added, especially the miracles, and the old material is enlarged and reshaped so as most effectively to serve the messianic interest. This document is produced in the Jerusalem community about the year 50; there and then was it most important to prove to unbelieving Judaism that "God had made him both Lord and Messiah, this Jesus whom you crucified."

5. The first discourse-group (Q¹), consisting primarily of an eschatological discourse to the disciples concerning their apostolic future (substance in Matt., chap. 10), with a further discourse on rank in the kingdom, illustrated by the little child; probably also the parable of the Sower. This document is based on traditional words of Jesus, but in this form is the product of the community. It is written to supplement G, to which it is now added, in the early fifties. Jerusalem is again its place of origin. With it Paul is familiar, as is clear from I Thess., chaps. 4 and 5, and I Cor., chap. 9. Its standpoint is that of strict Jewish Christianity; it forbids (Matt. 10:5 f.) the Gentile mission for those to whom it is addressed, even if not anti-Pauline in fuller sense.

6. A second addition to G (Q²), consisting of a series of seventeen conflicts between Jesus and the Pharisees, with a brief discourse dealing also with questions of the Law. The latter is added to Q¹, the former

to G, which, however, now form one document. The standpoint of Q² is less strictly Jewish than that of Q¹; it begins already to exercise some criticism on the traditional usages and convictions, and to develop independent moral and religious consciousness. This second addition to G is made also in Jerusalem, about 55, and is known to Paul (I Cor., chap. 7). G, Q¹, and Q², may exist in the year 55 in three separate parchment rolls, but are regarded as one collection of "memorabilia of Jesus" in successive issues. Later writers use them together.

7. A narrative, developed like G from the original *Stammberecht*, but independently. Since it becomes the special source of Mark, it is called S (*Sonderquelle*). This is historically the most valuable narrative source. Unlike G, it has no dogmatic purpose; it is written, not to prove any thesis, but to relate the gospel story. It has much material lacking in G, is exceedingly vivid and dramatic in style, and gives Mark its air of genuineness and reality. It is without special Jewish-Christian interest, and originates in some Hellenistic society, in the later fifties. It has no connection with Peter; the famous statement of Papias is only a mistaken conjecture, without real relation either to Mark's Gospel or to S.

8. The Gospel of Mark. This edited the two older works (G with its additions Q¹ and Q², and S) into one, with certain changes and editorial additions. The earlier unities were broken up, and passages from both sources were alternately used, causing frequent recapitulations and doublets. The work appears about the year 70; concerning the personality or residence of the author Haupt makes no comment.

9. A third addition to G (Q³), made by the Palestinian Christian group just after the destruction of Jerusalem. Here are some thirty-five passages of discourse, containing instruction for the community in the dark days when, separated from the mother synagogue, its name cast out as evil, it must gain courage and self-consciousness sufficient to face the world as an independent religious body. Q³ is longer than either of the earlier Q passages which it supplements; it contains the bulk of the Sermon on the Mount, the temptation story, and much more that is now most prominent in our gospels. It is the product of the community, not historical reminiscence of what Jesus had said; the spirit at most is his bequest. The standpoint is universalistic, severely critical of the Pharisees and the Jewish leaders, recognizing the just judgment of God on blind and stubborn Israel. This Q³ material is of course simply the Q material in Matthew and Luke which has no parallel in Mark, which was written just too early to make use of it.

10. Further narrative additions to G, after Mark used it, before Matthew and Luke used it. These include a Davidic genealogy (different in different copies of G), a story of virgin conception and birth (better kept in Matthew, Luke taking only the fact and giving new details), possibly also an account of the end of Judas (in Matthew and Acts). Matthew's copy of G had also other additions, notably in the passion and resurrection sections.

11. A third narrative document, used by Luke as a special source (L). A fairly complete narrative, based (like G and S) on the early *Stammberecht*, but continuing the story beyond the resurrection into the early apostolic days, so that it became a source also for Acts. Its material is much like that of S, quite unlike G, but it idealizes, has much devout and artless wonder, is plainly far removed from the historic basis of its narrative. The author is a Christian of Jewish origin but of universalistic attitude, for whom the early Jewish-Gentile controversy is long since forgotten. He always speaks of Jesus as "the Lord," and has many elements in common with the fourth evangelist (did "John" know L?); he may, therefore, write in Asia Minor, though his material is Judean. His date is approximately the year 80.

12. A series of further discourse-additions ($Q^s = \text{Zusatz zur } Q$), made to the Q parts of the GQ document, as the material of 10 was added to the G part. As before, the copy used by Matthew did not receive just the same series of additions as the copy used by Luke. There are allusions to the fate of Jerusalem, more parables and illustrations, especially in Luke (unjust judge, importunate friend, rich fool, good Samaritan, Dives and Lazarus, unjust steward), but also in Matthew (judgment of the sheep and goats). Some additions are common to both, mainly suggestions which were differently worked up by the two evangelists (Luke 12:35 f. = Matthew's ten virgins; Luke's prodigal son = Matthew's two unlike sons; Luke's older brother of the prodigal son = Matthew's workers in the vineyard; Luke's two debtors [7:41-43] = Matthew's wicked servant [18:23-34]). The additions under this head are mainly marginal notes made in the Q MSS, treated by the evangelists with more freedom than the texts themselves. Date and place of this editing are not given.

13. A late strict Jewish-Christian (Nazarene) redaction of the exemplar of GQ which Matthew later used. There is a mild anti-Pauline polemic, like that in the Epistle of James, which occupies about the same point of view, which is perhaps that of the Jewish-Christian group in Jerusalem after its rebuilding, late in the century.

14. The Gospel of Luke. Written about the year 100, by an author who is certainly *not* Paul's friend Luke, the author of the "we-sections" in Acts, probably not a Gentile. He is more of a historian than any of his predecessors or than Matthew, uses a larger number of sources (including Josephus) than any, and uses them more critically, though he makes fewer alterations of language than does Matthew. Of Mark he makes far less use than of Mark's sources and of L. On the whole, the actual form of the sources can be found most truly in Luke (compare his quotation of "we-passages" in Acts).

15. The Gospel of Matthew. Written by a universalistic Jewish-Christian, later than Luke by a few years. Matthew is more theologian than historian, most concerned to produce out of his various materials an edifying religious unity. He is skilled in this kind of composition, and presents "the gospel" more successfully than Luke, as the experience of the church has always recognized.

[16. Luke's own contribution; additions and editorial changes in the interest of Ebionitism, asceticism, humility.]

[17. Matthew's own contribution; fourteen *Reflexionszitate* from the Old Testament, added material in the sections concerning birth, passion, and resurrection, certain comments referring to Peter (especially 16: 17-19), a few added parables, illustrations, and editorial remarks.]

Thus the writing of our gospels of Matthew, Mark, and Luke means the writing, not of three, or four, documents, but of fifteen. The hypothesis is possible, "since many undertook to draw up a narrative concerning these matters." The material for its testing lies in Haupt's detailed analysis. One thing is clear, as Haupt points out in his *Vorwort*, and often in the later discussion: we have here very few *Worte Jesu*, very much *Gemeindeüberlieferung*, or rather *Gemeindedichtung*. "After a glance at the source-situation, one would scarcely dare to feel sure of the exact authenticity of even a single word of Jesus." That phrase from the preface well expresses the feeling of the reader when he closes the book. If this is true, we wish to know it. If not Jesus, but some unknown man in Jerusalem in the year 71, conceived the great words of the Sermon on the Mount, if not Jesus, but the unknown third evangelist, conceived the supreme parable of the Prodigal Son, we wish to know it. The knowledge will not harm us; the material is still ours, with all its values. But the critical question still remains whether the material itself does not bear clear evidence of being the product of a single master-mind, rather than a collocation of utterances from a great variety of divergent minds, during seventy years, in many environments. With

all allowance for the obvious editing of the material, does not the great bulk of the material exist prior to the editing? If Haupt is right, the material is due to the editing, comes into being in the editorial process. The solution cannot be found by literary analysis alone.

But whether Haupt is right in his main thesis or no, he is wonderfully right in many particular observations, which are illuminating for the exegesis of particular passages. Nowhere have the peculiar characteristics of the evangelists Matthew and Luke been set forth with more understanding and insight than in the closing sections of this book. How felicitous is the characterization of Matthew in his own words (13:52) as the "scribe discipled to the kingdom of God . . . bringing forth out of his treasure things new and old." The book shows thoroughness in scientific method, clear grasp of the material, appreciation of its values, insight into its meanings. It must be reckoned with in future studies of the synoptic problem.

There are rather more misprints than are common in German books, especially in the numerals referring to gospel verses. Accuracy here is peculiarly difficult, but also peculiarly necessary.

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NEW RELIGIONSGESCHICHTLICHE STUDIES ON CHRISTIAN ORIGINS

The three most important recent books bearing directly upon early Christianity and its relation to its contemporary religious world are Norden's *Agnostos Theos*,¹ Bousset's *Kyrios Christos*,² and J. Weiss's *Primitive Christianity*.³ The first is written from the point of view of the student of literature and is concerned primarily with an investigation of forms of religious discourse current in the Greco-Roman world of New Testament times. The second work is composed from the standpoint of the New Testament scholar who makes free use of materials from the gentile environment of the new religion as a means of explaining the genesis and evolution of christological doctrine down to the end

¹ *Agnostos Theos: Untersuchungen zur Formengeschichte religiöser Rede.* Von Eduard Norden. Leipzig: Teubner, 1913. ix+410 pages. M. 12.

² *Kyrios Christos: Geschichte des Christusglaubens von den Anfängen des Christentums bis Irenaeus.* Von Wilhelm Bousset. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht. xxiv+474 pages. M. 13.

³ *Das Urchristentum.* Von Johannes Weiss. I. Teil: 1.-3. Buch. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1914. iv+146 pages. M. 7.20.

of the second century A.D. Special value attaches to each of these two works in its own peculiar field. The third work is more general in character.

Norden's book falls into three parts; it is essentially three pamphlets bound together but all treating some phase of the relationship between the New Testament and contemporary literary forms. The first part (pp. 1-140) is concerned with Paul's address at Athens as reported in Acts 17:22-31. The second (pp. 143-308) discusses the literary forms used in predicating attributes or functions of the Deity and in prayer. The third part, entitled "Appendices" (pp. 311-87), treats a promiscuous lot of topics which were suggested by the previous studies. A more detailed examination of the first part will serve to illustrate the method and results of the whole.

At the outset Paul's Areopagus speech is shown to be a typical form of missionary sermon. Although the fundamental motif in Acts' version is Jewish-Christian, there is an accompanying motif which is distinctly stoic in character. This is seen in the statements that God is in need of nothing from men (vs. 25), that he can be discovered by "feeling after," in the sense of handling, him (vs. 27a), that God is near us all in nature (vs. 27b), and that "in him we live and move and have our being" (vs. 28). The general notion that God is invisible and can be seen only in his works was not, however, peculiar to Stoicism in this period but had also been taken up by Jewish theologians like Philo. The actual genesis of the Areopagus address is disclosed, however, in the fact that the speech attaches itself to an altar inscription, a familiar method of religious discourse. But the immediate ancestry of this portion of Acts is traced to a similar incident in the life of Apollonius of Tyana recorded first by his biographer Damis and later by Philostratus. Appendices I-III, which should be read at this point, elaborate Norden's theory of the composition of Acts. The book is thought to have consisted originally of a series of narratives, the "we-sections" being included among them. A later redactor inserted the speeches, adopting them mainly from similar addresses of gentile preachers but more particularly from reports of the speeches of Apollonius. As for the term "unknown God" in Paul's alleged address, its origin was oriental rather than Greek—God was unknown not because invisible or unnamable but because unrevealed. In contrast with the Greek philosophical conception that God is perceived by intellectual activity, the Orientals thought knowledge of God to be ascertainable mainly through the experience of the soul. The altar in Athens bore the inscription in the plural and it was

meant in the Greek sense; the redactor of Acts monotheized and orientalized the expression by writing it in the singular. Thus early Christian missionary preaching is found to have been Jewish-Oriental rather than Greco-philosophical in type, though by this time Greek philosophy, for example, Stoicism as represented by Posidonius, had come under the influence of oriental mysticism.

The argument proceeds mainly upon a study of words and phrases gleaned from the "byways and hedges" of Greek and Latin literature, rather than from a comprehensive investigation of religious movements within the life of the times. This feature constitutes the strength of the volume as well as its weakness—if it is fair to speak of weakness in so valuable a work. It is indispensable for the New Testament student to become familiar with the forms of religious expression current in the Greco-Roman world, not simply as used by those writers whose claim to literary consideration has commonly been recognized, but it is even more important to understand the now less familiar but once popular usage which best reveals the thought of the masses. Norden has gone everywhere gathering data and has amassed a wealth of information the value of which can hardly be overrated. At the same time a user of the book must constantly remind himself that a too purely lexical study may betray one into the danger of becoming so intent upon viewing the trees as to be unable to see the forest. Soil, climate, and environment are primary considerations conditioning the more intensive study. We do not mean to accuse the author of ignoring these fundamental items, but only to express a fear that the book might prove misleading if read without thorough orientation—a task which it does not purport to accomplish—in the syncretistic religious life of the Greco-Roman world. Its limitations are necessarily those accompanying all works dealing mainly with word-studies or literary forms. But a review restricted to observation of general content and method can convey only a vague idea of the mass of valuable materials to be found on every page. These can be appreciated only by a first-hand acquaintance with the volume, which is a distinctly important contribution to the study of Christian origins.

Bousset finds in the history and evolution of Christology the key to Christianity's expansion from its initial condition as a Jewish sect into a triumphant propaganda throughout the Greco-Roman world. And the distinctive characteristic of christological speculation, developed under the influence of a Hellenistic environment, was the thought of the risen Christ as Lord of the community—the new religion was a

"Lord" cult. The history of the development is traced to the time of Irenaeus in order to gain a longer perspective and to correct the notion that the Christianity of the New Testament is essentially a different thing from that of the apostolic or post-apostolic age. It is all a part of one continuous stream of development.

The primitive community in Palestine is, however, found to be only very remotely connected with this development. Their Christology consisted simply in the belief that the risen Jesus was the apocalyptic Son of Man later to be revealed. The Synoptic Gospels do not represent the views of the earliest disciples, but are an attempt at messianic apologetics. The life of the earthly Jesus is made to correspond with the figure of the heavenly Christ by the use of titles, miracles, messianic prophecies, and the beginnings of a soteriological interpretation of his death. There was also a primitive gentile community intervening between the Palestinians and Paul. It was here that the new religion first became a *Kyrios* (Lord) cult, following a tendency already prominent in Hellenistic religious circles. It was this gentile Christian community—not the Palestinian—which Paul had persecuted and from which he derived his information about the new religion.

Under Paul the movement further expands in the direction of Hellenistic syncretistic faiths. The eschatological notion of the apocalyptic Son of Man now becomes completely supplanted by the idea of the present Lord of the community who manifests his power in the presence of the Spirit, which is a supernatural entity possessed by believers only. Paul derived the stimuli and much of the content for this doctrine from his Hellenistic environment, and he followed it up with ideas from a similar source in which the believer's union with Christ was realistically defined, while the ordinances of baptism and the Lord's Supper were interpreted sacramentally. Furthermore, for Paul, Christ's death accomplished neither a juridical nor an ethical redemption but was a sacramental act. Its primary significance consisted in its making possible the believer's escape from death through union with the crucified and risen Christ who had come to earth as the Son of God. Thus Paul's Christianity owes much to the influences of oriental mystical cults already present in the syncretism of his day.

The genetic kinships of Johannine Christology are also found to be Hellenistic. But instead of Paul's notion that the believer has become divine through receiving the Spirit, John teaches a doctrine of deification through seeing God as revealed in his Son. This conception of salvation attained through a communication of heavenly wisdom

mediated by God to mortals is a notion for which pre-Christian Gnosticism had already prepared the way, hence the ease with which Christianity and Gnosticism now fused. This was a one-sided development of Pauline-Johannine features, however, and the main line of the new religion's expansion was in a less mystical direction. Yet the idea that Jesus was the present Lord of the community, thus showing the faith to have been a *Kyrios* cult, is found to be characteristic in the post-apostolic period as well as in earlier times.

Bousset's whole treatment is stimulating, and the correctness of his general method of expounding Christianity in the light of religious conditions within the Greco-Roman world can no longer be questioned. He is also undoubtedly correct in giving prominence to the recognition of Jesus' lordship as an outstanding characteristic of the new propaganda. But in details there naturally must still be many differences of opinion. There are a few particulars in which his interpretation seems especially open to question. In the first place, the difference he postulates between the primitive Palestinian community and Paul rests too exclusively upon an arbitrary datum of literary criticism, namely, the occurrence of the term Son of Man in the gospels and its absence from Paul's letters. So far as general thought-content is concerned Paul, who uses *Kyrios*, which is assumed to be a non-eschatological term, is as vividly apocalyptic as are those portions of the gospels using "Son of Man." The use of terms may be merely a matter of taste. Had the "Son of Man" been an "unintelligible hieroglyphic" in gentile circles, it is hardly conceivable that our Greek gospels, written for Hellenistic readers, would have used this phrase so frequently, employing it sometimes where no source document can plausibly be assumed. It would be easier to suppose—if that were our last resort—that the term "Son of Man" had not come into use in Paul's day than to give up the centrality of the apocalyptic hope in Paul's thinking.

Furthermore, is it so certain, as Bousset assumes, that the first believers did not think of the risen and heaven-exalted Jesus in terms of lordship? It is allowed that they prayed "Maranatha" but they merely meant to say "Our teacher, come!" How could so tame and unenthusiastic a community become the ancestor of a movement capable of arousing the hostility of Jews, to say nothing of establishing the vigorous gentile propaganda which is assumed to have antedated Paul? Not only has Paul been made too un-Jewish and too uneschatological, but the primitive Christians have been made too un-"spiritual" and too unecstatic. They have been painted in the colors of the later Jerusalem

church as presided over by James after the more aggressive spirits had moved to other fields and the primitive enthusiasm had disappeared. Whether the expanding life of Christianity on gentile soil has not sometimes been related too exclusively to only one phase of its contemporary environment might also be questioned. But these criticisms must not be taken as affecting either the correctness of the general method or the great value of the results as a whole. The book is very instructive if not always convincing in particulars.

Weiss's book contains only the first three sections of Part I of a projected two-part work on *Primitive Christianity*. And this in turn is ultimately to be preceded by another volume describing the religio-historical background and basis of the new religion, and giving an exposition of the life and teaching of Jesus. The whole when complete is to be entitled *Jesus und das Urchristentum*. The enterprise promises well, though an exact judgment upon the entire work is, of course, not yet possible. The part before us contains three "books": the primitive community, the heathen mission and Paul the missionary, and Paul the Christian and Theologian, the last "book" being incomplete. The inner life of the community and its experiences during the course of expansion form the chief interest of the author, but he draws freely upon the contemporary religious world, both Jewish and gentile, for illustrative material in certain parts of his work. But the main *religionsgeschichtliche* phases of the study are evidently reserved for the preliminary volume yet to appear.

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A NEW EDITION OF WEINEL'S NEW TESTAMENT THEOLOGY

Interest in the results of the critical investigation of the New Testament is not on the wane. The second edition of the *Schriften des Neuen Testaments* reached the total of 20,000. The second edition of Feine's New Testament Theology followed a year after the first. The second edition of Weinels *New Testament Theology* was called for within two years after the publication of the first.¹

Some objection had been taken to the general method and plan pursued by the Jena theologian. Those accustomed to the old arrangement of materials and topics experienced difficulty in finding their

¹ *Biblische Theologie des Neuen Testaments*. Von H. Weinel. 2. Auflage. Tübingen: Mohr, 1913. xvi+671 pages. M. 13.

favorite passage under the new system. Some expected continuity of outline to be sacrificed to a continuous treatment of New Testament, letter or epistle. Others pleaded for a "sociological" or thorough-going eschatological-point-of-view discussion. The employment of the term *aesthetische Erlösungsreligion* was thought unfortunate. We may be grateful that the author, while appreciating all fair criticism, refuses to return to the former arrangement of the subject-matter of New Testament theology. His aim was to trace the history of the religious life during the age of primitive Christianity. And this end amply justified departure from the ancient mode of procedure. The contribution of Weinle is conditioned by a comprehensive investigation of religion and the history of religion. The scope of the volume is also limited by its intention to be a students' compendium. Hence, the second edition adheres in the main to the order of the first. But much careful work has been done in the way of revision. Section and chapter titles have become more precise. A more incisive division and classification as well as addition of material is observable. The bibliography has been revised to almost the day of going to press. Failure to mention English and hardly any French books is probably due to the author's set purpose of making his theology a German students' manual. Several slight errors in enumeration occur, e.g., on pp. 8, 417, 420. And the index does not refer to "Reue" and "Christologie."

The review of the first edition of Weinle's theology in these pages analyzed his method and dealt critically with the great feature of his work, the interpretation of Jesus.¹ Here it will suffice briefly to characterize the second part of his investigation. His second main division is entitled "Primitive Christianity." The material is grouped under three heads: "The Beginnings of Christianity," "Paul," and "The Christianity of the Developing Church." The cut for primitive Christianity is made at about 150 A.D. Early patristic literature is rightly included as source material, for no New Testament production was born canonical. It is exceedingly difficult to draw a dividing line between the Apostolic age and old Catholic Christianity, but to regard the apologists as marking the boundary approximates the fact.

Christianity came to birth immediately after the death of Jesus, when Christ became the content of Christian faith. The essence of Christianity appeared to be faith in Christ as redeemer, Logos, wisdom. The gospel was profoundly influenced by the aesthetic religion of redemption. Christianity was rescued from submergence in the whirlpool of syncretistic religious currents by the ethical influence transmitted by

¹ *American Journal of Theology*, XVI (1912), 293 ff.

Jesus. At the end of the conflict with the mystery religions, an ecclesiastical Christianity existed in which the religion of Jesus merely survived but was no longer a controlling force.

The beginning of this transformation dates from the primitive community prior to Paul. He received from the early church baptism, the Lord's Supper, and the worship of the risen Lord. This formative period in the history of the church demands more investigation than Weinell bestows upon it. Paul's historical dependence upon the primitive disciples is much more intimate than is often assumed.

Paul was the most predominant figure in the primitive church. He very clearly grasped the universality of Christianity. His theory of Christianity was shaped by Pharisaism and the Greek-colored aesthetic religion of redemption. His relation to Jesus is still in debate because his experience of the ethical religion of redemption was so widely different from that of Jesus. But Paul was a disciple of Jesus and is not interpretable apart from him. Paulinism is an amalgam of Pharisaic juristic elements and Hellenistic mystical elements. In him the ethical religion of redemption assumed pessimistic and dualistic form. The Pauline gospel may be summarized in the question: What must I do to be saved? The content of salvation, redemption from evil, is of Hellenistic origin; the way of salvation, of Pharisaic origin. On the basis of Romans, Paul's theory is outlined. This style of treatment issues in a crossing of the juristic and mystical elements in Paul's thinking. The theory of Paul without the background of his life is a caricature. Many perplexing questions present themselves for which it supplies no answers. There were Pharisees who continued to expect salvation by way of the Law. There were many Jews who had not become thoroughgoing pessimists under the sway of Hellenism. Weinell, therefore, wisely adds a chapter to show that Paul's view grew out of his experience. Because the apostle was convinced that the path which took him to God was humanity's path to God, he raised his experience to the level of a general law. Paulinism is only one type of the gospel. In demonstrating his view to others, Paul appealed to their experience of power and of the Spirit and to the Old Testament.

Some remnants of a more primitive type of piety were retained or survived in the Christianity of Paul. Weinell rejects the symbolical interpretation of the Supper and baptism and argues for a sacramental view of them and also for a sacramental emphasis with reference to the church. The religion of the law plays a significant rôle especially in connection with the sins of Christians and the final judgment.

Hardly a score of pages are allotted to the discussion of Paul's ethics. Motives discovered are eschatological, eudemonic, those associated with the ethical religion of redemption and those arising out of a prophetic self-consciousness. Paul was interested in the individual and proposes no scheme for the reconstruction of society. His social hope was in the church.

The concluding section on Paul constructs his philosophy of the world and of history. In Paul's future hope, a Hellenistic gnostic vein is laid bare, e.g., II Cor. 5:8; Rom. 8:38 ff., and his peculiar doctrine of the resurrection briefly described.

Between the death of Paul and the end of the period surveyed the church enjoyed a geographical expansion and underwent an inner change which resulted in the origin of Catholic Christianity. This much is almost axiomatic. The stupendous task is to explain the transformation. The unsolved problem in the history of primitive Christianity is to trace the transition from Paul to the Hellenized gospel of 150 A.D. The concluding division of Weinel's book deals with this movement. And the author should be credited with attempting to outline the development, instead of taking recourse to an easy, homiletical chapter-and-verse analysis of the literature of the period. He obtains some of his conclusions by placing Colossians, Ephesians, and the Pastorals in this period and by assigning a late date to Luke and Acts. The "Western" solution of the apostolic decree seems untenable to Weinel, and he postdates the conference as well. The polemic against the Baptist seems overdrawn. In fact, Tübingen coloring adorns the picture somewhat plentifully in spots. It was the epoch of apology against heathenism and the state, of polemic against Jews and the adherents of John the Baptist, of the development of Christology, of mysticism, of ethics, and of the church. The factors assumed as shaping this development are, on the one hand, contact with the proletarian masses of the great cities and the continuation of the conflict with Judaism and Hellenism and, on the other hand, the clash between Paulinism and Jewish Christianity, the cessation of the primitive enthusiasm, the conversion of the future hope, and the development of Christology. The outcome of this struggle was old Catholic Christianity.

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THE SELF-REVELATION OF JESUS

The volume¹ before us is a discussion of the person and self-consciousness of Jesus based upon the statement of Matt. 11:27 (Luke 10:22): "All things have been delivered unto me of my Father, and no one knoweth the Son save the Father; neither doth any know the Father save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son willeth to reveal him." The long discussion of a single passage is justified by the author on the ground that it treats of the question of the existence in the Synoptic Gospels of a metaphysical divine sonship such as is indubitably set forth in the Fourth Gospel. Since the historicity of the Fourth Gospel is in some quarters under suspicion, a discussion of this passage is of fundamental significance in a reply to those who reject that gospel in favor of the Synoptics. The establishing of the genuineness of the passage in question will go far toward refuting those who belittle the Fourth Gospel and will have an exceedingly important bearing on the question of a developing Christology in the early Christian centuries; in fact, it will do much to rule it out of court.

The history of the problem as it emerges in the first three centuries and its revival under the impulse of modern biblical investigation are sketched. The former stage of the discussion resulted in what is practically an equating of the forms *novit* and *cognoscit*. The latter stage holds three possibilities: the speech attributed to Jesus in the verse is the product of an ecstatic condition, or a purely figurative statement of an ethical sonship, or the result of a later christological tendency. The criticism of these various phases of modern interpretation is not entirely satisfactory.

The troublesome and complicated textual questions which are connected with this passage are examined in detail. The author has done a large amount of painstaking work in this section of his book and has laboriously gathered the evidence. He takes strong exception to the conclusions which Harnack has reached on this subject and complains of unfairness in the presentation of facts and of lack of thoroughness. In his view Harnack has signally failed. The *ἐγὼ* which Harnack treats as a historical aorist is in the opinion of Schumacher a gnomic use of the tense. Some of the variant readings of Matthew are easily accounted for by the individual translation of the Aramaic Logia, the statement of Papias being in point here. The fullest form of the text is the original

¹ *Die Selbstoffenbarung Jesu bei Mat. XI:27 (Luc. X:22), eine kritisch-exegetische Untersuchung.* Von Heinrich Schumacher. Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1912. xviii + 225 pages. \$1.35.

one with the tense-variations of no real significance. It is a genuine saying of Jesus.

A long chapter of the book is concerned with the explanation of the ideas and statements of the passage, the result of which is found, in the main, in the sentence: "Jesus stellt sich dem göttliche Vater gleich als Teilhaber und Besitzer seines Wesens und seiner Macht, als metaphysischen Gottessohn. Den Titel 'Vater' hat aber Jesus nicht aus Demut für sich vermieden, . . . sondern weil er bei aller Identität mit dem Sein des Vaters eine von diesem zu unterscheidende Person ist" (p. 178). Thus the writer comes out with a text almost untouched by difficulties and an interpretation of the divine sonship of Jesus couched in metaphysical terminology. A further chapter concludes that the same idea is discoverable in other places in the Synoptics, as for example: the parable of the Wicked Husbandmen, the statement regarding David's son and Lord, the confession of Peter at Caesarea Philippi, and the claim of Jesus to be the son of God before the high priest. These passages show that Matt. 11:27 (Luke 10:22) are not isolated passages but are merely specially clear statements of a thought which is quite common in the Synoptic Gospels; namely, that Jesus was conscious of, and claimed a metaphysical sonship with, the Father.

The feeling one has on reading the book is that a large amount of faithful work has been put into it. The author has gathered and marshaled his facts with care and has made himself familiar with a large literature. But one cannot avoid a sense of disappointment that the treatment should be so lacking in historical spirit and insight and so palpably devoted to a dogmatic tendency—this, too, whether one agrees or disagrees with the conclusions. The *imprimatur* on the opening page would scarcely have been given to a thorough historical discussion of the passage.

A careful table of contents, a good bibliography, and lists of citations are excellent features of a volume whose chief value must lie in the marshaling of facts, but scarcely in its interpretation of them. It is questionable whether the book will contribute greatly to the solution of the problem to which it addresses itself.

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SCHEEL'S STUDY OF THE PRIMITIVE CHURCH

Unpretentious as is Dr. Scheel's little work,¹ it yet constitutes a step forward in the treatment of primitive Christianity. Like the larger work of Lowrie, *The Organization of the Primitive Church*, the present study is the working-out of Rudolf Sohm's ideas with regard to the character and organization of primitive Christian society. The term "primitive" is, however, by Scheel much more strictly used as applying only to the first generation of Christians. As sources of information for this period he regards only the Pauline Epistles as valid. Scheel's conclusions are somewhat as follows:

The Christian group was a unique creation, derived neither from the synagogue nor from Greek institutions. It was a community or corporation according to its own law. The word *ecclesia* does not necessarily connote a corporative community constitution. Rather by "church" was meant the people of God assembled in different places in the name of Jesus. The church of God is the assembly of those who through baptism have been freed from sin and are pledged to try to lead a holy life. In this effort they are helped by the Holy Spirit, the Divine Pneuma, which works only in the church. This fact gives the church group its exclusiveness; all those outside it are left helplessly to fight against the devils. Thus salvation was only in the church, which, furthermore, was conceived of as having existed before the creation of man. A newly baptized member was holy, but not perfect. Under the presupposition of sinlessness he progressed toward perfection, the charm of sin growing less and less. The church is thus composed of the holy ones, who, by believing, win justification from God. God out of grace forgives them their sins; they live in and by God's grace. They are all free, all bound together, all parts of one whole. If a man has qualities which enable him to act as leader in one place, he will be recognized as a leader elsewhere. Thus a local group may welcome a person from outside, and, of their own free will, follow his lead. Owing to this charismatic principle by which the church was run, there was no room for an election and community office resting on election. Objectively, grades of functions are possible, but fundamentally all members are of equal rank. Again, primitive Christianity was not democratic; all men were not brothers, though all church members were equal in rank because

¹ *Die Kirche im Urchristentum. Mit Durchblicken auf die Gegenwart.* (Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher. IV. Reihe, 20. Heft.) Von Otto Scheel. Tübingen: Mohr, 1912. 56 pages. M. o. 80.

equally members of the body of Christ. But the functions are assigned by God, not by the church members who are thus unable to distribute the sovereignty of their body. Furthermore, it is a question of function and not office, so that while one man was supreme in one function, he might have to follow the lead of another who was supreme in some other function. There thus results a community controlled by no law; its actions are characterized by "pneumatic anarchy." In summary, Scheel characterizes primitive Christian society from the point of view of its government as a "pneumocracy."

In this study, Scheel's motive is largely a wish to discover in what regards the primitive Christians differed in their ideas and practices, both from their immediate successors, the Christians of the Catholic church, and from their remote successors, the Protestants. He is at pains constantly to bring out such similarities and differences. In so doing he is but following a long and honorable succession of scholars who have felt the fascination of this problem. Nevertheless, it is not from this point of view, as it seems to me, that the results of Scheel gain their chief importance. They have a fuller significance than merely to indicate the lines of cleavage between the stages of Christian development. They bear, if unconsciously, on the wider question of the distinctive characteristics of the Christian social group, as compared with the social groups formed for religious or other purposes in the society of the Roman Empire. By emphasizing the feeling of oneness that bound all Christians together, and the notion that only in the church was there salvation from devils, and the fact that God alone, not the local group, picked the spirit-filled leaders, Scheel has given us a picture of Christian society that helps to explain why Christianity and not some other oriental religion became the predominantly important social factor in the Roman Empire.

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THE HISTORY OF THE PAPACY

It is with a certain sense of disappointment that one lays down Mr. Beet's latest contribution to the history of the Papacy,¹ well written as it is. Handicapped by a narrowness of interest, of which perhaps he himself is unconscious, the author has given us a study of little more than one phase of the development of the Papacy. Directed by an

¹ *The Early Roman Episcopate to A.D. 84.* By William Ernest Beet. London: Charles H. Kelly, 1913. xii+332 pages. 3s. 6d. net.

intense professional interest, he has searched the sources almost solely for what they have to tell of the light in which was regarded at different times the office of the bishop of Rome both by its holders and by other Christians. With his attention thus limited, Mr. Beet does indeed succeed in making clear the gradually changing light in which the bishop of Rome is viewed. But this is not to write a full and satisfying account of the growth of a great institution like the Papacy. Here we demand to know first and foremost the factors in the growth of the ecclesiastical organization as a whole, and in the second place the factors in the growth of the Papacy itself. For any cogent presentation of these we must look elsewhere than in Mr. Beet's book. Of the influence of economic factors in this whole matter there is not a hint. Yet where Mr. Beet has directed his vision he has not looked without success.

One of his excellences is to be found in his effective analyses of the well-known passages bearing on the Papacy. For instance, from the famous passage in Irenaeus he inclines to draw the conclusion that

Irenaeus actually meant to say nothing more than that, inasmuch as the capital was in constant communication with every part of the Empire, and multitudes were ever coming and going to and from the city, Christian thought would there be at its freshest and obscure points of doctrine most fully grasped and understood. . . . That Rome, in this sense, occupied a place pre-eminent among the churches . . . does not in the least imply that she was held in regard as the seat of a despotic spiritual authority of direct divine appointment and world-wide jurisdiction.

This, while it may not be convincing, is suggestive. But the most original part of Mr. Beet's work is his effort to ascertain why the name of Paul was gradually overshadowed by that of Peter. He suggests, among other things, that the atmosphere of Rome and the character of the membership of the church in that city may have contributed to this end; that St. Peter's message appealed more to the general attitude of mind which the atmosphere of Rome was calculated to create; that St. Peter appealed more to the Jewish-Christian of which the Christian community was at first largely composed; finally, that, while St. Paul's preaching reached a minority of choice spirits, that of Peter was more fitted to reach the great majority of men. Such are some of the most important contributions of this volume; its method calls for an additional word.

On this side Mr. Beet's work presents some curious contrasts. As far as original sources are concerned it shows a research characterized by diligent thoroughness. The same diligent thoroughness is exhibited in

the use of secondary treatments in book form written in English. When one passes from books to periodicals, and from English to other tongues, the contrasts begin to appear, the thoroughness, perhaps one might better say the completeness, for whatever reason, disappears. Only the scantiest references to periodical literature in any tongue are to be found. And as for books in German and French, to all intents and purposes they do not exist for the author. Only when the products of foreign scholarship make their appearance in English guise, seemingly, do they win attention from the author. The result of this neglect of foreign and periodic literature is both to impair somewhat one's confidence in the book as fully representative of the best international scholarship, and also to impart to it an oddly musty flavor, since the author is shut up to a world that knows not current editions of important foreign works. For example, Milman is introduced to us as a "modern historian"; Dean Stanley as a "recent writer," as also Moeller, the second German edition, 1902, of whose first volume on the history of the church is passed over in favor of an English translation of the first edition written in 1889. But perhaps the most extreme example of the extent to which the author is barred out from the results of modern foreign scholarship is afforded by his use of Kurtz's *History of the Church*. Passing by the 1906 edition of the original, he selects an English translation appearing in 1868. Yet in spite of this busy activity with editions of foreign writers long since out of date, the author's painstaking use of source material gives his work solid merit of a kind.

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STUDIES ON LUTHER AND GERHARDT

To get a book by a thoroughly competent hand which will direct one as to recent Luther discussions, which will impartially discuss the points in dispute between Denifle and Walther, Grisar and Kawerau, which will hold the balances even between opponent and friend, and which, while not a regular biography of Luther, will serve as either an introduction or supplement to one—that is a boon ardently to be coveted. This, one of the church history professors in Marburg has done in a most admirable big-little book.¹ He takes as his motto the words of Dante: "Open your

¹ *Luther im Lichte der neueren Forschung: ein kritischer Bericht*. Von Heinrich Boehmer. Dritte, vermehrte, und umgearbeitete Auflage. Leipzig und Berlin: Teubner, 1914. vi+170 pages. M. 1.25.

eyes and see me as I am." A few of his results might here be mentioned. It is well known that the traditional portraits of Luther are idealized and do not go back to contemporary pictures by the elder Cranach who gives us the genuine. These, however, are genuine: Luther as monk 1520 (full face, copper plate), Luther as monk 1521 (side view, copper), Luther as Junker George (1521, oil), and another oil painting in full face of 1526. These can be seen in any good illustrated biography of Luther, as for instance in Buchwald's *Luther* (Leipzig, 1902; 2d ed., 1914). The death mask of Luther was taken four days after his death, when the body had already decomposed, a process which sets in quickly after death by apoplexy, and therefore this mask cannot be trusted. Among modern works Boehmer says that von Ranke struck out the right path in his *Deutschen Geschichte im Zeitalter der Reformation* (1839 ff.), not to judge the past or use it for edifying, but simply to show it as it was. The Catholic Janssen set out to reveal the economic, social, political, religious, and moral conditions of the people. But he did not attain his object because he let that object be shoved back by the apologetic thesis that the fifteenth century was the richest blossoming of the whole civilized life, and no one else but Luther destroyed this fine harvest. Over against Albrecht Ritschl's taking down a peg the services of the pre-Reformation reformers as forerunners of Luther, Denifle shows that Luther was connected with the "modern" theologians of the late Middle Ages. But here again, says Boehmer, was the failure to judge Luther historically, because Father Denifle was always bent on showing Luther as a type of degeneration, and his theology as a degenerate product of degenerate scholasticism. Forty years ago the Anabaptists were looked upon generally as bloody fanatical revolutionaries or as narrow reactionaries, as mere stragglers on the religious movement of the dying Middle Ages. Now it is unanimously believed that the majority of the bitterly persecuted pious folk were not revolutionaries at all, but retiring ascetics like the later Quakers, not mere echoes of the mediaeval Waldenses and mystics, but to a certain degree followers of Humanism and especially opponents of mere faith in the letter and the moral carelessness of *vulgären Luthertums*; yes, in fact, some scholars are inclined to place them with Erasmus as forerunners of mighty modern religious movements, as ancestors of Congregationalists and Pietists, superior to Luther and his co-reformers. Boehmer himself looks upon the "step-children of fortune" von Schwenkfeld as the spiritual sire of the ideal of Pietist fellowship, and Sebastian Frank as the prophet of the religious views of Schleiermacher.

Boehmer divides his book into five chapters: (i) "The Old Luther Picture [artistic and literary] and the Development of Luther Investigation"; (ii) "Steps in the Conversion"; (iii) "The Beginning of the Open Struggle against the Church and the First Radical Reform Attempts"; (iv) "The Scholar and the Inner Man [intellectual and moral judgment of Luther]"; (v) "The Thinker and the Prophet." This lucidly written and closely printed little book, which you could put in your under-coat pocket, is a rich and interesting product of Luther research, and ought to be translated into every civilized tongue.¹

Everyone knows the immense importance of the large and small catechisms of Luther (1529) for the religious training of the German race. Superintendent Hardeland of Uslar has made an important and fairly thorough study in the history of doctrine in tracing the development of Luther's ideas up to 1529 on each of the topics or themes treated in the catechisms.² It deserves to stand as a sidelight by the side of Köstlin's *Theologie Luthers* (1902) and Thieme's investigation of Luther's doctrine of faith (*Sittliche Triebkraft usw.*, 1895) and supplements the brilliant sections on Luther in the doctrine histories of Seeberg and Harnack. In spite of the explanation in the Preface (p. xiii), the lack of an index is inexcusable.

The same author publishes a pamphlet against the conception that Luther looked upon the fear of the wrath of God as a fulfilment of the First Commandment.³ Rather, says Hardeland against Professor Meyer of Göttingen in *Neuen Kirchlichen Zeitschrift* (1913), Luther taught the true or filial fear of God, which is the accompaniment and fruit of faith. This last overcomes the fear worked by the law.

The University of Greifswald conferred the degree of Doctor of Theology upon Petrich for his life-long Gerhardt studies. Besides a book twenty-five years ago, another in 1907, he has been engaged on this for nine years, and it may be taken as the definitive book on the life of him in whom "Christianity does not appear as something opposed to human nature, but rather as the strongest, soundest, purest, and

¹ I notice that Boehmer's careful discussion of the Philip Bigamy (pp. 120-27) confirms my own conclusions in the *American Journal of Theology*, XVII (1913), 206-31.

² *Luthers Katechismusgedanken in ihrer Entwicklung bis Jahre 1529*. Von August Hardeland. Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1913. xiv+354 pages. M. 8.

³ *Der Begriff der Gottesfurcht in Luthers Katechismen*. Erwiderung Professor Dr. Joh. Meyer. Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1914. 45 pages. M. 0.80.

truest form of humanity."¹ There are ample indexes of places, persons, and hymns, but none of subjects. For a review of some of the books which appeared on the three hundredth anniversary of Gerhardt's birth see *Theol. Literaturblatt*, 1907, 82-83, 464-67. It is a singular omission that, as far as I see, Petrich never mentions the history of Gerhardt's hymns outside of Germany.

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RECENT WORKS ON ENGLISH CHURCH HISTORY

The first volume of Clark's work² was reviewed in the *American Journal of Theology*, XVI (1912), 303. It was mentioned there that Nonconformity has an ideal, but that this ideal has never been realized. Keeping the ideal in view, the author proposed to show Nonconformity as it had actually appeared in history. This ideal is fundamentally spiritual. Its objective manifestations have taken many forms but at various important points these forms have fallen far below the goal, because human nature and organized society were athwart the way.

The present volume starts in with the Restoration, and for nearly a century the ideal faded and almost fell out of view. Presbyterianism was defeated, and Charles II in his struggle for dispensing power found himself in opposition to all branches of Nonconformity. There was a deep decline of religion through the corrupting influences of the court, and the paralyzing invasion of rationalism. Presbyterians and General Baptists were almost entirely absorbed by the Unitarians. "Some of the Nonconformist bodies which had come down the direct line of ancestral descent from the first Nonconformist pioneers had half forgotten their ancient inspirations, had shifted their gaze from the issue which was central to issues which were, however important, circumferential and no more" (p. 200). But this was not to continue. There was a partial return to the ideal. First of all there came the great religious revival of the eighteenth century. This revival resulted in a

¹ *Paul Gerhardt: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des deutschen Geistes. Auf Grund neuer Forschungen und Funde.* Von Hermann Petrich. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1914, xiv+360 pages.

² *History of Nonconformity.* By Henry W. Clark. Vol. II: "From the Restoration to the Close of the Nineteenth Century." London: Chapman & Hall, 1913. xx+458 pages. 15s. net.

new religious denomination; in an evangelical party in the Establishment; and in a general awakening of Nonconformity to a new enthusiasm for its ideal.

Contemporaneously with the revival began a quickening determination for the extension of liberty and equality, and release from disabilities, political and religious. This great struggle ran through the nineteenth century, and phases of it continue on into the twentieth.

In a straightforward and vivacious style Mr. Clark has described this complicated development with all the leading features distinct and in their relations to the whole process. "Nonconformity," says he, "must recover the true Nonconformist ideal which insists that all church order and system, all church activities, all church programs of doctrines and discipline must be nothing else than the living Christ working himself out through the church which is his body, the fulness of Him that filleth all in all." This, no doubt, expresses the conviction and aspiration of all Christians, and so perhaps Mr. Clark would not object to calling subscription to this ideal Conformity in its true sense. For he says: "The Episcopalian may be an Episcopalian still; the Methodist a Methodist still; and so on the whole list through. It is only the *direction* of the life-movement that must be evoked upon as changed in actual fact: the movement, if it has been taken from outward to inward must be taken as from inward to outward now" (p. 427).

We are glad to see this large-spirited and thoughtful work brought to a successful completion.

All students of English history will be glad to have one more volume from the pen of the late Dr. Gairdner,¹ who died at the age of eighty-four last November. The volume was incomplete at the time of the author's death, but he was fortunate in securing the promise of his friend, Dr. Hunt, to make the necessary additions and prepare it for the press. The preface is a succinct but very valuable account of Dr. Gairdner's life and voluminous writings.

Although most of his life was spent among the records and archives, and he was supposed to see all sides of every mooted question, this did not prevent him from having strong convictions that looked very like biases. In Vol. IV of the *History of the English Church* edited by Dean Stephens and W. Hunt his sympathies seemed to be with the Catholics, and in various parts of the three preceding volumes of this work the same

¹ *Lollardy and the Reformation in England*. By James Gairdner. Vol. IV. Edited by William Hunt. New York: Macmillan, 1913. xiv+422 pages. \$3.00 net.

tendency appeared. Yet we were inclined to say that he was nevertheless only a good churchman anxious to be perfectly fair. But in this last volume which all gathers about the personality of Mary, it appears beyond a peradventure that he has not a trace of sympathy for Dissenters, and that he has no word of disapproval for Mary. For example, in the two chapters on "Heretics Painted Mostly by Themselves," and the "Spirit of the Edwardine Party," he appears, not as a historian, but as an advocate. Yet his sincerity is undoubted. "He believed that he had a special work to do; indeed, it may almost be said, a message to deliver."

His work as a whole gives evidence, not only of thoroughness in research, but also of philosophic thought; for he always "looked on events in their connection with the influences that shaped them." Sometimes these influences were domestic, sometimes foreign; sometimes political or social, sometimes religious. And so the work as a whole is an enduring monument to the ability, industry, and honesty of its author.

When University College at Oxford made Mr. Storr¹ a research fellow it enabled him to do a valuable piece of work, the first half of which is contained in this volume, which comes down to 1860.

The conservatism of the English church at the opening of the century was almost adamant. The great revival of the preceding century had not been without wholesome influence and this influence was to continue. But the great spiritual forces of the century were: the historical method, Romanticism, physical science, philosophical idealism, the French Revolution, democracy. The first twenty years were apparently stagnant, but it could only be a question of time when the new forces would begin to be effective. But in the next decade three new movements were born: first, the critical and historical work of the early Oriel school; second, Erskine's school in Scotland putting the emphasis on experience and the inner witness of the heart; third, the religious idealism of Coleridge with its "appeal to a philosophy more satisfying than utilitarianism." Then came the Oxford movement, which was reactionary, and which Mr. Storr does not regard with favor. But the leavening process was at work, and all the new spiritual forces, aided by German thought, gained ever-freer play, and the succeeding years up to 1860 became a time of preparation for the advent of Darwin's

¹ *The Development of English Theology in the Nineteenth Century—1800-1860.* By Vernon F. Storr. London and New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1913. viii+486 pages. \$3.50 net.

Origin of Species, and *Essays and Reviews*—the first appearing in 1859, the second in 1860, the date at which this volume ends.

Mr. Storr is fully in accord with the modern spirit of progress. He brings to his task a mind gifted, equipped, and sympathetic. He seeks to hold fast the good in the old and fully to appropriate the true in the new. "No age can hope to understand its own mind and temper, its purposes and ideals, except through a study of the past from which it has sprung." Beginning with a review of the eighteenth century and utilizing its legacy, the author estimates the tendencies and leading personalities of the time covered in his first volume. His work hitherto is so well done that we shall wait with high anticipations for the more difficult task that is involved in the remainder, because he has only reached the date of the publication of the *Origin of Species*, and he will have to deal as a pioneer with the great controversies which that work stirred up.

J. W. MONCRIEF

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THE CONCEPT OF SIN

Mr. Tennant's previous studies in the history of the doctrine of sin have made him exceptionally well fitted to undertake a much-needed revision of our conception of the meaning of sin.¹ He recognizes that the influence of the Pauline doctrine, according to which sin is posited as an objective power working in the individual prior to his consciousness of sin, has led to many confused and unethical definitions. He therefore undertakes to consult ethics and psychology in the attempt to define precisely what the term should connote in our modern life. But his inquiry is not quite an empirical one, after all; for he distinctly affirms that the teaching of Jesus on the subject is to be normative. "In the sense in which the Founder of Christianity used the term 'sin' when he spoke of the attitude of God toward human sinfulness, we ought to see the fixed and unalterable minimum of content for our concept. Its essential nucleus being thus determined, we only need to give the concept all the definiteness of outline which the sciences of ethics and of psychology can enable us to attain." Since, however, he finds in the teaching of Jesus only non-metaphysical ethical content, the discussion is not embarrassed by any *a priori* notions concerning depravity.

¹ *The Concept of Sin*. By F. R. Tennant. Cambridge: The University Press, 1912. 281 pages. 4s. 6d. net.

Sin, in the Christian sense of the term, must be defined in relation to the good which God wills man to attain. But God does not hold a man responsible for the attainment of a good which he does not know, or which he is constitutionally unable to reach. To use the word "sin" to describe mere ethical imperfection, without reference to the psychological state of accountability in any given case, can lead only to confusion. Moreover, even those who are devoted to the ethical life may grow in perfection, and thus may in the earlier stages of their development have attained an imperfect realization of the ideal to which they are nevertheless loyal. This fact of development makes a fixed objective standard impossible. Even Jesus grew in character and in achievement, although he was always sinless. Sin is to be determined, not by a fixed objective standard, but rather in relation to God's claim upon the individual. This claim is synonymous with the highest ideal which we know at the time. There may be innocent ignorance of the actually highest ideal. The "material of sin" is furnished by our natural impulses and instincts, which are in and of themselves non-moral; but which because of their pleasure-giving aspects may solicit one into neglect of less immediately pleasurable, but ethically higher opportunities. The temptation which thus arises is not to be confused with sin; though without it sin would be impossible. It is only when volition allies one with the lower possibility that there is actual sin. If such wrong volition becomes habitual, sin may be predicated of character as well as of single acts. In our whole consideration of the subject of sin, we need to bear in mind the difference between the "psychical" or subjectively emotional aspects of conduct, and the "psychological" or more broadly analyzed objective aspects of moral consciousness. The former alone is no safe criterion. The latter must give balance. Sin is briefly defined as "moral imperfection for which the agent is in God's sight accountable." The author recognizes that this definition makes it impossible for any human being to ascertain the precise degree of guilt which is to be ascribed to another; but he holds that it is the only definition which is not involved in ethical difficulties.

The value of such an analysis of the connotation of a concept is undoubted. But it might well be supplemented by a more definite study of the social aspects of the sense of sin. The only factors which Tennant seriously considers are those of individual constitution and individual knowledge. The situation is pictured as if the individual were alone in the presence of God. As a matter of fact the genesis and development of the moral sense is so thoroughly a social matter that a discussion of

temptations and standards which omits a consideration of the relation of the individual to the social whole is quite inadequate. Tennant has rendered a service in freeing the conception of sin from some of the irrational theological complications which have aroused moral protest. But he has failed to do justice to the fact that the "material of sin" is to be found in social relations quite as much as in individual impulses and instincts.

GERALD BIRNEY SMITH

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A NEW EXPOSITION OF HINDUISM¹

The increasingly sympathetic and appreciative attitude of missionaries toward the ethnic faiths finds a rather marked expression in India in a relatively small number who seek to find an "Old Testament" for Christianity in the Hindu scriptures. For them Christ "came not to destroy but to fulfil"; they emphasize supplementing rather than supplanting. The most recent as well as the best embodiment of this approach is *The Crown of Hinduism* by J. N. Farquhar, a man of recognized scholarship. In this volume as each subject is taken up we see Hinduism as a practical, functioning religion, we see it at its best; but in each case this sympathetic appreciation is followed by a clear, critical judgment of the deficiencies of Hinduism and the way in which Christianity fulfils it.

Let us illustrate the method from two chapters. Chap. vii recounts the fascinating history of India's austerities and ascetism and says:

Only high ideals most earnestly pursued could have produced the lofty literature of monasticism, the Upanishads and the Buddhist Suttas. But if the principles were high and noble, they were applied with a fearlessness, a devotion, a courage, and a constancy to which there are very few parallels. As long as the world lasts, men will look back with wonder upon the ascetics of India. Their quiet surrender of every earthly privilege and pleasure, and their strong endurance of many forms of suffering will be an inspiration to all generations of thinking Indians. For nearly three thousand years the ascetics of India have stood forth, a speaking testimony to the supremacy of the spiritual [p. 273].

But Hinduism is unable to meet the needs which have been the springs of this great movement; it

has produced for quite two thousand five hundred years an unending procession of men and women ready to devote themselves, body and soul, to the

¹ *The Crown of Hinduism*. By J. N. Farquhar. Oxford: University Press, 1913. 469 pages. 7s. 6d.

highest; but when they are produced, they are comparatively useless; for the mighty religion which inspires them to enter the ascetic life sets before them as their ideal the life of the actionless Brahman. But what India needs today is a great army of self-sacrificing men, ready to toil for the uplifting of the poor and the downtrodden, and for the advancement of education, agriculture, industry, art, morality, religion. . . . Thus the problem is, How are Hindus to be inspired to unselfish service? Clearly it cannot be by any form of Hindu philosophy; for that leads to inaction. Nor can there be any doubt that such inspiration can come only from religion [p. 277].

It is then shown how the motive and dynamic must come from Christianity.

Chap. viii deals with "The Work of Men's Hands." Here the genesis of image-worship is traced and a vivid description of the Hindu temple cults is given. One begins to see idolatry from the inside, more as the Hindu sees it. Modern Hindu criticism of idolatry and also its modern defense are set forth with clearness and abundant illustration from current Indian opinion. We are shown how Hindu idolatry ministers to some of the most powerful and most valuable of our religious instincts; how this is the very reason it has laid hold of the Hindu people.

History brings us face to face with this most solemn fact, that, if these needs are not fulfilled spiritually, they seek satisfaction in the grossness of idolatry. One writer proposes to cleanse the temples from idols and use them as schools for religious instruction. But that will not prevent the reappearance of idols. We must find a spiritual force as vivid and as real as idolatry, and as fully charged with religious emotion, a spiritual dynamic which will render idols obsolete by appealing as successfully as they do, and yet in healthy spiritual fashion, to the religious imagination and feeling.

And then the author shows

how it is one of the marvels of Christ that he is able to make such an appeal and to make it effectively; so that the man who has been used to the accessibility of idols and the joy and passion of their worship finds in him, in purest spiritual form, more than all the emotion and stimulus to reverent adoration which their vividness used to bring him.

In this way such fundamental and practical subjects for India as the following are dealt with: the Hindu family system, karma and rebirth, caste, the Vedanta, etc. Each institution is minutely studied in its origin and history, and its value in the present is estimated. The question of the relative value of religions and the relation of Christianity to Hinduism is taken up in the introduction.

In criticism it is possible to say that while Christ is the crown of much that is good in Hinduism, there are so many things in this religion that Christ can but destroy, and there are so many things in Christ which find no easily discovered germ in Hinduism, that one is in danger of misleading the Hindu by such a use of terms as are found in the title of this book. But in the reaction from that approach which tends ruthlessly to denounce the customs and beliefs of an ancient people, we feel it is better to err on the side of too great sympathy, rather than on the side of unappreciative criticism.

We have no hesitation in recommending this book as a thorough and illuminating exposition of Hinduism. We know of no other single book so well fitted through clearness, precision, and scholarship to give one an insight into the greatness of Hinduism, its essential errors and evils, and the way in which Christianity meets a new need that has arisen in India as the result of the whole impact of Christian civilization on her.

D. J. FLEMING

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

THE PROPHETS OF ISRAEL

A glance at the table of contents in Battenwieser's *The Prophets of Israel*¹ shows a somewhat unusual arrangement of materials. Amos appears, not at the beginning, but at the end of the book. Jeremiah leads the procession. The discussion of his prophecies, and of some problems suggested by his message, occupies 210 of 330 pages. Then follow two chapters on Amos' and Hosea's view of the nation's doom and a more extended discussion of "Isaiah's View of the Doom and His Attitude toward the Political Affairs of the Day." This completes the contents of Book I, subdivided into three parts and twelve chapters. The last 30 pages of the volume constitute Book II, Part I, under the general title of "The Message of the Prophets." This final discussion concerns itself chiefly with Amos and looks forward, according to the preface, to a second volume. One would naturally expect the prophets' proclamation of doom to be treated as an essential part of their message. But the author has dealt with this aspect of their work in Book I under the general title of "The Faith of the Prophets."

¹ *The Prophets of Israel from the Eighth Century to the Fifth Century. Their Faith and Their Message.* By Moses Battenwieser. New York: Macmillan, 1914. xx + 350 pages. \$2.00.

We are inclined to think that readers will find the foregoing arrangement of materials confusing, and largely because it lacks genetic coherence. Battenwieser explains his departure from the chronological order of treatment by saying that the spiritual side of the prophetic movement can, in his view, "be best studied by starting with it at the point of its highest development." He feels convinced that literary prophecy must be considered first of all from the point of view of the prophets' personal faith in order to comply fully with the analytic-genetic method; that "only after the spiritual side has been fully considered can the doctrinal side of the movement . . . be appreciated in its true significance." One might be tempted to infer from this statement that the author does not consider the genetic method of inquiry a necessary instrument for the determination of what the prophets' personal faith actually was. Such an inference, however, is not borne out by the excellent historical investigation which the book contains. Since the author avows himself "in full harmony with the historico-critical method of modern research," and since genetic coherence is always of advantage to the reader, the reviewer wonders whether Battenwieser has gained as much as he has lost by abandoning chronological sequence.

Battenwieser's best work has gone into the historical analysis of Jeremiah's prophecies. He is an independent investigator and frequently offers good and ingenious reasons for differing with Cornill, Duhm, and Giesebrecht. He discards, for instance, the customary interpretation of the Deuteronomic law of prophecy (Deut. 18:15-22) as the product of a preconceived idea with which later ages approached vs. 22. The latter he translates: "If it happen that a prophet pronounceth in the name of YHVH that which shall not be or occur, that is the word which YHVH hath not spoken; presumptuously hath the prophet pronounced it: you shall not be afraid of him." The crucial element in the verse is the phrase "in the name of YHVH." Battenwieser holds that the verse was expressly intended to prohibit prophetic utterances directed against the divine authority of the sacrificial cultus. The false prophet, then, is to be recognized by defiance of the Law (D) which invested the cultus with divine sanction. "To declare what is contrary to the Law might be reprehensible in itself, but to declare what is contrary to the Law in the name of YHVH, i.e., to claim divine authority for such a message, would be blasphemous" (p. 34). Jeremiah was persecuted for offending against this law.

This is only one of numerous instances that might be cited to illustrate the author's independence of judgment. His thorough equipment as a

Hebraist, and his evidently broad knowledge of oriental literature and customs make his findings especially worthy of consideration where they relate to textual analysis and interpretation. When he discusses such subjects as "Inspiration Opposed to Divination or Possession," most readers probably will find him a less reliable guide. Quotations from Schiller (in German), Wordsworth, and H. W. Mabie, however pertinent in other connections, are scarcely adequate to "bring out clearly the serious misapprehension of spiritual prophecy involved in the views of those scholars who consider the visions of Isa., chap. 6, and Jer. 1:1-10, 15-19, and the ecstasies or trances of the diviner, related phenomena." Battenwieser attempts to show that "the inspiration of the literary prophets and the mantic possession or ecstasy of the older prophets are two distinct phenomena proceeding from radically different states of mind" (p. 160). Ezekiel is found to be an inconvenient phenomenon and is therefore refused a place "in the same category with the six great prophets, Amos, Hosea, Micah, Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Deutero-Isaiah."

We apprehend that the author has set up a thesis here which not only is incapable of proof, but is inherently improbable. Modern Old Testament scholars will sympathize strongly with his value judgments, without feeling that those judgments are endangered by a development of literary prophecy out of the ecstasy prophetism of earlier times. The evidence of historical continuity requires stronger disproof, in our judgment, than the author has advanced. But the book is interesting and valuable from various points of view. It is the work of a modern Jewish scholar whose views on the rise of monotheism, on the ethical temper of the prophets, and their antagonism to the cultus, will receive a sympathetic welcome among students of the Old Testament.

WILLIAM FREDERIC BADE

PACIFIC THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

DOCTRINAL DISCUSSIONS

Mr. Harte,ⁱ a young scholar of Belfast, Ireland, makes a contribution to the discussion of the possibility and the meaning of ascribing personality to God by presenting the series of modern thinkers on the subject, beginning with Spinoza. He describes the essential elements of personality as self-confidence, self-determination, desire (=appetite in

ⁱ *The Philosophical Treatment of Divine Personality.* By Frederick E. Harte. London: Charles H. Kelly, 1913. 156 pages. 2s. 6d.

a rational being), and capacity for morality—a somewhat confused statement—and finally says: “A person is a conscious, permanent, self-distinguishing, individual, active, moral being.” This, at least, he says, personality in God must mean, for “God alone is perfect personality.”

Modern thinkers are divided, as regards the subject, into five main classes: the rationalists, as Spinoza and Leibniz; the empiricists, as Locke, Berkeley, and Hume; the German idealists, as Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Schopenhauer; and the agnostics, as Hamilton, Mansel, and Spencer. Schleiermacher and Lotze are each given a separate place. The views of each of the philosophers named are presented in simple, clear language, with no pretense at philosophic depth. The book makes good reading. But the treatment suffers inevitably through the isolation, in large measure, of each thinker in question from the world of thought in which he lived and also of his views on this particular subject from the whole articulated body of his thought. The brevity of the treatment also gives at times an appearance of jumping at conclusions when the author offers critical remarks. His discussion of Schleiermacher's view seems to be based on the *Reden* alone without reference to his greater work, the *Glaubenslehre*. Lotze is accorded the highest honor. To him belongs “the great merit of showing that the idea of personality is not inconsistent with the idea of God”—the exact opposite of Spencer's view. The author's own view is that truth is likely to be found along the lines of personal idealism and not of pantheistic idealism. “It is possible to avoid monism on the one hand and pluralism on the other. We may think of the Absolute as in some sense a society, consisting of God and the selves who are eternally present to his mind, selves called into being at particular moments of time in accordance with his will.” But he retains a strain of argumentation, in that he thinks that the nature of the Absolute “must be incomprehensible, save by the Absolute itself.”

A discussion of the Christian idea of the incarnation,¹ written and published in Japan, stirs one's imagination to attempt a prophecy of the influence the far-off East (or West, shall we say?) may have on the development of Christian thought. MacCauley's book professes to be the product of reflection during a long life. A deep biographical interest, touched with pathos, attaches to the words. For the author, who in his youth came under the “inspiring” influence of Frederick Henry Hodges and Edward Everett Hale, found himself unable to satisfy the council

¹ *The Faith of the Incarnation*. By Clay MacCauley. Yokohama: Kelly & Walsh, 1913. xiii+429 pages.

that examined him, with a view to ordination, of the orthodoxy of his views on the atonement, and both suffered the withdrawal of his license to preach and was ordered not to enter Christian pulpits again. This experience set him free from the attempt to be orthodox and led him into a prolonged study of the ultimate nature of Christianity. He sought for one inner, real, and vitalizing bond of union among Christians, orthodox and unorthodox. His words are: "We are confident that the consciousness here set forth as the Christ's ideal—his own sonship to God and his brotherhood to men—this faith of the incarnation, is the one inmost, the essential, bond of union among all who sincerely progress and call themselves Christians" (p. 31).

To establish this view the author undertakes the ambitious task of setting forth in broad, though careful, outline the beginnings of Christianity, the evolution and metamorphoses of Christianity, the emancipation and modern development of Christianity, and modern Christology. These correspond respectively with the primitive, Greek Catholic, and mediaeval Catholic, Protestant, and present periods of Christian history. The general outlines are correct, though the author seems unacquainted with many of the important discoveries of modern scholars. He thinks that the "master motive" that underlies the historical development of Christianity can be set forth in the affirmation, "Its perpetuation has all along depended upon the survival in it, in some form, of the consciousness of Jesus in the real fatherhood of God, in his own exalted divine sonship, and in the divine brotherhood of mankind." Query: What does he mean by "*real* fatherhood"?

The first and second portions of the history are treated at length and with discrimination, but a discussion of mediaeval and later Catholic theology and of Protestant thought is rather skimpy and reads like a succession of notes derived from general histories.

The work represents an attempt from the Unitarian point of view to come nearer to a basis of argument among Christians. The incarnation is for the author not the doctrine that the Second Person of a Triune God was incarnate in Jesus, but it is that the personality of Jesus Christ is ideal—an ideal ever more fully to be realized in the race. This, he says, is the true belief in the "incarnation of God in the man Jesus," which, while removing all the arbitrariness of the old orthodox view, retains the spiritual momentum which that doctrine mistakenly attempted to conserve. The book is an interesting and able statement of the ethical significance of the personality of Jesus and is to be welcomed as a statement of one side of a whole truth.

Bishop McConnell of the Methodist Episcopal church in the Merrick Lectures for 1911-12¹ has offered a survey of the main lines of religious and intellectual movements in America at present intended to encourage the belief that science, philosophy, sociology, and ethics unite with the deeper currents of religious life in the direction of "getting the Christ spirit and the Christ thought and the Christ life into effective working relationship with the forces of the world" of men. The author does not look for or desire a return to earlier doctrinal forms or traditional beliefs shaken by scientific research and social or ethical progress, but he anticipates that the insistent demand for a "control" of fluent forces will find its answer in the faith in a God who is the "center and source of these forces" and who is "using them with the spirit that is revealed in Christ." The work is popular and is well adapted to the present moods of a good many intelligent people who are disturbed in their faith.

GEORGE CROSS

ROCHESTER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

BRIEF MENTION

OLD TESTAMENT

MACALISTER, R. A. STEWART. *The Philistines: Their History and Civilization.* (The Schweich Lectures, 1911.) London: Oxford University Press, 1913. viii+136 pages. 3s.

At last we have a respectable history of the Philistines. Neither German nor English has heretofore had an adequate work upon these much maligned people. Professor Macalister, who has had long experience in the conduct of excavations in Palestine, was just the man to undertake this task. He has achieved a high degree of success, though the problems involved were neither few nor simple. The Mediterranean coast lands were the center of complex movements of population and of civilization and to disentangle the Philistine elements from the seething mass calls for historical skill of a high order. Professor Macalister has not failed us, though in a field of such breadth as this it could hardly be expected that he would escape all pitfalls or meet with the unqualified indorsement of any of his fellow-workers.

The four chapters treat of the origin of the Philistines, their history, their land, and their culture. The term "history" is thus used in a narrow sense, including only such facts as fall within the lines of politics and war. Culture is treated as a separate rubric, almost as though it had nothing to do with history, or as if there were no history of culture. Such treatment is detrimental to both "history" and "culture." One fact clearly established is the wide range of Philistine occupation and influence in Canaan in the twelfth and eleventh centuries B.C. The nation that reduced the Israelites to such dire straits in the days of Samuel and Saul was not an insignificant element in the life of Canaan. Another fact is that they evidently came to Southern Palestine from Crete

¹ *The Increase of Faith.* By Francis J. McConnell. New York: Eaton & Mains, 1913. 239 pages. \$1.00.

or the neighboring coast lands of Asia Minor. They were one of the many seafaring folk that worked down from the north toward Egypt in the days of the Twentieth Dynasty. It is an interesting suggestion that Sisera of Judges, chap. 5, was a Philistine prince; but it is at present only a conjecture. The treatment of the problem of the Phaestos disk seems to move along right lines. The identification of the Samson-story with a sun-myth is repudiated, but not proven illegitimate. The Tiglath-pileser III mentioned on pp. 63 and 134 is now known to have been the fourth king by that name. The careful reading of this book will convince any novice that the interpretation of the life and literature of the peoples of Palestine is no simple matter but calls for a wide range of learning and sober self-restraint in the estimation of the value of isolated details. All future historians of the Philistines will be heavily indebted to Professor Macalister for bringing together here so much material upon the question and for his suggestive treatment of that material.

GAUTIER, LUCIEN. *Introduction à l'Ancien Testament*. 2d ed. 2 vols. Lausanne: Bridel & Co., 1914. xvi+1091 pages. Fr. 20.

This is the best French introduction to the Old Testament and well deserves to go into a second edition. It is professedly popular in its aim, and has achieved that aim in very large measure. The audience addressed is made up, not of ministers and theological students, but of laymen in biblical and theological study. Most popular introductions satisfy themselves with very brief dogmatic statements of results regarding the literature of the Old Testament and do little in the way of elucidation and demonstration of the evidence upon which the results rest. Professor Gautier's extended work goes most carefully and fully into the processes by which the conclusions have been reached. But with the characteristic French faculty for clearness and simplicity, he makes every step of the way plain to the intelligent non-specialist. He shows himself closely acquainted with the best work upon the Old Testament in English and German as well as French. This edition differs from the first, published in 1906, only in that it takes account of the important publications and discoveries of three later years. The work is comprehensive, covering not only special introduction to the books of the Old Testament Canon and the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha, but also introduction to the study of the text, the Canon, and the Versions. The standpoint of the author is that of the historical school and his particular attitude is nearer to that of Cornill than the more cautious position of Driver. The book is an admirable piece of scholarly popularization and should do much to make French Protestants familiar with modern methods of interpretation.

KNUDSON, A. C. *The Beacon Lights of Prophecy. An Interpretation of Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and Deutero-Isaiah*. New York: Eaton & Mains, 1914. xii+281 pages. \$1.25.

These "Beacon Lights" are introduced by a chapter on "The History and Nature of Prophecy." The book is written for easy reading by those not trained in scientific Bible-study. In subject-matter, scope, and style it is admirably suited to the needs of its intended readers. As becomes such a book, it is cautious and sober in its criticism. But the essentials of the modern view are assumed to be correct and the whole presentation is printed with reference to them. The reading of the book will do much to introduce Sunday-school teachers and students to a sane and helpful understanding of the Hebrew prophets. Some of its statements need modification; as, for example,

when it makes Moses to have done away with polytheism in Israel, or represents Elijah as denying the existence of all gods except Yahweh, or says that the critical controversy regarding the Book of Isaiah is now over. But it is encouraging to see so modern an interpretation of biblical literature issued by the publication society of so soundly evangelical a body as the Methodist Episcopal church.

DRIVER, S. R. *An Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament*. (International Theological Library.) New Edition. Revised 1913. New York: Scribner, 1914. lii+577 pages. \$2.50.

This is the last edition of this famous work to be prepared by Dr. Driver himself. This book has become one of the established institutions of Old Testament scholarship. During the last twenty-three years it has rendered invaluable service to the cause of English scholarship. It is to be hoped that this valuable collection of facts may not be allowed to pass out of use; but that under other editorship it may be kept up with the times and continue its founder's service to later generations, even as do Gesenius' *Grammatik* and *Handwörterbuch*. This new edition preserves the plates of its predecessor, with paging unchanged. The new elements are found in the addition of the more important books of the last five years to the bibliographies; in a new treatment of Isa. 22: 1-14, and in a fifteen-page list of addenda. Among the latter, are important notes on the names of God in the Pentateuch and on the Aramaic Daniel. In the former, the position represented by H. M. Wiener and J. Dahse is stated and overthrown. In this exposure of the weakness of that position, the articles of Dr. Skinner in the *Expositor* of April to September, 1913, are summarized and effectively used. On the Aramaic of Daniel, reply is made to the criticism of the theory of Maccabaeon date presented by R. D. Wilson, of Princeton, in the *Princeton Biblical and Theological Studies* (1912). Driver has no difficulty in making good his position. There is nothing, in the Aramaic of Daniel to forbid its having been written in the Maccabaeon period. On p. 205, Tiglath-pileser IV should be read; likewise Shalmaneser V. On p. 22, Gressmann's *Mose* (1913) should be added to the literature on Exodus. Fowlers *History of the Literature of Ancient Israel* (1912), should go in on p. 2.

GOODRICK, A. T. S. *The Book of Wisdom*, with Introduction and Notes. (The Oxford Church Bible Commentary.) New York: Macmillan, 1913. xii+437 pages. \$2.00 net.

Mr. Goodrick has provided an extended introduction to Wisdom, a new translation with detailed critical historical and exegetical notes, a group of special notes on notable passages, some appendices, and full indexes. He does not print a Greek text, but bases his translation mainly upon that of Swete with occasional corrections. In two general points his views on the book differ from those of previous investigators of it. He "cannot accept the assumption that the Book of Wisdom is a homogeneous whole, written by the same pen, at the same time, and with the same purpose," and he is convinced "that the author did not really know Greek," and his use of it is that of a cultivated foreigner trying to write not common dialect but classical literary Greek. Nor is the writer so conversant with Greek learning and philosophy as has sometimes been claimed. Of the three contrasting strata of the book, chaps. 1-6, 7-9, and 10-19, Goodrick thinks the Solomonic section 7-9 subsequent to the other two, but probably from the same hand. The whole work reflects the persecution of the Alexandrian Jews under Gaius, and was written soon after that experience. No one definite

purpose characterizes the whole book. In the first section the writer appeals to the Epicurean Jews to give up worldly philosophy and return to the faith of their fathers. The third section has been called a Passover sermon. Goodrick's notes are scholarly and able. His acquaintance with the literature is wide and discriminating. In the first of his supplementary notes he reviews with approval Professor Porter's recent essay (1908), "On the Pre-existence of the Soul in the Book of Wisdom." On the whole, Mr. Goodrick has produced a useful and independent work on one of the leading Jewish documents of New Testament times.

NEW TESTAMENT

SODEN, HERMANN FREIHERR VON. *Griechisches Neues Testament*. Text mit kurzem Apparat (Handausgabe.) Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1913. xxviii+436 pages. M. 4.20; cloth, M. 5.

Professor von Soden's comprehensive labors upon the text of the New Testament have reached their climax in the recent publication of his edition of the New Testament text in what he considers its earliest attainable form. His large edition in more than 900 pages including a considerable apparatus of readings is now followed by the more concise and less expensive *Handausgabe*, with the full text but a reduced apparatus of readings, the second margin of the large edition being here omitted. Professor von Soden's colossal plan included not only the re-examination of many uncial witnesses to the text and the still larger task of the examination and classification of the enormous body of previously neglected cursives, but the actual reconstruction of the three types of text, Hesychian, Caesarean, and Lucianic, which he supposes to have originated about 300 A.D., and finally of the earliest attainable text lying back of these recensions. A most valuable feature of von Soden's work lies in his classification of the various subtypes of these texts, particularly of the Lucianic or K text, which in some of its forms prevailed in the mediaeval and Renaissance times.

The hand edition, like the larger one, is printed in a special Greek type of beautiful design, recalling Byzantine models and especially the type of the Complutensian New Testament of 1514. A preface outlines von Soden's famous theory and explains the principal symbols of the apparatus. The text follows, the apparatus occupying usually rather less than half the page, and citing by groups the witnesses for a given reading. In the left-hand margin are what may be called paragraph titles or summaries; in the right, references to scriptural quotations or parallels. The page is at once handsome and convenient.

The doubts inspired by von Soden's statement of principles are not relieved by the appearance of the text in which they have resulted. His acceptance of the Arabic Diatessaron as representing the text used by Tatian is open to serious question, as is the textual influence he ascribes to the Diatessaron. It will be remembered that while Hort explained the mediaeval or Byzantine ("Syrian") as largely a conflation of earlier texts, von Soden regards it as a type of text virtually co-ordinate with the Jerusalem and the Hesychian. Further, his somewhat mechanical method of accepting as the earliest text those readings in which two of his three textual types agree admits a large Byzantine element to his text. A reading which, in Hort's terminology, originated as a Western paraphrase, and chanced to be taken up into the Syrian revision, would find a place in von Soden's most ancient text, being vouched for by

both I and K. The new text is naturally a fuller one than Hort's, including whole verses which he thought spurious, and represents at least a partial reaction in the direction of the *Textus Receptus*. Yet in general it differs from Westcott and Hort no more than has probably been anticipated from a method which so frankly broke with theirs. A few particulars may be cited. In Mark 1:1 *υιοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ* is added to Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ. The story of the Adulteress, John 7:53 ff., which Hort prints after the Gospel of John, von Soden puts in its usual place but in small type. The number of persons on Paul's ship, Acts 27:37, is given as 276, not 76 as in Hort. In punctuation, the anacolutha in Paul's letters are less clearly shown than in Hort. The impossible ὠφεληθῆς, Mark 7:11, is retained, against Blass and practically all interpreters, as is the old accenting Μάρκος. Some of the typographical defects which have surprised the users of the larger edition have been corrected in this, but a long list of others is appended to the text, and it is by no means complete. The thickness of the type has evidently made proofreading very difficult. This has been especially disastrous in the headings: Λούκαν, p. 112, gives way to Λουκᾶν, pp. 113-19, Λουκῶν, p. 120, Λουκᾶν, pp. 121-76, Λούκαν, pp. 177-81; but these figures need not hold true of other copies, since the accent has been generally altered from Λούκαν to Λουκᾶν in the printed sheets. In view of these defects, it is unwise for the publishers to claim that the printing of these text-volumes is a "typographical masterpiece" (cover, p. 3). They compare in this respect very unfavorably with Hort's edition. Most of the passages double-bracketed by Hort as Western non-interpolations stand unchallenged in von Soden's text, which should interest those who think Hort gave the Western text too little weight, for in this respect at least von Soden gives it still less. It is very helpful to have von Soden's text in this convenient form. It is curious that with all his labors on cursive manuscripts all over Europe, he has made no use of the detailed collations of several American cursives which have been published in this and other journals, but has described all the American cursives of which he knew, as alike *unerreichbar*. Since the appearance of this edition, there has occurred the sudden and lamented death of Professor von Soden on January 15, 1914.

EBELING, HEINRICH. *Griechisch-deutsches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testamente*. Mit Nachweis der Abweichungen des neutestamentlichen Sprachgebrauchs vom Attischen und mit Hinweis auf seine Übereinstimmung mit dem hellenistischen Griechisch. Hannover und Leipzig: Hahn, 1913. viii+428 pages. M. 8.

Preuschen's lexicon of 1910 and Zorell's of 1911 are now followed by this more compact work. It does not include the Apostolic Fathers as did Preuschen, but like Zorell it takes account of the papyri as Preuschen did not. The range of papyri quoted is larger than in Zorell's work. The extreme condensation which Ebeling has deemed necessary has made his book less attractive than the others. Like Preuschen he has sought to include the principal variants, even to conjectures like *κενεμβατεύων*. Especial pains are taken to show what Greek writers use a given word. Verbs are translated by the first person singular, as in Zorell but not in Preuschen. Ebeling's text seems to be not Westcott and Hort, but Tischendorf, perhaps as reflected in Nestle; e.g., *ἦπιοι* is quoted as the text in I Thess 2:7, and Hort's *ῥῆπιοι* as a variant. The system of aspiration too is not that of Hort. There are a few misprints. In the longer articles where close analysis of meanings tests the lexicographer, e.g., *νόμοι*,

Ebeling is not better than his predecessors, while in the simpler cases there is the familiar tendency to depend too largely on individual contexts for unusual senses of a word. On some words Ebeling's citations of modern discussion are fuller than those of Preuschen, on others less full than his. On the whole, Ebeling has produced a useful dictionary, unique among Greek-German New Testament lexicons in its inclusion of papyrus instances, and superior it would seem to Zorell's Greek-Latin lexicon in the extent to which the papyrus literature is used.

FERGUSON, WILLIAM DUNCAN. *The Legal Terms Common to the Macedonian Inscriptions and the New Testament*. (Historical and Linguistic Studies in Literature Related to the New Testament, Second Series, Vol. II, Part 3.) Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1913. 109 pages. \$0.75 net.

The following words and their derivatives, so far as the latter fall within the province of this treatise, are discussed: βουλή, γερονσία, δῆμος, διαθήκη, δοκέω, ἐκκλησία, κληρος, λειτουργέω, νόμος, πολιτάρχης, πραιτώριον, πρεσβεύω, στρατηγός, ταμείον. The author has collected all the instances of the use of these terms in the Macedonian inscriptions and has studied them in the light of their context with a view to "furnishing to the student of the New Testament some additional data with which to approach his task of interpreting these technical terms in the Scriptures." It is not the author's fault that for the purpose mentioned the results are somewhat meager. To New Testament students these studies are valuable chiefly as furnishing interesting illustrative material from contemporary documents rather than for the new light that they throw on problems of interpretation. Aside from a few unimportant exceptions, these words have the same meanings in Macedonian inscriptions that they have in Attic Greek.

The studies throw some light upon the organization of Macedonian cities during the Roman period and also contribute to a more exact knowledge of the κοινή as it appears in more formal documents. The value of the book is greatly increased by an appendix containing a word-index to the Macedonian inscriptions.

KERN, OTTO. *Inscriptiones Graecae*. Bonn: Marcus und Weber, 1913. xxi+50 pages. M. 6.

This is one of a series of *tabulae in usum scholarum* published under the general editorship of J. Lietzmann. The volumes already published contain facsimiles of Latin, Greek, and oriental manuscripts, of Greek papyri, and of Latin inscriptions. The present volume contains fifty pages of photographic facsimiles, including over a hundred different inscriptions. These range in date from the seventh century B.C. to the third century A.D., and are taken from the various states on the Greek mainland, the islands of the Aegean, and some of the cities of Asia Minor. The introduction gives a brief description of each inscription and references to the more important literature in regard to it. Only indistinct portions have been transcribed. The book would be more serviceable to American students, who in many cases do not have access to collections of inscriptions, if complete transcriptions had been given. The facsimiles are very clear and admirably serve the purpose of the editor to give to the student a better conception of the physical appearance of the various types of Greek inscriptions.

ROBISON, HENRY B. *Syntax of the Participle in the Apostolic Fathers*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1913. 45 pages. \$0.50 net.

This study, covering the writings of the Apostolic Fathers that appear in the *editio minor* of Gebhart-Harnack-Zahn, gives a complete classification of the participles modeled on the categories of Burton's *Syntax of the Moods and Tenses of the New Testament*. More exact comparison with New Testament usage was made possible by the use of data obtained from unpublished investigations of Professor H. F. Allen. In general the Apostolic Fathers follow closely the New Testament usage. The most striking divergence is in the increased use of the perfect participle in the Apostolic Fathers, who have 16 per cent of perfects and 25 per cent of aorists compared with 9 per cent of perfects and 35 per cent of aorists in the New Testament. Further study, however, would probably show that this large percentage of perfects is due in large measure to the repeated use of certain perfect passive participles that are used to designate the believer and the non-believer, and that the encroachment of the perfect on the field of the aorist is not so great as Robison's statistics would seem to indicate. In general it is to be observed that any adequate description of syntactical phenomena must take into account vocabulary as well as forms. Under the category of the aorist participle of coincident action Robison gives references to twenty-four instances where the principal verb is in the present tense. This apparent divergence from classical usage largely disappears when it is noted that twenty-two of these instances are repetitions of the formula *ἀποκριθὲς λέγει* where the presence of the aorist participle is due to its use in the earlier formula *ἀποκριθὲς εἶπε*. The future participle has practically disappeared, there being only four in a total of 3,100. The negative *οὐ* persists in twenty instances as compared with 139 instances of the use of *μὴ* with the participle.

FONCK, LEOPOLDO. *I miracoli del Signore nel Santo Vangelo spiegati esegeticamente e praticamente*. Volume I, "I miracoli nella natura." Roma: Pontificio Istituto Biblico, 1914. xxviii+644 pages. L. 4. 50.

Dr. Fonck published at Innsbruck in 1903 the substance of his lectures of that year in the Catholic theological faculty at the University of Innsbruck. A second German edition followed in 1907, and now the Papal Biblical Institute, of which Fonck is rector, publishes an Italian translation. The volume forms part of a complete treatment of the gospels under the general title of *Christus, Lux Mundi*, part of which is as yet unwritten. The author is a Jesuit and a scholar; he knows the enormous literature of this time, ancient and modern, with remarkable completeness, citing Holtzmann, Weiss, and Pfeiderer with a freedom foreign to most Protestant scholars when referring to Catholic commentators. Yet of course San Tommaso di Aquino has spoken the final word. Miracles have a necessary place in the supernatural dispensation of grace, and given the freedom and omnipotence of God over against the weakness and dependence of man, they are antecedently credible. Nor have they ceased in the church; miraculous cures at Lourdes and other shrines, or the liquefaction of the blood of St. Januarius at Naples serve to illustrate the "serie immensa di miracoli tangibili e manifesti," which demonstrates the continuity of the divine activity.

Yet despite the foreordained conclusions, this book is one of the most useful treatises on miracles which we possess. As a collection of materials it has great value. Its bibliographies are unusually complete; its patristic citations are most serviceable;

its geographical and archaeological notes furnish a basis for sound exegesis. Where else shall we find so thorough a treatment? Here, for example, is the outline of the discussion of the turning of water to wine at Cana, the first of the nine miracles treated. First we have text, Greek with critical apparatus, and the Vulgate, followed by an Italian translation; then sections on the time of the miracle, its place, the house of the wedding, the contemporary wedding ceremonies; then a detailed explanation of the text, each passage having an entire section for its elucidation; then twelve pages on criticism and the miracle in which non-miraculous explanations are discussed and refuted, and the story's absence in the Synoptics explained. Next the value and importance of the miracle are set forth; it demonstrates Jesus' deity, as well as his kindness and humanity. Symbolically it figures the union of divine and human realized in the Eucharist. Then comes a very valuable account of the miracle as represented in Christian art, from the pictures in the catacombs down. Finally, the practical use of the miracle, in the liturgy, in doctrine, and in preaching, is set forth with a wealth of illustrative and bibliographical citation. All the other miracles are treated with the same fulness, and even those who approach them with other presuppositions and without ecclesiastical constraint will find much that is valuable and suggestive in this non-Modernist work of Jesuit scholarship.

WATKINS, C. H. *Der Kampf des Paulus um Galatien*. Tübingen: Mohr, 1913. 121 pages. M. 3.

This Heidelberg Doctor's dissertation of a London clergyman offers a very careful and detailed analysis of the Epistle to the Galatians, in an attempt to fix the exact meaning of every statement and its bearing upon the Galatian situation. Learning, painstaking thoroughness, and keenness of critical judgment unite to produce a valuable study. For many passages really valuable exegetical contributions are made. The author's own opinion does not always emerge with distinctness, perhaps because he is writing in a language manifestly not his own. And his most positive conclusions are presented modestly, without dogmatism. We may, then, be permitted to remain unconvinced that Acts, chap. 15, and Galatians, chap. 2, give in all essentials the same picture of the apostolic council, and that Paul might either inadvertently or with purpose omit any mention of the decrees without becoming open to our reproach. But the way in which Dr. Watkins argues this mistaken thesis is worth the notice of scholars.

ANER, KARL. *Aus den Briefen des Paulus nach Korinth: (Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher, VI, 1.)* Tübingen: Mohr, 1913. 56 pages. M. 0.40.

The sixth series of these most admirable "People's Books on Religion," planned by the lamented Dr. Schiele, is to present practical and helpful exegesis of biblical material (not necessarily of entire books) from the standpoint of devout critical scholarship. If this first issue is a fair indication of what is to follow, the venture will be a brilliant success. Nothing could be more admirable than Dr. Aner's exposition of a series of passages chosen with skill and insight from both Corinthian letters. The critical position is that of the best scholars of the day, the religious and ethical appreciation is that of an earnest Christian teacher, the style is clear and simple, yet with distinct literary grace and power. Nothing as good has been done on these great epistles in the same compass. We look with confident expectation to succeeding issues of the series.

HAVERFIELD, F. *Ancient Town-Planning*. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1913. 152 pages. 6s. net.

Mr. Haverfield has expanded a lecture given at the University of London (Creighton Lecture, 1910), and later presented to the London Conference on Town-Planning, into this interesting volume. He describes it as a scholar's contribution to a modern movement. After sketching the Babylonian models which influenced the Greeks, he outlines the rise of the town-planning idea in Greece in the fifth century, its rapid development in the Macedonian age, and the analogous Italian and Roman movements. It is interesting to observe how in the Middle Ages, with their turbulent conditions, the straight, open streets of the Roman architects gave way to crooked, narrow lanes, while modern times have witnessed a return to the statelier ancient city types, so appropriate to conditions of security and industry. Thirty-six plans and illustrations greatly enrich the volume. Hippodamus of Miletus, born about 480 B.C., seems to have been the first Greek architect to plan towns, and the Piræus, Thurii, and Rhodes are ascribed to him. The plan of Selinus shows the main thoroughfares crossing at right angles, a scheme familiar in Hellenistic cities. The chessboard plan comes in quite plainly with Alexander's architect Dinocrates and is best exemplified in Priene. The Macedonian architects had often to replan cities already existent, and with further excavations, much may still be learned of their system. The pillared streets of later Jerusalem and Samaria might well have been noted here, with the Madeba mosaic to illustrate the former. In Italy the Terremare villages of the Bronze age (*ca.* 1000) show a well-marked plan, and there is much to suggest that some Etruscan and early Roman towns like Roman camps were intelligently and broadly laid out. "Roman town-planning was recast under Hellenistic influence and thus gained mathematical precision and symmetry" (p. 81). Haverfield closes by pointing out how closely some of the forms of modern life depend on the Roman world, and one lays down his book convinced that in city-planning we are only beginning to learn what the ancients have to teach us. This highly suggestive book should be in the hands of all city-planners, while for students of ancient civilization it is an excellent monograph on a significant phase of ancient life. The possible influence of Egypt might have been more fully treated and the place of the single principal street as the dominating feature of sound Hellenistic cities has less recognition than one might have expected. In general Mr. Haverfield's book opens a subject of large promise, and shows that in city-planning we are returning to the large, comprehensive methods of Hellenistic and Roman times. We have been slow in realizing how modern the ancients really were.

HARNACK, ADOLF. *Über den privaten Gebrauch der Heiligen Schriften in der Alten Kirche*. (Beiträge zur Einleitung in das Neue Testament, 5.) Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1912. vi+111 pages. M. 3.

Bible Reading in the Early Church. Translated by J. R. Wilkinson. (New Testament Studies, V.) (Crown Theological Library.) New York: Putnam, 1912. x+159 pages. \$1.50 net.

Professor Harnack considers the problem of the private use of Scripture in the early church of interest from several points of view. It importantly divides Protestant and Catholic. The stimulating controversy between Lessing and Walch toward the end of the eighteenth century touched it, but left the matter not quite accurately settled. Further, the mystery cults now claiming so much notice, seem, in so far as

they had sacred books, to have forbidden or restricted their use by the laity. While there is not very much evidence for the free private use of the Septuagint in the churches before the times of Irenaeus, there is no evidence against it. In the next age, i.e., till Eusebius, the church clearly gave the Bible, which now included the New Testament, the greatest publicity, and this continued through the times of Theodore. This fact that its sacred books were accessible to all "reveals an essential difference between the Christian," with the Jewish religion and Islam, and other religions; each man is to be "taught of God" through the daily use of the Scripture. "Hence in the early days Christianity never fully became a mystery religion," (pp. 13 G, 13 T). Harnack concludes that the claim made by the Roman church of the right to determine in what measure Scripture is to be made accessible to the individual Christian is an innovation; that Lessing's thesis about the presbyterial restriction of lay use of the New Testament in the first three centuries is altogether wrong; and that the religion of the early church is by virtue of this distinction no mystery religion. The whole is argued with Harnack's well-known mastery of historical materials and method. The last point in particular will claim attention at a time when so much is being learned about the religions which in early times disputed the dominion of the Roman world with Christianity.

LUETGERT, W. *Der Roemerbrief als historisches Problem*. (Beiträge zur Förderung christliche Theologie, 17. Jahrgang, 1913, Heft 2.) Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1912. 112 pages. M. 2.

Failure to agree upon the composition of the church at Rome and on the occasion and purpose of the letter to the Romans is the indictment Luetgert presents against the historical study of Romans. The historical problem of Romans is to account for Paul's change of attitude toward Judaism. The violent polemic of Galatians has evolved into a conciliatory hope. Is Paul to be accused of abandoning the truth for the sake of Christian unity? If Paul were preaching another gospel in Romans, his own Galatian curse would overtake him.

It is evident that the problem needs re-examination. The thesis this essay defends is that Romans was penned to warn the gentile Christian church at Rome against antinomian tendencies. The change of front in Romans as compared with Galatians was not due to vacillation on the part of Paul. And the apostle was not engaging in the feat of crawling backward. The letters to the Corinthians show that, subsequent to the composition of Galatians, there developed within the gentile church an antinomian trend. This group boasted the leadership of Paul, but was on the way to a repudiation of his views. The law and Jewish Christianity were beginning to be held in contempt. Hence the Apostle to the Gentiles felt himself driven to defend his people and their law against the aspersions of the too liberal gentile Christians. Radical gentile Christians were placing Paul upon the defensive, were obliging him to define carefully his own gospel. This antinomian type of Christianity had reached Rome. To insure his reception by the church there, it was necessary for Paul to warn against the adulteration of the gospel by antinomians and to emphasize his positive view of the law. This he did, by stressing his doctrine of justification and making it plain that the law played a part in his doctrine of grace. And this new solution of the problem of Romans by way of the antinomian hypothesis seems all the more unavoidable because the letter to the Romans does not betray the slightest trace of a Judaistic agitation in favor of

circumcision and the law and against the gospel and the apostle. A good case is made out for the main proposition, although the subordinate contentions are not always well supported.

WEISS, JOHANNES. *Synoptische Tafeln zu den drei älteren Evangelien*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1913. 16 pages. M. 0.50.

As a supplement to his very popular commentary on the New Testament, Johannes Weiss has recently issued an analysis of the synoptic material. The Markan source appears in black, the Q material in red, the matter peculiar to Matthew in brown, the matter peculiar to Luke in green. Each pericope has a twofold designation, the heavy number denoting the synoptic section, the light number the gospel division. As the gospels are outlined *in extenso*, a glance suffices to locate the section synoptically without dislocating the passage from its gospel environment. In general Huck's *Synopsis* is followed, and thus this analysis may be used in connection with the complete material as there arranged. A parenthesis notes the corresponding passage from Q found in the other gospel. Of course such an arrangement as this cannot possibly call attention to all the niceties of the complicated synoptic problem, but as a serviceable guide to the more general dependence of synoptic material, this outline will help meet the average need.

SCHLATTER, A. *Das Alte Testament in der johannischen Apokalypse*. (Beiträge zur Förderung christlicher Theologie, 16. Jahrgang, Heft 6.) Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1912. 108 pages. M. 3.

A by-product of the criticism directed against the author's attempt in his *New Testament Theology* to refer all the New Testament writings appearing under the name of John to the disciple of Jesus.

The New Testament apocalypse is viewed as an interpretation and development of Old Testament prophecy. While it accepts the Haggadan as divine revelation there is not a single word in Revelation which may be traced to the Halachah. This is the difference between Revelation and Jewish apocalypticism. Moreover, the Jewish apocalypses are not Christian. Hence there is no immediate connection between Revelation and Jewish apocalypses. The search for the sources of Revelation should be abandoned. The New Testament apocalypse was composed by a Palestinian, a leader of the church of Asia, the author of the Fourth Gospel.

The study contains some valuable rabbinical citations of the second and third centuries of our era. It is deficient in method and conspicuous for inference. It will require another mode of investigation and the accumulation of different evidence to compel us to divorce the New Testament apocalypse from Jewish apocalypticism.

HOLDSWORTH, WILLIAM WEST. *Gospel Origins*. A Study in the Synoptic Problem. New York: Scribner, 1913. xiv+210 pages. \$0.75.

This brief study has the merit of summarizing with care some of the discussions of the synoptic problem in Germany, England, and America. It rightly rejects the theory of a "purely oral tradition as the basis of the three gospels." It objects to the existing confusion regarding the employment of the symbol Q, advocating its limitation to a "far more simple and elementary source than one which by adding narrative to logia would partake of the character of a gospel." The symbols Q (L) and (M) are

suggested to mark the difference between the discourse sources used respectively by Luke and Matthew.

The principal contribution the author desires to make to the discussion of the problem is to resuscitate Wright's theory of a proto-Mark, a deutero-Mark, and a trito-Mark, with this exception, that the differentiation is applied to documents rather than to oral tradition. The various traditional dates assigned to the composition of the Second Gospel are regarded as due to the fact that Eusebius, Irenaeus, *et al.*, used different editions of Mark. Proto-Mark was born at Caesarea and appears in our Luke; deutero-Mark was born at Alexandria and appears in our Matthew; trito-Mark was born at Rome and is our canonical Mark. *Das mag glauben wer glauben kann.*

MAYER, HANS HELMUT. *Über die Pastoralbriefe.* (Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments. Neue Folge, 3. Heft.) Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1913. 89 pages.

Mayer has assembled a series of investigations concerned with the various problems of the Pastoral Epistles: their philology, authorship, the organization of the church, asceticism, relation to the *Acta Pauli et Theclae*, the so-called second imprisonment of Paul, supplement dealing with *πιστὸς ὁ λόγος*, epistolary form, etc., and the dependence of the Syriac Didaskalia upon the Pastorals. The treatment is very compact and terse.

The style of the Pastorals indicates an author or authors of some culture. Although data pointing to composite authorship are discovered, the unity of the Pastorals is with some hesitancy accepted. The Epistles provide valuable material for the history of the development of the organization of the church. They owe their existence to the desire to record and establish as normative the practice of the church in Asia Minor. They recognize only bishops and deacons as officers of the church. While the former were always selected from approved older Christians the latter might be younger men. The teaching function did not attach to the office of bishop. There is no indication in this literature of the existence of a monarchical episcopate. The activity of the bishop consisted in the administration of the Eucharist and of the sacrificial gifts. There is as yet no office of deaconess. Both gnostic and ascetic tendencies appearing among the heretics are opposed. The Pastorals are held to oppose tendencies present in the Acts of Paul and Thecla, but it is not certain whether the author of I Timothy has the Acts in view in his polemic. Only II Timothy implies and describes an imprisoned Paul. But the passage in 4:16 ff. is interpreted of two apologies within the same imprisonment. The general conclusion arrived at is that there is no evidence in favor of a second imprisonment of Paul in Rome. The tradition of the second imprisonment resulted from the attempt to harmonize the journeys of the apostle referred to in our Book of Acts with those narrated in the Acts of Paul.

TURNER, CUTHBERT HAMILTON. *Ecclesiae occidentalis monumenta iuris antiquissima.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1913. Tom. I, Pars i, Fasc. ii, 16s. net; Tom. II, Pars ii, 21s. net.

This is the fourth publication in the treasury of sources of canon law upon which Mr. Turner has been occupied for over fifteen years. It is by far the most elaborate enterprise in early ecclesiastical history now in process of completion by an English-speaking scholar. The editor is well known as an erudite student of early church history, in the field of which he has published a volume on the *Use of Creeds in the Early*

Centuries (1906), several articles in Hastings, and the thorough chapter on the organization of the Christian church in the *Cambridge Mediaeval History* (Vol. I). His attitude is that of an enlightened High Churchman. In the present series, which aims to give a complete and as far as possible accurate presentation of the texts of the early conciliar proceedings and regulations, the following portions have already appeared: T. I, Fasc. i, Pars i (1899), "The Canons of the Apostles and the Preface of Nicea"; T. I, Pars ii (1904), "Prefaces, Capitula, Symbols, and Canons of Nicea"; T. II, Pars i, Fasc. i (*sic*) (1907), "Canons, Capitula, Prefaces, and Names of Ancyra and Neo-Caesarea."

The volume before us is, as stated above, the fourth; it concludes Nicea and adds three appendices, the series of which is prolonged from the preceding volume. These appendices are unusually important; therefore I give their contents: App. VIII, Roman Council of 379 ("Tome of Damasus"); App. IX, interpretations of the Symbol (Nicea) from Greek and Roman writers with an index of peculiar words and notes; App. X, a hitherto unpublished commentary on the Symbol (Latin) dating from about 380 A.D.; a second Pseudo-Jerome Commentary of the beginning of the fifth century. An Index of Scripture passages, names, etc., follows.

T. II, Pars ii, Fasc. i (1913): This, the fifth portion, gives the collated records of the Council of Gangra (343) which condemned Eustathius and promulgated twenty decrees regulating Christian marriage; also of Antioch (344). A useful table of text sources precedes the actual text of the canons and synodical letters. The same treatment is accorded Antioch, with the addition of an extensive critique of the twenty-five disciplinary canons and the four Arian Symbols offered.

The text apparatus is most complicated and prohibits the use of the book to any but the skilled canonist. Since the work is innocent of anything like a subject-index, a book of general conspectus, with references to the development of dogmas and discipline during the Arian Controversy, is next to be desired, as Hefele summed up the conciliar collections.

WICKES, DEAN ROCKWELL. *The Sources of Luke's Perean Section*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1912. 87 pages. \$0.54.

This is a detailed linguistic and literary study advocating the thesis that Luke 9:51—18:14 is not a literary unit but is composed of two originally distinct and separate sources. The argument is based upon the following considerations: (1) the fact that considerable portions of this material are closely paralleled in Matthew while other portions presumably germane to his purpose are wanting; (2) the evidences of differences between the two parts thus differentiated; and (3) the homogeneity of each of the two sections within itself. A complete reconstruction of the two documents is printed at the end. The author presents the data in favor of his position with great care and thoroughness.

KNOFF, RUDOLF. *Probleme der Paulusforschung*. Tübingen: Mohr, 1913. 41 pages. M. 1.20.

This brochure contains a very concise and clear statement of the present status of Pauline research. It does not deal with the literature of the subject but with the conclusions which have been advocated of late, and the problems as they now lie before scholars for further investigation. The problems range themselves in the following order: sources of information, general features in the life-history of Paul,

Pauline chronology, his "thorn in the flesh," his earlier life and conversion experience, his missionary activity, his relation to Judaism and to the Greco-Roman world, particularly in the realm of theological thinking, and, lastly, Paul's relation to Jesus. While the differences between the two are acknowledged to be striking, nevertheless Paul is thought to have been truly a servant and apostle of Jesus Christ.

SCOTT-MONCRIEFF, P. D. *Paganism and Christianity in Egypt*. Cambridge: The University Press, 1913. ix+225 pages. 6s.

This book deals with some of the more obscure phases of early Christian history in Egypt. Two preliminary chapters describe the Egyptian religion at the close of the Ptolemaic era and at the beginning of the third century. These are mainly an exposition of belief in Osiris as the god of immortality, first in the *Book of the Dead* and then along with Isis in Plutarch's *Isis and Osiris* and Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*. Then follows a description of early literary remains of Christianity in Egypt from the end of the second century on. To this are added a chapter on archaeological evidence, another on early Christian iconography, two chapters on gnostic developments, and a final discussion of the rise of asceticism and monasticism. These pages contain much that is interesting and valuable, but unfortunately they do not deal with the New Testament period and they overlook Hermeticism as a possible factor in the Egyptian world prior to Christianity's appearance.

PICK, BERNHARDT. *Jesus in the Talmud: His Personality, His Disciples and His Sayings*. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1913. 103 pages. \$0.75.

The Cabala: Its Influence on Christianity and Judaism. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1913. 115 pages. \$0.75.

The first of these booklets covers ground already made familiar by the similar but more complete works of Dalman, Herford, and Strack. The second pamphlet surveys a less familiar field and one that has attracted recent attention through the publication of Abelson's *Jewish Mysticism*. Pick gives the main facts regarding the origin, development, and content of that body of theosophical mystical Jewish teaching which emerged in the Middle Ages and which in general passes under the name Cabala (or Kabbalah). But Pick's estimate of the significance of this phase of Jewish history is naturally less sympathetic—and perhaps at times less just—than that of the Jewish writers above mentioned.

MOFFATT, JAMES. *The New Testament: A New Translation*. New York and London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1913. x+327 pages. \$1.50.

Every considerable advance in the science of New Testament interpretation necessitates a new translation. Since the appearance of the Revised Version, New Testament study has advanced a long way in many particulars. New light on lexical and grammatical matters has come from an examination of the papyri by such scholars as Deissmann, Moulton, and Milligan. Von Soden's monumental work upon textual criticism has been brought to completion. Problems of "introduction" have been more definitely settled, thus fixing more accurately the time and circumstance of the composition of certain books in the light of which they can now be better understood. The Jewish background of early Christianity is now more accurately known, and its

Hellenistic environment is coming to be more fully recognized and used for the purposes of interpretation. All translation which rises above the level of meaningless literalism must in the nature of the case be an interpretation and as such it ought to embody the latest results of scientific research in all departments of New Testament study.

In this new translation the author has had in mind mainly the recent advance in linguistic and textual studies. He has based his rendering mainly upon von Soden's text and has aimed "to produce a version which will to some degree represent the gains of recent lexical research." But this has not been done without regard to attractive English style. The result is a fresh, vigorous, and pleasing rendering that will do much to give many passages, already meaningless through long familiarity, a new and truer significance.

Handbuch zum Neuen Testament. Herausgegeben von Hans Lietzmann: *Das Johannesevangelium.* Erklärt von Walter Bauer. Tübingen: Mohr, 1912. iv+189 pages. M. 3.70.

Der Hebräerbrief. Erklärt von Hans Windisch. Tübingen: Mohr, 1913. iv+122 pages. M. 2.40

These short commentaries are a model of condensation, and are especially strong on the side of *religionsgeschichtliche* interpretation. They contain a concise analysis of the content of each book, a list of the most important literature, a discussion of introductory problems, a new translation, detailed interpretative comments on the basis of the Greek text, and numerous excurses on special topics. The Fourth Gospel is dated 100-125 A.D., perhaps coming from Ephesus, although an Antiochian or even an Egyptian provenance is thought possible. The Logos idea, the teaching about a "new birth," and the doctrine of union with Christ through the sacraments are shown to have close resemblances, if not direct affinities, with Egyptian mysticism as contained in the Hermetic literature. Bauer maintains that the Logos conception, for example, is essentially neither Hebrew nor Philonic, as has often been supposed, but belongs more properly in the same category with the Hermes of popular Stoic preaching, or with the Hermes-Logos of Plutarch.

Windisch thinks Hebrews was originally a hortatory tract or lecture, a written sermon designed for a particular community. The name of the author cannot be conjectured with any degree of probability, though it is likely that he was a Jew but not a member of the primitive apostolic company. The date of composition is set in the eighties, and the intended readers were members of some gentile church. The Jerusalem community cannot have been in the writer's mind, and reasons are also given against assuming Rome to have been the church addressed. The genetic relationships of the author's thought are found to lie both in Hellenism and in Judaism.

NAU, F., *La Didascalie des douze apôtres, traduite du syriaque pour la première fois.* Deuxième édition, revue et augmentée de la traduction de la Didachè des douze apôtres, de la Didascalie de l'apôtre Addai, et des empêchements de mariage (pseudo) apostoliques (Ancienne littérature canonique syriaque, Fascicule I.) Paris: Lethielleux, 1912. xxxii+264 pages.

This work is a revision and amplification of a volume which appeared some twelve years ago and which formed the first fascicle of a series entitled *Ancienne littérature canonique syriaque*. Subsequently other portions made their appearance.

Since the first edition was published, certain work has been done on the document concerned and some discoveries have been made of which account needs to be taken. Among these are the publication of a new MS of the *Didascalia*, together with the variants of a number of others, by Mrs. Gibson, the translation into German by Fleming of Lagarde's edition of the *Didascalia*, Achelis' comments, and the edition of a Latin translation by Funk. These works have been used by M. Nau to correct and to amplify statements made in the earlier edition and to revise the translation therein given. The purpose of the augmentation of the text is best expressed in the words of the author himself: "Nous avons ajouté aussi la traduction de la *Didachè* grecque, comme point de comparaison avec la *Didascalie* et avec la constitution apostolique de l'Eglise (livre III de l'*Ocistaeuque* de Clement) que le manuscrit de Mesopotamie a interpolée aussi dans la *Didascalie*" (pp. vi-vii). "Le manuscrit de Mesopotamie" is the one published by Mrs. Gibson. The division into books, chapters, and paragraphs used by Funk and the pagination of Lagarde are added for purposes of reference to the *Apostolic Constitutions* on the one hand and to the various translations on the other.

M. Nau gives a summary and comparison of the various documents which have more or less important relationships with the *Didascalia* ranging from the *Didachè* to the *Canons of the Apostles*. Turning to the questions of introduction relating to the *Didascalia*, the author concludes that it is a Mesopotamian work of the third century with possible modifications at the beginning of the fourth. As to the author one cannot say more than that he was probably an "excellent" bishop of the third century. The relationships of the document to canonical and apocryphal literature are discussed, and a very cautious attitude is assumed regarding the use of any gospel other than the four canonical ones. The apocryphal *Acts of Peter and Paul* are used for the story of Simon Magus. A short discussion of the relation of the *Didascalia* to the *Mishna* is interesting.

The work is fairly well done, but the chief value of the book lies in the convenience of possessing documents related to each other and to the *Apostolic Constitutions* in a form in which comparison is easy. The documents also serve as an admirable illustration of literary method in the early centuries of our era. To those who work upon the obscure problems regarding church orders, polity, and discipline which emerge from much of our early Christian literature, the manual edition of M. Nau will be very welcome.

CHURCH HISTORY

DENNIS, JAMES S. *The Modern Call of Missions*. New York and Chicago: Revell, 1913. \$1.50 net.

Dr. Dennis is so well known as an authority on missions that the announcement of a new book from his pen always awakens interest. This volume is a collection of articles and papers that he has recently published in missionary reviews and periodicals. They deal with the larger aspects and wider relations of the great subject. Few people have ever supposed that missions were a large factor in diplomacy, or that they had been influential in colonial history, or natural evolution, or commerce. Yet all this and much more is conclusively shown in this book. There are eighteen chapters and a good index.

BOGGIS, R. J. EDMUND. *Praying for the Dead*. London and New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1913. \$1.25 net.

The author begins with several fundamental and generally accepted religious principles: first, a Supreme Being on whom man's existence depends, and who sustains and directs every creature on earth; second, a belief that man can affect his fellow-creatures by making an appeal to this Supreme Being; third, the conviction that death does not involve extinction, so that life here does not involve the whole of man's being; fourth, that man after death is to some degree sentient, so that the great Being who exercised power over him while on earth is still his supreme ruler after death; fifth, that as prayer for the living may avail, so likewise may prayers for the dead. This last principle has not been adopted by all.

After this statement of principles Mr. Boggis enters upon an extensive historical investigation to determine the extent of prayers for the dead in different ages and among different religions. He seeks the evidence of antiquity; of Judaism; of the New Testament; of the early Eastern church; of the early Western church; of the Liturgies; of the early Christian tombs; the early Britons and English; the pre-Reformation period in England; the Reformation period in England; the recoil from mediaevalism and the practice of English churchmen since the Reformation; the attitude of Protestantism. He closes with a chapter on "The Church of England and the Future."

Nonconformists have generally been opposed to the practice, but there are numerous exceptions within the separate bodies. Even among the Presbyterians, although the Westminster Confession is explicitly opposed, there are several prominent leaders who are favorable. The author believes that there is a rising interest in the subject among Protestants, and that the Church of England "will again bring herself into full accord with the rest of Catholic Christendom in respect of the primitive and general custom of praying for the dead."

AYER, JOSEPH CULLEN, JR. *A Source Book for Ancient Church History*. New York: Scribner, 1913. \$3.00 net.

This book covers the history of the church from the Apostolic age to the Seventh General Council, Nicaea, 787 A.D. Professor Ayer intended this work to be used in connection with some good textbook like Duchesne's *Early History of the Church*, but the introductions are so admirably done, and taken together connect up so well, that we believe it could be used without any other text. The interest of the reader must be awakened at the beginning and kept up to the end. The selections appear to us to be judicious, and the student who in the beginning has no conception of source material and how it is used in the construction of historical narrative will get a new vision and no longer be contented with information on controverted points that is gained at second hand. We think that Professor Ayer has rendered an excellent service in bringing into church history a method that is so successful in teaching secular history.

SIMPSON, W. J. SPARROW. *Non-communicating Attendance*. New York and London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1913. \$1.60 net.

In the early church all the attendants communicated, and that is the ideal for all time. But soon the practice of non-communicating attendance arose, and it became common. The Church of England has keenly felt the failure to hold up to the ideal,

and various attempts have been made to relieve the inconsistency. Dr. Simpson has reviewed the history of the Eucharist from the beginning and taken careful account of all these attempts. His concluding chapter on "Practical Conclusions" sums up the whole matter. The eucharistic ideal must be held up, non-communicating attendance should be permitted, but the impression should prevail that deception is a solemn individual responsibility, to be determined by each. "Until the Eucharist is thus fully restored to its central place every Lord's Day in our churches, the people are being deprived of the highest expression of worship of which the English Church is capable."

EDMUNDSON, GEORGE. *The Church in Rome in the First Century*. (The Bampton Lectures for 1913.) London and New York: Longmans, Green & Co. xiv+296 pages. \$2.50.

The apostle Peter founded the Roman church during a visit to Rome in the years 42-45. He then returned to Jerusalem to take part in the events of Gal. 2:1-10 and spent the period 47-54 in missionary work in the East, with Antioch as his headquarters. In the next year, after laboring in Corinth, he paid Rome a second visit and stayed until 56, so compelling Paul (with whom, however, he was on the most friendly terms and in perfect theological agreement) to remain away from the city. The Roman church had now become a large and influential body but it was recruited almost entirely from Jews and semi-proselytes, and as yet contained only a handful of anti-Pauline Judaizers. Peter's third visit took place in 63 and was terminated by his martyrdom in the early summer of 65. However, Peter and Paul were never in Rome simultaneously. The latter was released from prison in 62, worked in Spain and later in the East, returned to Rome in 66, and was martyred there in 67.

On Peter's second visit to Rome he completed the organization of the church by choosing from its presbyters a triumvirate of *episcopi*, Linus, Anacletus, and Clement. After the apostle's death these selected Linus to succeed him as supreme governor of the church, but all three shared in the general direction of affairs. But no new *co-episcopi* were afterward elected, and by the successive deaths of Linus (in 80) and Anacletus (in 92), Clement finally became sole ruler. Thus the monarchical episcopate was developed at Rome.

With this historical scheme, considerable readjustments of the literary evidence become necessary. As self-effacement is impossible for a monarchical bishop, Clement's epistle must be dated back before 70. Similarly, the vagueness of references to church government in *Hermas* makes a date prior to 92 needful for it, while on the other hand the *Didache* is dismissed as a fourth-century forgery. After this it is no surprise to read that the Second Gospel was written in 45 or that authentic portraits of Peter and Paul have been preserved.

The foregoing structure speaks for itself and a detailed criticism is hardly worth while. Scholarship doubtless may often have been at fault in treating the later Roman traditions too contemptuously and more historic truth may be embodied in them than is now generally admitted. But Mr. Edmundson's canonization of the legends will not help much in clearing up the problems. Unfortunately his undisguised purpose has been not to follow the guiding of the earliest data but to show how by violent wrenching these data can be forced to fit into a preconceived scheme. In a Bampton Lecture series such a method is particularly deplorable; an apologetic that represents faith as depending on a most precarious series of "may have been's" is of all things most mistaken.

DOCTRINAL

MACKINTOSH, ROBERT. *Christianity and Sin*. (Studies in Theology.) New York: Scribner, 1914. 231 pages. \$0.75.

The general excellence of the series to which this volume belongs leads one to set a high standard by which to measure any new contribution. Professor Mackintosh's theme is admittedly a difficult one, and it is made peculiarly difficult just now because of the generally fluid state of our conceptions of ethics and of theology. The author brings to his task abundant scholarship and wide reading. But it is to be feared that the readers for whom this series is intended will find themselves quite as much bewildered after reading this discussion as they were before. The author evidently hoped to use the historical method so as to throw light on our present problems. But he is unable to disengage himself from the consciousness of having read scores of volumes, upon which he wishes to pass criticism. The consequence is a running commentary on the various phases of his theme, with an abundance of acute observations; but the discussion never seems to head up into a definite exposition of the actual subject. Professor Mackintosh is in distinct revolt against the dogmatic Augustinian conception of sin and its Protestant descendants. He reviews some of the great discussions of ethical problems in modern times, without, however, finding any of them satisfactory. In the concluding chapters, he discusses various practical aspects of sin, insisting on freedom and conscience as primary facts, suggesting "social traducianism" as perhaps the best theory of the origin of sin, and calling attention to the necessity of both a punitive and a reformatory purpose in God's dealing with sin. A chapter on the atonement is especially discursive and inconclusive. The principal impression left by the book is that we are in a transition period of thinking when neither the older dogmatic explanations nor the newer ethical suggestions are very satisfactory.

ALEXANDER, ARCHIBALD B. D. *Christianity and Ethics*. (Studies in Theology.) New York: Scribner, 1914. xii+252 pages. \$0.75.

The author of this book is already known by his *Ethics of St. Paul*. Here he undertakes to give us a "handbook of Christian ethics," as the subtitle informs us. The most striking characteristic of the book is the author's apparent incapacity for thinking of ethics as rooted in the social evolution of men in their actual group life. He begins, in good old-fashioned philosophical style, with the "postulates" of ethics, engaging in logical distinctions which, when once they are made, scarcely enter at all into the subsequent discussions. In fact, the book as a whole impresses one as being too largely an agreeable display of considerable erudition with an edifying homiletical exposition of themes taken over from conventional ethical and theological discussions. The lack of any fundamental analysis of his problem appears strikingly in his attempt to define Christian ethics (pp. 22 and 23). Here he makes Christian ethics (1) "a branch of general ethics," (2) "ethics in its richest and fullest expression," (3) the interpretation of life resting on God's revelation in Christ, (4) all that has been taught about goodness everywhere, "gathered up, sifted, and tried by one all-authoritative measure of truth—the mind of Christ," (5) the ethics of a regenerate character.

With this elastic conception, the author can on one page paint a picture of non-Christian systems which would leave the impression that they are fatally defective,

and on a later page extend the most hospitable arms to the philosophers, claiming that Christianity gives a deeper spiritual interpretation to the truths which philosophy rightly affirms. His apologetic attitude leads him occasionally to make statements which could scarcely be substantiated, as for example, "Speculative ethics [he means "all non-Christian systems"] prescribes only what ought ideally to be done or avoided. *It takes no account of the foes of the spiritual life*; nor does it consider the remedy by which the character, once it is perverted or destroyed, can be restored or transformed" (p. 24, italics mine). Retaining, as he does, the conception of a definite revelation of the content of Christian ethics, the author is concerned to find a validation in the Bible and in the teaching of Jesus for modern ethical ideas. He decides that Jesus could not have entertained apocalyptic views; for such an interpretation "virtually makes Christ a false prophet." Yet "Christian ethics, though deduced from Scripture, is not a cut-and-dried code of rules prescribed by God which man must blindly obey. It has to be thought out, and intelligently applied to all circumstances of life" (p. 33).

Doubtless most readers will find in the book much inspiration; for the style is agreeable, and the easy apologetic arguments tend to preserve the feeling that Christianity is a "perfect" system, with revealed principles adequate to the ethical handling of any and all questions. The critical reader, however, will note with regret the almost total absence of an accurate historical spirit, and will feel keenly the formalism of the abstract deductive method employed by the author.

HISTORY OF RELIGION

CARPENTER, J. ESTLIN. *Comparative Religion*. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1913. 256 pages. \$0.50.

This is a popular presentation of the task, method, and purpose of comparative study of religions, with ample citations of data to make the work concrete and readable. The inquiry is conducted in a purely scientific spirit. The author considers it no part of his task to speculate regarding the origin of religion or religions, but contents himself with discovering and examining the resemblances in different religions and interpreting the outer and inner forces by which these resemblances have been produced. His general working principle is an evolutionary conception of all religion. A survey of classical historical forms is followed by a description of religion in lower stages of culture. Then specific features—spirits and gods, sacred acts, sacred products, religion and morality, and problems of life and destiny—are examined. The book is instructive and entertaining throughout, a typical popular handbook, as it is intended to be. But it is conspicuously deficient in one respect; it almost never draws any important illustrative materials from the Hebrew and Christian religions.

FABER, GEORG. *Buddhistische und neutestamentliche Erzählungen: Das Problem ihrer gegenseitigen Beeinflussung*. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1913. 70 pages. M. 2.50.

This is a useful pamphlet, giving a survey and critical estimate of books dealing with the question of genetic relationships between Christianity and Buddhism. A brief chapter on the rise of Buddhistic literature is followed by another on the relation between India and the Nearer East in ancient times. The chief points at which

indebtedness of one religion to the other has been alleged are then examined. The study issues in three main conclusions: (1) the origin of these items in Buddhistic tradition is in the main too doubtful to permit any positive views on the problem of mutual influence between these and New Testament narratives; (2) the relation between India and the eastern Mediterranean lands makes possible the influence of the latter on the former, or vice versa; (3) but detailed investigation furnishes no very substantial grounds for such a conclusion, and where the positive evidence is strongest it points to Buddhism as the borrower.

MISCELLANEOUS

CLOW, W. M. *Christ in the Social Order*. New York: Hodder & Stoughton, 1914. xii+295 pages. \$1.25.

Dr. Clow feels that it is a mistake to attempt to turn the energy of Christianity in the direction of "Christianizing the social order." He prefers to speak of Christ "in" the social order. His point of view is that of a mildly controlled individualism. He deals with proposed substitutes for the present social order in a spirit of hostile criticism, pointing out what seem to him to be the impracticable elements of all current social remedies. A chapter on "The Social Ideal of Jesus" leads one to wonder why the word "social" should have been used at all; for Dr. Clow pictures Jesus as a religious individualist. He summarizes as follows: "The distinctions between Christ's social ideal and all other commended solutions of our social unrest can be expressed in three contrasts. It keeps its eyes upon the man, not upon the state. It has regard to external conditions of life chiefly in view of their discipline of character. It is essentially religious in its basis and sanctions, for it is a kingdom whose issues and rewards transcend those of earth and time" (p. 93). The ideal of individual "stewardship" is urged as the Christian goal; and evidently Dr. Clow is on the whole very well satisfied with the present social order. It only needs better men to administer it, he believes. Some of his statements evoke incredulous surprise. For example, "Every man who knows the poor can recount numberless cases of homes, as holy as the home of Nazareth, maintained on less than £1 per week." (p. 63). One fears that in the ordinary family such saintliness would find speedy reward in starvation, which doubtless Dr. Clow would explain on "disciplinary" grounds. There is much excellent advice concerning individual ethics; but it is to be feared that the book will encourage an unfortunate complacency with reference to social problems.

PERIODICAL LITERATURE

"The Apostolic Decree against *πορνεία*" (B. W. Bacon in the *Expositor*, 8th Series, No. 37 [January, 1914], 40-61).

Professor Bacon finds in Professor Sanday's article in the October number of the *Expositor* on "The Text of the Apostolic Decree" the opportune moment for the presentation of further evidence as to the historical sense and bearing of the Decrees from contemporary sources hitherto overlooked.

The writer dissents from the ethical interpretation which the Western text labors to attach to the Decrees, and urges that the apostolic council of Acts, chap. 15, is an

idealizing historian's combination of (1) the conference of Paul and Barnabas with the Pillars (Gal. 2:1-10), issuing in the division of missionary fields and the first missionary journey, and (2) an apostolic conclave at Jerusalem at which neither Paul nor Peter was present, whose Decrees could not have been in force when Peter ate with the Gentiles at Antioch, and which, moreover, are at fundamental variance with Paul's solution in Galatians and I Corinthians. Paul's *modus vivendi* is based upon the indifference of the distinctions for *all* believers; that of Luke, on the contrary, proceeds on the assumption of the permanent validity of Mosaic distinctions for believers of Jewish birth. The Decrees represent the solution which was valid for "Peter and all the Jews," and authoritative for Antioch, Syria, and Cilicia, but never accepted by Paul, nor by the churches beyond the Cilician gates.

Both Paul and Luke distinguish two crises in the controversy with the Judaizers. The first one turned upon the circumcision of Titus and issued in a hearty agreement to the effect that the "Pillars" and their agents were to make no proselytes among Paul's converts, while Paul and Barnabas should keep within corresponding bounds. The absolute freedom of the Gentiles from the yoke of the law was conceded, but not the freedom of the Jew. Hence the inevitable second stage of the conflict, occasioned by Peter's eating with the Gentiles at Antioch, over the more crucial problem with which the Jerusalem council had not dealt, viz.: Should "Jews which are among the Gentiles" relinquish their ceremonial purity by eating with their Gentile brethren? Paul holds they must, if occasion so require, Gentile and Jew alike being freed from the law; but the delegation from James would lay the Gentiles under compulsion in the matter of distinctions of meats. They won the day. This, however, was not a conscious attempt to compel the Gentiles to Judaize; nor was it a rescinding of the act at Jerusalem which had recognized the absolute freedom of the Gentiles, but it regarded Jewish believers, who were still under the divine obligation to keep the law, as having the right to lay down certain requirements as necessary conditions of such acts of fellowship as eating together, though only such as were necessary for the protection of their own ritual purity. Luke represents both stages of the conflict as settled by the "apostles and elders in Jerusalem" at one sitting, thus obliterating the Pauline disagreement.

The writer's discussion of the intrinsic character of the Decrees constitutes at the same time the third point in his threefold argument in support of the foregoing position. Professor Bacon thinks that K. Six has clearly established that the connective idea which unifies the group of the four forbidden things (Acts 15:20) is the danger of "communion with demons." They are not moral, nor a part of mosaism retained at the sacrifice of the rest, but a purity law which rests upon a sacramentarian or quasi-magical conception of the value of the distinctions of meats. The Jewish-Christian and common post-Pauline views interpret the food laws as protecting the life of God resident in the Christian from contamination by intermixture with demoniac life. Paul, on the contrary, holds that pollution can be only moral and voluntary. "There is nothing unclean of itself, but to him who esteemeth it to be unclean, to him it is unclean." Paul endeavors to raise the pre-existing conceptions of a more magical character to a purely moral level.

"Fornication" is grouped with the other three abstinences because the two functions of nutrition and reproduction are regarded as special means of union with divine life. Sexual immorality is classed with "pollutions of idols," because, like the use of sacrificial food, it unites to alien life, especially of the demons. With Paul,

however, ceremonial purity is not necessary because there is no union without moral consent.

"Five Epistles to the Philippians" (J. E. Symes in the *Interpreter*, X, No. 2 [January, 1914], 167-170).

The writer proposes and defends a reconstruction of the correspondence between Paul and the Philippians which he believes sweeps away all difficulties. The reconstruction is as follows: (a) a letter by Paul after leaving Macedonia in A.D. 56 reporting progress. They then send him the first of the gifts referred to (4:16) and inform him of the arrival of the Judaizers in Philippi who disparage the work of Paul. (b) St. Paul writes a second letter (3:2-4:9), acknowledging the gift. In this he deals with the attacks made on him (3:2-6), gives a personal vindication and exposition of his faith (3:7-14), following with personal messages and benediction (3:15-4:9). The Philippians did not keep the record of their own generosity, with which the letter began. Date A.D. 58. (c) A third letter, acknowledging their second gift, which, as probably merely containing thanks for their generosity, perished. Date A.D. 59. (d) A third gift followed. A fragment only of Paul's reply is preserved in 4:10-20, the early and formal part being destroyed, so that the remaining part begins with a "But." Date, A.D. 60. (e) Finally, the whole epistle, 1:1-3:1, together with 4:21-23, having nothing to do with any gift, but being a grand statement of Christian theology and Christian duty worked out in the enforced leisure of the apostle's captivity in Rome. Date A.D. 61. (f) Some scribe inserted the preserved fragments of the second and fourth letters (b) and (d) before the benediction of Paul's fifth letter (e) but abstained from any editorial work.

"Tertullian's Laienstand" (Hugo Koch in the *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte*, XXXV [1914], 1-8).

Koch emphasizes *De exhort. cast. C. 7* as the decisive passage where Tertullian classes himself with the laymen: "Nonne et laici sacerdotes sumus?" "Are not we laymen also priests?" He maintains against Karl Kastner that the force of this passage is not weakened by the fact that Tertullian is supposed to have been a Montanist when he wrote it. He shows that Tertullian as a Catholic derived the distinction between laymen and priests not from divine but from church law. He holds that in whatever way Jerome's statement about Tertullian's priesthood may have arisen, Tertullian never at any time became a priest.

"Zur Vorgeschichte des ephesinischen Konzils" (Eduard Schwartz in *Historische Zeitschrift*, 3d Series, Vol. XVI, Heft. 2 [1914], 237-63).

This article is concerned with the church politics of the first half of the fifth century and grew out of the author's plans to deal with the church politics involved in the history of the councils of Ephesus and Chalcedon, the completion of which plan has, however, been indefinitely postponed. The church politics of this period are represented as being dominated by the ambition of the patriarchs of Alexandria; in particular, by their determination to thwart the effort of the emperors to make the patriarchate of Constantinople superior to that of Alexandria. The day in which Nestorius, when called from Antioch to Constantinople, becomes involved in a controversy over the cult-word "God-bearer" applied to the Virgin is clearly brought out. This situation Cyril of Alexandria is represented as turning to his advantage. By

manipulating respectively the opposition to Nestorius in Constantinople, Caelestin of Rome, the monastic element in Egypt and elsewhere, Cyril paves the way for bending the Eastern emperor to his will and humiliating the great obstacle in the way of his hierarchical ambitions, the patriarch of Constantinople. One might add that documentary evidence for this activity of Cyril is given in rather scanty quantities.

"Manegold of Lautenbach" (Miss M. T. Stead in the *English Historical Review*, XXIX, No. 113 [January, 1914], 1-6).

Following a line suggested in Dr. Poole's *Illustrations of Mediaeval Thought* (p. 232), Miss Stead has examined the polemical literature which followed the excommunication and deposition of Henry IV, German emperor, by Gregory VII in 1076 and 1080, and especially the *Liber ad Gebhardum* of Manegold of Lautenbach, an obscure German monk who at the instance of Hartman, prior of his monastery, undertook to justify the action of the Pope. The chief interest in his work is that he was the only supporter of the Pope who made a departure from the hierarchical doctrine and ascribed to the people the power of choosing and deposing the king, which Gregory claimed for the successors of St. Peter.

"The Children's Crusade" (Professor D. C. Munro in the *American Historical Review*, XIX, No. 3 [April, 1914], 516-25).

It is because of the uncritical treatment which this event has received at the hands of modern historians that Professor Munro has thought it worth while to set forth the truth about the Children's Crusade. Valuable material can be gained from about sixty writers of the thirteenth century, of whom at least sixteen give independent accounts in whole or in part trustworthy.

Professor Munro points out that modern writers have been so influenced by the romantic phases of the movement as to give undue credulity to the legendary tales with which it soon became embellished.

There were really two movements, one French and the other German, both occurring in 1212. Whether or how they were related does not appear in the sources extant. For the movement in France, Professor Munro cites the chronicles of Laon, Mortmer, Jennings, and Andrés as giving the most trustworthy accounts. From these sources the French crusade reduces itself to a comparatively simple story—it cannot be called a crusade at all. It was confined wholly to France; starting probably at Vendome, it extended over the territory between Paris, Laon, Calais, and Rouen and perhaps farther. The Laon chronicle puts the number of participants at 30,000. Children and young men and women gathered about a poor shepherd boy of Cloges, named Stephen, who claimed to have had a vision. After marching in procession through the cities, castles, towns, and villages, carrying banners, candles, and crosses, swaying censers, and singing, and saying they were "going to God," they were finally compelled by hunger and by the order of the king to return to their homes.

There is no suggestion in these chronicles that the children were thinking of a crusade or even of a pilgrimage. The later stories of their reaching the sea, of their being sold into slavery, and of the tortures received at the hands of the Saracens rest on insufficient evidence and are clearly the inventions of a superstitious and imaginative age. It is significant that not one chronicle south of the Loire mentions the French movement at all.

Of the movement in Germany there are many accounts. Professor Munro cites nine chronicles, all composed within a few years after 1212 or else containing statements that seem to be those of eyewitnesses. By dovetailing these independent accounts he is able to give a fairly connected story.

This movement may well be called a crusade. The leader, Nicholas, a boy of Cologne, began probably in or near the Rhine Valley. His followers came from a wide extent of territory, mainly from the agricultural classes. About 7,000 men and women, boys and girls entered Italy and in August, 1212, arrived at Genoa. Here they divided, seeking in different parts for means to cross over sea to the Holy Land. Some went to Marseilles, others to "Vieneiane," whence some were carried off by pirates and sold to the Saracens; others went to Brindisi, where they were prevented by the bishop from embarking. With this the account of the pilgrimage ends. Nicholas is later reported to have gone to the Holy Land, but of his disillusioned followers a few shamefaced stragglers returned home, many died on the road, and many were enslaved by those through whose lands they passed. The additions to this story of the Old Man of the Mountain and the Pied Piper of Hamelin find no place in these earliest chroniclers of the event.

"La suzeraineté du Pape sur Rome, aux XIII et XIV siècles" (A. de Boillard in *Revue Historique*, CXVI [Mai-June, 1914] 61-71).

In accounting for the eclipse of Arnold's Republic and the rehabilitation of the Papacy in Rome, the writer offers no new suggestions. He notes that Rome's prestige had declined with the departure of the Pope; also that her revenues had shrunk with the cessation of pilgrimages. In analyzing the relations of the restored Papacy to the city of Rome, he presents the interesting fact (v. Lea) that the Senate at Rome, unlike the governing authorities in the cities of Lombardy or Tuscany, promulgated a decree "organizing a veritable secular inquisition." He contends that the cardinals were allowed to participate in the government of the city and that a ban of excommunication might disqualify a Roman in the exercise of his right of citizenship. He maintains that in the matter of government the Papacy showed no preference for either an aristocracy or a democracy. He concludes that the Pope's sovereignty over Rome did not violate its communal character. The Senate existed independently of St. Peter's. Although the Pope confirmed the senators in their office the republican principle remained intact.

BOOKS RECEIVED

The more important books in this list will be reviewed at length

OLD TESTAMENT

- Beer, G., und Holtzmann, O. *Die Mischana, Text, Übersetzung, und ausführliche Erklärung. Rosch ha-schana (Neujahr), Text, Übersetzung, und Erklärung. Nebst einem textkritischen Anhang von Paul Fiebig.* M. 6.75. Horajot (Entscheidungen) von Walter Windfuhr. M. 2.15. Kil'ajim (Verbotene Mischgattungen) von Karl Albrecht. M. 4.80.
- Cheyne, T. K. *Fresh Voyages on Unfrequented Waters.* London: Adam & Charles Black, 1914. xxii+176 pages. 5s. 4d. net.
- Driver, S. R. *An Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament.* New edition, revised, 1913. (International Theological Library.) New York: Scribner, 1914. xli+xl+557 pages. \$2.50.
- Duhm, Bernhard. *Das Buch Jesaja. Dritte, verbesserte, und vermehrte Auflage.* (Göttinger Handkommentar zum Alten Testament. In Verbindung mit anderer Fachgelehrten herausgegeben von W. Nowack. III. Abteilung. Die prophetischen Bücher. 1. Band.) Göttingen: Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht, 1914. xxiv+459 pages. M. 10.
- Eraines, Jean d'. *Le problème des origines et des migrations. I. La Bible document historique; II. Science et méthode; III. La grande hypothèse origine de la race blanche.* Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1914. 174 pages.
- Gautier, Lucien. *Introduction à l'Ancien Testament. Seconde édition revue.* Tomes I, II. Paris: Fischbacher, 1914. Tome I, xvi+547 pages. Tome II, 544 pages.
- Hudal, Alois. *Die religiösen und sittlichen Ideen des Spruchbuches. Kritisch exegetische Studie.* (Scripta pontificii biblici.) Rome: Verlag des Päpstl. Bibel-Instituts, 1914. xxviii+261 pages. L. 4.50.
- Knudson, A. C. *Beacon Lights of Prophecy.* New York: Eaton & Mains, 1914. xii+281 pages. \$1.25.

- Schwab, Johann. *Der Begriff der Nefesh in den heiligen Schriften des Alten Testaments. Ein Beitrag zur altjüdischen Religionsgeschichte.* Leipzig: Robert Noske, 1913. x+103 pages. M. 4.
- The Life-Work of Samuel Rolles Driver—A Sermon Preached in Christ Church Cathedral on March 8, 1914, by W. Sanday.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914. 12 pages. 6d. net.

NEW TESTAMENT AND PATRISTICS

- Abbott, Edwin A. *Miscellanea Evangelica (I).* Cambridge University Press, 1913. viii+97 pages. 2s. net.
- Abbott, Edwin A. *The Fourfold Gospel. Section II. The Beginning.* Cambridge University Press, 1914. xxxi+456 pages. 12s. 6d.
- Burnside, W. F. *The Gospel According to St. Luke. The Greek text edited with introduction and notes for the use of schools.* Cambridge University Press, 1913. xxxvi+272 pages. 3s. net.
- Burrage, Champlin. *Nazareth and the Beginnings of Christianity. A New View Based upon Philological Evidence. With critical appendices, including unnoticed precanonical readings; a discussion of the birthplace of Jesus; and the text of what is believed to be the hitherto undiscovered source of the prophecy, that the Messiah "should be called a Nazarene."* Oxford University Press, 1914. 68 pages. 3s. 6d.
- Clark, Albert C. *The Primitive Text of the Gospels and Acts.* London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1914. viii+112 pages. 4s. net.
- Juster, Jean. *Les juifs dans l'Empire Romain, leur condition juridique, économique et sociale.* Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1914. Tome I, xviii+510 pages. Tome II, viii+338 pages. Fr. 36.

- Montefiore, C. G. *Judaism and St. Paul—Two Essays*. London: Max Goschen, 1914. 240 pages. 2s. 6d. net.
- Niebergall, Friedrich. *Praktische Auslegung des Neuen Testaments für Prediger und Religionslehrer*. Zweite Auflage. Tübingen: Mohr, 1914. viii+608 pages. M. 13.50.
- Strong, A. H. *Popular Lectures on the Books of the New Testament*. Philadelphia: Griffith & Rowland Press, 1914. xxiii+398 pages. \$1.00 net.
- Tucker, Emma C. *The Later Version of the Wycliffite Epistle to the Romans, Compared with the Latin Original: A Study of Wycliffite English*. (Yale Studies in English, Albert S. Cook, Editor, XLIX.) New York: Holt, 1914. xxxvi+177 pages. \$1.50.
- Weinel, Heinrich, and Widgery, Alban G. *Jesus in the Nineteenth Century and After*. New York: Scribner, 1914. x+458 pages.
- Whitman, P. Spencer. *The Early Life of Jesus and New Light on the Passion Week*. Edited by Alonzo Abernethy and John A. Earl. Philadelphia: Griffith & Rowland Press, 1914. 148 pages. \$1.00 net.
- CHURCH HISTORY**
- Dobschütz, Ernst von. *The Influence of the Bible on Civilization*. New York: Scribner, 1914. x+190 pages. \$1.25 net.
- Hardeland, August. *Der Bergiff der Gottesfurcht in Luthers Katechismen*. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1914. 45 pages. M. 0.80.
- Harnack, Adolf. *Dogmengeschichte*. Fünfte verbesserte Auflage. (Grundriss Theologischen Wissenschaften.) Tübingen: Mohr, 1914. xii+472 pages. M. 8.
- Keller, Ludwig. *Die Freimaurerei: Eine Einführung in ihre Anschauungswelt und ihre Geschichte*. Leipzig: Teubner, 1914. 147 pages. M. 1.25.
- DOCTRINAL**
- Alexander, Archibald B. D. *Christianity and Ethics: A Handbook of Christian Ethics*. New York: Scribner, 1914. xii+257 pages. \$0.75 net.
- Allier, R., *et al.* *Morale religieuse et morale laïque. Leçons faites à l'École des Hautes Études sociales*. (Bibliothèque générale des sciences sociales.) Paris: Felix Alcan, 1914. iv+271 pages. Fr. 6.
- Bohrmann, Georg. *Spinozas Stellung zur Religion. Eine Untersuchung auf der Grundlage des theologisch-politischen Traktats. Nebst einem Anhang: Spinoza in England (1670-1750)*. Giessen: Töpelmann, 1914. 84 pages. M. 2.40.
- Cohu, J. R. *Vital Problems of Religion. With an Introduction by the Right Rev. the Lord Bishop of S. Asaph*. New York: Scribner, 1914. xiv+289 pages.
- Donat, Joseph. *The Freedom of Science*. London, St. Louis, and Freiburg (Baden): Herder, 1913; New York: Joseph F. Wagner, 1913. ix+419 pages. \$2.50.
- Gurnhill, J. *The Spiritual Philosophy. As Affording a Key to the Solution of Some of the Problems of Evolution*. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1914. xi+167 pages. \$2.25 net.
- Haering, Theodore. *The Christian Faith: A System of Dogmatics*. Translated from the second revised and enlarged German edition, 1912, by John Dickie and George Ferris. Vols. I and II. New York and London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1913.
- Peake, A. S. *The Bible, Its Origin, Its Significance and Its Abiding Worth*. New York and London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1914. xxxvi+517 pages. \$2.00.
- Rivière, Jean. *Le dogme de la rédemption étude théologique*. Paris: J. Gabalda, 1914. x+570 pages. Fr. 6.
- Sodeur, Kierkegaard und Nietzsche (Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher begründet F. M. Schiele V. Reihe. 14. Heft.) 48 pages. M. 0.80.
- Wendland, Johannes. *Die neue Diesseitsreligion*. (Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher, V. 13.) Tübingen: Mohr, 1914. 48 pages. M. 0.80.
- Wernle, Paul. *Evangelisches Christentum in der Gegenwart. Drei Vorträge*. Tübingen, 1914. viii+118 pages. M. 2.50.
- White, Douglas. *Forgiveness and Suffering: A Study of Christian Belief*. Cambridge University Press, 1914. xi+133 pages. 3s. net.
- HISTORY OF RELIGIONS**
- Dussaud, René. *Introduction à la histoire des religions*. (Bibliothèque historique des religions.) Paris: Leroux, 1914. vi+292 pages. Fr. 3.50.

- Foucart, Paul. *Les Mystères d'Eleusis*. Paris: Picard, 1914. 508 pages. Fr. 10.
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- Moulton, James Hope. *Early Zoroastrianism*. Lectures delivered in Oxford and in London, February to May, 1912. (Hibbert Lectures, second series.) London: Williams & Norgate, 1913. xviii+468 pages.

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PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

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- Dorchester, Daniel, Jr. *The Sovereign People*. New York: Eaton & Mains, 1914. 243 pages. \$1.00 net.
- Locke, C. E. *A Man's Reach: or Some Character Ideals*. New York: Eaton & Mains, 1914. 278 pages. \$1.00 net.
- Muss-Arnolt, William. *The Book of Common Prayer among the Nations of the World: A History of Translations of the Prayer Book of the Church of England and of the Protestant Episcopal Church of America. A Study based mainly on the collection of Josiah Henry Benton, LL.D.* London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1914. xxi+473 pages. \$3.00.
- Parks, Leighton. *Moral Leadership and Other Sermons*. New York: Scribner, 1914. 188 pages.

MISCELLANEOUS

- Bigelow, John. *American Policy: The Western Hemisphere in Its Relation to the Eastern*. New York: Scribner, 1914. vi+184 pages. \$1.00 net.
- Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*. Handwörterbuch in gemeinverständlicher Darstellung. Unter Mitwirkung von Hermann Gunkel und Otto Scheel herausgegeben von Friedrich M. Schiele und Leopold Zscharnack. Tübingen: Mohr. 2146-2175 pages.
- Dowd, Jerome. *The Negro Races: A Sociological Study*. Vol. II. New York: Neale Publishing Co., 1914. 310 pages. \$2.50 net.
- Hunt, Theodore W. *English Literary Miscellany*. Second series. Oberlin, Ohio: Bibliotheca Sacra Co., 1914. xvi+318 pages.
- Logos — Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie der Kultur*. Herausgegeben von Richard Kroner und Georg Mehlis. Unter Mitwirkung von Rudolf Eucken, *et al.* Band IV. Heft 3. Tübingen, 1913. 253+396 pages. M. 4.50. Band V. Heft 1. Tübingen: Mohr, 1914. 124 pages. M. 4.50.
- Neue kirchliche Zeitschrift* herausgegeben von Wilhelm Engelhardt. XXV. Jahrgang. 5. Heft. Leipzig: Deichert, 1914. 250 pages. Preis pro Quartal, M. 2.50.
- The Church, the People, and the Age*. Edited by Robert Scott and G. A. Gilmore. Analysis and Summary by Clarence A. Beckwith. New York and London: Funk & Wagnalls Co., 1914. xxi+571 pages. \$3.00 net.
- Udalen, Alfred. *Die Theologie der Gegenwart* herausgegeben von R. H. Grützmacher, *et al.* Leipzig: Deichert, 1914. Heft 2. 76 pages. M. 3.50.
- Walter, Johnstone Estep. *Nature and Cognition of Space and Time*. West Newton, Pa., 1914. 186 pages. \$1.35.

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PAUL AND HELLENISM

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The following pages are intended to furnish a survey of the work which has been done in recent years upon the subject "Paul and Hellenism." I have, however, not merely endeavored to enumerate a list of books with their contents, but, in so far as space permitted, I have set forth the problems themselves and their possible solutions. The subject "Paul and Hellenism" seems to me beyond question to designate the field in which the chief problems of Pauline study for the future lie.

I have confined myself to the consideration of German works. This, indeed, is not to be taken to mean that nothing worthy of mention in this field is done outside of Germany. Certainly much valuable work is being done in Anglo-Saxon lands. One readily thinks of many items in W. M. Ramsay's books, of P. Gardner's excellent exposition of *The Religious Experience of St. Paul*, or of the valuable investigation of the mystery-religions which is to be found in the researches of J. G. Frazer, R. R. Marett, and Miss Harrison. But I regard it as quite unnecessary for a German to bring English and American works to the attention of Anglo-Saxon readers. Moreover, English and American treatises are not so fully accessible to me as the German. And, finally, it is possible to set forth the problems and their solutions even if one restricts himself to the field of German

scholarship. On these grounds I would explain and excuse my provincialism.

Before taking up our specific subject one very important fact should be strongly emphasized. This fact is almost self-evident, yet it must ever be kept in mind when placing Paul into relation with his surroundings; that is, he cannot possibly be explained merely as a result of his environment. No man can be so explained, least of all a superior individual who has awakened to a self-conscious life of distinctive personality and who is inwardly aware of the mystery of his own person. Paul experienced God inwardly, and from the day of his vision on the way to Damascus the consciousness of being chosen and called of God dominated his life. In ecstasy, revelations, visions, voices, and intuitions which came forth from the obscurity of his consciousness God made himself known to Paul. The yearning and self-torture, the seeking after God, in which so many of the best of his countrymen remained involved, were for Paul quieted. Peace and grace and blessed assurance had been born within him, for God had spoken to him. To one who has had an inner religious experience it is not necessary to explain at length that personal religious life in its subtlest and yet strongest manifestations never can be derived merely from education and environment. On the contrary, in such an experience the soul in its deepest life touches God, and God speaks to the soul. And that which is true of the simplest life of an average man must be still more readily assumed in the case of a religious hero and leader such as Paul. But we must frankly recognize that scientific inquiry, which can indeed describe and in some degree explain, at this point ceases and here we must resort to intuition and interpretation of life's deepest mysteries.

Nevertheless any specific personal religious life, with its experiences and inner conviction, always clothes itself in the thought-forms and language of a particular age. Every religious individual finds himself in a strong stream of tradition which in turn supports and enriches him, and if he wishes to exert an influence upon his contemporaries he must speak in words and accents intelligible to his own age. What are these links of attachment between Paul and his age?

In attempting to answer this question, one is confronted at the outset by the fact that Paul was a Jew. In this article, however, which is concerned in an especial way with Paul's Greek environment, I shall deal only very briefly with the question of his Jewish presuppositions. These presuppositions are perfectly familiar to any student.

Paul is a Jew, as he himself was keenly conscious—"a Hebrew the son of a Hebrew, a Pharisee the son of a Pharisee." Paul grew up, and remained, within the rich religious tradition of his people. Their sacred writings, their method of interpretation, their religious instruction, their pious customs, and the ethical training of Judaism were from youth familiar to Paul, who was born in a Pharisean home and became prominent in the learning of the Pharisees. Yet we must not think that Paul's Jewish inheritance can be understood by looking solely to the Old Testament. This procedure was possible for students of an earlier age to whom post-exilic Judaism was virtually an unknown quantity. We now know that Judaism itself developed considerably in the centuries following the Exile and that it also was extensively and emphatically influenced by foreign religions and ways of thinking. We also know this later Judaism of the Hellenistic period from a number of sources, the most important of which are the so-called Apocrypha of the Septuagint, the extant apocalypses, and the writings of Philo. Even rabbinical tradition, as contained in the various strata of the Talmud, is to be drawn upon more than formerly. As aids to this study, besides Schürer's¹ great and well-known work, we may place Bousset's exceptionally valuable exposition² as well as certain sections from Wendland's book³ to which reference will later be frequently made. Much work, however, remains to be done in this field, although excellent treatments of individual questions have appeared. As early as 1893 R. Kabisch⁴ expounded the eschatology of Paul with the help of the material which contemporary

¹ *Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes* (3 vols., 4th ed., Leipzig, 1901 ff.).

² *Die Religion des Judentums im neutestamentlichen Zeitalter* (2d ed., Berlin, 1906).

³ *Die hellenistisch-römische Kultur in ihren Beziehungen zu Judentum und Christentum* (2d ed., Tübingen, 1912).

⁴ *Die Eschatologie des Paulus* (Göttingen, 1893).

Judaism offered. Brückner undertook a similar task for Christology,¹ and Everling² and Dibelius³ interpreted the Pauline teaching about spirits and angels. These investigations, and others that might be mentioned, show a strong Jewish substratum, not only in the realm of Paul's religious ideas, but also in his religious feelings. To be sure, when we have attained an understanding of the distinctive Pauline teaching of justification by faith we have comprehended an essential—indeed the most essential—item in Pauline religion. Yet just as this central item certainly confronts us in a form conditioned by Paul's Jewish inheritance, so it is certain that in other respects his religion is to be understood in the light of the theology and practice of later Judaism.

The foregoing observations regarding the Jewish background of Pauline thought and feeling must inevitably have suggested further queries. What sort of a Judaism was it in which Paul grew up? Was it that of Palestinian Pharisaism? Does not the tradition which placed Paul's birth and the most important years of his youth in Tarsus, and further, the language in which his extant letters are written, testify that Hellenism, the dominant world-culture of his age, must have exerted a decisive influence upon him? Can the apostle be properly classified when, as frequently happens, he is called a "Jew of genuinely Palestinian stamp," a "full-blooded Jew"? These questions suggest the problems which it is the chief purpose of this paper to discuss.

Paul designates himself a Hebrew the son of a Hebrew. Although his family lived in the Diaspora, Hebrew—that is, Aramaic—was the language of his home. Thus Paul's family was certainly consciously conservative, and the religious life of the home must have been conducted in the Aramaic, and partly also in the Hebrew, language. The data which Paul himself supplies make it clear that Aramaic was his mother-tongue.

But Paul's letters themselves immediately suggest a contradiction. These are written in Greek and Paul is fully master of the *Koine* language of his day. He must have learned it even in his

¹ *Die Entstehung der Paulinischen Christologie* (Strassburg, 1903).

² *Paulinische Angelologie und Dämonologie* (Göttingen, 1888).

³ *Die Geisterwelt im Glauben des Paulus* (Göttingen, 1909).

youth, although he also had ample opportunity during his long seventeen-year residence in Antioch and Syria to perfect himself in the use of the Greek speech. Moreover, bi-lingualism is a well-known phenomenon which may be frequently observed even today in both the nearer and farther East. Since Paul grew up with intimate knowledge of spoken Greek, since he spent the formative years of his youth and later, after conversion, a long period of active life in an emphatically Hellenistic environment outside Palestine, his relationship to Hellenism was from the start quite different from, and was far more positive than, that of Peter the apostle or James the Lord's brother. In discussing the question of Paul's relation to Hellenism it would be particularly important to know more of Paul's youth. But unfortunately at this point his letters and the Book of Acts fail us completely. There is, however, another way of procuring important material on this subject; that is by investigating carefully the situation in which Paul spent his youth. We do not know when he came to Jerusalem, but it certainly was not in his earliest youth, and in Tarsus he must have previously come into contact with Hellenism, especially with the non-Jewish culture of the East. Hence, so far as the sources of information permit, the cultural conditions of Tarsus must be examined in minutest detail. In this unexplored field an estimable monograph by Böhlig¹ has recently appeared. Böhlig presents his material under three main topics: the religion of Tarsus, the philosophy of Tarsus, and the Judaism of Tarsus. He enlarges in a most desirable way upon the admirable exposition which Ramsay² had already given. Böhlig shows that the language, style, and thought-world of Paul are best explained, not from the standpoint of Jerusalem or Antioch, but from Tarsus as a point of departure. Paul is naturally fundamentally influenced by the environment which he found in the Judaism of his native city. Moreover, the Judaism of Tarsus politically and socially, culturally and religiously, differed from the Judaism of Palestine; and it also held a distinctive place within the Judaism of the Diaspora in general.

¹ *Die Geisteskultur von Tarsos im augusteischen Zeitalter mit Berücksichtigung der Paulinischen Schriften* (Göttingen, 1913).

² *The Cities of St. Paul* (London, 1907), pp. 85-244.

Other foreign influences also touched Paul in his native city. The popular faith of Cilicia had been strongly affected by ancient and continued contact with Cappadocia, Assyria, Babylonia, and Persia. Syrian Hellenistic Mysticism also took firm root in Tarsus. The philosophy which flourished in Tarsus was Stoicism, and prominent Stoic leaders came from there. Paul came into touch with Stoic philosophy in Tarsus, perhaps through the medium of Tarsian Judaism. Finally, in the popular heathen beliefs of Tarsus the god Sandan, a savior and redeemer exalted to heaven, played an especial rôle; and this deity appears to have exerted an influence upon the religious terminology of Paul. Böhlig has given us a very good treatment of the subject, using the extant data. Unfortunately these are far from as complete as could be desired. The ancient city of Tarsus itself still lies buried under the houses of the new city. Is it possible that future excavation may here bring to light buildings and inscriptions of greatest significance?

In the light of Paul's family connections and education—for he at least grew up surrounded by the culture of his own people—he cannot possibly be reckoned among the lower classes of society. His Greek to be sure cannot be measured by the standards of Attic literature, but he handled with great skill the rich vocabulary of the *Koine*, which he reinforced with expressions from his own Bible, the Septuagint. Besides the well-known works of Deissmann and the researches of other scholars, Nägeli¹ has very forcibly shown the richness of Paul's vocabulary.

Closely connected with vocabulary is the question of style. One who analyzes the style of Paul must recognize here as elsewhere the twofold aspect of Paul's life. He stands within both the ancient oriental and the Greek traditional cultures. Norden, the Berlin philologist, in his recently published and very valuable book,² has shown how the Orient with its ancient religious linguistic heritage has projected itself into the Pauline letters. There is one chief item in this oriental heritage: Paul, both in language and in style, shows the influence of the remarkable poetic form of passages from the Septuagint (above all from the prophets and Psalms), a

¹ *Der Wortschatz des Apostels Paulus* (Göttingen, 1905).

² *Agnoskos Theos* (Leipzig, 1912).

form which was very impressive, even in the Greek. With these oriental stylistic elements is mingled in Paul, as previously in the Old Testament poetry itself, a very ancient type of elevated Hebraic address, for which parallels are to be found in Egypt and Babylonia, in ancient hymns, prayers, and royal inscriptions. An example of oriental style—conceived in a wider sense than that included in Hebraic—is found in Col. 1:12-20.¹

Besides this formal oriental element of great beauty, one finds in Paul very distinct features of Greek oratory. He does not employ ancient Attic style; he does not speak to us in the periods of Demosthenes. In view of the whole course of his previous education, this form of Greek style was never accessible to Paul. But he shows distinctly the influence of contemporary Greek even in its higher form as current in the rhetoric of the time. For example, he employs short clauses, parataxis, equally balanced sentences, parallelism, antitheses, play on words, and alliteration.² In individual instances it is not easy to tell whether Paul's sentence parallelism is Semitic (oriental) or Greek. At this point Norden carefully endeavors, however, to elucidate the distinction between Greek and Semitic forms of address. A strong Greek element is undoubtedly present in Paul, and some investigations, which are, however, far from sufficient, clearly exhibit these facts. A beginning has been made by J. Weiss,³ who followed out suggestions received from Blass, *Grammatik des neutestamentlichen Griechisch*. Unfortunately this beginning has not been followed up nor has it received the attention it deserved. Now, however, reference can be made to Bultmann's⁴ and Bonhöffer's⁵ researches, as well as to Norden's observations in *Agnostos Theos* and Wendland's valuable remarks in his exposition of the ancient Christian literature.⁶ Much accurate information upon this subject has been assembled in the

¹ Norden, *op. cit.*, pp. 250-54.

² Cf. I Cor. 7:18-24, 27.

³ *Beiträge zur Paulinischen Rhetorik* (Göttingen, 1897).

⁴ *Der Stil der Paulinischen Predigt und die kynisch-stoische Diatribe* (Göttingen, 1910).

⁵ *Epiktet und das Neue Testament* (Giessen, 1911).

⁶ *Die urchristlichen Literaturformen* (Tübingen, 1912).

materials and observations given by J. Weiss in his commentary on I Corinthians,¹ as well as by Heinrici in his various commentaries on the Corinthian letters.

The question which these observations about Greek rhetoric raise in Paul's case are: In how far did Paul consciously employ the devices of Greek rhetoric in the passages where these features appear? and, Whence did he derive his sense of Greek style? and, How are his very striking agreements with the forms of the Diatribe and the Asiatic oratory to be explained? Certainly we must suppose that Paul, in spite of his independence of "Greek wisdom," shows, in this particular, intimate contact with the Greek culture of the age. He cannot have learned this in the street and the market-place only. Again we cannot restrain an earnest desire to know something more regarding the course of the apostle's education.

A further question may appropriately be raised here, as it belongs to the subject of Paul and Hellenism. This is the problem of the literary genus of Paul's letters. Several years ago Deissmann opened the problem,² and more recently³ he has discussed it further. In contrast with a type of thought which consciously or unconsciously starts with the idea that the Pauline letters are artistic literary products, Deissmann has rendered great service by demonstrating decisively the non-literary and occasional character of the Pauline letters. But the discussions which have been connected with Deissmann's assertions have led to important modifications of his conclusions. Certainly one must not exaggerate the non-literary character of Paul's letters. The tone and style and the character of the themes discussed raise these writings far above the ancient contemporary occasional documents, the papyrus letters. In numerous passages Paul clearly employs forms of argument which transcend the character of occasional writing. Above all we may mention in this connection the letter to the Romans, which

¹ *Der erste Korintherbrief* (Meyer's *Kommentar über das Neue Testament*, 5. Abt. 9. Aufl. [Göttingen, 1910]).

² *Bibelstudien* (Marburg, 1895), pp. 187 ff.

³ *Licht vom Osten* (Tübingen, 1909), pp. 100 ff., and *Paulus* (Tübingen, 1911), pp. 4 ff.

expounds the content and essence of the Pauline gospel, its relation to Judaism and the law, and especially the divine plan of salvation. This letter goes far beyond any mere occasional document and as a work of instruction quite loses the character of an intimate writing designed only for a narrow circle.

Passing from the consideration of forms to the question of content, the first problem which presents itself is Paul's relation to earlier Hellenistic ideas, particularly his relation to the philosophy and the religion of Hellenism.

To begin with the former, it is certain that Paul's contact with the philosophy of his age was not thoroughgoing. There is one portion of the New Testament, however, which shows the apostle to have been in very close touch with contemporary philosophy and especially with the highly developed form which it assumed in the Stoicism of the early imperial period. This is seen in Acts, chap. 17, in Paul's Areopagus address. But it can be assumed with certainty that this address was not spoken by Paul, but is a work of the author of Acts. Valuable as the speech is in showing us a very early connection between Christian preaching and the content of idealistic [Stoic] philosophy, it cannot be used as a source for the preaching of Paul. In treating this question we have to rely solely upon data which can be derived from Paul's own letters. Material for this purpose is to be found in a series of commentaries and special researches. Besides the above-mentioned investigations of Bonhöffer and Bultmann, the commentaries of Heinrich and J. Weiss on I and II Corinthians, and Wendland's valuable exposition of Greco-Roman culture, the following works may be mentioned: Clemen's *Religionsgeschichtliche Erklärung des Neuen Testaments*,¹ pp. 45 ff.; the well-known works on New Testament theology by Holtzmann, Feine, and Weinel, which appeared in second editions in, respectively, 1911, 1912, and 1913; certain sections in Pfleiderer's *Das Urchristentum, seine Schriften und Lehren*,² the commentaries of Lietzmann and Dibelius on the Pauline

¹ Giessen, 1909. English tr., *Primitive Christianity and Its Non-Jewish Sources* (Edinburgh, 1912).

² Two vols., Berlin, 1902². English tr., *Primitive Christianity: Its Writings and Teachings in Their Historical Connections* (4 vols., New York, 1906-12).

letters;¹ Feine's article on Christianity and the Stoics.² Very important contributions to the understanding of Pauline Christology are made by the recently published book of Bousset, *Kyrios Christos*.³

At the outset we must admit that Paul could readily come into contact with ancient philosophy. It did not take long for men who were content with a smattering of these things to become proficient, since philosophy in the imperial period had long since forsaken its high pedestal and its exclusive circles. It had appeared in the market-place and the street, it had assumed a popular form and was made at home in wide circles through the activity of its advocates, the traveling preachers. A remarkable picture of its proclamation, its advocates, and its content has been preserved for us in Epictetus' *Dissertations*, ii. 22 (*περὶ Κυνισμοῦ*). Thus the Cynic-Stoic Diatribe had forced its way into wide circles of society and Paul, from youth up, in various places of residence during the period that his life is unknown to us, might have come into contact with philosophy even though he had never himself read a philosophical tract. But even this possibility does not at all need to be absolutely excluded. Paul certainly had opportunity to become acquainted with this literature, and he was sufficiently well educated to understand what he read and heard. Furthermore, we should never forget that Hellenistic Judaism had already come under the influence of philosophy. In the popular philosophy of the Roman imperial period the closely related preaching of the Stoics and Cynics occupied the first place. Paul is to be set into relation with these two schools above all others. But he may also have come into contact with neo-Pythagorean and Platonic thinking, for even the views of these schools found expression in the popular philosophical preaching of the time. The close arguments and similarities between various philosophical schools in the realm of ethics and in their attitude toward life

¹ *Handbuch zum Neuen Testament*. Herausgegeben von H. Lietzmann. Bd. III, 1, *Die vier Paulinischen Hauptbriefe*. Erklärt von H. Lietzmann (Tübingen, 1906-10); Bd. III, 2, *Die neun kleinen Briefe des Paulus*. Erklärt von M. Dibelius (Tübingen, 1911-13).

² "Stoicismus und Christentum," *Theologisches Literaturblatt*, 1905, No. 7.

³ Göttingen, 1914.

were all very significant for the cultural status of the age; and Stoics, Cynics, and neo-Pythagoreans differed but little from one another in what they were saying, either among themselves or to the world at large. The content of their teaching and their method of treatment were largely similar if not identical. Yet when we are looking for points of contact between Paul and contemporary philosophy we must consider primarily the Stoic-Cynic popular philosophy, because the preaching of these two closely connected schools reached the widest circles, and especially because Tarsus was, as indicated above, a seat of Stoic philosophy and a center from which it emanated.

In the consideration of this question we must not allow ourselves to be led astray by the decided disrespect with which Paul himself in I Corinthians, chaps. 1-3, speaks of the wisdom of this world, or by the fact that he chances to place together in Col. 2:8 philosophy and vain deceit as the tradition of men. Here, as in Romans, chaps. 1 and 2, it is the missionary and messenger of the faith who speaks out of the blessed certainty which glows within his breast, dispensing with all other knowledge since this is of no avail and becomes even an obstacle on the way to truth (Rom. 1:22). According to the testimony of Paul's own consciousness he owed nothing to the wisdom of the world. And we may, indeed, at the outset concede that any extensive systematic influence of Greek philosophy upon Paul is out of the question. We are concerned only with individual thoughts, notions, images, and modes of expression. But with this modification we can at least produce, from the content of Greek philosophy, striking parallels to the Pauline letters. A few of these parallels from the chief letters of Paul may now be noted.

In a well-known passage Paul speaks of the natural knowledge of God which the heathen had, who from the works of creation ought to have recognized with the eyes of the mind the invisible God. In the Stoic treatise, *De mundo*, passing under the name of Aristotle, it is said that God "though invisible to all mankind is seen from his very works."¹ And Cicero says in the *Tusculan*

¹ πᾶσι θνητῇ φύσει γινόμενος ἀθεώρητος (scil. ὁ θεός) ἀπ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων θεωρεῖται.—*De mundo* 6.

Disputations i. 70: "When we view these and numberless other things can we doubt that someone presides over them or has made them or is the regulator of such works and blessings? Thus though you see not the soul of man, as you do not see God, yet as you recognized God from his works so you must recognize the divine power of the soul from its faculty of remembering, its inventiveness, its quickness of motion, and all its beauty of virtue."² It is a fundamental principle of Stoic ethics that all moral action consists in following the unwritten law implanted in man by nature and by God; as in Cicero, *De legibus* i. 6. 18, to mention only one illustration. Paul clearly refers to this widespread notion in the "unwritten law" (*ἀγγραφος νόμος*) of Rom. 2:15. In the same passage Paul employs the term "conscience" (*συνείδησις*), which he also uses frequently elsewhere. So far as we know he is the first Christian to use this exceedingly important conception. In Rom. 1:29-31 Paul gives a catalogue of vices, and at other places in his letters he presents similar collocations (Rom. 13:13; I Cor. 5:10 f.; 6:9 f.; II Cor. 12:20 f.; Gal. 5:19-21; Col. 3:5, 8; cf. also the catalogue of virtues in Gal. 5:22 f.). Commonly with Paul as with the Stoics, who very frequently employed this form of ethical instruction, these catalogues of vices are so phrased that the sinful disposition and not individual sinful acts, as in the Old Testament catalogues of vices (Exod., chaps. 20-23; Lev., chap. 19), stand in the foreground. Since numerous catalogues of vices are to be found in the Hellenistic Jewish literature which has been affected by Stoic influence we do not need to be puzzled regarding the question of how the influence of Stoic ethics reached Paul. In the same connection in Rom. 1:28 Paul uses a favorite and genuinely Stoic expression, "the things which are not fitting" (*τὰ μὴ καθήκοντα*). Thus within relatively narrow limits in a few sentences of Romans we find several points of contact between Paul and philosophy. A few examples from I Corinthians may

² Haec igitur et alia innumerabilia cum cernimus, possumusne dubitare, quin iis praesit aliquis uel effector uel moderator tanti operis et muneris? Sic mentem hominis, quamuis eam non uideas, ut deum non uides, tamen ut deum agnoscis ex operibus eius, sic ex memoria rerum et inuentione et celeritate motus omnique pulchritudine uirtutis uim diuinam mentis agnoscito.

be added to the list. The figure of the milk and the solid food, which Paul employs in I Cor. 3:2, is of frequent occurrence in the Stoic-Cynic Diatribe. Thus Epictetus, *Dissertations* ii. 16. 39, says: "Why will you not be weaned as children are, and take more solid food?"¹ And similarly in iii. 24. 9: "Shall we never wean ourselves and remember what we have heard from the philosophers?"² See also Philo *De agricultura* 9: "But since milk is the food of infants, but cakes made of wheat are the food of full-grown men, so also the soul must have a milk-like nourishment in its age of childhood, namely, the elementary instruction of encyclical science. But the perfect food appropriate for men consists of explanations dictated by prudence and temperance and every virtue."³ In I Cor. 4:9 Paul says that the apostles are as criminals who strive for their own execution, a spectacle for angels and men. It is a favorite Stoic figure that the wise man, in his struggle with his untoward fate, is a spectacle for gods and men. See, for example, Seneca *De providentia* 2. 9: "Behold a sight worthy to be viewed by a god interested in his own work, behold a pair worthy of a god, a brave man matched with evil fortune . . . I do not know what nobler spectacle Jupiter could find on earth, should he turn his eyes thither, than that of Cato, after his party had more than once been defeated, still standing upright amid the ruins of the commonwealth."⁴ In I Cor. 9:24-27 Paul compares the laborious struggle of the Christian after salvation with the anxieties and hardships to which the contestant subjects himself in preparation for the competitive games. The figure recurs also

¹ Οὐ θέλεις ἤδη ὡς τὰ παῖδια ἀπογαλακτισθῆναι καὶ ἀπτεσθαι τροφῆς στερεωτέρας;

² Οὐκ ἀπογαλακτίσμεν ἤδη ποθ' ἑαυτοὺς καὶ μεμνησόμεθα ὧν ἠκούσαμεν παρὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων;

³ ἐπεὶ δὲ νηπίοις μὲν ἐστὶ γάλα τροφή, τελείοις δὲ τὰ ἐκ πυρῶν πέμματα, καὶ ψυχῆς γαλακτώδεις μὲν ἂν εἴεν τροφαὶ κατὰ τὴν παιδικὴν ἡλικίαν τὰ τῆς ἐγκυκλίου μουσικῆς προπαιδεύματα, τελεῖαι δὲ καὶ ἀνδράσιν ἐμπρεπεῖς αἱ διὰ φρονήσεως καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀπάσης ἀρετῆς ὑψηλότητες.

⁴ ecce spectaculum dignum, ad quod respiciat intentus operi suo deus, ecce par deo dignum, uir fortis cum fortuna mala compositus . . . non uideo, inquam, quid habeat in terris Iuppiter pulchrius, si conuertere animum uelit, quam ut spectet Catonem jam partibus non semel fractis stantem nihilo minus inter ruinas publicas rectum.

in other places in Paul's letters, e.g., Rom. 9:16; Gal. 2:2; 5:7; Phil. 2:16; 3:13 f. But the comparisons and metaphors drawn from the games are the most certain and emphatic instrument of ethical instruction within the Cynic-Stoic popular philosophy. Many passages of this sort are to be found in Epictetus, one of the most important being *Dissertations* iii. 15. 2 ff.: "I would conquer at the Olympic games [you say]. But consider what precedes and follows, and then if it be for your advantage engage in the affair. You must conform to rules, submit to a diet, refrain from dainties, take compulsory physical exercise at a stated hour in heat and in cold; you must drink neither cold water, nor wine on any occasion. Then in the combat you may be thrown into a ditch, dislocate a hand, turn an ankle, swallow much dust, be scourged, and after all these things you may then be conquered. After taking account of these possibilities, if you still wish to do so, go into athletic training."¹ Also Seneca *Epist.* 78. 16: "What blows athletes endure in their desire for glory! Let us likewise surmount all difficulties, our reward being not simply a crown or a palm . . . but virtue and stability of mind, and peace acquired for the future."² The exposition of Paul in I Cor. 6:12; 9:1; 10:23 recalls the well-known Stoic-Cynic doctrine that everything natural is permissible, and that the wise man alone is free, noble, and a king and lord over all. Also other passages in Paul's letters in which he in very similar language extols his freedom from the law and from similar obligations may have been influenced by the Stoic teaching of the wise man and his freedom (cf. Gal. 4:23 f., 26, 30 f.; 5:1, 13; Rom. 6:20; 7:3; 8:2). The fundamental notion of the unity of all humanity, expressed in Gal. 3:28, readily reminds us of Stoic statements.

¹ "θέλω Ὀλύμπια νικῆσαι" ἀλλὰ σκόπει τὰ καθηγούμενα αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰ ἀκόλουθα. καὶ οὕτως ἂν σοι λυσιτελῇ, ἅπτου τοῦ ἔργου. δεῖ σε εὐτακτεῖν, ἀναγκοφαγεῖν, ἀπέχεσθαι πεμμάτων, γυμνάζεσθαι πρὸς ἀνάγκην, ὥρα τεταγμένη, ἐν καύματι, ἐν ψύχει· μὴ ψυχρὸν πίνειν, μὴ οἶνον, ὅτ' ἔτυχεν . . . εἴτα ἐν τῷ ἀγῶνι παρορύσσεσθαι, ἔστιν ὅτε χεῖρα ἐκβαλεῖν, σφυρὸν στρέψαι, πολλὴν ἀφὴν καταπιεῖν, μαστιγωθῆναι καὶ μετὰ τούτων πάντων ἐσθ' ὅτε νικηθῆναι. ταῦτα λογισάμενος, ἂν ἔτι θέλῃς, ἔρχου ἐπὶ τὸ ἀθλεῖν.

² athletae quantum plagarum . . . ferunt . . . gloriae cupiditate . . . nos quoque euincamus omnia, quorum praeium non corona nec palma est . . . sed uirtus et firmitas animi et pax in ceterum parta.

Still other parallels between Paul and philosophical thought could be produced. But the question which arises at this point is not the possibility of assembling complete and impressive parallels, but properly to explain the parallelisms. Are the agreements concerned only with analogies, ideas, and modes of speech which were in the air, so to speak, forming a constituent part of the intellectual atmosphere which had been widely disseminated by the popular philosophical propaganda? Or have we to recognize in Paul the fact of an actual contact with philosophy, so that he in some way came directly under its influence? I have already above alluded to this problem. The question cannot be solved without bringing in the data supplied by a study of the Pauline rhetoric. The style of Paul and his relation to the style of the popular philosophical tractate; the question whether Paul owed his style—clearly designed to be effective—only to the current speech, or whether he had read and heard the popular Greek literature of the Stoics and the Cynics—these questions must be solved along with the above-mentioned problem of the influence which the content of popular philosophy exerted upon Paul. I certainly believe that we may credit Paul with a somewhat closer contact with Greek wisdom than his own allusions in the first chapters of I Corinthians lead us to suppose. Bonhöffer has set Paul beside the rigid Stoic system as it is revived by Epictetus, and since Paul does not fit in this system Bonhöffer does not allow any relationship between Paul and Stoicism. But when we undertake to solve the problem of Paul's relation to Greek philosophy we must utilize the much more pervasive platonizing ideas and sentiments of middle Stoicism as it had existed long before Paul's time, as seen, for example, in the famous Posidonius. We must certainly take account of the whole range of popular philosophy if we would solve our problem.

Turning now to the second part of our task, we have to consider Paul's relation to Hellenistic religion. Within recent years we have become somewhat more accurately acquainted with the religion of Hellenism. Its tradition has come down to us partly in literary form, as, for example, in the *Metamorphoses* of Apuleius, the treatise of Plutarch on Isis and Osiris, and the corpus of

Hermetic writings. Fortunately, moreover, our knowledge has been furthered by the recovery of inscriptions and papyri, such as the well-known *Mithrasliturgie* which Dieterich treated in his investigation to be mentioned presently, or the hymn of Isis preserved in an inscription of Andros, or, in general, the numerous inscriptions which give information regarding the spread of the Isis cult in the Roman Empire.

Hellenistic religion in the imperial period is essentially the product of oriental influences pressing into the Mediterranean world from the East. We must clearly recognize that, in religion as in many other phases of Hellenistic culture, "Hellenism" means not only a Grecizing of oriental elements, but much more an orientalizing of Greek culture. In the different religions and mysteries which we meet widely scattered over the Roman world in the imperial period we have an oriental commodity bearing a Greek stamp and label. Recent study in the history of the religions of this period has made us familiar with the most important phases of these Hellenistic cults and has also set them into relation with nascent Christianity. We can best inform ourselves regarding this triumph of the East over the West from Cumont's excellent lectures on the *Oriental Religions*, where much of the pertinent literature is also listed.¹ The philologists Dieterich and Reitzenstein have further interpreted the material by very valuable investigations in which they have set it into relation with primitive Christianity, and especially into relation with Paul.² Among theologians who seek in this same field important information for the understanding of Paulinism are Bousset³ and J. Weiss⁴ in their expositions of the Corinthian letters; also Heitmüller⁵ and Lietz-

¹ F. Cumont, *Les religions orientales dans le paganisme romain* (Paris, 1906). A German translation appeared in 1910 and an English one in 1911.

² A. Dieterich, *Eine Mithrasliturgie* (Leipzig, 1910⁶); R. Reitzenstein, *Poimandres: Studien zur griechisch-ägyptischen und frühchristlichen Literatur* (Leipzig, 1904), and *Die hellenistischen Mysterienreligionen: Ihre Grundgedanken und Wirkungen* (Leipzig, 1910). The latter is especially important for theologians.

³ In *Die Schriften des Neuen Testaments* edited by J. Weiss (Göttingen, 1908), II, 72-214.

⁴ In Meyer's *Kommentar*, 5. Abt.; see above, p. 504.

⁵ *Im Namen Jesu* (Göttingen, 1903); *Taufe und Abendmahl bei Paulus* (Göttingen, 1903); cf. also *Taufe und Abendmahl im Urchristentum* (Tübingen, 1911).

mann and Debelius, who have interpreted the Pauline letters in the third volume of Lietzmann's *Handbuch* which has already been frequently mentioned. Explicit reference may also be made to the treatment of *religionsgeschichtliche* questions in Weinel's above-mentioned work on New Testament theology and P. Wendland's exposition of the Greco-Roman culture. Even Jacoby's¹ can be consulted, and we gratefully remember also the older works of Anrich² and Wobbermin.³

When we undertake to investigate the question of Paul's Hellenism we must at the outset remind ourselves that in Paul's day Hellenism had affected Judaism, or at least the Judaism of the Diaspora. Judaism did not occupy a lonely island upon whose shores the great rising wave of oriental world-syncretism broke without leaving any trace of its effect. Not only through Judaism, but also in other ways—ways which we are quite unable to specify—must Hellenism have touched Paul. Mystical religion, which occupied so prominent a place in heathendom, exhibits so much similarity with Pauline religion in spirit, symbolism, and thinking that we now and then clearly recognize the same atmosphere. We recall Paul's strong antithesis between flesh and spirit and the closely related bias toward asceticism; the notion of supramundane powers, great spirits of heaven (*κοσμοκράτορες*) who hold man within their power and from whose dominion he is to be freed; the conception of "mystery" (*μυστήριον*) and sacrament; the activity of the savior god—we recall these and many other things which appear so prominently in the preaching of Paul. The most important item upon which our recognition of Paul's relation to Hellenism chiefly depends may now be treated somewhat more in detail.

Paul has two thought-categories which he uses in expounding his conception of salvation and redemption. The one category is entirely, or at least predominantly, Jewish: law, works, vicarious sacrifice, faith, man's righteousness, God's righteousness—these

¹ *Die antike Mysterienreligionen und das Christentum* (Tübingen, 1910).

² *Das antike Mysterienwesen in seinem Einfluss auf das Christentum* (Göttingen, 1894).

³ *Religionsgeschichtliche Studien zur Frage der Beeinflussung des Urchristentums durch das antike Mysterienwesen* (Berlin, 1896).

are the great familiar ideas which we meet in Paul's writings. But everyone acquainted with Paul's letters knows that alongside of these a second group of ideas is found in which Paul can also express his religious experience: spirit and flesh, death with Christ, and new life through union with the Risen One, *Pneuma* and new mystical life. Also ecstasy, whose paroxysms and delights are familiar to Paul, finds its place in this theory of redemption with the religious experiences it presupposes.

The Christ-mysticism and God-mysticism of Paul, his thought of the inward and realistic union of the believer with his Lord—Christ in the believer and the believer in Christ—all these are notions for which Hellenistic mystery-religion offers the closest parallels. Mysticism did not grow upon Jewish soil. Closely connected with the Christ-mysticism—the notion of union with the heavenly Lord—is the idea of the new life or the new birth, even though this latter expression is not used by Paul. This conception is not to be found in Judaism and it is lacking in the Jesus of the Synoptic Gospels, although it is present in the Fourth Gospel. The mystery-religions had made the notion of the new creation and rebirth—an acceptable and profoundly suggestive idea—at home in the Mediterranean world of the Roman Empire. At the moment of initiation the old man within the believer passes away and a new one is born who is imperishable. A new sense of knowledge, feeling, willing, assurance, and blessedness awakes within the believer and this experience is interpreted in terms of rebirth. Paul believed that his heavenly Lord, the Christ, had entered into him and that, as the old man vanished, the new took his place.

Furthermore, strong parallels can be produced from Hellenism for the idea that death and resurrection to new life are connected most closely with the death and resurrection of the savior God. Because he has died and risen his followers die with him and become partakers of the new life. Because Orpheus descended to the lower world and came forth again, because Osiris, Adonis, and Attis died and arose again, therefore those who are united to these gods through initiation into the mysteries partake of the rebirth and the new life. We need only to read Romans, chap. 6, in order to observe Paul's close connection with this type of thinking. Also in the

ideas of spirit, ecstasy, revelation, prophecy, gnosis, Paul shows himself to be everywhere in very close relations with Hellenism.

Thus we doubtless have, in Paul's mystical doctrine of redemption, a widespread type of thinking which links Paul firmly with his own age. For one who is at all willing to see the light and has any keenness of discernment, the works already enumerated furnish ample evidence for this conclusion.

We may now take up a second group of Pauline ideas, namely, his teaching regarding the sacraments. This phase of his teaching is closely connected with the one just considered, because the sacraments are related to the idea of salvation and because the two groups of ideas can be connected at many points.

As in all vital religions from earliest times, Paul sees the divine revelation in the God-filled man who, in the exuberance of feeling and knowledge, attests that which God permits him to experience inwardly as God reveals himself to man and shows man the paths and powers of life. Paul experienced this form of religion within his own soul, and the idea of salvation by means of a rich mystical experience, as previously observed, accompanies this type of divine revelation. But Paul knows still another way of participating in divinity and making its power effective in the life of believers. That is by means of sacraments. It is a primitive and widespread notion among men that the individual obtains a share in the superior life and in the power and holiness of the deity whom he reveres by the very fact that he observes and is permitted to observe certain holy initiations. He takes part in certain holy acts, he partakes of holy food, he observes holy washings or anointings, he performs bloody rites along with the sacrifice, he partakes of the offering and its blood, he smears himself with the blood, it drips over him, and thus he enters into a mysterious but very real fellowship with the divinity.

These primitive notions had long ago been exploded by the philosophical speculation of the Greeks, but they come into prominence again in later antiquity, in the Hellenistic and imperial age when the East becomes predominant in the realm of religion. These ideas come from the Orient like a mighty flood pressing into that age, which was religiously agitated and conscious of its needs.

These notions were also connected with the thought of death and immortality, and were revived in the cult and in the mysteries of the great gods of light and springtime. Washings, blood-baptisms, sacred signs and anointings, holy food, and holy meals were intermingled with the mysteries of the deities which come from the East. To refer to only one sufficiently well-known instance, the mysteries of Mithra contain sacraments which are so strikingly analogous to the ancient Christian sacraments that the early church Fathers (e.g., Justin, Tertullian) recognize the similarity and assign it to demonic imitation. The Mithraic mysteries knew a blood-baptism, and a sacramental meal of the initiated observed with the bread and the cup; and with the sacraments of Mithra were connected thoughts of union with the god, the new creation, the new birth, and the food of immortality. The analogies with baptism and the Lord's Supper, as these rites were known to Paul and as they were observed in his churches, are striking and indubitable. Moreover, we must consider how far removed Jesus himself is from sacramental mysticism. He did not baptize, nor did he ordain that his disciples should baptize; the command to baptize is first given by the Risen One. For Jesus the Last Supper had a memorial and parabolic significance, but he founded no sacrament in the ancient sense of the word. Yet water baptism and the meal very soon came to be regarded as a sacrament in that particular world. Where this first took place we do not know, but this important development began before Paul's day. He bears witness to the accomplished fact and he himself stands within the development. It is in this line of development that the Catholic church appears. In his sacramentalism Paul felt and thought as did the Hellenistic world of his age.

In all of this, important lines to be pursued in future research are suggested. We shall presently see what limitations are to be set to such investigation.

The particular conclusions which have been reached in the foregoing inquiry and the method employed for their attainment have not passed unchallenged. As opponents of these views, we may mention Schweitzer and Clemen.

Schweitzer's attack upon the *religionsgeschichtliche* interpretation of Paul is contained in the seventh chapter of his book on *Paul*

and *His Interpreters*,¹ where he incisively criticizes the position of the *religionsgeschichtliche* school, directing his criticisms particularly against Heitmüller and Reitzenstein. Schweitzer took advantage not unskilfully of certain weaknesses of the *religionsgeschichtliche* method, but on the whole his attack is unjustified and ineffectual. Schweitzer will not concede that the sacramental idea is the same with Paul and the Pauline community as it is in the mysteries. If Paul found 'mystery-religion and sacraments present at all in his world, he took the sacraments by storm (*vergewaltigt*). He does not speculate about the performance, but ascribes to it, without further ado, the postulated effect. Accordingly, Schweitzer must admit that Paul entertains "an unmediated and naked sacramental conception which is not to be met with elsewhere." He further objects that the ceremonial details of sacramental mystery-religion are lacking in Paul, and that he and his community apparently attach very little worth to the elaborate and emotional display of sacred ceremonies. Moreover, if the Pauline doctrine of salvation is actually connected with the sacraments, yet it is not constructed upon them and would remain intact were baptism and the Lord's Supper removed. The prominent sacramental items in the utterances of Paul are the result of a theological adjustment of thought, emphasizing and combining earlier features, and so a matter of externalism rather than a structure in which sacraments are fundamental.

Schweitzer also further criticizes Reitzenstein's study of words and ideas. Paul's notion of mystical union with Christ is explained by Schweitzer on the ground that Paul expects union with the heavenly Lord when the end of the world comes; and then with the end of the messianic kingdom, when God becomes all in all, Paul looks for union with God. Thus the apostle's Christ-mysticism is only an anticipation of the superearthy mode of existence to be realized in the messianic kingdom.

This last suggestion shows us the way in which Schweitzer seeks to solve the chief problems of Paulinism. It is the eschatological method—the same method which he formerly employed in his effort to arrive at an understanding of Jesus' teaching. Again

¹ *Geschichte der Paulinischen Forschung von der Reformation bis auf die Gegenwart* (Tübingen, 1911); English tr., *Paul and His Interpreters* (London, 1912).

and again he resorts to eschatology, which certainly was an important phenomenon, and from this he attempts to derive the oldest form of Christianity. According to Schweitzer, the mystical and sacramental "physical element" (*Naturhafte*) in Paul's scheme of redemption does not stand on a par with the eschatological element. The latter is a given quantum, along with the notions of transformation and resurrection; but both mysticism and sacraments must be derived from eschatology. With reference to the very important fact that Pauline and Hellenistic mysticism are so closely akin in linguistic forms of expression, Schweitzer thinks that the Pauline mysticism, which developed from eschatology, found in the language of the mystery-religions notions and expressions which, "as though it had been determined by a pre-established *religionsgeschichtliche* harmony," facilitated, suggested, and even first made possible its own further growth.

It is quite true that Schweitzer occasionally opposes false inferences which may attach themselves to the methods and results of *religionsgeschichtliche* study. Yet it is also certain that his constant and exclusive emphasis upon eschatology is an uncontrolled exaggeration and that his polemic rests for the most part upon inferences and points of view which at the outset do not appeal to any student of the history of religion. Reitzenstein, in a lengthy article,¹ answered Schweitzer's criticism in a charitable and friendly manner, while very skilfully and successfully maintaining the superiority of his own position. In the performance of this task, as frequently on other occasions, he shows an inward religious appreciation of the subject and he differentiates between that which admits of *religionsgeschichtliche* comparison and that which must remain unexplained in Paul because it is his own inward religious experience, his revelation.

Another scholar whose criticism of the *religionsgeschichtliche* school I would mention in closing is C. Clemen. Two books² have come from his pen, one more comprehensive and the other more

¹ "Religionsgeschichte und Eschatologie," *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft*, XIII (1912), 1-28.

² *Religionsgeschichtliche Erklärung des Neuen Testaments* (see above, p. 505) and *Der Einfluss der Mysterienreligionen auf das älteste Christentum* (Giessen, 1913).

brief. It is only the second, briefer one to which I wish to refer, because this is the more recent and is wholly concerned with the present subject. Clemen's criticism corresponds in some respects with that of Schweitzer. Clemen also would allow that the mystery-religions may have exerted a slight influence upon early Christianity. He emphasizes very strongly that we know nothing of so early a spread of the mysteries. These are encountered, in their wider expansion, first in the second half of the first and in the second centuries. In reply to this it may be said that our knowledge of the mysteries is as a whole very meager, and that these cults and initiations may have been widespread even though we now know nothing of them. Then we may refer to the fact that the language used by Paul, where he shows striking connections with the religious language of the mysteries, likewise presupposes that these things are older than we may be able to demonstrate. In the age in which Paul grew up the mysteries were much more widely spread than the paucity of the extant sources would lead us to believe. In this connection the isolated statement of Plutarch, to which Böhlig referred in his previously mentioned book,¹ is well worthy of attention. In his life of Pompey, chap. xxiv, Plutarch gives an account of the pirates: "They offered strange sacrifices upon Mount Olympus [in Lycia] and performed certain secret rites, of which those of Mithra are preserved even to our own time, having first been introduced by those people."² We are dealing here with a statement which in point of time belongs to the first century B.C.; and the provenance is Paul's native state, for the pirates had their stronghold in Cilicia.

A second means which Clemen uses to separate Paul from the mysteries is to give a new significance to the statements of the apostle, spiritualizing them as much as possible to make a symbol out of sacramental experiences and expressions. To give a short illustration, "as many of you as were baptized into Christ put on Christ"³ does not mean that you put on Christ through the

¹ *Die Geisteskultur von Tarsos*, p. 90; cf. also pp. 76-84 and 89-107.

² *ἔξρας δὲ θυσίας ἔθνον αὐτοὶ τὰς ἐν Ὀλύμπῳ καὶ τελετὰς τινὰς ἀπορρήτους ἐτέλουν ὧν ἡ τοῦ Μίθρου καὶ μέχρι δεῦρο διασώζεται καταδειχθεῖσα πρῶτον ὑπ' ἐκείνων.*

³ *ὅσοι εἰς Χριστὸν ἐβαπτίσθητε, Χριστὸν ἐνεδύσασθε*, Gal. 3:27.

performance of baptism, but that in baptism you have confessed your faith and thereby you put on Christ. But Paul's statements in the main are too unequivocal and emphatic to permit of such symbolic spiritualization. We may note, for example, I Cor. 10:1 ff. or 15:29.

In conclusion, we may indicate the results of recent research on the subject of Paul and Hellenism. The variety of excellent and devoted work which has been done by theologians and philologists shows us the way by which we can come nearer to an understanding and a correct estimate of Paul. We see him and his Christianity surrounded by a world which was exceptionally rich in religious thinking. We see the feelings and ideas of this environment passing over into early Christianity. There is little danger that the greatness and distinctiveness of Paul can be lessened by this inquiry. Paul is to be judged, not by what he had in common with his environment, but by what was distinctive to him. He who knows how to read and understand will ever be charmed anew by the power of personally experienced religion in the very refined, spiritual, and imperishable form in which it meets us in the Pauline letters. That which constitutes the greatness and value of the gospels—inwardness, belief in the Father, the worth of man's soul, love, and the close union of religion with ethics—all this is vitally experienced by Paul and is freshly and insistently expounded. This type of religion was never supplanted by the religion of "physical" mysticism and sacramentalism. On turning from a study of the Hellenistic mystery-religions we are always newly impressed by the greatness and inwardness of Pauline religion. It is the business of correct *religionsgeschichtliche* research never to obliterate this distinction. A religion is never to be judged by the survivals which adhere to it from an earlier stage of development, but by the noblest features which appear in its evolution.

THE CHRIST OF FAITH AND THE JESUS OF HISTORY

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One of the most conspicuous modern tendencies in theology is the widespread discrediting of the Chalcedonian Christology by Protestant theologians. Says Professor Loofs: "There is hardly a single learned theologian—I know of none in Germany—who defends the orthodox Christology in its unaltered form."¹ It is true that this Christology still finds formal expression in treatises which reproduce traditional doctrine, and that it has vigorous defenders. But the distinct trend of christological interpretation during the past century has been away from the formulations which passed into the great creeds of the church, and which had for centuries been accepted as final. The Christ of these creeds is no longer considered identical with the historical Jesus.

Catholic theology would look upon such a movement as apostasy. Indeed, the late Professor Charles A. Briggs declared that the nature of Christ is defined with absolute correctness by the Nicene and Chalcedonian creeds, and that no one may rightfully claim to be an interpreter of Christian doctrine who questions the finality of the teaching of these creeds, so far as substance of doctrine is concerned.² Professor Benjamin W. Warfield is likewise unequivocal in his insistence on the complete adequacy of the Chalcedonian Christology.³ Says he: "The significance of this revolt becomes at once apparent, when we reflect that the doctrine of the Two Natures is only another way of stating the

¹ *What Is the Truth about Jesus Christ?* p. 184.

² "The Christ of the Church," *American Journal of Theology*, XVI, No. 2 (April, 1912), pp. 196 ff. See also *The Fundamental Faith* (New York, 1913) and *Theological Symbolics* (New York, 1914).

³ *The Lord of Glory* (New York, 1907); and "The 'Two Natures' and Recent Christological Speculation," *American Journal of Theology*, XV, No. 3 (July, 1911), pp. 337 ff., and XV, No. 4 (October, 1911), pp. 546 ff.; also "The Twentieth Century Christ," *Hibbert Journal*, XII, No. 3 (April, 1914), pp. 583-602.

doctrine of the Incarnation, and the doctrine of the Incarnation is the hinge on which the Christian system turns. No Two Natures, no Incarnation; no Incarnation, no Christianity in any distinctive sense."¹ The statements of these conservative scholars are of especial interest because in them we may see with unequivocal clearness the profound revolution involved in a revised Christology.

The crucial point is this. If salvation is to be referred both inclusively and exclusively to Christ, it is necessary to locate in Christ, and uniquely in Christ, all the divine powers essential to saviorhood. The complete and unique deity of Christ is thus necessary in order to guarantee our complete redemption; for no one less than God can possess all the qualities necessary to redeem us. So argued Athanasius; and so argue the modern defenders of the Chalcedonian Christology. If, now, there shall appear any significant modification of the conception of the deity of Christ, it would appear, on the foregoing hypothesis, that serious impairment of the central doctrine of Christianity follows; for the saving power of Christ is by such modification apparently diminished.

For the establishment of a satisfactory Christology, there are two essentials. In the first place, the person of Christ must be so defined as to furnish precisely those qualities which are essential to salvation. In the second place, one must be convinced that the Christ who is thus defined as an adequate savior is identical with the historical Jesus. Hence the results of historical investigation must be reckoned with. The prevalent tendency away from the Chalcedonian Christology is due both to religious and to historical reasons. It is the purpose of this article, in the first place, to call attention to the religious reasons for the general abandonment of the Chalcedonian Christology, pointing out why the advocates of modern types of Christology do not feel any serious impairment of the content of salvation because of changes in christological doctrine. In the second place, we shall inquire into the problem of identifying the Christ of faith with the historical Jesus.

I. THE DEFINITION OF THE CHRIST OF FAITH

Protestantism, with its insistence on the psychological inwardness of the process of salvation has been concerned to define the

¹ *American Journal of Theology*, XV, No. 3 (July, 1911), p. 337.

person of the Savior in such a way as to make Christ a real psychological factor in religious consciousness. While Luther positively affirmed the Chalcedonian doctrine of the two natures in Christ, he nevertheless constantly insisted that the attention of the believer should be directed to the life and deeds of Jesus as the revelation of the saving grace of God.¹ Christology was thus to be approached from the point of view of the evangelical conception of salvation as the revelation of God's redemptive grace. Melancthon expressed this ideal in the much-quoted sentence from the first edition of his *Loci*, where he says that Christ is to be known from his benefits to us, not from speculation concerning his two natures.² This emphasis of Protestantism on the correlation of Christology with Christian experience opened the way for developments in the doctrine of Christ which were not countenanced by the Catholic church, with its ecclesiastical control of theological interpretation. If the emphasis in our Christology is to be determined by asking what Christ actually accomplishes in our experience of salvation, any significant change in the nature of religious experience will directly register itself in the content of christological doctrine. The Christ of faith will be defined in relation to the actual experience of the Christian.

Now the past two centuries have witnessed the rise and development of a new religious consciousness, as compared with the Christianity of the Middle Ages or even of the time of Luther. So different is this new religious experience from the older form that Troeltsch has made the fruitful suggestion that we distinguish two types of Protestantism—Old Protestantism and New Protestantism.³ Old Protestantism shares with Catholicism the conception of salvation as a rescue from this world by the intervention of supernatural power. Its primary concern is to save the individual for an eternal life; and such salvation is possible only as divine forces from the realm of eternity shall invade the realm

¹ See Köstlin, *Luthers Theologie*, II, 130; Herrmann, *The Christian's Communion with God*, pp. 146 ff. (Eng. Transl.).

² Ed. Plitt, p. 64.

³ See *Protestantism and Progress*, chap. i; and "Protestantisches Christentum und Kirche in der Neuzeit," *Kultur der Gegenwart*, Teil I, Abt. IV, pp. 253-458; cf. McGiffert, *Protestant Thought before Kant*.

of the natural life and transform it. It is evident that the Christology of the traditional creeds exactly suits this conception; for it defines Christ essentially in terms of his supernatural character. New Protestantism, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with the possibilities of life here and now. It pictures the future life distinctly in terms of continuity with this present life. Consequently, it is desirous of defining salvation as the enrichment of our natural powers, the development of our personal life to its highest form of spiritual achievement. It seeks to find God not primarily as the one who rescues us by purely objective means, but rather as the one who is so immediately present in history that man may draw from the "natural" world the divine power which he needs for the triumph of the spirit. This modern emphasis appears in the typical new conceptions of Christ which have been developed in recent times.

Negatively, this interest was expressed in the rationalism of the eighteenth century. Here the new culture which had been developing since the Renaissance had come to self-consciousness, and was putting forth a positive program for religion. According to this program, the primary necessity was the acquirement by man of a reasonable life. Wisdom was the supreme means of correcting evil. Salvation meant reasonableness. Accordingly, if Jesus is to be the Savior, he must be the bringer of wisdom. The metaphysical puzzles of the orthodox Christology seemed irrational, and hence were rejected. The value of Jesus was sought in the realm of reason. Jesus was consequently regarded as the supreme teacher of reasonable conduct.

The hostility which has always existed between rationalism and evangelicalism has frequently blinded our eyes to the fact that *formally* the rationalists were only doing what everyone does who commits the "original sin of Protestantism."¹ Just as Luther revised the emphasis of the Catholic church so as to bring his estimate of Jesus into closer accord with his own religious experi-

¹ Father Joseph Rickaby, S. J., in his contribution to the *Hibbert Journal Supplement*, "Jesus or Christ," declared that the present christological departures from the Chalcedonian formula are the natural consequences of the "original sin of Protestantism" in departing from the Christology of the church. See Article X, "One Lord, Jesus Christ."

ence, so the rationalists revised the Christology of orthodoxy, in order to make the picture of Jesus fit their conception of religion. The Christ of faith in both instances is defined by asking what living faith really demands, rather than by allowing the church to decide the entire question for us. The only adequate reply to rationalism must be sought in a criticism of the rationalistic conception of religion.

This criticism was furnished by Schleiermacher in his famous *Discourses on Religion*. He felt that rationalism was entirely too shallow; that its program of a rational life accompanied by an intellectual theology was too cold and formal to meet the needs of man. What we must have if we are to be saved at all is a rich and confident experience of the presence and power of God in our life. In this, Schleiermacher echoed the demand of Luther. But in his conception of the meaning of salvation, Schleiermacher voiced the religious attitude of New Protestantism rather than that of Luther. The source of Luther's distress was the fear of an angry God. The source of the modern man's distress is the apparently heartless and soulless pressure of the universe which we know through our science, with its inviolable laws, and its seeming indifference to human welfare. Luther wished to change the picture of an angry God into the vision of a loving and forgiving Father. Schleiermacher wished to reveal a divine presence permeating the universe; a presence invisible, indeed, to mere sensuous perception, but discernible by the development of religious faith. To feel the reality of God in all experience; to transform our ordinary perceptions of reality into the certainty that our dependence on the world is really a dependence on God; and to walk in the light and strength of this new vision—this is what religion meant to Schleiermacher.

To be saved, therefore, means to attain a God-consciousness; and the Savior must be one who enables us to attain it. It is interesting to follow the logical outcome of this religious emphasis in Schleiermacher's discussion of Christology in his *Glaubenslehre*. He takes up successively the articles of the historic creeds, and after analyzing them in the light of his conception of the meaning of religion, dismisses them one after another as inadequate to express

Christ's ability to save us. Neither virgin birth, nor supernatural substance, nor death on the cross, nor physical resurrection, nor present exaltation, nor second coming is what we supremely need for our salvation. If religion means that we are to be able to walk in this world with the steady consciousness of a divine presence in and through all finite things, we must ask first of all whether Jesus possessed this God-consciousness. In other words, the center of Schleiermacher's Christology is in the *religious experience of Jesus*. If that religious experience can be shown to be dominated by an unvarying consciousness of God, Jesus possesses what we need, and we can look to him for salvation. Schleiermacher thus defines the significance of Jesus in terms of his God-consciousness. Paragraph 94 of the *Glaubenslehre* reads: "The redeemer is exactly like all other men so far as concerns his human nature; but he differs from all other men by virtue of the unvarying power of his God-consciousness, which constituted a real existence of God in him."¹ The practical expression of Christ's work in salvation finds expression in paragraph 100, as follows: "The redeemer takes believers up into the strength of his own God-consciousness; and this constitutes his redemptive activity."²

The Christ of Schleiermacher's faith, therefore, is not the Christ of the creeds—one person with two natures. He is rather the Great Mystic, possessed of a God-consciousness which enabled him to resist and overcome that sense-consciousness which dulls the spiritual life in all other men. A Christology, Schleiermacher believed, should lay chief emphasis on the fact of this mystical insight possessed by Jesus. It is of less importance to formulate a theory as to the ontological origin or metaphysical nature of Jesus than to bring clearly to light the wonderful God-consciousness of Jesus during his earthly life. The sharp contrast between this ideal and that of conservative theology is revealed by a sentence from Dr. Briggs. Said he: "The life of Jesus in this world has little *doctrinal* significance."³

¹ "Der Erlöser ist sonach allen Menschen gleich vermöge der Selbigkeit der menschlichen Natur, von Allen aber unterschieden durch die stetige Kräftigkeit seines Gottesbewusstseins, welche ein eigentliche Sein Gottes in ihm war."

² "Der Erlöser nimmt die Gläubigen in die Kräftigkeit seines Gottesbewusstseins auf, und dies ist seine erlosende Thätigkeit."

³ *The Fundamental Christian Faith*, p. 113.

The Ritschlian Christology, like that of Schleiermacher, is dominated by distinctly modern soteriological considerations. For the Ritschlian, salvation consists in establishing such relations with God as to make us certain that a moral life will triumph in a universe which seems to be indifferent to moral values. We must, accordingly, find some revelation of God *in history*, which convinces us of the reality of a forgiving and a redeeming spiritual power. The Ritschlian wishes this saving faith to be a freely attained conviction. He therefore asks us to become acquainted with the historical Jesus (the "Man Jesus," as Herrmann is fond of saying), and there to find a spiritual power which overwhelms us with its moral grandeur and its redeeming love. It is only after we have actually experienced the power of the person of Jesus that we have any right to make doctrinal statements concerning him; and those doctrinal statements must be restricted to the *values* which we are compelled to assign to him. This rigid restriction of a Christology to the bounds of religious experience means the elimination of many of the traits assigned to Christ in the older creeds. Herrmann has attempted to show that this restricted Christology is the inevitable result of applying the empirical tests which Luther himself insisted upon. In other words, the "original sin of Protestantism" here leads to results which Old Protestantism emphatically repudiates. The Christ of the Ritschlian faith is the Man Jesus, possessed of such moral fidelity to the purposes of God that in his life we see clearly and convincingly the actual purpose of God, and yield ourselves in faith to the God revealed in Jesus.¹ Beyond this practical valuation of Jesus in relation to our religious needs we do not need to go. "It is what we experience in the Man Jesus that first gives definite content to the confession of the deity of Christ."² When we ask further what it is that we experience in coming into contact with the Man Jesus, Herrmann tells us that

¹ The most influential exponent of this ideal is Herrmann. See especially *Der Verkehr des Christen mit Gott*, 4. Aufl., 1903; translated under the title, *The Christian's Communion with God*, 2d ed., 1906. Herrmann's *Ethik* also sets forth the relation of religious experience to acquaintance with the Man Jesus. See especially pp. 95 ff. (5. Aufl., 1913).

² *Communion with God*, p. 128 (2d ed., English translation); Cf. 4th German ed., p. 105: "Erst das, was wir an dem Menschen Jesus erleben, kann dem Bekenntnis zu der Gottheit Jesu einen bestimmte Inhalt geben."

it is the certainty that in that life of moral devotion God speaks the message of forgiveness and love to the penitent and morally earnest soul. The content of Christology is thus defined in relation to a modern moral-religious experience.

We may briefly refer to another typical interpretation of religion which has exercised profound influence during the past century. This interpretation, brought into vogue by Hegel, is concerned to find a metaphysical interpretation of the cosmic process which shall make it possible to affirm that the Absolute is dynamically present in all phases of finite reality. The Christian doctrine of the incarnation, which expresses the immediate presence of God in human form, is here expanded to a universal principle of philosophy. The apparently positive use of the idea of incarnation in this type of monistic philosophy has led many theologians to suppose that in the modern conception of an immanent divine potency throughout the cosmic process we have an apologetic defense of the Christian conception of the significance of Christ.

It should be noted, however, that the strength of the modern monistic interpretation depends on the possibility of affirming the *universal* validity of the principle of incarnation. Therefore, the orthodox emphasis on the *uniqueness* of the deity of Christ is fundamentally modified or is even abandoned. The complete presence of God in Christ, if it have religious value from this point of view, must be simply the clear revelation in Christ of the character of the cosmic process as a whole. We shall later call attention to the comparative absence of interest in the historical Jesus in this type of thinking. It is the conception of the indwelling divine Logos which is the real theme of this Christology. The religious efficacy of this interpretation of Christology requires such emphasis on the divine character of the entire cosmic process as to lead to an abandonment of the uniqueness of Christ in any such sense as this is expressed in orthodox Christology. From this monistic religious interest has come the common habit among modern theologians of criticizing adversely the older doctrines because these start with an insuperable dualism between God and man. On the contrary, modern writers insist, God and man are essentially akin. The incarnation is thus no incomprehensible

miracle, but is rather simply the expression in perfect form of that universal immanence of God which is the fundamental tenet of religious faith.¹ Into the incarnation, therefore, we read the essentials of a monistic doctrine of a dynamically immanent God in an evolving universe. Now the traditional significance of the incarnation is found in the unique introduction into this hopelessly lost world of an alien power to redeem men out of the world. A flat negation of the dualism of the Chalcedonian Christology is demanded to fulfil the requirements of this Hegelian conception of religion.

Indeed Biedermann definitely proposed to distinguish between the Christ-person, who must be a definitely limited historical figure, and the Christ-principle, which is the universal ground of religious redemption. Jesus is the complete embodiment of this redemptive principle, and therefore is the objective ground of redemptive faith; but the real source of redemption is located in the spiritual identity of the Absolute with the spiritual activities of the finite throughout all cosmic history. In other words, a faith based on monistic philosophy needs to affirm more than can strictly be affirmed of any single historical figure. For such faith is grounded

¹ Two or three citations will serve to illustrate this current type of exposition.

"But however true it may be that the relation of the divine and human in the person of Christ transcends, in one sense, all earthly parallel, it must yet be a union of which by its very structure and essence humanity is capable" (John Caird, *Fundamental Ideas of Christianity*, II, 158).

"If we were to begin by assuming that God and man are essentially unlike, that there is a positive antithesis between the divine and the human, so that God and man are separated by an impassable gulf of difference in nature, then indeed, no incarnation would seem possible. . . . Nevertheless, mankind has always been making the contrary assumption, and acting upon it in his religious life" (William Newton Clarke, *Outline of Christian Theology*, pp. 290, 291).

"Strange as it may seem to some of my readers, I believe what the creeds say about Jesus, but I believe it in a way that puts no gulf between him and the rest of the human race. . . . All human history represents the incarnation or manifesting of the eternal Son or Christ of God. The incarnation cannot be limited to one life only, however great that life may be. It is quite a false idea to think of Jesus and no one else as the Son of God incarnate" (Campbell, *The New Theology*, pp. 72, 106).

"In other words, in order to save man from his state of division and estrangement, God must 'in an objective manner' enter this empirical or sensuous present as man's equal or fellow, and so cause it to appear . . . that the Divine and the human natures are not in themselves different, but really alike, akin, able to be in the unity of a person." (Fairbairn, *The Place of Christ in Modern Theology*, p. 220).

in universal metaphysical principles rather than in specific historical events.¹

One other type of thought about Jesus should be mentioned; for it is coming to be increasingly familiar as we become more keenly conscious of the social problems which confront the church. Can Christianity furnish a salvation for society as well as for individuals? Can we hope for the regeneration of our social order as well as for the rescue of individuals? An eloquent appeal for an interpretation of Jesus which shall serve this social interest appeared a year or more ago in the much-read but historically erratic book by Bouck White, *The Call of the Carpenter*. Here Jesus is represented as a revolutionary socialist. His redemptive work was thwarted by the apostle Paul, who transformed the original revolutionary message of Jesus into a gospel of loyalty to the divinely established powers that be. True Christianity, according to Bouck White, consists in the recovery of this alleged original social mission of Jesus. The passion for social salvation has recently been voiced in an unusually suggestive book by C. H. Dickinson, entitled *The Christian Reconstruction of Modern Life*. Two or three quotations from this book will serve to show where the demands of social religious faith lead, in estimating the significance of Jesus.

The world-transcending task, which is appointed to our civilization because imperative upon every man and humanity, was the task of Jesus. He also must win in and from and against the world that one thing precious, his own soul. If he so attained himself as to new-create our spiritual manhood by sufficient powers for its self-realization, then his central place in humanity and in the unfolding spiritual universe is not less than that which Christianity claims for him. The redemptive significance of Jesus is to be expressed in terms of the task, in which, for himself and for the brotherhood of men, he overcame the world.²

The Christian confession, presented to mankind to be the universal confession, is this: Jesus is our Savior who accomplished his task and ours; for every member of the humanity through which courses the power that is at the heart of it, actively depends upon that central accomplishment new-creative of the whole.³

¹ See Biedermann, *Dogmatik*, secs. 814-16.

² *The Christian Reconstruction of Life*, p. 214.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 215.

In this view many things which have been declared essential to Jesus disappear, and many things belonging to him which it is becoming customary to consider accidental and transitory are evidently essential. Everything which belonged to his task, even the most apparently trifling incident, or a superstition of his age which he shared and put to use, is of abiding value, because these things are of his task; in and from and against these he accomplished himself. . . . On the other hand, all that has been attributed to him which is not of his task no longer concerns us; for example, his alleged pre-existence, membership in the Trinity, place in a plan of salvation.¹

The Christ of Mr. Dickinson's faith is the heroic moral figure who, facing all the difficulties which any human being must face, nevertheless triumphed through the strength of his religious experience. Fellowship with such a victorious spirit may give to us assurance of moral victory. "To accept the faith of Jesus is most real acceptance of faith in Jesus, for in his faith he is our Savior."²

When we consider the content of these typical modern interpretations of the meaning of salvation, it becomes apparent that a being defined in terms of the Chalcedonian Christ could not do what is here required of a savior. It is absolutely indispensable to the efficiency of the saviorhood of Jesus from the point of view of these typical modern interests, that he should enter completely into the perplexing experiences which constitute the religious problem of the modern man. He must be a citizen of this world, rather than an alien from another world. The mere "human nature" of the traditional creeds is incompetent to express the psychological and ethical content which is indispensable, if Jesus is to enter as a vital transforming force into the religious experience of the modern man. Such doctrinal indifference to the earthly life of Jesus as is frankly confessed by Dr. Briggs³ is impossible for the representatives of the revised Christology in our day. These are concerned to find a saving insight into the problems of religion in the religious

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 216.

² *Ibid.*, p. 249.

³ Note the significance of the following words: "Lives of Jesus Christ are really modern conceptions, which in some respects lead to false ideas of him. The New Testament leaves all those things that go to make up a biography in the background of his teaching and of his miracles of love; and thus makes him what he is and from the nature of the case must be, the Messiah and Savior, a mystery, a unique man, one apart from all men in a unique relation to God, his Father, in a sense peculiar to him alone" (*The Fundamental Christian Faith*, p. 114).

experience of Jesus rather than in a unique mystery defined in more or less obscure terms by ecclesiastical councils.

So far all is clear. Modern Christologies are eager to find in the character of the historical Jesus precisely those traits which are essential to furnish the soul with the spiritual insight and power needed to overcome the difficulties inherent in the acquirement of a vigorous faith. This leads us to the second main inquiry. What does historical criticism have to say as to the legitimacy of the interpretations of the person of Jesus demanded by modern faith? The theological significance of this inquiry will appear if we remind ourselves again that it has been felt doctrinally necessary to locate in the person of Jesus *all* that is essential to our salvation. The historical creeds declared that Jesus possessed precisely those divine powers which, according to the theory of salvation current at the time, were necessary to saviorhood. Those who express grave doubts as to the possibility of a historical verification of the items of the orthodox Christology seem to be confident that the traits affirmed to be essential to the modern conception of saviorhood are traits which the historical Jesus actually possessed. The tenability of this position must now occupy our attention. Can "modern" interpretations claim a greater historical accuracy than the traditional Christology?¹

2. THE QUEST OF THE HISTORICAL JESUS

The question as to the identity between the Christ of faith and the historical Jesus has become serious only since the perfection and general adoption of critical historical methods in the study of the New Testament. Theologians formerly were content with discovering to their satisfaction that the doctrinal statements of the New Testament concerning Christ confirmed their own christological tenets. But with the growing recognition of the fact of development of belief in the period between the life of Jesus and the writing of the various New Testament books has come the desire

¹ A suggestive account of the various ways in which interpreters during the past century have attempted to portray Jesus as a fundamentally modern man in his way of viewing the problems of life was given by Weinle in *Jesus im neunzehnten Jahrhundert*, 1st ed., 1903; translated into English by Allen P. Widgery, under the title, *Jesus in the Nineteenth Century and After* (Edinburgh, 1914).

to test our conceptions of Jesus by the actual historical facts rather than by the interpretations of the significance of Jesus reflected in the apostolic and post-apostolic writings. Any modern interpretation of the person of Jesus which fails to take this problem seriously is justly liable to the reproach of theological subjectivism. How stands the case with the typical interpretations which we have cited?

Schleiermacher, as is well known, selected the Fourth Gospel as the one which gives the most accurate picture of the historical Jesus.¹ In the stage of historical criticism which prevailed in his day, this is perhaps not to be wondered at. Still, the reasons for his preference seems to have been largely theological; for the Fourth Gospel depicts Jesus as the supremely God-conscious one, whereas in the Synoptics he is represented in terms of Jewish messianism. This messianism with its spectacular miraculous element seemed to Schleiermacher so artificial that he could not use it in his construction of the character of the God-conscious one who is to command the worship of men. Moreover, Schleiermacher's conclusions concerning the consciousness of the Christ of this Fourth Gospel are determined almost entirely by his dialectic of religion. Inspiring as is his account of the nature of Jesus, it is a construction of the religious imagination rather than the result of critical historical study.

In the case of the Ritschlian Christology, we find a somewhat perplexing situation. It is true that this school of theology definitely and emphatically insisted that the speculative methods which marked the work of the disciples of Schleiermacher and of Hegel should be abandoned in favor of an appeal to history. But the interest of the Ritschlians in the autonomy of faith led them to object just as strenuously to making faith dependent on the specialized researches of historical critics, as they objected to making it dependent upon the dogmatic decrees of the church. While the emphasis upon the "Man Jesus" led naturally to the selection of the Synoptics as being closer to the historical facts, and while men like Harnack and Wendt have contributed much to our

¹ *Das Leben Jesu*. Published in 1864 from notes taken by a student of a course given in 1832.

historical understanding of the life and teaching of Jesus, yet, so far as a Christology is concerned, all Ritschlians agree that faith rather than historical criticism must supply the details. Consequently, the Ritschlian has been able to proceed with astonishing little concern over the battles of historical criticism. In fact, it is the boast of Herrmann that he has discovered a pathway to faith which is completely independent of the results of historical criticism. "The proof of the historical reality of Jesus," he declares, "for a believer rests always on the significance which the story of Jesus has gained for his life."¹ Indeed, in his most recent publication, Herrmann calmly surveys the panic caused by current attempts to deny the historicity of Jesus entirely, and points out that the Ritschlian basis of faith is not in the least disturbed by this skepticism. He says:

If anyone thinks to terrify us by declaring that the historical reality of the person [of Jesus] cannot be established by any human means, we answer: We have absolutely no need of any such assurance. On the contrary, in this very existing uncertainty we welcome an incontrovertible evidence that our salvation is found solely in the experiences in which we become certain of the compelling presence of God in our own life.²

Herrmann goes on to say that no historical criticism can forbid a man to put himself spiritually under the influence of the picture of Jesus found in the Gospels. If, as the practical result of this acquaintance with the Jesus of the Gospels, one experiences the transforming power of God, one has become certain of the main thing, and can then be relatively indifferent to the results of historical criticism. Although Herrmann does not explicitly admit it, this is really a frank confession that the Christ of faith need not be at all identical with the Jesus discovered by historical criticism.

The Hegelian type of Christology has always moved in the realm of speculation with comparatively little concern as to the results of a historical study of the Gospels. Professor Royce frankly confesses that an idealistic Christology does not need to

¹ *Communion with God*, Eng. transl., 2d ed., p. 226.

² *Die mit der Theologie verknüpfte Not der evangelischen Kirche und ihre Ueberwindung*, p. 30.

come to any particular conclusions concerning the historical Jesus.¹

As to the modern social interpretations of the significance of Jesus, we find that these, again, like other modern Christian ideals, are due to the pressure of modern moral and religious interests, rather than to an exact study of the data connected with the life of Jesus. For a time, indeed, it seemed as if the process of criticism might reveal to us behind the doctrinal statements of the New Testament the figure of one who was interested primarily in the social questions which are so vital to us.² But as historical criticism has proceeded, it has led many scholars to feel that it is probable that Jesus entertained an apocalyptic view of the course of history which puts miraculous deliverance in the foreground, and which is therefore not compatible with the ideal of social evolution so familiar to us. While it would be too much to say that the view of Schweitzer has come to be taken seriously by many scholars, nevertheless it is at present impossible for us to be historically certain that Jesus actually held the religious ideals which the advocates of the "social gospel" today demand.

It is noticeable, moreover, that this social gospel is interested in the *faith* of Jesus rather than in his "person."³ We are to look for salvation to "the God and Father" of Christ, and to be saved by the presence in our life of the same divine presence which made the life of Jesus what it was. It is only by way of courtesy that this interpretation can be called a "Christology" at all. The object of faith here is not a historical figure, but is rather the

¹ Cf. the following statement: "I have a right to decline and I actually do decline to express any opinion as to any details about the person and life of the founder [of Christianity]. For such an opinion the historical evidences are lacking, although it seems to me natural to suppose that the sayings and the parables which tradition attributed to the founder were the work of a single author, concerning whose life we probably possess some actually correct reports" (*The Problem of Christianity*, I, p. xxviii).

² Such was the general position of books like Seeley's *Ecce Homo* (London, 1866), Peabody's *Jesus Christ and the Social Question*, New York, 1907, Naumann's *Jesus als Volksmann* (Göttingen, 1896), and Mathews' *The Social Teaching of Jesus* (New York, 1897).

³ "To accept the faith of Jesus is most real faith in Jesus, for in his faith he is our Savior (Dickinson, *op. cit.*, p. 249).

invisible God or the spiritual ideal which dominated the life of Jesus. It is true that the vitality of this ethical-social interpretation depends on the possibility of being sure that Jesus actually existed and met the sort of moral-social problems in which we today are interested. But the details of his experience may be very different from the details of ours. If only we can be sure of a moral fidelity and a spiritual positiveness which we can appreciate, Jesus may help us into the possibility of a similar moral and spiritual fidelity. Manifestly, this estimate of Jesus is capable of considerable idealizing, and need not be very deeply concerned as to the detailed findings of historical criticism.

In brief, it cannot be said that any of the typical Christologies which we have considered really come frankly to terms with the critical historical problem. It is assumed that the christological content demanded by religious faith is at least compatible with the findings of historical criticism; but the content of the character of Jesus is actually derived from the religious ideals of living faith rather than from an exact exegesis.

If, now, we turn away from these distinctly theological undertakings to the work of the historical scholars, what do we find?

It was not so very long ago that men were writing the "Life of Jesus" with every confidence that such a biographical sketch could be drawn up on historical grounds. Gradually, however, this confidence has been disturbed by the seemingly incontrovertible evidence that the gospel records are not at all concerned with questions of chronological succession, but are really religious tracts for the times. Whereupon, it was asserted that, even though we are not able to construct with accuracy the course of the outward life of Jesus, we can at least form a reliable conception of his inner character. But little by little historical criticism has forced scholars to the conclusion that the interpretations of the inner character of Jesus in the Gospels are appreciations due partially to the religious convictions engendered in the Christian community during the period between the life of Jesus and the time when the Gospels were written. First criticism

came to treat the Fourth Gospel as a record of later christological faith; and now the Synoptics are also being generally interpreted as utterances of the faith of the early community. How much of later theologizing was read back into the gospel records by their authors is a question which it is extremely difficult to answer. But the fact that the question is asked at all is significant. For it means that we have in the Gospels themselves the picture of the Christ of faith, rather than the record of the life of the historical Jesus. The early church was not at all interested in the historical Jesus as we today are. Men were looking to the exalted Christ, soon to appear in glory; and they looked back on the earthly life of their Lord in the light of this christological faith.

We are thus led by the process of historical criticism to recognize that it is the Christ of faith whom we meet in the New Testament writings just as truly as it is the Christ of faith who is set forth in the ecumenical creeds or developed by modern dissenting theologians. And it seems difficult to press with certainty very far back of this Christ of faith. Any attempt to get back of the New Testament faith will mean simply the substitution of the critic's interpretation of Jesus for the interpretation given by John or by Paul or by Mark. The critic may, it is true, be furnished with data which make his reconstruction of the picture of Jesus seem more in accord with the facts than is the interpretation of someone else. But since practically all the information which we possess concerning Jesus is embodied precisely in the documents which set forth the Christ of the evangelists' faith, the reconstruction undertaken by the critic must inevitably contain a large amount of conjecture; and conjecture is again dependent upon the critic's own view of the probable course of historical development.

This subjective influence is freely charged against liberal theologians by those who wish to retain a conservative Christology. For example, Loofs, in his recent book, *What Is the Truth about Jesus Christ?* repeatedly states that the presuppositions of liberal theologians prevent them from estimating accurately the data of the Gospels. He asserts that these prepossessions are responsible for all sorts of arbitrary views as to dates and authorship and

interpretation of New Testament writings.¹ So, too, Dr. Charles A. Briggs declared:

If they [i.e., the critical scholars] come to the Christ of the Bible with a priori theories which it is impossible to reconcile with the Christ of the Bible they cannot from the very nature of the case accept him. But such preconceptions are altogether uncritical, unscientific, and destructive of sound scholarship as well as of faith.²

But on the other hand, it seems to men trained in methods of historical criticism to be an indefensible prejudice which insists that we shall refuse to apply in the investigation of events narrated in Scripture the same canons of probability which are applied in the investigation of any other literature. For example, Stiskind, in a recent discussion of Troeltsch's theology,³ calls attention to the fact that the historian has to recognize that in *all* ancient literature narratives abound in supernatural explanations. To insist that the supernatural items in the New Testament shall be reverently accepted, while similar supernatural items in secular literature shall be rigorously subjected to criticism, is surely an evidence of prejudice quite as pronounced as is that of which Briggs and Warfield complain.

Here, then, is the situation which confronts us. Historical analysis shows that the interpretations of Jesus which we have either in ancient or in modern times are expressions of faith, in which the believer attributes to Jesus those traits which are deemed by him to be essential to salvation. The persistent demand of such faith is to find in Jesus all those forces which are necessary for our salvation. The power of a Christology, however, depends on the conviction that the historical Jesus actually possessed the traits which the Christ of faith possesses.

¹ See especially the third lecture, entitled "The Liberal Jesus-Research and the Sources," pp. 79-119.

² *American Journal of Theology*, XVI, No. 2 (April, 1914), p. 200. Compare the statement of Professor Warfield that to attempt to get back of the New Testament Christology to a more real historical Jesus "is not acute historical exposition, but the crassest kind of dogmatic imposition" (*American Journal of Theology*, XV, No. 4 [October, 1911], p. 556).

³ *Theologische Rundschau*, VII, No. 1 (January, 1914), pp. 4 ff.

Now in the case of Christologies with which one does *not* agree one has no difficulty in showing that the doctrinal elements of which one disapproves come from a source other than the real person of Christ. If one is not a millenarian, one is likely to trace messianism to contemporary Judaism rather than to Jesus. If one is not a sacramentarian, one finds the emphasis on the conception of divine substance to be the product of the thinking of the Hellenic world. If one is a conservative, one discovers that the liberal estimates of Jesus are supplied by the modern *Zeitgeist*. The question which I wish to raise is whether every Christology, whatever its content, does not contain elements which cannot be traced to the historical at all.

If this be admitted, the further question arises whether we are actually furthering the cause of a true interpretation of our religion if we continue to attempt to maintain that all the vital forces which enter into the salvation of men must be definitely located in the person of Jesus in order to be regarded as valid. Granting that messianism was of non-Christian origin, did it not prove itself to be a powerful agent in the Christian life of the first century? What if the Nicene doctrine is a Greek product? Is that any reason for denying its tremendous positive contribution to the Christian life of the church? And if our own time is bringing to light new religious motives and forces, may we not welcome them without feeling obliged to make Jesus who lived and thought and spoke in terms of first-century life in Palestine sponsor for ideals which are demonstrably due to the exigencies of modern life?

Clearness and accuracy in our thinking must compel us to recognize that there are important subjective factors in any attempt to locate objectively in the person of the historical Jesus all the dynamic forces of the Christian life. A critical examination of almost any Christology will disclose the fact that an alleged christocentric theology is in reality dependent on broader foundations for its validity. What is apparently the simplest form of identification of the Christ of faith with the historical Jesus—viz., the insistence on the absolute objective truth of the New Testament statements—requires for its validity a belief in such absolute accuracy of the New Testament writings as to make them different

in origin and character from all other literature.¹ Loofs, in defense of a conservative Christology, makes the bewildering statement: "First I shall have to show that nobody, relying on the supposition that Jesus was a purely human being, is able to write a really historical life of Jesus; and secondly, I shall have to make it evident that this supposition itself, although necessary for scientific historical treatment of the subject, is yet a false one."² In other words, we must adopt one hypothesis in order to get the historical truth; but we must adopt a precisely opposite hypothesis in order to discover religious truth. There is evidently here abundant room for subjective judgments. D. W. Forrest, in his book *The Christ of History and of Experience*, urges the positive contribution of a spiritual expectancy born of faith in the problem of discovering the truth about Jesus. He, like Loofs, seems to suggest that the verdict of such faith is to be received as evidence concerning historical facts, thus making good the deficiencies of mere historical investigation.³ Of course, in case of disagreement between interpreters, on this hypothesis, the primary question would be concerning the comparative validity of the two kinds of "faith" which were responsible for the differing judgments. And the very fact of disagreement would indicate that something more than the personality of Jesus was making its impression and expressing itself in religious valuations.

The trend in critical scholarship is toward a distinct recognition of this inevitable subjective element. Wobbermin, for example, proposes a distinction between *Historie* and *Geschichte*.⁴ The Jesus of *Historie* must, of course, be discovered by historical criticism. But our faith does not base itself on this mere *historische*

¹ Dr. Briggs, for example, prefaces his discussion of *The Fundamental Faith* with a statement that the apostles and their associates were endowed by the Holy Spirit with especial powers and divine authority to interpret accurately the content of Christian faith; see *The Fundamental Faith*, p. 1.

² *What Is the Truth about Jesus Christ?* p. 85.

³ "Now the historic personality of Christ is, like Christianity itself, an indubitable fact. The only question is, What kind of a fact is it? The answer to that which any man gives will be in accordance with his moral insight" (*The Christ of History and of Experience*, p. 320).

⁴ *Geschichte und Historie in der Religionswissenschaft* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1911).

character. It rests rather on the *geschichtliche* figure of Christ which has been such a spiritual power in human history. This *geschichtliche* Christ is an objective reality, capable of supplying the content which religious faith demands. But Wobbermin distinctly declares that we should not identify the Christ of *Geschichte* with the Jesus of *Historie*; for in the latter are some items of merely temporary significance, which we cannot today appreciate positively. He criticizes Kähler for such an identification, on the ground that not everything which the historical Jesus did or said passed into Christian history with spiritual power.¹ He believes that the essentials of the work of Jesus are to be seen in his ethical purpose of love, his identity of will with God, and his resurrection and exaltation.² Herrmann, so Wobbermin feels, has unduly reduced the content of a Christology, by omitting the resurrection.³ If Kähler has been too objective, Herrmann has been too subjective. But this evidently raises the entire problem of the nature of that subjective process which constructs a Christ of faith which shall avowedly not be in all points identical with the Jesus of history. Wobbermin believes he has discovered a sound principle, by asking what aspects of the life and work of Jesus actually passed into subsequent history with power. If we can discover these, we have the essentials of Christological faith. But, as Beth points out,⁴ Wobbermin has not been able to avoid the influence of modern interests. For example, he says nothing about the miraculous aspects of the person and work of Christ, although in Christian history miracles have been quite as essential in the interpretation of the significance of Christ as have some of the factors which Wobbermin explicitly mentions. In short, the appeal to *Geschichte* turns out, after all, to include the consultation of modern religious interests; and it is doubtful whether Wobbermin can claim as great objectivity for his method of determining the content of Christology as would appear from his analysis of the problem.

A frank recognition of the fact that vital faith demands a content which cannot be located *in toto* in the person of Jesus

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

² *Ibid.*, p. 23.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 23, 35, 39.

⁴ *Theologische Rundschau*, XV, No. 1 (January, 1912), p. 12.

appeared in Bousset's address at the Congress of Liberal Religion at Berlin in 1910.¹ Recognizing the uncertainties connected with the critical determination of the exact historical facts concerning Jesus, and recognizing also the fact that faith insists on locating in Jesus those spiritual forces which it demands for a vigorous religious life, Bousset suggests that we may do justice both to the supreme significance of Jesus for our religious life and to the demands of honesty by recognizing that in any Christology Jesus becomes the "symbol" of the divine power which redeems us. But since a symbol illustrates spiritual reality rather than demonstrates it, we seek the ultimate grounds of religion in that which lies behind the symbol. For Bousset religion is an inevitable and persistent attempt of mankind to attach spiritual life to some absolute and eternal reality. This attempt is worked out in history, and thus is most effectively expounded in terms of historical revelation. But notwithstanding the great changes in human history, and the disturbing effects of criticism, religion persists. If we anchor our faith in this universal rational fact of human life, we need not fear the results of criticism. Even in the improbable event of such an outcome of historical criticism as would make it doubtful whether there ever was any such a man as the Gospels describe, "faith would still abide, for it rests on its own eternal foundation. Moreover, the picture of Jesus given in the Gospels would abide; and although it would in that case be regarded as a great imaginative picture, nevertheless this very work of the imagination would have eternal symbolic significance."² Bousset would thus have us recognize the immense importance of the subjective creations of religious thought, and would affirm that power is given to any religion when the figure of its founder or of its reformer is thus idealized, so that the eternal ideas of religious faith become concrete and capable of effective practical consequences in history.

A similar interpretation of Christology was set forth by Troeltsch, but with the unequivocal recognition of the fact that

¹ "Die Bedeutung der Person Jesu für den Glauben." Fünfter Weltkongress für freies Christentum und religiösen Fortschritt, Berlin, 5 bis 10 August, 1910. *Protokoll der Verhandlungen*, I. Band, pp. 291-305.

² *Ibid.*, p. 305.

when once the person of Jesus is viewed as a "symbol," rather than as the realistically objective creative source of Christianity, it is impossible any longer to retain a christocentric theology.¹ This logical conclusion he reinforces by the historical fact that into Christianity in its early days many factors other than those derived from Jesus found a place and exercised a creative influence.² Moreover, Troeltsch's own philosophy of religion enables him to appeal to a "religious *a priori*" as the eternal anchor for religious assurance. He has thus actually grown away from the sense of need of a christocentric theology. Nevertheless, such is the elasticity of the idea of a "symbol," that he is able to make concrete the content of faith in terms which harmonize fairly well with the church's confession of faith.

The above survey of the problem of the relation of the Christ of faith to the historical Jesus suggests that we are now beginning to pass through a reconstruction of our Christology which will bring it into harmony with some of the other reconstructions in theology which have been made. The analogy between the problem which we have been discussing and the problem of the nature of the Bible is suggestive. The older theologians attempted to find explicitly in the Bible the entire content of Christian faith, and indeed, to find it expressed in eternal form. But as critical examination of both the Bible and the nature of faith progressed, it became evident that as a matter of fact other factors besides the Bible inevitably enter into religious thinking and condition the results. When once this is recognized, it is possible to cease attempting to make the Bible teach everything which the modern theologian wishes to affirm. Men can let the Bible speak for itself, and utter its message honestly. The result has been that we are now in a position to ascertain truthfully exactly what the Bible contains, and to use it honestly. It cannot be said that the practice of forced exegesis has entirely disappeared; but we are more and more abandoning the method of the scribes. With the abandonment of this method comes the possibility of a more accurate

¹ *Die Bedeutung der Geschichlichkeit Jesu für den Glauben* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1911).

² *Ibid.*, pp. 15, 23.

understanding of the actual historical evolution of our religious faith. Thus we are seeing a rewriting of our theology and a revision of our methods of religious education.

The present trend in christological discussion is in the direction of a similar honesty of attitude with reference to Jesus. Just as there has been much forced exegesis of the Bible, so there has been much forced interpretation of the significance of Jesus. At present, it is generally true that only those types of theology which hold to the exclusive conception of revelation are retaining unchanged the traditional doctrine of Christ. As we have seen, it is characteristic of Protestantism generally to attempt to formulate the doctrine of Christ in such a way as to make room for both the demands of a distinctly modern religious consciousness and the possible fluctuations in opinion concerning historical facts. As over against the traditional position, this seems like a "reduced" Christology, to use Dr. Sanday's expressive term. And if we must continue to find in the *verifiable* traits of the historical Jesus *all* that faith needs to affirm faith will inevitably be made poorer by the more cautious and critical attitude of modern scholarship. If, however, just as we have done in the case of the Bible, we recognize the wider sources of our religious history and the broader scope of a providential historical development, we may still continue positively to affirm all that a vital religious faith requires without feeling compelled to validate the entire content by explicit reference to the person of Christ. If once this broader conception of the nature of Christianity shall come to prevail, we shall be in a position to find out honestly the real significance of Jesus for our faith and to construct a doctrinal statement in the person of Jesus compatible with historical accuracy. But to attempt to locate everything which modern faith affirms leads to serious confusion as soon as it is clearly seen that there is any considerable difference between the demands of living faith and the ascertainable facts concerning the historical Jesus.

NIETZSCHE'S SERVICE TO CHRISTIANITY

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At first thought the phrase sounds paradoxical and preposterous. Can any conceivable service have been rendered to Christianity by the apostle of individualism, by the author of *Antichrist*, by the man who inexorably and pitilessly subjected every moral proposition cherished by society to the most searching scrutiny and found reasons, ample and satisfactory to his own mind, for rejecting most of them? Before his own death Nietzsche had the somewhat uncommon privilege of seeing his doctrines received, rather, seized with avidity, by many, and of being able to foresee in some measure how influential they were destined to become. More than a decade has passed since he died, and his philosophy is still making headway. Some of his characteristic ideas have been welcomed by men of action on both sides of the Atlantic who find in them a sufficient excuse for themselves, if not an argument strong enough to convince society, for some of their relentless and unscrupulous methods of acquiring and using wealth and power. The gospel of superman has made affinity with capable and self-willed men. Nietzsche's teachings came at such a time as would warrant their remarkable acceptability and spread. Society had begun to weary of the platitudes of a morality which was wearing thin in spots, and was ready to receive any ideas or system that might give a new outlook upon life. In novelty and originality Nietzsche amply met the demand, and we are witnessing the strange spectacle of the popularity of the striking characteristics in the philosophy of a man who steadfastly despised the acclamations of the populace. Does this presage good for Christianity? Or must it be the pious duty of every believer in religion to renounce Friedrich Nietzsche and all his works?

When the momentous task is undertaken of adding to the calendar of the saints one who is deemed worthy of the honor, in opposition to those who have been chosen to emphasize the merits of the candidate, a man of large scholarship and critical mind is

appointed to the important office of devil's advocate. It is his duty, as his significant title suggests, to bring to light any flaws in the candidate's claim to sainthood and to throw all possible objections in the way of his canonization. If his efforts prove to be unavailing the candidate is eventually crowned as saint with the added luster that comes from the vindication of his merits against all assaults. Nietzsche may justly be regarded as a sort of devil's advocate in the case of Christianity. Its implacable and uncompromising foe, his very hostility serves the stimulating purpose of compelling Christianity to reveal what merits it possesses and to show such virtues as will stand the most searching and merciless criticism. And Nietzsche, like some of the philosophers who repudiated the Christian religion in the first centuries of its course, is a foeman worthy of Christianity's steel. He is not such a one as can lightly be dismissed on the ground that his reasoning is but the extravagances of a moral pervert, for it is the testimony of all who knew him that his life was singularly lofty and above reproach. That last and unworthy weapon of controversialists, the *argumentum ad hominem*, would be futile against Nietzsche. His arguments may fall, but he does not fall with them. And in all candor we cannot get away from the fact that when he flashes the searchlight of his critical mind upon some things which we have commonly held to be true simply because we have not gone to the trouble of investigating them, he sometimes exposes weaknesses which were entirely unsuspected. If he has done nothing else, Nietzsche has made men think, and that in itself is worth much. He forbids us to take things for granted. He has compelled us to weigh anew moral values which we thought were established for all time and to make the disconcerting discovery that through the wear of ages some of these values may have become fictitious. Aeroplanes rise best against the wind, and if Christianity has any motive power at all it rises today as of old to its loftiest heights on the headwind of criticism, hostility, and even persecution. The attitude toward it of a man of the intellectual caliber of Nietzsche cannot but be tonic in its effects. Organized Christianity may be suffering from a lack of soul-searching and stimulating criticism. When Nietzsche assails truths that were thought impregnable, brings into question

nearly every social and moral idea that has received the sanction of time, and casts doubt upon things which men have taken for granted, he is doing religion the wholesome service of shaking it, sometimes, it must be admitted, with unnecessary roughness, out of a slumber that may be as harmful as it is pleasant. Indeed, is he not thereby doing what the prophets of Israel did to arouse a comfortably complacent generation? They did it in their zeal for the Lord of Hosts; he has done it driven by his own remorseless convictions, but both accomplished practically the same end.

If Nietzsche was pitiless toward others in some of their ideas and manner of life he was yet more so to himself. He made Zoroaster exhort his disciples to spare neither him nor themselves. Believing a certain line of reasoning to be true and a certain course of conduct the one to travel, Nietzsche set himself resolutely to follow both to their logical conclusion regardless of the consequences to himself or to anyone else. His break with Christianity was a momentous and irrevocable step. He was not the kind of man to cast away the faith of his fathers and of his early years on a mere whim. His study of the classic civilizations convinced him by a line of reasoning, unacceptable perhaps to most minds but sufficient and cogent for him, that the Christian religion had proved a hindrance to real human progress and was therefore an enterprise to be repudiated and denounced. Upon premises, questionable, to say the least, to many, but nevertheless presenting some show of plausibility, Nietzsche built up from history two standards of human conduct, calling the one the "master-morality" of the free and independent men who have at all times constituted the small minority in society, and the other the "slave-morality" developed by the great bulk of humanity who are deficient and feeble in body and mind and whom he regards as the legitimate instruments and even, should the necessity arise, victims of their rightful masters. To men of the class of masters pity and its kindred emotions, far from being virtues, are vices to be resolutely suppressed. To what purpose are these debilitating feelings? Nietzsche asks. They serve no higher end than on the one hand of prolonging the sufferings of the underlings whose existence at best is a poor and inadequate affair and who were better exterminated as summarily as

possible, especially if it becomes evident that they can render no more service to their superiors, and on the other hand of prejudicing the judgment and impairing the will of those who yield to them.

In the Christian religion Nietzsche sees the slave-morality run riot.

In the sentiments of pity, humility, patience, brotherhood, reverence, and their like he finds the marks of slaves who have emphasized these qualities as having been most serviceable to them in their struggle for existence. And it is the survival of these qualities and the insistence upon them that are responsible, he maintains, for the sure decadence that he detects in society today, a decadence which reveals itself in the spread of democracy, which he abhors, and in the prevalence of philistinism in the arts, which offends his soul. Christianity is largely to blame for all this, and he will have none of it. To Nietzsche the Sermon on the Mount is anathema.

What possible service can this sort of thing render to Christianity? it may naturally be asked. Of direct service of course there is none. But indirectly the benefit may be great. This consists not alone in the fact that such conclusions as Nietzsche reaches furnish a startling background against which the accepted worth of the Christian religion shines with intensified light. If merely a contrasting background were sought Christianity could find many such without having recourse to Nietzsche's philosophy. But in the fearless logic with which Nietzsche drives his reasoning to the bitter end we find the intrepid spirit of an intellectual hero who incites us to follow the same method unhesitatingly and boldly in the teachings and practice of the Christian religion. Christianity has seldom been thought out or lived out to its logical conclusion. In each age a few select spirits have attempted this and have partially succeeded—and have usually received for their pains the silent disregard or the open hostility of their fellows. One alone thought religion out and lived it out to its logical conclusion, and he died on a cross. May it not be that many of the ills from which society suffers and for which Nietzsche held Christianity in part at least responsible are due less to the fact that Christian principles and morals exist at all than to the fact that they have not been lived enough? The Christianity which Nietzsche attacks is an incomplete, hesitating, illogical movement, most of whose followers

with pity comes
on social
reaction—
reaction is it
not inherent

are afraid to see it through to the finish. We fear the latent possibilities of the faith that we confess, and accordingly we are diligent to refrain from being unduly and perhaps painfully consistent. A thoroughgoing, logical, and fearless living of the religion of Christ on the part of many would be highly illuminating as a social experiment if nothing else.

It is perhaps as the creator of superman that Nietzsche is best known. He draws the picture of a future social condition in which a few strong men, having lived down what he regards as the perverted morality of today, shall be the guiding influence of the rest of mankind. Their value to society will have become recognized, and accordingly they will be given places of power and direction. False notions of altruism and of responsibility to their inferiors will have no place in their thoughts. While incidentally and even inevitably conferring benefit upon society by their dominion which will be wise and strong, they themselves will be the sufficient justification of their ascendancy. Untroubled by the religious phantasies and the moral scruples of their inferiors, they will become themselves the creators of new moral values. Contrary to the idea of those who have failed to apprehend Nietzsche's conception of superman, these superior beings will be neither gross and self-indulgent beasts nor refined devils. The superman will be hard and remorseless toward his inferiors, but he will be equally hard and remorseless toward himself. He will find the joy of life in struggle against hardships and in the glad sense of dominion. Freed from all incumbrance of conscience and debilitating sense of sin he will welcome all that life has to offer and go unhesitatingly toward the universal goal of annihilation with a blithe and unregretting spirit. In this particular Nietzsche differs essentially from Schopenhauer, whose disciple he was at first. Schopenhauer preaches the doctrine of passive resignation to the inevitable sorry scheme of things. While Nietzsche's superman will entertain no illusions about indeterminism or free-will or immortality, he will rejoice in his strength, seize with avidity the present moment, and fall fighting to the last.

Nietzsche himself exemplified as long as he could the gospel of superman that he preached. His life until near the end was a

gallant fight against physical hardship. A sufferer for many years from severe ailments, he brought his indomitable will to bear upon his condition and for a time actually willed himself into a measure of health. Without God and without hope beyond the life which now is, he evolved and lived a strange optimism that cannot but compel our admiration. And, more eloquently than his *Joyful Wisdom*, his *Thus Spake Zoroaster*, and his *Will to Power*, he proclaimed in his own character the power and worth of human personality. For this we must thank him. In this we find an antidote to the present-day tendency to sink the individual in the multitude, to subordinate men to institutions, and to give undue value to mediocrity. And in this too we find a gospel which has much in common with the spirit of Christianity. For while Christianity insists upon an altruism which Nietzsche altogether repudiated, it also proclaims in no uncertain terms the inestimable worth of the individual man and sees for him vast and glorious possibilities. Christ's message was unquestionably social, but he sought the regeneration of society through the regeneration of the individual. His distinctive teachings were to individuals and not to masses of men, and to individuals he committed the fortunes of the cause to which he devoted his life. Moreover in Nietzsche's idea of superman we can see a principle which is not so foreign to Christian thought as at first it might seem to be. Nothing of course could be more unlike and contradictory than on the one hand the dominion of superman founded upon the most inexorable egoism and on the other the kingdom of heaven whose law is love. But in both we see an expectation of better things and a motive for hopeful effort. Christianity believes the best is yet to be, and Nietzsche, traveling by a strange and altogether different road, reaches a similar destination and unconsciously confirms the age-long earnest expectation of humanity which has found its satisfying and perfect fulfilment in the word of Christ.

We are to thank Nietzsche for his stern insistence upon what he regards as reality. He discovers in the conventions and sentiments prevalent in society much that is superficial and false. He thinks he finds the modern world in hopeless idolatry to the fetish of

democracy and its underlying doctrine of the essential equality of men. In his opinion the watchword of eighteenth-century revolutionism has been reiterated too long. He regards democracy as an evil dream and an enterprise that must eventually and justly fail because he believes in the essential inequality of men. To Nietzsche the first proposition of our Declaration of Independence would be an absurdity. Though living as we do in a social atmosphere impregnated with democratic ideas, sentiments, and even sentimentalities, we cannot help feeling the force of Nietzsche's judgment. Are men equal? Are our political and social institutions, built upon that assumption, really working out well? And how much are the praises of democracy the result of unthinking prejudice? Hypocrisy and even self-delusion can prevail in politics as easily as in religion. Self-delusion Nietzsche held to be the unpardonable sin, and for hypocrisy, save as an instrument in the hands of his superman that he might use in the working out of his designs, he entertained a most cordial detestation. His teaching had for its supreme purpose the tearing away of the veils which hide realities. He sought to steel men's souls against the fear which made them shrink from gazing upon actualities, be they never so repulsive. He frankly admits that many can never dominate this fear and that to them reality is an appalling and petrifying Medusa's head. But as for him he keeps right on in his self-appointed task of destroying what he holds to be illusions, uncaring what the effect will be upon the many, in fact rejoicing in their abject confusion, and addressing himself to the few minds with strength enough to bear his doctrine. It is a far cry from Nietzsche to Christ, yet in the German philosopher's bold love for reality and scorn for self-delusion and hypocrisy we cannot but see something that reminds us of the attitude of Him who had no possible common ground with the Pharisees and who uttered the denunciations of the twenty-third chapter of Matthew. In his notion of what reality is Nietzsche may have been, indeed in some cases doubtless was, himself the victim of self-delusion, but in his faithful and steadfast purpose to discover it at whatever cost we catch here and there at least a gleam from the surpassing glory of Him who came to bear supreme witness to the truth.

1. Nietzsche's view of reality

Some years before Nietzsche's death his bodily infirmities increased and were accompanied by insanity. The apostle of superman succumbed to the weakness of human flesh, and from his darkened mind was dissipated the consciousness of the will to power. The intrepid philosopher of ruthless independence became helpless and wholly dependent upon the compassion and care of others. And Friedrich Nietzsche, who had despised pity and compassion as infirmities to be suppressed, by an irony of fate lived to see the day when he himself became the object of these peculiarly Christian virtues.

"Galilean, thou hast conquered!"

THE NEW CHRISTIANITY AND WORLD-CONVERSION

—*Concluded*

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But there are signs of the coming of a new day for foreign missions, when a wiser, because more generous and less timid, policy will prevail. One of the gratifying things about recent reports from the mission field is the frank and cordial expression on the part of many missionaries of their appreciation of the value of the higher criticism as an aid to evangelization. Against many of the attacks of non-Christians it is found to afford a complete defense.¹ And as we read in one of the reports: "The activity and unrest of theological thought in the West is already powerfully affecting many minds in other lands, and probably not many years will have passed before the free spirit of oriental Christians will find expression in views of truth and adaptations of Christian doctrine which may perhaps startle, and even for a time pain, their teachers." Such things necessarily belong to a time of transition; moreover, they are always the nobler spirits who choose the privations of the wilderness-journey for the sake of freedom and a place they can call their own, rather than to be fed to the full in the house of their bondage. And then, as Professor Cairns reminds us, it is out of new emergencies that new faith is always born.²

If it be asked whether it is a new faith—a new kind of faith, that is—a new religion, or simply a "new theology of the old faith," that is called for in the present situation, the answer is that that remains to be seen. It is a serious question to what extent we can have the "old-time religion" without the old-time theology. Religion is not in the first instance the product of theology, to be sure; rather is theology the product of religion. But it is no mere by-product; it is produced for a purpose, viz., to guide religious adjustment for the sake of controlling religious experience. Consequently some of the more radical changes in theology have a very practical

¹ *Report of the World Missionary Conference, 1910*, II, 262-63; IV, 200-204.

² *Ibid.*, IV, 215.

significance, for better or for worse, in relation to religious experience. If our new theology has resulted from such an elimination of the old and addition of the new that a difference is made in the objects and manner and results of our prayer, then in some real sense we have changed our religion. In turning now from the critical to the constructive part of our discussion we must deal with such changes as appear most imperative in theology, leaving it to be determined, as we proceed, to what extent these carry with them a change in religion.

It has been intimated that before the missionary message can be expected to win the modern critical, scientific, reality-loving world, it must be rid of the reproach of the old supernaturalism, the old evangelicalism, and the old orthodoxy. But mere negation is not enough. This has been the great reason for the non-evangelistic character of most religious liberalism hitherto, and of its failure to convert and inspire the world: its message has been predominantly negative. The old Christianity was positive and vital; we must conserve for our new age, if we can, the vital essence of Christian supernaturalism, of Christian evangelicalism, and of Christian orthodoxy.

First, then, let us inquire whether the religion for the world—which must be rational, not unscientific—can find room for *a new Christian supernaturalism*. “Miracle is the dearest child of faith”—and why? Not because of any difficulty it may make for scientific understanding, but because it is an event within human experience which can be interpreted as in a special sense the direct and immediate product of the divine purposive activity, and thus a sign of the divine presence. This is the essential definition of miracle, rather than that which makes it consist in a breach of cosmic law and order. Miracle is special providence, revelation. It is thus essential to vital religion. Unless there are events within our knowledge to which we can point as the purposive acts of God, and unless such events may possibly take place within our own experience, it does not matter much what kind of religion we have: it is as if there were no God.

This is not meant as a defense of the view that arbitrary or magical changes in the order of natural events, such as would defeat

man's purpose to understand the world he lives in, have taken place, or ever will take place. It is not meant that we are asked to admit as authentic history anything, even in the life of Jesus, which is not intelligible and probable in the light of practically unquestioned human experience. We deem it probable that he was a more than ordinarily successful faith-healer, but it is not even works of this sort that have the greatest revelation-value, or are most clearly miraculous, supernatural, according to the new Christian supernaturalism. The great miracle of the Christian religion is what God accomplished in the spiritual life of Jesus, and what he accomplishes in the lives of the disciples of Jesus. Regeneration, sanctification, enduement with power through the Spirit of God—these are the true and constant miracles of our religion.

It may be said that the history of religion is the record of a prolonged series of religious experiments, made with a view to learning what kind of miracles actually do take place, or, in other words, what sort of prayer is uniformly—and therefore *really*—answered. That will be the final religion which is able to arrive at a universally valid induction on this point. We believe that in the essentially Christian attitude of persistent religious dependence for moral renewal there is the true prayer which is always answered, so that in essential Christianity, with its experience of this spiritual miracle, we have reached finality—not the end of development, but eternal validity—in religion.

But can this supernaturalism be maintained philosophically? We believe it can. As Driesch and other neo-vitalists are enabling us to see more clearly than before, the phenomena of even physical life are not to be explained, without remainder, in terms of chemical and mechanical law; the biological or physiological organizes mechanism into its service, indeed, but it is essentially teleological, supermechanical. In consciousness we see this *elan vital*—to use Bergson's term—this creative life-power, in still higher form, organizing not only inorganic but also organic processes into the service of its ends; this psychical reality we may speak of as superphysical or even superphysiological. But in the life of the human spirit, with its power of creating ideals and creatively striving for their realization, subduing not only the mechanical

but the life of subconscious impulse and mere desire to the requirements of the ideal, we have a still higher form of creative activity; if we consent to equate nature with the universe in so far as it is of a lower order of creative activity, qualitatively, than this which is distinctively human, we may call this last supernatural. In the spiritual life, as Eucken virtually maintains, we have the presence and creative activity of the supernatural. Indeed, this term may be applied, in a sense, to all free human activity. The spiritual life of man is not reducible, without remainder, even to psychological law; habitual psychoses—which the laws of psychology describe—are freely readjusted by a creative principle, adequately to deal with which we need the point of view which Eucken calls noölogical, that of the free activity of spirit, as distinguished from the psychological, which deals with the pre-determined. But, once more, when man, through a spiritual adjustment to a superhuman Spiritual Power or Being, experiences a new increment of power in his spiritual life, a moral uplift which is to be referred, inductively, to his religious relationship and that religious Object for its adequate explanation, this is the highest type of creative activity that we know. It is not only supernatural, as, in some sense, the spiritual always is; it is also superhuman, miraculous, the immediate creative activity of God. This is the miracle of which we need not remain in doubt, for we may experience it within our own lives.

This view has some points of agreement with the position taken by Bushnell in his *Nature and the Supernatural*, but it is not identical with his view. He maintained, indeed, that all free human action is supernatural; but the point toward which his argument is directed is a defense of the possibility of such marvelous events as are related in the Gospels. "We require," he says, "to be certified that the miracles reported are facts. This done, Christianity, as a supernatural revelation of God, is established."² His view of the supernatural activity of God is accordingly that it is similar to, and co-ordinate with, the supernatural activity of man. But there are several difficulties which must be encountered by any such theory. In the first place, there would be this difference between

² *Nature and the Supernatural* (ed. 1886), p. 333.

this supposed supernatural activity of God and the supernatural activity of man, in so far as they are thought of as co-ordinating mechanical processes in new ways, that while the human action on the mechanical is mediated through the biological, the supposed divine action would apparently be entirely unmediated. Again, while we are constantly witnessing the supernatural activity of man, this *co-ordinate* supernatural activity of God does not come within our observation. Whatever may be said of God's action in the life of man, we see no unmediated action of God in the world of nature below man. True, if certain of the events recorded in the Gospels are accepted as authentic history, they might conceivably be interpreted as supernatural acts of God, but whether those recorded events actually took place is the exact matter of dispute. A theory which finds its only basis in that which is to be based upon the theory itself is neither well founded nor a good foundation.

Our view, as distinct from Bushnell's, is that the supernatural activity of God is not co-ordinate with man's but superordinate. The supernatural activity of God is in and through the supernatural activity of man, which again is through the psychical or superphysical. This, again, in so far as it is directed toward the co-ordination of mechanical processes, is always through the biological or supermechanical. There is then a hierarchy of realities, each characterized by creative activity, but related to the others as follows: the mechanical subordinated to the biological, or physiological, the physiological to the psychological, the psychological to the noölogical (the human supernatural), and the noölogical to the theological, or God (the superhuman supernatural). On this view the only miracles that we know anything about are the works of God within the life of the human spirit.

Does this new supernaturalism mean a new religion? To a certain extent it does. It means that there will be eliminated from religious experience the distress that comes from the failure of efforts after the unattainable. Special providences and direct answers to prayer will not be looked for outside the realm of the human spirit. Such scattered instances as might seem to be such will be interpreted as coincidences. In some sense, then, the new supernaturalism will mean a new religion. But, on the other hand,

it is the Christlike quality of life that will be sought through a Christlike attitude toward a Christlike God. The religion will therefore be essentially Christian. But a religion which is at once both new and Christian must be properly designated as a new Christianity. The supernaturalism which we have just described is therefore rightly designated as the new Christian supernaturalism.

Our next inquiry must be as to whether a thoroughly rational—and so possibly universal—religion can find room for a *new Christian evangelicalism*. The Christian gospel has always been a message of salvation from sin and its consequences, through faith in God as he is revealed in Jesus Christ. Our problem is whether, within the limits of scientific (rational and empirical) religion, there is room for this Christian gospel in vitality and power. Since we are especially concerned with salvation from sin and its consequences, it will be well to begin by indicating the general relation of morality to the other universal human interests.

The universal human interests are perhaps seven: the hygienic, the economic, the social, the scientific, the aesthetic, the moral, and the religious.¹ A spiritual life is one in which the spiritual interests are properly co-ordinated with each other as ultimate ends, the others being regarded as means rather than as ends. The spiritual interests are the scientific, the aesthetic, the moral, the religious, and the social, in so far as one's fellows are viewed as ends rather than as means. Ultimately the hygienic and economic are to be viewed as means to the realization of the spiritual interests as represented by the ideals of universal human well-being and brotherhood (social), knowledge of the truth (scientific), contemplation of the beautiful (aesthetic), perfection of character and conduct (moral), and fellowship with God (religious). Now the spiritual interests, while co-ordinate in the sense that they are all legitimate elements of the ultimate end, are also related to each other in other ways. The scientific, for example, is not only an end, but a necessary means to the realization of all the other interests. The aesthetic not only has a content co-ordinate with the

¹ For this classification I am indebted to Professors A. W. Small and C. R. Henderson. Professor Henderson's list differs from that of Professor Small in making the moral and the religious distinct interests.

others, but, in so far as any activity comes to be an end rather than a means to other ends, it passes over into the aesthetic; work, when interesting for its own sake, becomes art, and its product an object of aesthetic contemplation. Morality as rightness of character is an ultimate end; as rightness of conduct it is means to the realization of all universal human interests in their proper relation to each other. Thus sin, defect of morality, especially in conduct, has evil external consequences in relation to the other human interests, as well as evil internal consequences in character. Finally, we would maintain, the religious is not only an end in itself; it is a means to morality, and through morality to all universal human interests.

If we mean by salvation what God does for human welfare, especially through man's religious life, it may be said that salvation is primarily moral (as well as religious), and—through this moral salvation—also social, intellectual, aesthetic, and even hygienic and economic. Thus we see in their true perspective the measure of validity in the religion of health, the religion of economic success,¹ the religion of humanity, the religion of science, and the religion of art. True, i.e., verifiable, religion, we would maintain as an induction based upon observation of the religious experience of man, is primarily the religion of morality. It becomes, of course, religion for its own sake, but it is from the beginning religion for the sake of morality primarily. Secondarily it may be for the sake of health, or wealth, or friendship, or knowledge, or art. But the way in which religion promotes these interests—at least, ordinarily—is indirectly, through promoting morality. True religion is thus primarily moral salvation through religious dependence. This salvation may be either prevention of sin or its cure. When it is cure, it may be called moral redemption.

We are now in a position to state what is essential in Christianity. The primary thing—logically speaking—is Christian morality, Christlikeness of character and conduct, spirituality, and unselfish brotherly love. Following the moral example of Jesus will lead to the unification of humanity, the reconciliation, at-one-ment, of man with man, and that upon the highest level of spiritual interest. But this following of the moral example of Jesus is not,

¹ See T. N. Carver, *The Religion Worth Having*.

as the Socinians thought, the essence of the Christian gospel. It is not gospel at all, but law—the new law of love. The at-one-ment of man with man is not—as some modern theologians and philosophers,¹ under the influence of immanent idealism, have maintained—itsself the *religious* experience of salvation, redemption, atonement. It is one of its consequences, rather.

The Christian *law*, then, is concerned with following the *moral* example of Jesus—not a slavish external imitation, but action according to his fundamental principle, ideal, and spirit. The Christian *gospel*, however, is the good news as to how this may be most successfully accomplished. It is concerned with the *religious* example of Christ. It is the good news that every human being may, if he will, follow the religious example of Christ, be related to God as Christ was, which is both an ultimate end in itself, and at the same time the most effective means toward following Christ's moral example. Through his religious life, his union with God, Christ was saved from sin—by way of prevention. Through a Christlike union with God we may be saved from sin—by way of cure and prevention both. The definite establishment of this union of man with God is the unification, the at-one-ment, of man with God. It is not complete salvation; it is but the beginning of salvation, but it has in it the promise and potency of conformity to the image of the Son of God.

If the question be raised how men who are sinful can follow the religious example of Christ, how those estranged from God through their own sin can begin to have fellowship with God, the answer will involve both reference to what was said in connection with the new supernaturalism, and a partial anticipation of what is to be dealt with in our consideration of the new orthodoxy. Through the Christlike religious adjustment the creative activity of God in the spiritual life of man is made most readily possible. This will mean, then, that the characteristic moral activity of Christ was the direct outcome of the creative operation of God. The distinctive thing about Christ, then, is the divine life and activity in him, and this

¹ E. g., R. J. Campbell in *The New Theology*, and J. Royce in *The Problem of Christianity*, and also in an article entitled "The Christian Doctrine of Life" (*Hibbert Journal*, April, 1913).

means that if we would know the character of God, we may learn it by remembering the character Christ was enabled to have through the presence of God in his life. God, then, must be like Christ—spiritual, holy, indeed, but full of love and compassion for sinful humanity, not willing that any should perish, but willing that all should come to repentance. Indeed, on this view even the burden which lay upon the heart of Jesus because of the sin of the world of human beings whom he loved and whom he sought to save, by bringing them into fellowship with God, is but representative of the burden that lies upon the heart of God, because he loves the sinner while he hates his sin. Obviously, then, man's sin can never be a valid reason for staying away from God. The sinner is to come, just as he is, to the gracious God who came so fully into the life of Jesus Christ in saving power; and, coming in repentance and trust, he will be reconciled, united in the fellowship of love, *at one* with God. Then he is in a position to enter into his birthright; he too is a "son of God"; he too will be progressively saved from sinning in so far as he lives up to his privilege and follows the religious example of Jesus. He will be progressively saved too—not in a magical way, but in a way that is rationally intelligible—from the consequences of sin. He is saved from what would have been the evil consequences of the sins which he might have committed, but from committing which he was kept by the indwelling power of God. He is also increasingly saved from the consequences of sin committed in the past, by a process of counteracting those evil consequences through the moral activity made possible through following the religious example of Christ.

This view of the gospel has the great merit of being at the same time rational, moral, and vital. It is rational in the best sense of that word; it is empirically rational, scientifically verifiable. It is vital in that, like the gospel in its old form, it appeals to hope, while it presupposes fear. There is this difference, however, that the hope and the fear are both more rational, because they are moral. The fear is the fear, primarily, of moral deterioration through actual sin, and also of the loss of values, individual and social, that will be bound up with this moral deterioration. The

hope is the hope of moral salvation through coming in repentance and dependence to the God of Jesus Christ, and taking up for life the Christlike religious attitude.

This view is thoroughly moral, as is shown by the way in which it finally solves the old problem of the satisfaction of the righteousness of God. The chief criticism directed against the prevailing modern theory of the atonement—which has been variously styled the ethical, moral, or moral-influence theory—has been the charge that it fails to deal satisfactorily with this problem. It is felt that, while true repentance is indeed the indispensable condition and preparation for being forgiven, reconciled to God, still God's righteousness is not satisfied with repentance alone, for the reason that evil moral and other consequences of the sin repented of are still in existence. Some theologians vainly endeavor to impart a semblance of rationality to the forever outgrown notion of vicarious punishment; others frame ingenious new theories of their own, but in most cases with no better success. Two lines of thought, however, in attempted supplementation of the Bushnellian moral theory, deserve special mention. The one theory places the responsibility for satisfying the righteousness of God upon God himself;¹ the other places it upon man.² According to the former theory God is justified in forgiving the repentant sinner only because he (God) takes upon himself the task of completely eradicating all evil consequences of all human sin, and foresees that it will be done. (According to Dinsmore's theory, God eternally sees it as already accomplished.) According to the other view, however, God is justified in forgiving the repentant sinner only because man, in his repentance, virtually takes upon himself the task of co-operating with God as fully as possible for the total eradication of sin and all its evil consequences. In both positions it is maintained that God's righteousness can be satisfied only with the eradication of the sin and all its evil consequences. But each of these theories has its own peculiar weakness. The former view tends to be religious without being moral; the latter, to be moral without being

¹ C. A. Dinsmore, *Atonement in Literature and Life*.

² G. B. Smith, *The Atonement* (Burton, Smith, and Smith); cf. also E. W. Lyman, *Theology and Human Problems*, chap. iv.

religious. The former encourages gratitude to God for the destruction of sin and evil, but tends to weaken the sense of human responsibility—especially when one tries to view the matter *sub specie aeternitatis*. The latter view encourages a sense of responsibility on the part of the forgiven sinner, but it does not explicitly point him to God as the only one whose power we can be sure is adequate to cope with sin. The one tends to dependence upon God without self-dependence; the other, to self-dependence without dependence upon God. In the view which we have tried to set forth here, however, these defects are overcome. Salvation is primarily moral deliverance through religious dependence; although ultimately it will include the realization of all that is dependent upon that moral deliverance. It is moral unification and union of man with God, eventuating in the moral unification and union of man with man. Thus from the beginning the religious dependence is moral in its purpose, and the moral task is undertaken in religious dependence. And so we see that when evangelicalism is made thoroughly rational, it necessarily becomes thoroughly moral and therefore remains thoroughly vital—or, rather, attains to a vitality which no future advance in culture can ever destroy.

It is not the least of the merits of this interpretation of the gospel that, if adopted by the Christian missionary, it would completely remove the foundation for all objections made on rational and moral grounds by non-Christian peoples, and especially by the Hindus, against the Christian message of salvation. The message of the cross no longer need be “to the Greeks”—or to the Hindus, either—“foolishness.” Indeed, even the objection to the common Christian over-emphasis of a particular fact of history, staking not only the verifiability but the truth and value of Christian faith upon an event only very indirectly accessible to the man of today, would be removed, and that without losing the value contained in that supremely significant historic fact. If the historicity of Jesus ever should be disproved, or rendered seriously doubtful, the Christian gospel of salvation would still be verifiable in human experience, and a Christlike life could still be fostered by a Christlike dependence upon a Christlike God. But, being practically certain of the *essential* historicity of Jesus, we have all the advantages that

come from reference to this fullest of all revelations of the divine in human life.

Does this mean a "new gospel," a new religion? This question must be answered by comparing the religious experience which it mediates with that which was characteristic of the older evangelicalism. Certain differences do appear. Salvation being no longer interpreted as primarily eschatological in its significance, or magical in its mediation, the preaching of the gospel will no longer be in danger of encouraging the thought that one may sin, that grace may abound. The element of experience, due to the reaction that follows being delivered from a somewhat irrational fear without the irrationality of the fear being discovered, will also be eliminated. There will also be the tendency to experience a broader salvation, inasmuch as morality is here interpreted as organically related to everything that has to do with the true welfare of man. And yet, all this does but leave one less trammelled by mistaken ideas than before to enter into that moral religious experience which always has been the most vital essence of Christian evangelicalism. Again, therefore, we are led to the judgment that, while with this gospel our religion will be in some respects new, it will still be in its essence most undoubtedly Christian. What it offers is a new Christian evangelicalism.

We have still to raise the question whether, within the limits of a scientifically rational religion, we can have a doctrine of God that will embody and preserve, and mediate to the world, the essential values of Christian faith and experience. Can we have a religiously sufficient and universally accessible doctrine of God—perchance *a new Christian orthodoxy*? Our doctrine of God must meet the essential demands of moral religion, and must embody the fundamental assurance of mystical religion. It must avoid the one-sidedness of Judaism, Mohammedanism, and historic Unitarianism on the one hand, and that of Greek mystical religion, Hinduism, and modern mysticism, with its tendency to an impersonal Absolutism, on the other.

In its doctrine of the person of Christ it must and may maintain that, essential historicity being taken for granted as sufficiently certain, it was the life and activity of God that were present and mani-

festated in him. Especially through his religious life, which was the appropriating of the power of the spirit of God, the divine spiritual life was manifested in him in such a unique degree that, of all the sons of God in whose spiritual lives God creatively works, Jesus Christ stands forth as the peerless one, *the* Son of God, having the unique function of being the truest norm for human morality and religion, and the supreme revelation of God in the life of an individual man. The most essential doctrine of Christian theology—of the new Christian orthodoxy, if you will—is that of the special presence and creative activity of God, not only, as we believe, in the man Christ Jesus, but also in the Christlike everywhere.

In undertaking to suggest a modern substitute for the Trinitarian formula, it may be noted that Christian mysticism, generally speaking, has long since learned that it must be moral; hence the tendency to hold to the merely superpersonal divine Substance of the negative theology has practically disappeared. In place of it there is the impersonal physical universe, with the various grades of supermechanical creative activity to which we referred in our brief exposition of the new supernaturalism. Modern theism, constructed under the influence of this empirically grounded creative evolutionism, or activism, will tend to regard God's relation to the universe somewhat after the analogy of the relation of the human spirit to the human body. When moral religion becomes so vital and experiential that it verges upon the mystical, and when mystical religion becomes sane and practical and thereby necessarily moral, both coincide in the affirmation of the essential personality and spirituality of God. In the one case this is a postulate taken as a working hypothesis and verified; in the other case, an intuition critically tested in the light of practical life. As transcendent, this personal life of the cosmos is God the Father; as immanent in the spiritual life of man, God the Holy Spirit. Normally, that is, in the realization of true ideals, human beings are organs through which the activities of God the Holy Spirit are carried out in the world. Thus God is not only *in* three persons; he is in millions of persons, and yet he is but one Person. The Father is God; the Holy Spirit is God; the Father is the Holy Spirit, and the Holy Spirit is the Father. The Son of God was and is the human Jesus. The Son

is not the Father; the Son is not the Holy Spirit; the Son is not God; but God, the Father, the Holy Spirit, was in the Son, and is in his "many brethren." But in unique measure God, the Father, the Holy Spirit, was in *him*, reconciling the world unto himself. Our complete Christian view of God, then, is that he is God the Father, present as the Holy Spirit in the spiritual lives of men, and so fully present in the historic Jesus that he becomes for us *the* divine man, holding the unique position of being *the* historic Revealer of God and Savior of men.

This is neither historic Trinitarianism nor historic Unitarianism, but it contains, in our opinion, the essentials of each of those largely obsolete doctrinal systems. It combines the religious values of Trinitarianism—those of moral and mystical religion—with the rationality insisted upon by Unitarianism. If, as it seems to be, it is the view of God involved in what we have called the new Christian supernaturalism and the new Christian evangelicalism, it is new only as they are new; it is as Christian as they are. It presents, in bare outline, what we may take to be the new Christian orthodoxy.

It was claimed for the older orthodoxy once upon a time that it was the universal traditional Christian doctrine—*quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus creditum est*, as Vincent of Lerins phrased it. But that there was any considerable body of doctrine which had been steadfastly believed by all Christians everywhere from the beginning was itself a belief whose certainty was likely to vary inversely with the extent to which the facts had been investigated; it was best maintained as a dogma. The new Christian orthodoxy will be of a different spirit. Its face will be toward the future, rather than toward the past. Its method will be empirical investigation, rather than *ex cathedra* utterance. It will undertake to set forth what ought to be believed by all Christians everywhere, and what will be believed by persons of vital Christian experience so soon as their theology has become genuinely scientific. In the end the only doctrine that is really catholic, that can command universal belief, is science; and the question of a catholic religious doctrine for the future is the question of the possibility of a scientific theology. But if what we have called the new Christian super-

naturalism and the new Christian evangelicalism are fundamentally valid, the primary conditions for the formulation of such a theology are fulfilled. There is a type of religious experience through which the divine activity in human life can be made the object of a genuinely scientific observation. What God is can be known—within limits, of course—by what he can be depended upon to do in human life, when that life is in proper religious adjustment. As we have seen, there is a moral result of a certain sort for which man can depend upon God, and he can learn how he must adjust himself to the religious Object, God, in order to obtain that result. It needs, then, only that one should have, and that he should scientifically use, the power of religious perception—of being aware of the divine when it is actively present—for the construction of a scientific inductive theology to be entirely feasible.

Our contention, then, is that with the new Christian supernaturalism, the new Christian evangelicalism, and the new Christian orthodoxy, continuously developed along empirically scientific lines, we have what may be called, if one pleases, *a new Christianity*. By this is not meant anything unduly radical, but simply Christianity universalized for the twentieth century. We would not advocate any mere haphazard syncretism of the religions of the world, guided only by the principle of mutual compromise. There must be competition, the struggle for existence and survival of the fittest, among religions as among other human institutions, and only a religion whose theology can become scientific is fitted to survive. Our belief is that such a religion will turn out to be essentially Christian.

We do not mean, however, that the conversion of the world, even to such a religion, is inevitable. What we wish to say is that the time is coming when the world will have a religion with a scientific theology, a religion containing in rational, scientific form, a new Christian supernaturalism, a new Christian evangelicalism, and a new Christian orthodoxy, if it has any religion at all. The world's religion will be the new Christianity, or none. The new Christianity has a good fighting chance of converting and ultimately Christianizing the world. The old Christianity, unless the race should lapse to a prescientific level, has not even a fighting chance.

The new Christianity calls for a *new Christian evangelism*. It must be broader in its outlook than the old evangelism, realizing that religion is essentially akin to other spiritual values, in that what God does in response to religious adjustment is ultimately identical with what is accomplished when any truly spiritual ideals are realized. But while broader than the old evangelism, the new cannot afford to be any less devoted. And, as needs above all to be emphasized today, the new evangelism must be characterized by great frankness in discussion. One source of weakness in the modern pulpit is that many preachers feel that, for prudential reasons, they must keep back part of the truth. Their sermons lack the enthusiasm and abandon of the old-time evangelism. We must be pedagogical, it is true; but we must not be pusillanimous. "The meanest of misers is he who hoards the truth." There was one who came not to send peace on the earth, but the sword. "And when they beheld the boldness of Peter and John, they took knowledge of them that they had been with Jesus." Indeed, the well-equipped minister or missionary of today has a special advantage over those who sought to evangelize an earlier generation, with its greater subserviency to tradition. There are fewer today than formerly who are averse to an impersonal discussion of fundamental religious problems; but inasmuch as these questions cannot be scientifically treated without reference to religious experience, theological discussion will readily lend itself to the purposes of evangelism. In the most natural way it leads up to an emphasis upon the necessity, even for purposes of knowledge, of a deepening of the spiritual life through the cultivation of personal religion.

Men must be recruited and trained for the new Christian evangelism. Special effort must be made to get able, scientifically minded young men into the ministry and into missionary service. They must be trained to be independent workers in the construction of a scientific, empirical theology. It is a lamentable fact that almost all that is taught in our theological seminaries today, whether conservative or liberal, is a combination of science that is no longer strictly theological, with theology that is not yet completely scientific. Conferences of theological students and professors are held from time to time throughout the land to

discuss everything that pertains to the evangelization of the world—everything, that is, except theology. But, unless we are wholly mistaken, the Student Volunteer Movement and the Laymen's Missionary Movement will make comparatively little impression upon the non-Christian world, unless they are accompanied by a third movement which shall have for its aim the preparation of missionaries to work in a thoroughly scientific manner for the conversion of the world to the new Christianity.

It remains to note briefly the relation of this evangelism of the new Christianity to the growing movement for Christian union. The main forces underlying this union movement are perhaps three. There is the prudential, largely economic motive, which would tend to the amalgamation of ecclesiastical organizations for the sake of reducing expenses. With most, let us hope, this financial consideration is purely secondary. At any rate it is a factor which may be ignored in the present connection; it has nothing in common with the forces making for the new Christianity. A second motive at work in the union movement is mainly sentimental. There are many who long for the prestige of numbers, and who, from an interest in historic continuity, would be prepared to sacrifice much for the sake of the reunion of all Christendom by a return to the doctrine and polity of the ancient Catholic church. Such propagandists for union are, at least from the point of view of the new Christianity, the false prophets of the movement. The path of progress does not lie in the direction of the old Catholicism. The churches commonly called Catholic must experience an intellectual emancipation before affiliation with them can be anything but a hindrance to the development of that new Christianity to which alone the world can be converted. Protestantism must not barter away at any price her hard-won Christian freedom.

But there is a third factor underlying the union movement which is of one spirit with all that underlies the new Christian evangelism. This is the growing feeling that, in view of the supreme task of the evangelization, conversion, and Christianization of the world, the points upon which the churches are divided are of but slight importance today, except where the vital religious experience of the members is directly concerned. For the sake of

the transfer of emphasis from things trivial to matters of supreme moment, the new evangelism is interested in Christian union. But union must not be consummated, it would insist, at the expense of spiritual freedom. Its hope can only be that the united church of the future will be left freely to develop into an embodiment of the new Christianity and the chosen instrument of world-conversion. For the sake of freedom to be true to her own deeper insight, Christianity was obliged to cut loose from Judaism. For the same reason Protestantism was compelled to come out and be separate from the Roman church. There are few projects before the Christian churches of today of greater moment than that of Christian union; but one of these is the development of a scientifically rational and essentially Christian theology, both for the sake of those already Christian, and for the conversion of the non-Christian nations. For the sake of freedom to pursue this greater good we should give to the movement for the union of the churches our cordial, but not uncritical, support.

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH

III. ΠΝΕΥΜΑ, ΨΥΧΗ, AND ΣΑΡΞ IN GREEK WRITERS FROM EPICURUS TO ARIUS DIDYMUS—*Concluded*

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THE EARLY PRE-CHRISTIAN STOICS

For the views of the early Stoics, such as Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus, we are dependent upon the quotations from their writings and the statements about their views made by later authors. The most important of these are Cicero (60 B.C.), Plutarch (100 A.D.), Galen (163 A.D.), Diogenes Laertius (200 A.D.). The last-named, although writing some four centuries after these early Stoics, seems to have had their works before him as he wrote. Other testimonies are to be found in Stobaeus (500 A.D.), the resemblance of whose statements to those of Plutarch shows that both were quoting from an earlier writer. The latter is believed by Diels to be a certain Aëtius who was a contemporary of Plutarch. The following passages will suffice to set forth the principal elements of the thought of the early Stoics, especially Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus, as reflected mainly in the statements of later writers. Not all of the passages contain the words under discussion, but all of them furnish direct or indirect testimony to the conceptions which they represented. Incidentally there is frequent mention of later Stoics, especially of Posidonius. Use will be made of this information at a later point.

Diog. Laert. vii. 1. 68 ff. (134 ff.):

68. They [the Stoics] think that there are two general principles [ἀρχαί] in the universe, the active and the passive, that the passive is matter [ὑλη], an existence without any distinctive quality, that the other is the reason [λόγος] which exists in matter, viz., God. For he, being eternal, and existing throughout all matter, makes everything. And Zeno the Citiean lays down this doctrine in his *Concerning Substance* and so does Cleanthes in his *Concerning*

Atoms and Chrysippus in the first book of his *Physics*, toward the end, Archedemus in his *Concerning Elements* and Posidonius in the second book of his *Physics*. But they say that principles [ἀρχαί] and elements [στοιχεῖα] differ one from another. For the former are ungenerated and indestructible, but the elements are destroyed by the action of fire; yet the principles also are bodies [σώματα] and without form. Now a body, says Apollodorus in his *Physics*, is that which has threefold extension, length, breadth, and thickness. And this is also called a solid body. But surface is the limit of a body and has length and breadth only, but not depth. But Posidonius in the third book of his *Celestial Phenomena* rejects this [surface] as possible neither in thought nor in fact. And a line is the boundary of a surface, having length without breadth, or length only. And a point is the limit of a line, which is the least thing that can be thought of. And they hold that God is one and mind [νοῦς] and fate and Zeus, and that he is called besides by various other names, and that being in the beginning by himself he turned into water the whole substance which pervaded the air. And as the seed is contained in the produce, so, too, he, being the seminal principle of the world, remained behind in moisture, making matter fit to be employed by himself for the production of those things which were to come after; and then first of all he brought into being [ἀπογεννάω] the four elements, fire, water, air, earth. And Zeno speaks of these in his *On the Universe* and Chrysippus in the first book of his *Physics* and Archedemus in his *Concerning Elements*.

69. And an element is that from which originally the things which become proceed, and into which at last they are dissolved. And the four elements are all alike substance [οὐσία], without distinctive quality, i.e., matter [ὑλη]. And fire is the warm and water is the wet and air [ἀήρ] is the cold, and earth is the dry, though not so but that in the air also is there the same part [i.e., the quality of dryness]. Highest is fire, which is also called aether, in which was brought into being first of all the sphere in which the fixed stars are set, then that in which the planets are, after that the air, then the water, and the sediment of all is the earth which is placed in the center of the world.

70. They also speak of the world [κόσμος] in a threefold sense, at one time meaning God himself, who, in distinction from the totality of substance, is of distinctive quality, being imperishable and unbegotten, being the maker [δημιουργός] of the orderly arrangement, and after certain periods of time he absorbs into himself the totality of substance and then produces [ἀπογεννάω] it again from himself. And the orderly arrangement of the stars itself they call the world [κόσμος]. And the third sense is the combination of both the preceding. . . . And the world is administered according to intelligence and providence [νοῦς καὶ πρόνοια], as says Chrysippus in his *Concerning the Gods*, the νοῦς permeating every part of the world, just as the soul [ψυχή] does in us, but through some parts more and other parts less. For through some it is present as cohesion [ἔξις] as through the bones and tendons, through some as mind [νοῦς], as through the ruling part. So also the whole world, they say,

being a living being [ζῶον], possessed of a soul [ἐμψυχος], and of reason [λογικός], has the aether as the ruling part, as says Antipater the Tyrian in the eighth book of his *Concerning the World*. But Chrysippus in the first book of his *Concerning Providence* and Posidonius in his *Concerning the Gods* says that the heaven is the ruling part of the world. But Cleanthes says that the sun is. Chrysippus even more differently again says it is the purer part of the aether in itself, which they call the first God, which is spread abroad throughout all the things in the air and through all the living creatures and plants. It also extends through the earth itself as cohesion. And the world [they say] is one, and it is limited, having a spherical shape. For thus it is most fitted for motion, as says Posidonius in the fifteenth book of his *Physics*, and the followers of Antipater in their *Concerning the World*. And surrounding it outside is the boundless void [infinite space], which is incorporeal. And it is incorporeal because it is such that it can be contained by bodies, but is not so contained. But in the world there is no void, but the world is unified. For this it is that secures the harmony and concord of the heavens in relation to the things of earth. (And Chrysippus speaks about the void in his *Concerning Space*, and in the first book of his *Physical Arts*, and Apollopheanes in his *Physics* and Apollodorus, and Posidonius in the second book of his *Physics*.) And [they say] these things are incorporeal, being alike; further, that time is incorporeal, being the measure of the movement of the world. And the past and the future are infinite, but the present is finite. And they are of the opinion also that the world is destructible, being brought into being after the manner of the things that are perceptible by the senses, of which the parts are destructible and the whole. And the parts of the world are destructible (for they are convertible into one another); therefore the world is destructible. Now concerning the genesis and destruction of the world, Zeno speaks in his *Concerning the Universe*, and Chrysippus in the first book of his *Physics*, and Posidonius in the first book of his *Concerning the World*, and Cleanthes, and Antipater in Book Ten of his *Concerning the World*. But Panaetius says that the world is indestructible, and that the world is a living being [ζῶον] and endowed with reason [λογικός] and soul [ἐμψυχος] and with power of perception [νοερός] both Chrysippus says in the first book of his *Concerning Providence*, and Apollodorus in his *Physics*; and Posidonius that, being thus a living being, it is a substance possessed of soul [ἐμψυχος], and with perception [αἰσθητικός]. For the living is better than the non-living. But nothing is better than the world, therefore the world is a living being. And it is possessed of soul, as is plain from our soul [ψυχῇ] being a fragment broken off from it [the world]. And Boëthius says that the world is a living thing; and that it is one, Zeno says in his *Concerning the Whole*, and Chrysippus and Apollodorus in his *Physics*, and Posidonius in Book One of his *Physics*. And the whole is called, as Apollodorus says, the world [κόσμος], or, according to another way of speaking, the system that consists of the world and the outside void. The world, therefore, is limited, but the void [space] is infinite.

72. They say also that God is a living being, immortal, rational, perfect, and intelligent in his happiness, being insusceptible to evil of any kind, having forethought for the world and for the things that are in the world. Yet he is not like man; but he is the maker of all things and as it were father of all. . . . And Zeno says that the whole world and the heaven is the substance [οὐσία] of God, and likewise Chrysippus . . . and Posidonius. And Antipater . . . that his substance is air-like [ἀεροειδής] and Boëthius . . . that the sphere of the fixed stars is the substance of God.

76. And they say that the primitive matter [ἡ πρώτη ὕλη] is the substance of all things, as Chrysippus says in the first book of his *Physics*, and Zeno. And matter is that out of which everything whatever comes. And it is called by two names, substance [οὐσία] and matter [ὕλη], the first as it applies to all things and the second to these taken severally. The substance of all things becomes neither greater nor less, but that which relates to things taken severally [ὕλη, matter] both increases and diminishes.

77. And substance is according to them body [σῶμα], and finite, as says Antipater, and Apollodorus. And it [i.e., οὐσία] is subject to change, as the same author says. For if it were immutable the things which have been produced from it could not have been produced. And they say that there are deities [δαίμονες] that have sympathy with man and demigods [ἡμίθεοι] which are the departed souls of the good.

84. Another of their doctrines is that nature [φύσις]¹ is a constructive fire, which follows a regular course to production, which is air [πνεῦμα], fire-like and endowed with skill, and the soul [ψυχή] is endowed with perception and is the breath [air?] that is congenital to us [τὸ συμφυὲς ἡμῖν πνεῦμα].² Therefore also it is body [σῶμα] and continues after death, but is perishable. But the soul of the universe [ἡ δὲ τῶν ὅλων (ψυχὴ)] is imperishable, of which the souls which are in living beings are parts. And Zeno the Citiean, and Antipater in their treatises on the soul, and Posidonius say that the soul is warm air [πνεῦμα ἑνθερμον], for by this we are able to breathe and by it we are moved. And Cleanthes says that all souls will continue to exist till the Conflagration. But Chrysippus that only the souls of the wise will do so. And the parts of the soul, they say, are eight: the five senses, and the reproductive power which is in us, and the power of speech and the power of reason.

¹ But Plutarch and Stobaeus quote the statement with θεόν instead of φύσιν. The whole passage in Plutarch (*Eph.* i. 7, Diels, *Dox.*, pp. 305 f.) reads as follows: οἱ Στωικοὶ νοεὶν θεὸν ἀποφαίνονται, πῦρ τεχνικόν, ὃδ' ὡς βαδίζον ἐπὶ γένεσιν κόσμου, ἐμπειριοληφὸς πάντας τοὺς σπερματικοὺς λόγους, καθ' οὓς ἕκαστα καθ' εἰμαρμένην γίνονται· καὶ πνεῦμα μὲν διήκον δι' ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου, τὰς δὲ προσηγορίας μεταλαμβάνον δι' ὅλης τῆς ὕλης, δι' ἧς κεχώρηκε, παραλλάξεις. θεοὺς δὲ καὶ τὸν κόσμον καὶ τοὺς ἀστέρας καὶ τὴν γῆν, τὸν δ' ἀνωτάτω πάντων νοῦν ἐν αἰθέρι. [See p. 595.]

² Cf. τὸ σύμφυτον πνεῦμα, Arist. i. 659b, quoted in *American Journal of Theology*, October, 1913, p. 571.

86. And they say that the supreme part of the soul is dominant, in which the imaginations and the impulses arise, whence also the reason proceeds, which is in the breast.

Stob. *Ecl.* i. 17 (Ar. Did. *Fr. phys.* 28, Diels, *Dox.*, p. 463; Arnim, *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, II, 471): Χρύσιππος δὲ τοιοῦτόν τι διεβεβαίουτο· εἶναι τὸ δν πνεῦμα κινεῖν ἑαυτὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ἢ πνεῦμα ἑαυτὸ κινεῖν πρόσω καὶ ὀπίσω· πνεῦμα δὲ εἴληπται διὰ τὸ λέγεσθαι αὐτὸ ἀέρα εἶναι κινούμενον· ἀνάλογον δὲ γίνεσθαι κάπλ τοῦ αἰθέρος, ὥστε καὶ εἰς κοινὸν λόγον πεσεῖν αὐτά.

Chrysippus argued somewhat as follows: that that which is πνεῦμα moving itself toward itself and from itself, or πνεῦμα moving itself forward and backward; and it has been taken to be πνεῦμα because it is said to be air moving itself; and it is similar to the aether, so that they fall into a common category.

Plut. *Epit.* i. 4 (Diels, *Dox.*, p. 289; cf. Stob. *Ecl.* i. 10. *ibid.*): Ζήνων Μνασέου Κιτιεὺς ἀρχὰς μὲν τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὴν ὕλην, ὧν ὁ μὲν ἐστὶ τοῦ ποιεῖν αἴτιος, ἡ δὲ τοῦ πάσχειν, στοιχεῖα δὲ τέσσαρα.

Zeno, the Citiean, son of Mnaseos says that God and matter are the ultimate principles, of which the first is the cause of action, and the second of passivity, and the elements are four.

Cicero *De nat. deor.* i. 14. 36 (Diels, *Dox.*, p. 542): Atque hic [Zeno] idem alio loco aethera deum dicit, si intelligi potest nihil sentiens deus, qui numquam nobis occurrit neque in precibus, neque in optatis, neque in votis.

And this same philosopher [Zeno] in another place says that God is aether, if it is possible to conceive of a God who feels nothing, and who never meets with us in prayers or wishes or vows.

Cicero *De nat. deor.* i. 37 (Diels, *Dox.*, p. 543; Arnim, I, 530): Cleanthes autem qui Zenonem audivit . . . tum ipsum mundum deum dicit esse, tum totius naturae menti atque animo tribuit hoc nomen, tum ultimum et altissimum atque undique circumfusum et extremum omnia cingentem atque complexum ardorem, qui aether nominetur, certissimum deum iudicat.

Cleanthes, however, who was a disciple of Zeno, at one time says that the world itself is God, at another attributes this name to the mind and soul of all nature, at another concludes that the last and highest fire, everywhere dispersed, surrounding and enfolding all things to the uttermost, which is also called aether, is that which is most surely God.

See also i. 15. 39 for similar opinions ascribed to Chrysippus (Diels, *Dox.*, p. 545).

Tertull. *Apol.* 21 (Arnim, I, 160): Apud vestros quoque sapientes λόγον, id est sermonem atque rationem, constat artificem videri universitatis. Hunc enim Zeno determinat factitorem, qui cuncta indispositione formaverit; eundem et fatum vocari, et deum et animum Iovis, et necessitatem omnium rerum. Haec Cleanthes in spiritum congerit, quem permeatorem universitatis adfirmat.

Among your wise men, too, it is plain, λόγος, that is, word and reason, is regarded as the creator of the world. This [λόγος] Zeno says is the creator who formed all things in regular order, and that the same is to be called fate and God, and the mind of Jove and the necessity of all things. These Cleanthes brought together in the word spirit, which, he affirms, is something which permeates the whole world.

Ar. *Did. Fr. phys.* 21 (Diels, *Dox.*, p. 458), cited Arnold, *Roman Stoicism*, p. 181: τὸ δὲ [πῦρ] κατ' ἐξοχὴν στοιχεῖον λέγεσθαι διὰ τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ πρώτου τὰ λοιπὰ συνίστασθαι κατὰ μεταβολὴν καὶ εἰς αὐτὸ ἐσχατον πάντα χεόμενα διαλύεσθαι.

But fire is called the chief element because by means of it from the very first the other things were compounded through change, and into the same at last all things, being melted, are dissolved.

Cic. *Tusc.* i. 9. 19: Zenoni stoico animus ignis videtur.

Zeno held that the soul is fire.

Cic. *Ac.* i. 11. 39: De naturis autem sic [Zeno] sentiebat, ut primum [in] quattuor initiis [στοιχεῖα] rerum illis quintam hanc naturam, ex qua superiores sensus et mentem effici rebantur, non adhiberet: statuebat enim ignem esse ipsam naturam quae quidque gigneret, et mentem atque sensus.

Zeno's doctrine of the elements, however, was such that in the first place he did not connect this fifth element, from which his predecessors thought sense and intellect were produced, with the four original constituents of things: for he postulated fire as that element which produces everything, both intellect and sense [cf. *De fin.* iv. 5. 12; *De nat. deor.* ii. 22. 57, cited in Arnold, p. 180].

Cic. *Ac.* ii. 126: Zenoni et reliquis fere Stoicis aether videtur summus deus, mente praeditus, qua omnia regantur. Cleanthes . . . Zenonis auditor solem dominari et rerum potiri putet.

Zeno and almost all of the Stoics regard the supreme God as aether endowed with mind, by which all things are ruled. Cleanthes, a disciple of Zeno, thinks that the sun rules and governs affairs.

Nemesius, *Nat. hom.*, p. 96 (Arnim, I, 143): Zeno the Stoic says that the soul [ψυχή] has eight parts, dividing it into the governing part and the five senses, the power of speech and the generative power [cf. Diog. Laert. vii. 1. 84, above].

Epiphanius *Prooem. et Anacephal.* (1) (Diels, *Dox.*, p. 587): Στωικοί σώμα τὸ πᾶν δογματίζοντες καὶ τὸν αἰσθητὸν τοῦτον κόσμον θεὸν νομίζοντες. τινὲς δὲ ἐκ τῆς τοῦ πυρὸς οὐσίας τὴν φύσιν ἔχειν αὐτὸν ἀπεφάναντο. καὶ τὸν μὲν θεὸν νοῦν ὀρίζουσι καὶ ὡς ψυχὴν παντὸς τοῦ ὄντος κύτους οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς, σῶμα δὲ αὐτοῦ τὸ πᾶν, ὡς ἔφη, καὶ ὀφθαλμοὺς τοὺς φωστῆρας. τὴν δὲ σάρκα πάντων ἀπόλλυσθαι καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν πάντων μεταγγίζεσθαι ἀπὸ σώματος εἰς σῶμα.

The Stoics lay down the opinion that the universe is body and think this perceptible world is God. Some declare that its nature [φύσις] is of the substance of fire. And they define God as mind [νοῦς] and as the soul of all that is, container of heaven and earth, and that the universe is body, as I said, and that the stars are eyes. But the flesh of all things, they say, perishes and the soul of all is poured out from one body into another.

Eusebius *Prep. Evang.* xv. 20 (Diels, *Dox.*, pp. 470 f.): Now concerning the soul Cleanthes, quoting the opinion of Zeno, in comparison with the other physicists says that Zeno says that the soul is an exhalation endowed with power of perception, as Heraclitus says. For wishing to prove that souls, being exhaled always become perceptive, he compares them to the rivers, saying, "Other things enter the rivers themselves, and other waters flow in besides." And souls are exhaled from the moist [things]. Therefore Zeno, like Heraclitus, calls the soul an exhalation, but says that it is endowed with perception on this account, because the ruling part of the soul can be impressed through the senses by the things that are and exist, and can receive the impressions of them. For these are the peculiarities of a soul.

Stob. *Ecl.* i. 25. 3 (Ar. Did. *Fr. phys.* 33; Arnim, I, 120; Diels, *Dox.*, p. 467): Zeno says that the sun, moon, and each of the other stars has the power of perception and thought [νοερός καὶ φρόνιμος], being composed of constructive [τεχνικός, workmanlike] fire. For there are two kinds of fire, that which is destructive [ἀτεχνος], and converts its fuel into itself, and the constructive, which has the power of growth and preservation, such as is in the plants and animals [ζῷα], which is nature and soul [φύσις καὶ ψυχή]. And of this kind of fire is the substance of the stars.

Galen *Hist. Phil.* 16 (Diels, *Dox.*, p. 608): Plato, then, and Zeno the Stoic, having discussed the substance of God, were not of the same opinion on this point. Plato said that God was incorporeal, but Zeno that he was body

[σῶμα], neither of them saying anything about his form. And Epicurus says that God is anthropomorphous. But the Stoics say that he does not always maintain the same form, but is fiery air [πνεῦμα πυρῶδες], being easily assimilated to all things with which it comes in contact.

Hippolytus, *Phil.* 21. 1 (Diels, *Dox.*, p. 571): Chrysippus and Zeno who themselves lay it down as a principle that God is the origin [ἀρχή] of all things, being the purest body [σῶμα], and that his providence provides all things.

Nemesius, *Nat. hom.*, p. 33; cited in Zeller, *Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics*, p. 210, ascribes the following argument to Cleanthes: οὐδὲν ἀσώματον συμπάσχει σώματι, οὐδὲ ἀσωμάτῳ σῶμα, ἀλλὰ σῶμα σώματι· συμπάσχει δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι νοσοῦντι καὶ τεμνομένῳ, καὶ τὸ σῶμα τῇ ψυχῇ· αἰσχυνομένης γοῦν, ἐρυθρόν γίνεταί, καὶ φοβουμένης, ὠχρόν· σῶμα ἄρα ἡ ψυχή.

Neither can the incorporeal suffer with the corporeal, nor the corporeal with the incorporeal. But the soul does suffer with the body when it is sick or when it is cut, and the body with the soul. Thus when the soul is ashamed the body blushes, and when the soul is afraid it is pale. The soul, therefore, is body.

Ibid., p. 32 (also ascribed to Cleanthes): οὐ μόνον, φησὶν, ὁμοιοὶ τοῖς γονεῦσι γινόμεθα, κατὰ τὸ σῶμα, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν, τοῖς πάθεσι, τοῖς ἡθεσι, ταῖς διαθέσεσι· σώματος δέ, τὸ ὁμοιον καὶ ἀνόμοιον, οὐχὶ δὲ ἀσωμάτου· σῶμα ἄρα ἡ ψυχή.

Not only, he says, are we born like our parents as to body but also as to soul, in passions, habits, and dispositions. Now likeness and unlikeness are matters of body, not incorporeal. Therefore the soul is body.

Nemesius, *Nat. hom.*, p. 34, ascribes the following to Chrysippus: ὁ θάνατος ἐστὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος· οὐδὲν δὲ ἀσώματον ἀπὸ σώματος χωρίζεται· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐφάπτεται σώματος ἀσώματον· ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ καὶ ἐφάπτεται καὶ χωρίζεται τοῦ σώματος· σῶμα ἄρα ἡ ψυχή.

Death is the separation of soul from body. But nothing incorporeal is separated from a body; for neither is anything incorporeal joined to a body. But the soul is joined to and is separated from the body. Therefore the soul is body.

Tertull. *De anima*, chap. 5 (Arnim, I, 137): denique Zeno "consitum spiritum"¹ definiens animam hoc modo instruit: "quo,"

¹ *Consitum spiritus* probably is Aristotle's σόμφυτον πνεῦμα.

inquit, "digresso animal emoritur, corpus est: consito autem spiritu digresso animal emoritur; ergo consitus spiritus corpus est; consitus autem spiritus anima est; ergo corpus est anima."

Accordingly, Zeno defining the soul as inborn air teaches as follows: that which, by its departure, causes the animal to die is body. But when the in-born air departs the animal dies. Therefore the inborn air is body. But the inborn air is the soul, therefore the soul is body.

Stobaeus, *Ecl.* i. 19. 4 (Arnim, I, 99; Ar. Did. *Fr. phys.* 23, Diels, *Dox.*, p. 459): But a body does not always have weight. But air [ἀήρ] and fire are without weight.

Galen *De plac. Hippoc. et Plat.* ii. 8 (p. 248 M): But if he [Diogenes the Babylonian] should follow Cleanthes and Chrysippus and Zeno in saying that the soul is nourished by blood, and that the breath [air?] is its substance [οὐσίαν δ' αὐτῆς ὑπάρχων τὸ πνεῦμα]

Galen *De plac. Hippoc. et Plat.* iii. 1 (p. 251 M, cited by Zeller, *op. cit.*, p. 211): λέγω δὴ, ὅτι ὁ Χρῆσιππος κατὰ τὸν πρῶτον αὐτοῦ περὶ ψυχῆς λόγον τῶν μερῶν αὐτῆς τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ μνημονεύειν ἀρχόμενος, ἔθθα δεικνύναι πειρᾶται τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ μόνῃ περιέχεσθαι, οὕτως λέγει· ἡ ψυχὴ πνεῦμά ἐστι σύμφυτον ἡμῖν συνεχές παντὶ τῷ σώματι διήκον ἕστε ἂν ἡ τῆς ζωῆς συμμετρία παρῇ ἐν τῷ σώματι. ταύτης οὖν τῶν μερῶν ἐκάστῳ διατεταγμένων μορίῳ τὸ διήκον αὐτῆς εἰς τὴν τραχείαν ἀρτηρίαν φωνὴν φαμεν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ εἰς ὀφθαλμοὺς ὄψιν, τὸ δὲ εἰς ὠτα ἀκοήν, τὸ δὲ εἰς ῥίνας ὁσφρησιν, τὸ δὲ εἰς γλῶτταν γεῦσιν, τὸ δὲ εἰς ὀλὴν τὴν σάρκα ἀφήν καὶ τὸ εἰς ὄρχεις ἑτερόν τινα ἔχον τοιοῦτον λόγον σπερματικόν, εἰς δὲ συμβαίνει πάντα ταῦτα, ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ εἶναι μέρος ὃν αὐτῆς τὸ ἡγεμονικόν.

Now I say that Chrysippus in his first essay on the soul, beginning with the mention of the dominant one of the parts of the soul, then endeavors to show that the origin of the soul is in the heart alone, and says as follows: The soul is air congenital in us, extending to all the body continuously as long as the due proportion of the life remains in the body. The parts of this being distributed to each portion, that portion of it which extends to the windpipe we call voice; that to the eyes, vision; that to the ears, hearing; that to the nostrils, smell; that to the tongue, taste; that to all the body, touch; also that to the testicles having such a special function, we call the spermatic [part]; and that which goes where all these come together, viz., in the heart, we say is the ruling part of it.

Galen *Hist. Phil.* 24 (Diels, *Dox.*, p. 613, 12; Arnim, I, 136): τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν αὐτῆς [sc. τῆς ψυχῆς] οἱ μὲν ἀσώματον ἔφασαν, ὡς Πλάτων, οἱ

δὲ σώματα κινεῖν, ὡς Ζήνων καὶ οἱ ἐξ αὐτοῦ. πνεῦμα γὰρ εἶναι ταύτην ὑπενόησαν καὶ οὗτοι.

And some, like Plato, say that the substance of the soul is incorporeal; but others that it moves bodies, as Zeno and his followers; for these also suppose that the soul is air.

Plut. *Epit.* v. 4 (Diels, *Dox.*, p. 417): Δεύκιππος καὶ Ζήνων σῶμα· ψυχῆς γὰρ εἶναι ἀπόσπασμα.

Leucippus and Zeno [say that seed is] body; for it is a fragment broken off the soul [cf. also Euseb. *Prep. evang.* xv. 20 (Ar. Did. *Fr. phys.* 39; Diels, *Dox.*, p. 470)].

Diog. Laert. vii. 1. 85: And the seed of man which the man emits is together with moisture mixed with the parts of the soul according to the kind of mixture which was that of the parents. And Chrysippus says in the second book of his *Physics* that it [the seed] is according to its substance air [πνεῦμα], as is plain from the seeds which are cast into the earth, which if they have become old no longer germinate, as is plain, their virtue having evaporated [διαπεπνευκίας].¹

Plut. *De primo frig.* 2. 5 (cited by Zeller, *Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics*, p. 213): οἱ δὲ Στωικοὶ καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα λέγουσιν ἐν τοῖς σώμασι τῶν βρεφῶν τῇ περιψύξει στομοῦσθαι καὶ μεταβάλλον ἐκ φύσεως γίγνεσθαι ψυχὴν.

The Stoics say that the πνεῦμα in the bodies of infants is hardened by the cooling and being changed by the process of generation becomes soul.

Hippolyt. *Phil.* 21 (Diels, *Dox.*, p. 571): τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν λέγουσιν ἀθάνατον εἶναι, σῶμα δέ, καὶ γενέσθαι ἐκ τῆς περιψύξεως τοῦ ἀέρος τοῦ περιέχοντος, διὸ καὶ καλεῖσθαι ψυχὴν· ὁμολογοῦσι δὲ καὶ μετενσωμάτων γίνεσθαι ὠρισμένων οὐσῶν τῶν ψυχῶν.

And they [the Stoics] say that the soul is immortal, and is body, and that it comes into being from the cooling of the air that surrounds it, therefore also it is called soul. And they hold also that a transmigration takes place when the souls reach the appointed number.

Plut. *Epit.* iv. 20 (Diels, *Dox.*, p. 410): Οἱ δὲ Στωικοὶ σῶμα τὴν φωνήν· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ δρῶν ἢ καὶ ποιοῦν σῶμα· ἢ δὲ φωνὴ ποιεῖ καὶ δρᾶ· ἀκούομεν γὰρ αὐτῆς καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα προσπιπτούσης τῇ ἀκοῇ καὶ ἐκτυπούσης καθάπερ δακτυλίου εἰς κηρόν. ἔτι πᾶν τὸ κινοῦν καὶ ἐνοχλοῦν σῶμά ἐστι· κινεῖ δὲ ἡμᾶς ἡ εὐμονσία, ἐνοχλεῖ δὲ ἡ ἀμουσία. ἔτι πᾶν τὸ

¹ The argument here is that because by evaporation seeds lose their virtue, so the semen (i.e., the vital part of it) is πνεῦμα—moisture or air.

κινούμενον σῶμά ἐστι· κινεῖται δὲ ἡ φωνὴ καὶ προσπίπτει εἰς τοὺς λείους τόπους καὶ ἀντανακλᾶται καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῆς σφαίρας τῆς βαλλομένης εἰς τοῖχον· ἐν γούν ταῖς κατ' Αἴγυπτον πυραμίσι ἐνδον μία φωνὴ ῥηγνυμένη τέτταρας ἢ καὶ πέντε ἤχους ἀπεργάζεται.

And the Stoics say that the voice is body. For everything that does or makes is body. But the voice makes and does. For we hear it and we understand when it falls upon the sense of hearing and makes an impression like that of the finger on wax. Also that which moves or annoys is body. But refinement moves us and rudeness annoys us. Again everything which is moved is body. But the voice is moved and falls into the hollow places and is reflected just as in the case of a ball being thrown against a wall. Indeed inside the pyramids of Egypt when one voice breaks forth it produces four or five echoes.

Plut. *Epit.* i. 6 (Diels, *Dox.*, p. 292): ὁρίζονται δὲ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ οὐσίαν οἱ Στωικοὶ οὕτως· πνεῦμα νοερὸν καὶ πυρῶδες οὐκ ἔχον μὲν μορφὴν, μεταβάλλον δὲ εἰς ὃ βούλεται καὶ συνεξομοιούμενον πᾶσιν.

The Stoics define the substance of God as follows: air, intelligent and fiery, not having indeed form but changing into what it will and assimilating itself to all things.

Stob. *Ecl.* i. 1 (Diels, *Dox.*, p. 302): Ποσειδώνιος πνεῦμα νοερὸν καὶ πυρῶδες, οὐκ ἔχον μὲν μορφὴν μεταβάλλον δὲ εἰς ὃ βούλεται καὶ συνεξομοιούμενον πᾶσιν.

Posidonius says that [God is] air intelligent and fiery, not having indeed form, but changing into what it will and assimilating itself to all things.

Stob. *Ecl.* i. 1 (Diels, *Dox.*, p. 302): Διογένης καὶ Κλεάνθης καὶ Οἰνοπίδης [τὸν θεόν] τὴν τοῦ κόσμου ψυχὴν.

Diogenes and Cleanthes and Oinopides say that God is the soul of the world.

Galen *Hist. Phil.* 35 (Diels, *Dox.*, pp. 618-19): οἱ Στωικοὶ δὲ τὸν θεὸν πῦρ ἔντεχρον ἢ πνεῦμα νομίζουσιν, ὁδῶ βαδίζον ἐπὶ κόσμον γένεσιν, ἐμπεριειληφὸς πάντας τοὺς σπερματικούς λόγους, καθ' οὓς ἕκαστα καθ' εἰμαρμένην γίνεσθαι, καὶ διῆκειν δι' ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου τὰς προσηγορίας μεταλαμβάνον [τὲ] κατὰ τὰς τῆς ὕλης δι' ἧς κεχώρηκε παραλλάξει. θεοὺς δὲ καὶ τὸν κόσμον καὶ τοὺς ἀστέρας καὶ τὴν γῆν εἶναι νομίζουσιν, τὸ δὲ ἀνώτατον πάντων τὸν νοῦν εἶναι, τὸν θεόν.

The Stoics think that God is a constructive fire or air proceeding methodically to the creation of a world, embracing all the principles of generation, according to which everything comes into being in its allotted way, and it extends, they think, throughout all the world, receiving names according to the different forms of matter through which it spreads. And they think

that the world and the stars and the earth are gods, but that the highest of all is mind, that is, God [cf. also Plut. *Eph.* i. 7 and Stob. *Ecl.* i. 1, Diels, *Dox.*, pp. 305-6, where, with minor variations, the same passage occurs].

Plut. *Eph.* iv. 21 (Diels, *Dox.*, pp. 410-11): οἱ Στωικοὶ φασιν εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς ἀνώτατον μέρος τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, τὸ ποιοῦν τὰς φαντασίας καὶ συγκαταθέσεις καὶ αἰσθήσεις καὶ ὁρμάς· καὶ τοῦτο λογισμὸν καλοῦσιν.

Ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ ἑπτὰ μέρη ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐκπεφυκῶτα καὶ ἐκτεινόμενα εἰς τὸ σῶμα καθάπερ αἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ πολύποδος πλεκτάναι· τῶν δὲ ἑπτὰ μερῶν τῆς ψυχῆς πέντε μὲν εἰσι τὰ αἰσθητήρια, δρασὶς δσφρησις ἀκοή γεῦσις καὶ ἀφή.

Ὡν ἡ μὲν δρασὶς ἐστὶ πνεῦμα διατεῖνον ἀπὸ ἡγεμονικοῦ μέχρις ὀφθαλμῶν, ἀκοή δὲ πνεῦμα διατεῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ μέχρις ὠτων, δσφρησις δὲ πνεῦμα διατεῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ μέχρι μυκτήρων [λεπτύνων], γεῦσις δὲ πνεῦμα διατεῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ μέχρι γλῶττης, ἀφή δὲ πνεῦμα διατεῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ μέχρις ἐπιφανείας εἰς θίξιν εὐαίσθητον τῶν προσπιπτόντων.

Τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν τὸ μὲν λέγεται σπέρμα, ὅπερ καὶ αὐτὸ πνεῦμά ἐστι διατεῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ μέχρι τῶν παραστατῶν· τὸ δὲ 'φωναεν' ὑπὸ τοῦ Ζήνωνος εἰρημένον, ὃ καὶ φωνήν καλοῦσιν, ἔστι πνεῦμα διατεῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ μέχρι φάρυγγος καὶ γλῶττης καὶ τῶν οἰκείων ὀργάνων. αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν ὥσπερ ἐν κόσμῳ κατοικεῖ ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ σφαιροειδεῖ κεφαλῇ.

The Stoics say that the ruling part of the soul is highest. It is that which produces imaginations and sanctions and perceptions and impulses; and this they call the logical part. And there are seven parts of the soul generated from the ruling part and extending into the body like the arms from the polypus. Of the seven parts of the soul five are the senses, sight, smell, hearing, taste, and touch. Of these, sight is πνεῦμα [air?] extending from the ruling part to the eyes; hearing is πνεῦμα extending from the ruling part to the ears; smell is πνεῦμα, extending from the ruling part to the nostrils; taste is πνεῦμα, extending from the ruling part to the tongue; feeling is πνεῦμα, extending from the ruling part to surfaces, sensitive to the touch of things coming in contact with them. Of the others the seed is mentioned, which is itself also πνεῦμα, extending from the ruling part to the testicles; and the utterance, mentioned by Zeno, which also they call voice, is πνεῦμα, extending from the ruling part to the throat and tongue and the neighboring organs. But the ruling part itself, as in a κόσμος, dwells in our sphere-shaped head. Cf. also iv. 8, 15.

Varro *De lingua lat.* v. 59: sive ut Zenon Citieus animalium semen ignis est, qui anima ac mens.

According to Zeno the Citiean, the semen of animals is a fire which is life and intelligence.


Rufus Ephes. *De part. hom.*, p. 44 C: θερμασίαν δὲ καὶ πνεῦμα Ζήνων τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι φησιν.

Zeno says that heat and πνεῦμα are the same.

Theodoret, *Gr. aff. cur.* v. 25 (Arnim, I, 128): Ζήνων δὲ ὁ Κιτιεὺς ὁ τῆσδε τῆς αἰρέσεως ἡγησάμενος τοιάδε περὶ ψυχῆς δοξάζειν τοὺς οἰκείους ἐδίδαξε φοιτητάς· τὸν γάρ τοι ἀνθρώπινον θορόν, ὑγρόν ὄντα καὶ μετέχοντα πνεύματος, τῆς ψυχῆς ἔφησεν εἶναι μέρος τε καὶ ἀπόσπασμα καὶ τοῦ τῶν προγόνων σπέρματος κέρασμά τε καὶ μίγμα ἐξ ἀπάντων τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μορίων ξυναθροισθέν.

Zeno the Citiean, the founder of this sect, taught his own disciples to hold these opinions about the soul. For he said that the human semen, being moist, and composed in part of πνεῦμα, is a part of the soul and a fragment and mixture of the seed of the parents, being compounded of all the parts of the soul.

Quotations might be multiplied almost indefinitely, but these will suffice to set forth the main features of the doctrine of the early Stoics in respect to the matter we are considering. A diagram, though necessarily imperfect, will perhaps make the relationship of the various terms and conceptions more clear.



According to Stobaeus (*Ecl.* i. 17, Diels, *Dox.*, p. 463; Arnim, II, 471), Chrysippus affirmed that the ultimate reality was πνεῦμα moving itself, i.e., self-moving air (ἀήρ).¹ This ultimate reality is also called σῶμα as over against infinite space, which, together with time, falls into the category of the ἀσώματον (Diog. Laert. vii. 1. 70 [140]). This ultimate reality consists of two principles (ἀρχαί), or rather perhaps has two fundamental characteristics or aspects, viz.: (1) the active, λόγος, reason (also called θεός); and (2) the passive, ὕλη, matter (Diog. Laert. vii. 1. 68; Plut. *Epit.* i. 4, Diels, *Dox.*, p. 289). To each of these various other predicates are attached. Thus the first, λόγος, is said to be θεός, and θεός in turn is said to be αἰθήρ (Cic. *De nat. deor.* i. 36; *Ac.* ii. 126), πῦρ (Cic. *De nat. deor.* i. 37; Arnim, I, 530; Galen *Hist. Phil.* 35), νοῦς (Diog. Laert. vii. 1. 68), and an immortal being, ζῶν ἀθάνατον (Diog. Laert. vii. 1. 72), but also σῶμα (Galen *Hist. Phil.* 16, Diels, *Dox.*, p. 608; Hippol. *Phil.* 21. 1, Diels, *Dox.*, p. 571). Tertullian says (*Apol.* 21) that Cleanthes summed up all the predicates of God in the word *spiritus* (= πνεῦμα), but the accuracy of his statement, unsupported by other testimony, is perhaps not beyond question. The second principle, called, as it consists of parts, ὕλη, is, conceived as a whole, οὐσία. The ὕλη permeated and controlled by λόγος, which is God, becomes a σύστημα ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς καὶ τῶν ἐν τούτοις φύσεων (Ar. Did. *Fr. phys.* 31, Diels, *Dox.*, p. 465), or more briefly stated, ἡ διακόσμησις τῶν ἀστέρων (Diog. Laert. vii. 1. 70 [138]), and is called ἡ διακόσμησις or κόσμος. This κόσμος is a living being, ζῶν, endowed with reason, soul, and perception, but is destructible (*ibid.*). To it also is applied the predicate σῶμα (Diog. Laert. vii. 1. 68; cf. also 70). God also is said to be κόσμος (*ibid.* 70, 72) and in the largest sense of the term the κόσμος includes God and the universe (Diog. Laert. vii. 1. 70 [138]; Ar. Did. *Fr. phys.* 31; Stob. *Ecl.* i. 21, Diels, *Dox.*, p. 465). God is said to be the seminal principle of the world (Diog. Laert. 68) and the δημιουργός of the orderly arrangement. The νοῦς permeates every part of the world just as ψυχή permeates us. Moreover, God periodically absorbs the totality of substance into himself, then gives it forth again (*ibid.* 70; cf. 68).

¹ Arnold, *Rom. Stoicism*, p. 89.

"Τλη consists of four elements (στοιχεῖα), viz.: πῦρ, ἀήρ, ὕδωρ, γῆ (*ibid.* 69). The four elements are interconvertible (*ibid.* 70). They are not, therefore, four substances or kinds of matter, but four forms of one substance. The first of them, πῦρ, is supreme and is also called aether (*ibid.* 69). The second, ἀήρ, is nearly identical with πνεῦμα in its primary sense of wind (Stob. *Ecl.* i. 17).

The Stoics distinguish two kinds of fire, the πῦρ ἀτεχνον and the πῦρ τεχνικόν, meaning fire that destroys and fire that preserves and contributes to growth (Stob. *Ecl.* i. 25). It is the former, apparently, which is said to destroy the elements (Diog. Laert. vii. 1. 68). From the latter spring the plants and animals. It is called also φύσις (in respect to plants) and ψυχή (in respect to animals); and of it is the substance of the stars (Stob. *Ecl.* i. 25; Ar. Did. *Fr. phys.* 33, Diels, *Dox.*, p. 467).

By the ψυχή the Stoics commonly mean the seat of life, feeling, thought, and will. The definition of the word is found in its functions.¹ Of the soul, so defined, Zeno says that it is πνεῦμα ἐνθερμον (Diog. Laert. vii. 1. 84) or πῦρ (Cic. *Tusc.* i. 9. 19). Since Cicero says expressly that Zeno did not add a fifth element to the four, but that the Stoics regard fire as that which produces all things, even mind and perception (Cic. *Ac.* i. 11. 39; cf. *De nat. deor.* ii. 22. 57), it is probable that by πνεῦμα ἐνθερμον Zeno means a combination of fire and air, or fire on the way to become air, or air on the way to become fire. Galen also ascribes to Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and Zeno the opinion that the soul is nourished by blood and that the breath [air?] is its substance (Galen *De plac. Hippoc. et Plat.*, p. 248 M; cf. also Galen *Hist. Phil.* 24, Diels, *Dox.*, p. 613).

¹ This is of course true, not of Stoic writers only, but of Greek writers generally. Cf. *American Journal of Theology*, July, 1914, p. 411. Less clearly so when it means "life" or "shade," but obviously so when meaning "soul," ψυχή is by definition a functional term, while πνεῦμα on the other hand is substantial. The relation between the two, through a large part at least of their contemporary use, corresponds to that, e.g., of the terms "knife" and "steel." The definition of the one lies in that which it does, that of the other—in its elements or qualities. The second may be predicated of the first; the first cannot be of the second. One may say ἡ ψυχή πνευμά ἐστι; but not τὸ πνεῦμα ψυχή ἐστι. Ψυχή never denotes a substance; only in a relatively late period does πνεῦμα acquire a functional meaning.

Galen p. 251 M ascribes to Chrysippus the statement: ἡ ψυχὴ πνεῦμά ἐστι σύμφυτον ἡμῖν συνεχὲς παντὶ τῷ σώματι διήκον (see above, p. 579). The expression at once recalls Aristotle's σύμφυτον πνεῦμα (i. 659b. 17ff; i. 669a. 1; 743b. 39; *American Journal of Theology*, October, 1913, p. 571f).¹ It is doubtless the same doctrine and probably the same passage which Diogenes Laertius has in mind when in vii. 1. 84 he says that the Stoics say that the soul is τὸ συμφυὲς ἡμῖν πνεῦμα.

The soul is also said to be σῶμα (Galen *Hist. Phil.* 24, Diels, *Dox.*, p. 613; Diog. Laert. vii. 1. 84; cf. the doctrine of Democritus, Stob. *Ecl.* i. 49, Diels, *Dox.*, p. 388; Nem., *Nat. hom.*, pp. 32, 33, 34; Tertull. *De anima*, chap. v).

The soul has various parts or functions, sometimes four, as shown in the diagram, sometimes increased to eight by analyzing

¹ The expression σύμφυτον πνεῦμα occurs also in the *Περὶ Πνεύματος*, probably written about the first century A.D. and erroneously ascribed to Aristotle (see Christ, *Handbuch der klassischen Altertums-Wissenschaft*, VII, 736; Neustadt in *Hermes*, XLIV [1909], 60 ff.):

τὸ δὲ σύμφυτον πνεῦμα δι' ὅλου, καὶ ἀρχὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ πνεύματος [chap. iv].

Ἐπεὶ δὲ τρεῖς αἱ κινήσεις τοῦ ἐν τῇ ἀρτηρίᾳ πνεύματος, ἀναπνοή, σφυγμός, τρίτη δ' ἡ τὴν τροφήν ἐπάγουσα καὶ κατεργαζομένη, λεκτέον ὑπὲρ ἐκάστης καὶ τοῦ, καὶ πῶς, καὶ τίνος χάριν [chap. iv].

καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ὡς περὶ τὴν αὔξησιν καὶ τροφήν τοῦ πνεύματος [chap. ii, fin.].

τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα, τὸ ἐκ τῆς ἀναπνοῆς φέρεσθαι μὲν εἰς τὴν κοιλίαν, οὐ διὰ τοῦ στομάχου (τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἀδύνατον), ἀλλὰ πόρον εἶναι παρὰ τὴν ὀσφύν, δι' οὗ τὸ πνεῦμα τῇ ἀναπνοῇ φέρεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ βρογχίου εἰς τὴν κοιλίαν καὶ πάλιν ἔξω· τοῦτο δὲ τῇ αἰσθήσει φανερόν [chap. v, *init.*].

According to Neustadt (*Hermes*, XLIV, 60 ff.) the *Περὶ Πνεύματος* is the product of a school known as the πνευματικοί, concerning whom we derive a certain amount of information from Galen, having been perhaps written by Athenaeus, the founder of the school. He draws this conclusion from the parallels which he discovers between the treatise and the statements of Galen about the views of the school. From these it appears that the men of this school recognized the four elements, the hot and the cold, the wet and the dry; but also four qualities to which they applied the same names. From the four substances and qualities they derived what they called the *ὁμοιομέρη* or homogeneous bodies, among which they included bones, flesh, and arteries, in each of which one of the four qualities predominated and determined the character. Thus the flesh is wet, the gristle is cold, the bones dry and cold, the fat wet and warm.

But that which is of special interest for us is their doctrine of the πνεῦμα and ψυχή. Galen says that Athenaeus, following the Stoics, introduced, as a fifth element, the πνεῦμα which pervades all things (Neustadt, p. 68). Yet this element does not seem to have been deified for him. For in the *Περὶ Πνεύματος*, defending the proposition

τὸ αἰσθητικόν into the five senses and counting these instead of that.

Plut., *Epil.* iv. 15, ascribes to Chrysippus the view that we perceive darkness by the impact of the intermediate air, adding that the air is pierced by the visual πνεῦμα, which proceeds from the principal part of the soul even to the eyeball. In iv. 21 (see above, p. 582) this latter view is expanded into the statement that, according to the Stoics, there extend from the ruling part of the soul, located in the head, seven parts or senses—sight, hearing, etc. Each of these is said to be πνεῦμα, though the soul itself is not here called πνεῦμα.

In iv. 8 he ascribes to the Stoics the view that the media of sense-perception are πνεύματα νοερά extending from the governing that there are not, as some maintain, two kinds of fire, one in the organic and another in the inorganic world, but in the inorganic world different effects of fire according to the quality of the thing affected by it, and in the organic world, not fire proper, but warmth, he adds: "But the arts use the warmth only as a tool, but nature both as a tool and as material. Accordingly this difference offers no obstacle to the view that nature, which uses the warm and which at the same time produces with the visible appearances harmonious movement, possesses intelligence. For fire and breath (πνεῦμα) do not indeed do it [i.e., do not possess or do not impart intelligence]. Yet the same capacity meets us also in the soul (ψυχή). It is well, therefore, to ascribe both to the same source (either in general or specifically in part), which brings it about that the like movement is always present, for it is nature from which becoming springs."

Apparently, therefore, the πνευματικοί, while finding one source of intelligence both in the soul and in the universe, and while postulating πνεῦμα additional to the four elements or the four qualities, yet did not identify the πνεῦμα with the all-pervading intelligence.

In this respect they remind us of what Sextus says of the Stoics, having in mind perhaps Chrysippus, who, Galen says, was the great-grandfather of the pneumatic sect (Arnim, II, 311; Neustadt, p. 64): "The substance of things that are, they say, being of itself incapable of motion and formless, must be moved by and given form by some cause. Therefore, as when we see a beautiful piece of metal work we wish to know who was the artist, believing that the material is itself without power of motion, so also when we contemplate the matter of the universe moving and taking form and order we should reasonably inquire for the cause that moves it and gives it diverse forms. And it is probable that this is nothing else than a certain power that permeates it as soul (ψυχή) permeates us . . . so that this would be God."

Here also the order and motion which the universe shows are ascribed to a power in itself analogous to the soul in the human person. But this power is not called πνεῦμα, though it is not as in the *Περὶ Πνεύματος* expressly said that it is not πνεῦμα.

From all this it appears that, for whatever reason the πνευματικοί were called such, it was not because they affirmed that God was πνεῦμα or because they held any notion of immaterial spirit.

part of the soul to the organs of the body. These πνεύματα νοερά are manifestly identical with the πνεῦμα of iv. 15 and 21, and with the πνεῦμα σύμφυτον παντὶ τῷ σώματι διήκον of Galen, p. 251 M, being pluralized only as parts of that which quantitatively and generically considered is called πνεῦμα.

What, then, did the early Stoics mean by σῶμα and πνεῦμα as predicates of ψυχή? It is to be noted that the two terms are not sharply antithetical. Not only are they both predicated of ψυχή, but the soul is said to be σῶμα because it is πνεῦμα (Diog. Laert. vii. 1. 84). Σῶμα clearly has two distinct uses. First, in the common unphilosophical sense, it denotes that which contains the soul, and is distinct from it, the two being frequently spoken of in antithesis (Diog. Laert. vii. 1. 65; Nem., *Nat. hom.*, pp. 32, 33, 34). It is doubtless composed of the elements, perhaps the four (Galen *Const. art. med.* i. p. 251, K; Arnim, II, 405), or possibly the two lower (Arnold, *Rom. Stoicism*, p. 257). On the other hand, as shown above, the soul is said to be body (Nem., *Nat. hom.*, *loc. cit.*), and God is said to be body (Galen *Hist. Phil.* 16, Diels, *Dox.*, p. 608; Hippol. *Phil.* 21. 1, Diels, *Dox.*, p. 571). Moreover, the whole universe is divided into body and not-body, the former term being applied to the two ἀρχαί and the latter to things that have no real existence, such as time and space (Diog. Laert. vii. 1. 70 [140]).

It might seem, therefore, that σῶμα was simply the Stoic term for a real existence. And this may be thought to be confirmed by the statement quoted by Arius Didymus from Zeno that the cause is body (Stob. *Ecl.* i. 13, Diels, *Dox.*, p. 457).¹ But, on the other hand, it is to be noticed that the two senses of σῶμα are closely related to one another, so that one may argue from the one to the other, as in the argument concerning the separation of soul and body (Nem., *Nat. hom.*, *loc. cit.*). Moreover, in immediate connection with the passage from Ar. Did. in which he says that the cause is body, body is defined as that which has extension in three dimensions; cf. Galen *Hist. Phil.* 23, Diels, *Dox.*, p. 612. Diogenes Laertius ascribes the same opinion to Apollodorus (vii. 1. 68).

¹ Cf. also the statement in Plut. *Epil.* i. 11, Diels, *Dox.*, p. 310: οἱ Στωικοὶ πάντα τὰ αἰτία σωματικά· πνεύματα γάρ.

It is true, indeed, that the Stoic categories, somatic and asomatic, do not exactly correspond to the modern categories, material and immaterial. Zeno said, e.g., that bodies do not necessarily have weight (Stob. *Ecl.* i. 19. 4, Diels, *Dox.*, p. 459), referring especially to fire and air (and it is of these, of course, that the soul is composed). It is true also that the Stoic would probably not have said, "Whatever is *σῶμα* is *ὕλη*." Yet he excluded from the somatic only such things as space and time, and neither formed a third category of immaterial entities nor denied to any part of the somatic the essentially material qualities.

It seems necessary to conclude, therefore, that while the Stoics applied *σῶμα* as a philosophic term to a much larger class of existences than that of which modern thinkers use it, and while the emphatic element of its meaning is objective or real existence, yet it also carried with it the implication of materiality. It could be applied to things extremely tenuous and not subject to most of the laws of physics, indeed was the most inclusive term they could use for real existences (being more inclusive, for example, than substance, *οὐσία*), yet affirmed of all such existences materiality.¹

Concerning *πνεῦμα* it is important to notice that the early Stoics still employed the term in its primitive sense of wind² (see analysis of meanings). We have seen that Stobaeus says that Chrysippus defines the ultimate reality as *πνεῦμα* or air endowed with the power of self-motion, being in the same category with aether, the upper air (Stob. *Ecl.* i. 17, Diels, *Dox.*, p. 463). If it is *πνεῦμα* in this sense that is predicated of the human soul, the soul is thereby made fundamentally a physical entity. Or if *πνεῦμα* as applied to the soul is fire, or air on the way to become fire, or, as the expression *σύμφυτον πνεῦμα* suggests, breath or inborn air, it is in that case one of the *στοιχεῖα*, being interconvertible with water and earth, and falling under the category *ὕλη*, and so still more clearly physical. Nor is this conclusion invalidated by

¹ Cf. Hicks in art. "Stoics" in *Encyc. Brit.*, Ed. IX, vol. xxii, p. 592, and Ed. XI, vol. xxv, pp. 943-4.

² With this usage may be compared the use of the word by Pseud.-Hippoc., *περὶ φυσῶν* (Litttré, VI, 94), as a common term, to use modern phraseology, for gas, air, and aether. See *American Journal of Theology*, July, 1914, p. 401.

the fact that the early Stoics probably, as their successors certainly, said that God was *πνεῦμα*. For they also said that he was aether and body, and identified him with the *κόσμος*. In short, if to predicate mental qualities and powers of a subject having material qualities is to be a materialist, this is apparently precisely what the Stoics were. They were, indeed, less pronouncedly materialistic than the Epicureans, in contrast with whom it might almost be said that they were non-materialists. Yet it seems impossible to escape the conclusion that their ultimate reality had a material quality.

But it is even more clear that they ascribed material qualities to the soul,¹ than that they used *σῶμα* in a material sense. Paradoxical as it may seem, of the two predicates of the soul, *σῶμα* and *πνεῦμα*, the latter affirms its materiality more explicitly than the former. For while *σῶμα* can be applied to anything having real existence, being a predicate of both the two *ἀρχαί*, *πνεῦμα* as applied to the soul seems quite clearly to belong to the *ὕλη*. Even the most spiritual reality had its material aspect.

On the other hand, it is equally important to observe that, if we may trust the testimony of Plutarch, Galen, and Stobaeus concerning the views of Chrysippus and the other early Stoics, the *πνεῦμα*, of which, according to these early writers, the soul was composed, was not perishable breath, as Xenophanes held, or inert matter—the passive *ὕλη* of Aristotle—but, while material, also, by virtue of its permeation by *λόγος*, active. The *πνεῦμα* in which, according to Stobaeus, Chrysippus found the ultimate basis of all things is not simply air in motion, as was the *πνεῦμα* of earlier writers, but self-moving. It is true, indeed, and important to note, that self-motion does not thereby become a quality of *πνεῦμα* as such. It is predicated, not of all *πνεῦμα* by an analytic judgment, but of the *πνεῦμα* which is identified with *τὸ ὄν*, and of this by a synthetic judgment. Nor is it wholly clear, by virtue of direct statement or evidence, that *πνεῦμα* in itself implies activity. Yet the soul, which is said to be *πνεῦμα ἐνθερμον*, is active, and it seems probable that the fact of activity is associated in Stoic thought with the

¹ It is instructive to observe that Tertullian not only interprets the Stoics in this way, but himself adopts their view in a sense more obviously material than their own (*Apol.*, chap. 21).

fact that it is *πνεῦμα*, if not also with the self-activity of the *πνεῦμα* which constitutes the *τὸ ὄν*. For before the Stoics *πνεῦμα* signified air *in motion*; the Stoics say that the individual soul is a part of the universal soul (Diog. Laert. vii. 1. 84), and, according to Galen, Chrysippus, affirming that the soul is *πνεῦμα σύμφυτον ἡμῖν*, says also that it extends to all parts of the body, becoming voice, vision, hearing, etc., and in the testicles having a special function. Plutarch, perhaps quoting less literally, says that the Stoics say that there are seven parts of the soul, each of which proceeds from the ruling part and is *πνεῦμα*. Thus sight, hearing, smell, taste, feeling, and voice are each said to be *πνεῦμα*, and the semen (reproductive power) is also said to be *πνεῦμα*, "extending from the ruling part to the testicles." *Πνεῦμα*, therefore, of which the soul consists, though physical, is endowed with vitality—is soul-stuff; or, as it extends from the soul to the organs of sense and reproduction, a vital nervous fluid.

Of the ultimate reality, accordingly, of God, and of the soul, it is affirmed that each is *σῶμα* and each is *πνεῦμα*. As the first affirms materiality without affirming passivity, so the second suggests, or perhaps even affirms, activity without denying, but indeed implying, materiality.

To this evidence derived from quotations from the Stoics themselves there are two pieces of interesting evidence which come to us from outside sources. Menander, a comic poet, a contemporary of Zeno, born later, and dying earlier (342–292), has left us the following lines:

παύσασθε νοῦν λέγοντες· οὐδὲν γὰρ πλεόν
 ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ὁ τῆς τύχης
 (εἰτ' ἐστὶ τοῦτο πνεῦμα θεῖον εἴτε νοῦς)
 τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ κυβερνῶν ἅπαντα καὶ στρέφον
 καὶ σφύζων, ἢ πρόνοια δ' ἢ θνητὴ καπνὸς
 καὶ φλόγαφος. πείσθητε κ' οὐ μέμψεσθέ με·
 πανθ' ὅσα νοοῦμεν ἢ λέγομεν ἢ πράττομεν
 τύχη 'στίν, ἡμεῖς δ' ἐσμὲν ἐπιγεγραμμένοι.

τύχη κυβερνᾷ πάντα, ταύτην καὶ φρένας
 δεῖ καὶ πρόνοιαν τὴν θεὸν καλεῖν μόνην,
 εἰ μὴ τις ἄλλως ὀνόμασιν χαίρει κενόις.
 [Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.*, III, p. 139.]

Cease talking about νοῦς. For no other human νοῦς is there except that of Fortune (be it divine πνεῦμα or νοῦς). This it is that controls and guides and preserves all things, and human foresight is smoke and nonsense. Be persuaded and you will not blame me. All that we think, or say, or do is Fortune, and we are conscripts. . . . Fortune controls everything, and we ought to call it mind and foresight, the only goddess, unless one likes to use mere empty words.

The doctrine of the poet is that men have no control of their lives. The god whom he calls τύχη controls everything; human foresight is all nonsense. Of human νοῦς as controlling anything it is absurd to speak. Parenthetically he remarks, "You may if you like call it [i.e., τύχη] πνεῦμα θεῖον¹ or νοῦς; it matters not; fortune, τύχη, governs everything." The parenthetical remark seems to indicate that some of his contemporaries employed these terms to designate the supreme power that controls all things, and that though these are not the words that he prefers, he will not quarrel with them about words; the fact is that τύχη rules everything.

In the pseudo-Platonic dialogue *Axiochus*, 370 c, occurs the following sentence: οὐ γὰρ δὴ γε θνητὴ γε φύσις τόσον δίουσ' ἂν ἤρατο μεγαθυρίας, ὥστε καταφρονῆσαι μὲν ὑπερβαλλόντων θηρίων βίας, διαπεραιώσασθαι δὲ πελάγη, δείμασθαι δὲ ἄσπῃ, καταστήσασθαι δὲ πολιτείας, ἀναβλέψαι δὲ εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ ἰδεῖν περιφορὰς ἄστρον καὶ δρόμους ἡλίου τε καὶ σελήνης ἀνατολὰς τε καὶ δύσεις ἐκλείψεις τε καὶ ταχείας ἀποκαταστάσεις ἰσημερίας τε καὶ τροπὰς διττάς, καὶ Πλειάδων χειμῶνας καὶ θέρους ἀνέμους, καὶ τὰ τοῦ κόσμου παθήματα παραπῆξασθαι πρὸς τὸν αἰῶνα, εἰ μὴ τι θεῖον ὄντως ἐνὶ πνεῦμα τῇ ψυχῇ, δι' οὗ τὴν τῶν τηλικῶνδε περίνοιαν καὶ γνώσιν ἔσχεν.

For mortal nature at least would not have acquired and maintained so great effectiveness as to despise the violence of overpowering wild beasts, to cross seas, to build cities, to found commonwealths, to look into the heavens and discern orbits and courses of stars and the summer winds, and to chart out for the future the risings and settings and eclipses of sun and moon, and the swift return of the equinox, and the two solstices, and the autumn storms and the summer winds, and the cosmic events, if there were not really in the soul some divine breath, through which it possessed intelligence and knowledge of so great things.

¹ On the meaning of θεῖον in this connection, compare also Stob. *Ecl.* i. 24, Diels, *Dox.*, p. 466: "Ἄστρον δὲ εἶναι φησιν ὁ Ποσειδώνιος σῶμα θεῖον ἐξ αἰθέρος συνεστηκός, λαμπρὸν καὶ πυρῶδες.

There is much difference of opinion respecting the date and authorship of this dialogue, some assigning it to the third, others to the first century B.C. See especially Susemihl, *Geschichte der gr. Lit. in der Alexandrinerzeit*, I, 21 ff., who inclines to the early date, and Heidel, *Pseudo-Platonica*, pp. 15-17, who ascribes the dialogue to the first century. The meaning of the expression is evidently similar to that which it bears in the passage from Menander. But while in Menander *θεῖον πνεῦμα* controls all things, specifically human destiny, in the *Axiochus* it gives intelligence and knowledge and is directly associated with the human *ψυχή*. Both passages testify in a most interesting way to the presence, in Greek thought of the pre-Christian period, of the idea of divine power or influence affecting the mind or destiny of men, but the *Axiochus* passage much more clearly implies the presence of this power in the human soul.

Though the precise expression *θεῖον πνεῦμα* has not been observed in any pre-Christian Stoic writer,¹ we shall see presently that Posidonius, writing about 100 B.C., said that God is *πνεῦμα*. This fact raises the question whether he or some of his fellow-Stoics not only made this affirmation, but employed the phrase *θεῖον πνεῦμα* for the expression of the same thought. But if the expression does come from a Stoic source, then, since Menander at least was a contemporary of Zeno, these passages would seem to prove that the phrase did not arise with Posidonius, but with a Stoic of a much earlier period. On the other hand, the absence of this expression from the vocabulary of the early Stoics, so far as transmitted to us, suggests that it may not have originated with them, but was either coined by others to express the Stoic idea or belonged to the terminology of some other school of thinkers. We are apparently without sufficient data to decide between these several possibilities. We must be content with the evidence, slight, but seemingly decisive, that the phrase *θεῖον πνεῦμα* was already in use about 300 B.C.

It is a separate question precisely how far the term had advanced on the road toward immateriality in the days of Menander. It

¹ In Euripides, *Hipp.* 1391, occurs the expression *ὁ θεῖον ὀσμῆς πνεῦμα*, "O divinely odorous breath." But there is no apparent connection between this phrase and that in Menander or the *Axiochus*.

is not at all impossible that it represents a further movement in that direction than is to be found even in Posidonius, and that not only the Epicurean but the Stoic thought marks a return from the "spiritual" tendency of Plato. Whether so or not it is to be noticed that even in the *Axiochus* it expresses a quantitative rather than a personalized conception. The phrase *θεῖον πνεῦμα* is still without the article and accompanied by *τι* (contrast *τῇ ψυχῇ*) and denotes neither the human spirit nor apparently personal divine spirit but breath (or spirit?) proceeding from God or having divine quality.

THE LATER PRE-CHRISTIAN STOICS

From Panaetius and Posidonius we trace the introduction of certain modifications of the conceptions of the earlier Stoics. Thus Panaetius maintained against his predecessors that the world was imperishable (Diog. Laert. vii. 1. 70; Stob. *Ecl.* i. 414), but on the other hand denied even the limited immortality of the soul which had been held by his predecessors (Cic. *Tusc.* i. 32. 79). Posidonius, though a pupil of Panaetius, assumed an eclectic attitude both toward his teacher and toward the earlier Stoicism. Of the statements expressly ascribed to him by later writers, there is none perhaps more important for our purpose than Stobaeus' (*Ecl.* i. 1, Diels, *Dox.*, p. 302) testimony that he spoke of God as *πνεῦμα νοερόν καὶ πυρώδες* (cf. Galen *Hist. Phil.* 16, Diels, *Dox.*, p. 609). Though it is probable that this expression was derived from the earlier conception that the ultimate basis of existence was *πνεῦμα* or *πῦρ*, yet it is important to observe that this is the earliest extant express statement by a Greek writer that God is *πνεῦμα*.

Plutarch, indeed, ascribes to the Stoics, without mention of individual names, the doctrine that the substance (*οὐσία*) of God is *πνεῦμα νοερόν καὶ πυρώδες* (*Epit.* i. 6, Diels, *Dox.*, p. 292). But the context of the two passages shows that Stobaeus and Plutarch are both quoting from the same passage of Aëtius. There can be no doubt that Stobaeus has preserved in the name Posidonius the correct reading of Aëtius, for which Plutarch has substituted the more general expression "the Stoics." We cannot, therefore, from *this* passage ascribe the doctrine that God is *πνεῦμα* to any writer earlier than Posidonius.

In another passage Aëtius, as attested by both Plutarch and Stobaeus, ascribes to the Stoics the doctrine that God is *νοερόν* *πῦρ τεχνικόν, ὁδῶ βαδίζον ἐπὶ γενέσει κόσμου* *καὶ πνεῦμα μὲν διήκον δι' ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου* (Diels, *Dox.*, p. 306). Diogenes Laertius makes the same statement with so much of the same context as to show that he is drawing from the same source, substituting, however, according to our present text at least, *φύσιν* for *θεόν*. Diog. Laert. vii. 1.84: *Δοκεῖ δὲ αὐτοῖς τὴν μὲν φύσιν εἶναι πῦρ τεχνικόν, ὁδῶ βαδίζον, εἰς γένεσιν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ πνεῦμα πυρροειδὲς καὶ τεχνροειδές*.

On the important question thus raised whether, on the basis of this latter thrice-quoted passage, the use of *πνεῦμα* as a predicate of God can be carried back to the Stoics earlier than Posidonius, the evidence is conflicting. On the one side the examination of the passages in which Diogenes Laertius speaks of "the Stoics" suggests that he does not use the phrase when quoting the view of one author only, but means by it the Stoic writers from Zeno to Posidonius inclusive, or a number of them. On the other hand, though it is probable that *φύσιν* in the Diogenes Laertius passage is a substitute for *θεόν*, we are scarcely justified in making this probability the basis of an argument, and it is possible that by "the Stoics" Aëtius (Diels, *Dox.*, p. 306) means Posidonius in particular, as Plutarch does in the passage above mentioned (Diels, *Dox.*, p. 292). While, therefore, there is a possibility that the older Stoics called God *πνεῦμα*, it remains that we cannot by definite evidence attest this usage for a writer earlier than Posidonius (135-51 B.C.).

The statement that the *ψυχὴ* is *πνεῦμα ἐνθερμον*, which Diogenes Laertius ascribes to Zeno, Antipater, and Posidonius (vii. 1. 84), is paralleled in Stobaeus by the statement that the Stoics call the soul *πνεῦμα νοερόν θερμόν*. Plutarch, however, in his parallel citation from Aëtius omits *νοερόν* (Diels, *Dox.*, p. 388). While, therefore, the doctrine that the soul is *νοερός* is familiar enough, this passage cannot be used as evidence that the Stoics employed the phrase *πνεῦμα νοερόν* of the soul. Stobaeus apparently took it over from the predicates of God.

It is an interesting variation from the statement that the soul is *πνεῦμα ἐνθερμον*, when we find in Plutarch the affirmation that

the Stoics say that πνεῦμα in the bodies of infants becomes ψυχὴ by cooling; and in Hippolytus, apparently quoting the same passage, that they say that the soul arises by the cooling of the air (ἀήρ) that surrounds it. Though by reason of the difference between the statements we are left in doubt whether the Stoics conceived of the soul as produced from πνεῦμα or ἀήρ, it is clear in either case that they held the notion of an airlike soul-stuff.

While the argument from silence is always precarious, it is worthy of notice that neither Diogenes Laertius, Arius Didymus, nor Aëtius expressly ascribes to the Stoics of the middle or later period (Panaetius or later) the statement that God is σῶμα or that the soul is σῶμα.¹

Of somewhat similar character is the argument by which Schmekel, *Die Philosophie der mittleren Stoa*, endeavors to show that the views of Posidonius are extensively reflected in the writings of later Stoics, especially Cicero and Sextus Empiricus, even when these writers make no mention of him, and on this basis ascribes to Posidonius the doctrine that without the soul the body is matter, useless and defiling flesh. The soul is the bearer of life, it is the indwelling divinity; as a part of divinity it has autonomy. This power, as it cannot have originated in conception, so also cannot perish with death. The soul is therefore both pre-existent and immortal; the body is a drag upon it, limiting but unable wholly to destroy its freedom of action (pp. 247 ff.). Whether these ideas were held by Posidonius or not, some of them at least are well

¹ Galen (Diels, *Dox.*, p. 608, 19) says that Zeno says that God is σῶμα; Hippolytus (Diels, *Dox.*, p. 571, 9) ascribes the same to Chrysippus and Zeno; Galen (Diels, *Dox.*, p. 613, 13) ascribes the view that the soul is σῶμα to Zeno and his followers; Nemesius, *Nat. hom.*, pp. 32, 33, 34, says Cleanthes and Chrysippus held this; Tertullian *De anima*, chap. v. ascribes to Zeno the doctrine that the ψυχὴ is σῶμα.

Diog. Laert. vii. 1. 84 says that they (the Stoics) hold that the soul is body; but in 68, without mentioning particular philosophers, he says that they hold that the elements are bodies but that the principles are not bodies. From this one might draw the inference that God is not body, since λόγος, which is identified with θεός, is one of the principles. But the inference is evidently unwarranted; for on the one hand it would equally prove that θάλη is not body, and on the other, it contradicts the explicit testimony of Galen and Hippolytus as concerns the Stoic teaching about God.

Hippolytus (Diels, *Dox.*, p. 571, 17) says that "they" say that the soul is body, leaving it uncertain whether he means the Stoics in general or Chrysippus and Zeno in particular.

attested as belonging to some of the middle and late Stoics, and evidently represent a considerable departure from the views of the early Stoics and a partial return to Platonism. It is probable that with this revival of Platonic ideas which made the soul less material and set it over against the material body, *σῶμα*, is connected the disappearance of *σῶμα* as a predicate of the soul. Though the two senses of *σῶμα* were not identical, the sharp antithesis between *ψυχή* and *σῶμα* in one of these senses made it difficult to affirm *σῶμα* of *ψυχή* in the other sense of the former. With this change, in turn, is associated a reversal of the relationship between *πνεῦμα* and *σῶμα* as predicates of *ψυχή*. *Πνεῦμα* has become less material; the use of *σῶμα* to denote reality with materiality only implied (because whatever is real is material; cf. p. 589) has disappeared, leaving only the use of *σῶμα* in a strictly material sense. The soul, now considered pre-existent and immortal, is no longer called *σῶμα*, nor is God *σῶμα*.

What, then, did the later pre-Christian Stoics do for the word *πνεῦμα*? So far as concerns its use in respect to the human *ψυχή*, they made little advance upon their predecessors, except perhaps to associate the two terms more closely together. Xenophanes had said nearly three centuries before that the *ψυχή* was *πνεῦμα*, thereby emphasizing its perishableness and suggesting that it ceased to exist at the death of the body. The early Stoics denied, indeed, that the soul perished with the separation from the body, giving it a limited existence after death, and Posidonius made the soul immortal. But in neither case is this view based upon the doctrine that the *ψυχή* is *πνεῦμα*, for *πνεῦμα* itself is a material term. Panaetius denied any after-death existence of the soul without denying that the soul was *πνεῦμα*; and Diogenes Laertius (vii. 1. 84) ascribes to the Stoics (without mentioning individual names) the argument that because the soul is *πνεῦμα*, therefore it is body and not immortal (*διὸ καὶ σῶμα εἶναι καὶ μετὰ θάνατον ἐπιμένειν φθαρτὴν δὲ εἶναι*).

Anaximenes in the same century with Xenophanes (the sixth B.C.) had said that the soul was *ἀήρ*. A century later Epicharmus, though not directly predicating *πνεῦμα* of *ψυχή*, employed the former of the soul-stuff, and said that at death the *πνεῦμα* returned

whence it came. Aristotle also used the term to describe the vital (*ἐμψυχος*) and generative material which in his opinion, or in that of some contemporary of his, pervades all plants and animals. The Stoic doctrine of the four elements had been anticipated by Empedocles in the fifth century and by Aristotle in the fourth, and both had made air one of them and fire another. When, therefore, the early Stoics described the soul as *πνεῦμα ἐνθερμον*, and then insisted with emphasis that, being *πνεῦμα*, it was also *σῶμα*, they probably meant by the former term to deny that it was mere passive *ὕλη*, while by the latter they affirmed that it was material. That they used *ἀήρ* when enumerating the elements, and *πνεῦμα* when predicating this same element of the soul was perhaps because of the usage which we find in Epicharmus, perhaps because of some association with *πνεῦμα* meaning breath, or with the phrases for death in which *πνεῦμα*, and not *ἀήρ*, was used, perhaps especially because *πνεῦμα* conveyed, or suggested, as *ἀήρ* did not, the idea of activity, which they ascribed to the soul.

Πνεῦμα does indeed less distinctly express transitoriness than when Xenophanes said that the soul was *πνεῦμα*, meaning that it was as perishable as breath; but it is no less material when used by the Stoics of the soul than it is in Epicharmus. It is the Stoics who say that the soul is an exhalation or vapor (Euseb. *P.E.* xv. 20, 2, Diels, *Dox.*, p. 470) and that it is nourished by the blood (Galen, p. 248 M), joining with the latter statement the assertion that it is *πνεῦμα*. If in any respect the Stoics have spiritualized the conception of the soul, it is mainly or only by affirming the same things both of the soul and of God, viz., that both were both *πνεῦμα* and *σῶμα*, and by the fact that this term *πνεῦμα* suggested activity more definitely than it had done at an earlier time.

On the other hand, Posidonius was the first whom we definitely know to have used the word *πνεῦμα* as a predicate of God. And in this perhaps he contributed indirectly to the ultimate development of the idea that God is immaterial spirit. Yet that he had not himself arrived at this thought is made probable by his coupling with *πνεῦμα* the adjective *πυρῶδες*. What he has done by predicating *πνεῦμα* of God is what Xenophanes did in applying *πνεῦμα* to the soul, viz., joined two terms together ready for the

time when the predicate *πνεῦμα* should acquire a more distinctly non-material sense. *Πνεῦμα* as applied both to the soul and to God was still stuff, not God, and ultimately, though not emphatically, material.

Σάρξ is not a frequent term in either the early or later pre-Christian Stoic writers. When it occurs, it is used in a purely physical sense, signifying, as shown in the analysis of meanings, the soft part of the body or the body as a whole. *Σῶμα* is the common term for the body, but neither *σῶμα* nor *σάρξ* in any passage definitely referable to the pre-Christian period bears an ethical sense. For though, according to Seneca (*Epist.* 92. 10), Posidonius says *inutilis caro et fluida receptandis tantum cibis habilis*, such a statement involves only ordinary anti-Epicureanism, not a philosophic doctrine of the evil of the flesh. Whether the argument of Schmekel that the conception of the body as a drag upon the soul, as found in Seneca and Sextus Empiricus, is derived by them from Posidonius is conclusive or not is immaterial at this point, for the doctrine of even these later writers does not, in any instance, amount to an ascription of ethical quality either to the *σῶμα* or to the *σάρξ*.

CRITICAL NOTES

PECCA FORTITER

One often sees the above words quoted in Roman Catholic and Episcopal papers. There must be thousands who have read but little more of Luther than the words, "Sin boldly." They have also been much exploited by Catholic and Anglican controversialists, and are sufficient, of course, to condemn Luther immediately as a reprobate. Luther is partly to blame for this, for he sometimes writes paradoxically and with provoking exaggeration. He is one who cannot be judged by an occasional extravagance, whether in earnest or in joke, but by the general trend of his deliberate public utterances. It is not the intention here to go into his doctrine of sin and salvation, of faith and good works, but just to look for a moment on this now famous passage.

While Luther was in the Wartburg, Melanchthon in Wittenberg was beating the wings of his sensitive soul, inflamed by the charge of imaginary sins, against the cage of conscience. Especially was he concerned over the alleged sins of the celibacy of monks and of priests and of communion in one kind. In his disputation of July 19, 1521, Carlstadt had demanded as a right the restitution of the cup to the laity. Its withholding had been represented as a sin. Melanchthon had been worried for fear he had been guilty of this sin, and he had been apparently burdening his righteous soul with other fictitious sins. He wrote to Luther in his anxiety. This letter is lost, or we might have a better clue to explain the rough manner by which Luther shakes him out of his anxiety. That shaking is done in a Latin letter, preserved to us (De Wette 2, 34; Enders 3, 205-10), of August 1, 1521—a private letter to an oversensitive soul and in Latin. The words, shocking to us, occur in the latter part of the letter, which I translate.

Concerning both kinds in the Eucharist I do not argue from the example, but from the word, of Christ. For there is nothing [in any specific word of Christ] to show that those receiving one species either do or do not sin; but this moves me that Christ demanded neither. So neither is baptism required by necessity, if a tyrant or the world should prohibit water. So the violence of persecution separates man and woman, whom nevertheless God forbids to be separated, for neither do they consent to be separated [and so there is no sin in such cases]. So neither do pious hearts consent to be deprived of the other kind [in the Eucharist]. Those who consent and approve are papists, not Christians, and who will deny that they sin?

When therefore it is not demanded by necessity, and when a tyrant impels, I do not see how they sin receiving one kind. For who can take away by force the tyrant being unwilling? So hitherto nothing impels except the reason which says that the institution of Christ is not held. But the Scripture defines nothing, without which we cannot pronounce anything a sin. It [the Eucharist] is instituted of Christ, but there is a free permission, which cannot be confined in whole or in part.

For what would be done if that happens which happened to Donatus the martyr, that certain could not partake, the cup being broken and spilled, when there could not be at hand other wine, and many similar cases? In short, because Scripture does not say this to be sin, I shall not assert it to be sin.

Of course you should keep intact the institution of Christ. For it was this which I was thinking of urging before all things if I might have returned to you. For we have knowledge of this tyrant, and we can resist him unless we are compelled to receive so much the other kind.

But I will not celebrate a private mass to all eternity [for that would be a real sin]. Pray let us beseech the Lord that he hasten to give to us his larger spirit. For I fear the Lord will quickly visit Germany, as its unbelief, impiety, and hatred of the gospel deserve. And this stroke will be imputed to us, because as heretics we may have provoked God. We shall be hated of men and rejected by the people, they will get hold of excuses for their sins and justify themselves and will approve the bad and become good neither by kindness nor by wrath. The will of the Lord, be done, be done—Amen.

If you are a preacher of grace, preach a real grace, not a fictitious one. God does not make saved sinners fictitiously. Be a sinner and sin boldly [hold yourself for a great sinner], but believe more boldly and rejoice in Christ, who is victor over sin, death, and the world. There is to be sin as long as we are thus [that is, in this life there is bound to be sin, even in Christians, as both the Roman church and the Reformers held]; for this life is not the habitation of righteousness, but we look for, says Peter, a new heaven and a new earth wherein dwelleth righteousness. It suffices that through the riches of the glory of God we know the Lamb who taketh away the sin of the world, from him sin cannot tear us away, even a thousand, even though we should commit fornication or murder a thousand times in one day. Do you think that the price and redemption for our sins by such a Lamb is so small?

Pray boldly, for you are the boldest sinner [this to shake Melanchthon out of his scruples over fictitious sins, restore his sanity of mind, him who was one of the holiest and most conscientious of men; that he did not take offense at the letter shows that he understood Luther better than his critics].

It is as though Luther said: Melanchthon, don't let Carlstadt worry you over the fictitious sin of celebrating the Supper in one kind. We have a Savior who saves from real sin. You know all Christians sin. The Savior is greater than the sin, and even grievous sin cannot drive

us from his love, nor even from salvation if—which is to be understood—we repent and believe. Live boldly and faithfully, then, for you and all are great sinners, though everybody knows you are a saint.

This famous passage then, has nothing to do with Luther's doctrine of faith and good works, with the relation of a Christian man to the law or to morality, with the doctrine of sanctification—but it is an effort in a confidential letter to console and save an aching, anxious heart by an exaggerated paradox at the bottom of which was a truth great and precious, and the healthful intention and meaning of which was immediately perceived by the recipient of the letter, who otherwise would have repudiated Luther instantly. You are worrying yourself sick over sins fictitious or real. Don't be a fool, my dear Melancthon. Of course you are a great sinner, as Paul confessed, and every true Christian knows himself to be. But remember that God's grace is greater than all our sins, and it is real grace for real sins.

What was Luther's attitude toward a careless Christian who thinks he can sin that grace may abound, who feels no drawing to a holy life, is an entirely different matter and one on which I could quote passages which place Luther in an entirely different light from that expressed by the sharp condemnation by Catholic and Anglican commentators of the epistle of August 1, 1521.

Another passage which has greatly damaged Luther's reputation in the house of his enemies occurs in *De captivitate babylonica*, 1520. I quote from the translation of Buchheim, in Wace and Buchheim, *Luther's Primary Works* (London and Philadelphia, 1885), p. 184.¹

We see then how rich a Christian or baptized man is; since, even if he would, he cannot lose his salvation by any sins, however great, unless he refuses to believe, for no sins whatever can condemn him, but unbelief alone. All other sins, if faith in the Divine promise made to the baptized man stands firm or is restored, are swallowed up in a moment through that same faith; yea, through the truth of God, because he cannot deny himself if thou confess him, and cleave believing to his promise. Whereas contrition and confession of sins, and satisfaction for sins, and every effort that can be devised by men, will desert thee at thy need, and will make thee more miserable than ever, if thou forgettest this divine truth and puffest thyself up with such things as these. For whatever work is wrought apart from faith in the truth of God is vanity and vexation of spirit.

It is evident that this passage may be innocent if it means one thing, or it may be vicious if it means another. To find what it really does mean, we must consult the context. What is Luther talking about?

¹ See *Luthers Werke*, ed. Clemen (Bonn, 1912), i, 461.

What does the whole section teach? It occurs in the section on baptism, and is part of a discussion of how to retain the favor of God for sins committed after baptism. Luther and his opponents both agreed that no sin committed by a baptized man would necessarily damn him. The startling proposition that no sins can condemn the baptized man, except unbelief, was equally received by the Roman church, but the church interpreted belief and unbelief in a way different from Luther. The church said that the mortal sins you have committed after baptism will condemn you unless you have faith, meaning unless you return to the church, confess your sins to the priest, receive absolution, and do the necessary works of satisfaction. Luther said that the sins a baptized man commits after baptism will condemn him, unless he has faith, meaning unless he return with a true and living faith to his Savior, to the promise given him in baptism. Luther says in the context, speaking of the true method of receiving grace after baptism, that the true method is to go back and take hold of the divine promise. He who believes and is baptized, shall be saved. "This promise is to be infinitely preferred to the whole display of works, vows, religious orders, and whatever has been introduced by the invention of man; on this promise depends our whole salvation, and we must take heed to exercise faith in it. Unless this faith exists and is applied, baptism profits us nothing; nay, it is hurtful to us." But this doctrine that a sinner is restored, not by the works of the church, but by faith in the original promise of God, "ought to have been studiously inculcated in the people by preaching." "Men ought to have been continually reminded of their baptism; faith ought to have been called forth and nourished." "Thus when we rise out of our sins"—not when we keep in our sins and go on sinning, but—"when we rise out of our sins and exercise penitence we are simply reverting to the efficacy of baptism and to faith in it, whence we had fallen; and return to the promise then made to us, but which we had abandoned through our sins." What can be plainer than this? The man sinned and lost his faith, lost his hold on the promise. But let him return to faith, and he will return to righteousness. For he goes on: "Thus it will be of no little profit to a penitent first to recall to mind his baptism, and to remember with confidence that divine promise which he had deserted; rejoicing that still he is in a fortress of safety, in that he has been baptized; and detesting his own wicked ingratitude in having fallen away from the faith and truth of baptism." Now if this is all true—and Luther believed it to be true both from the Scripture and his own experience—then he feels justified in the conclusion: "How rich a Christian or baptized man is, since even if he would he cannot lose his salvation by any

sins however great, unless he refuse to believe, for no sins whatever can condemn him but unbelief alone. All other sins, if faith in the divine promise stand firm or is restored, are swallowed up in a moment through that same faith." It is evident from the context that Luther does not mean to say that mortal sins committed by a Christian do not bring him into condemnation, for his whole thought presupposes it; but he means that those sins cannot finally condemn him unless they are the expression of a deliberate rejection of God. If he has not lost his faith in God, he will "return," "rise out of his sins" and receive free forgiveness. His sins are "swallowed up" by God's mercy through faith. The promise remains whether the Christian commits sins or not. But it will avail for him only if he returns with living faith. But Luther distinctly allows that if he does not return he will perish in his sins. "It is a pernicious error," he says in the context, "to suppose that the virtue of baptism has been brought to an end by sin, and that this ship has been dashed to pieces [that is, the ship of God's peace offered to us in baptism, especially the promise, Believe and be baptized, and thou shalt be saved]. The ship remains all solid and indestructible, and can never be broken up into different planks. In it, we all are conveyed who are carried to the port of salvation, since it is the truth of God giving promises in the sacraments. What certainly does happen is that many rashly leap out of the ship into the sea and perish; these are they who abandon faith in the promise and rush headlong into sin. But the ship itself abides, and passes on safely in its course; and any man who by the peace of God returns to the ship will be borne on to life, not on a plank, but on the solid ship itself. Such a man is he who returns by faith to the fixed and abiding promises of God."

In fact the situation was simply this: The church had placed herself between the sinner and salvation, and said: For the mortal sins you have committed after baptism you must make satisfaction to us. You have forfeited salvation. Do penance, give alms, make satisfaction in this and that way. Luther cries out to the church: That man has not forfeited salvation, if he will return in faith to God. He need have no care for your penances or satisfactions. Believe and be baptized, and thou shalt be saved. He has been baptized, now let him come back to faith. And faith with Luther was an active thing, the spring of a new and regenerate life, which could not co-exist with mortal sin; though he and all the Reformers had a vivid sense of sin in believers.

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RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE

THE WELLHAUSEN VOLUME¹

The seventieth birthday of Julius Wellhausen was marked by the presentation of this volume of essays by his friends and pupils. The contributors are twenty-two in number, representing Germany, England (both Oxford and Cambridge), Denmark, Holland, Switzerland, France, and our own country. Smend and Driver, who had promised to take part, were called out of this life before they had completed their essays. The names of the contributors are all well known to biblical scholars and the volume is striking evidence of the predominance of the Wellhausen point of view in the Old Testament science of today.

The variety of subjects in a volume of this kind makes it difficult to give an adequate idea of its contents within small compass. The matters treated are mostly within the Old Testament department. But Albrecht edits a mediaeval Jewish poem; Bevan discusses the tradition of Mohammed's night ride to heaven; Frankenberg treats of a topic in comparative grammar, and Gray investigates the proper names in the Aramaic papyri from Elephantine. The conclusion of the book is made by a list of Wellhausen's publications. Including book notices these are 235 in number, and a glance at the list shows how influential many of them have been and still are.

Two of the articles deal with lexicography, one by Buhl on the stem לרץ or לרץ, the other by Ludwig Köhler on the defects of the Hebrew lexicons. The latter gives a specimen of what a lexicon article ought to be and will command general approval, though the lexicon-makers may think the ideal beyond their reach. In text criticism we have Bertholet's notes on Deutero-Isaiah, and the elaborate reconstruction of the Song of Deborah by Haupt. This author thinks that Deborah was the name of a town rather than of a woman. His notes on the poem display the wealth of learning to which we are accustomed in works from him.

¹ *Studien zur semitischen Philologie und Religionsgeschichte Julius Wellhausen zum siebenzigsten Geburtstag am 17. Mai 1914 gewidmet von Freunden und Schülern, und in ihrem Auftrag herausgegeben von Karl Marti.* Mit dem Bildnis von J. Wellhausen. Giessen: Töpelmann, 1914. Pp. xii+388. Large octavo. The book forms Beiheft 27 of the *Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft*. Unbound. M. 18.

Literary criticism is represented by Budde's article on the Book of Amos. He argues acutely that Amos 7:10-17 is only a fragment from a more extended history of Amos' career. Its original once stood at the opening of the book. Excised when the book was incorporated with the rest of the Twelve, a part of it was rescued by an editor and inserted where we now find it. Cornill resumes his discussion with Sellin at two points. One is Gen. 49:10 f., and maintains his ground against the assertion that vs. 11 refers to the Messiah. The other is the Yahwistic Decalogue (Exod., chap. 34) which he thinks easily arranges itself in five pairs of commands. Guthe's contribution on "Sign and Prediction in Isa. 7:14-17" stands on the border-line between literary criticism and Old Testament theology. Contrary to exegetical tradition, he holds that Immanuel was not intended to encourage the people, but rather the reverse: "Though the young woman who bears a son [in the near future] may call his name Immanuel, yet the boy must eat milk and honey [the product of a land given over to pasture] until he becomes able to refuse the evil and choose the good."

Elhorst examines afresh the Israelite mourning customs and is not satisfied that they can be wholly derived from worship of the *manes* or dread of the ghosts. He thinks that gods of the underworld (who are in fact demons of death) were in popular belief associated with the spirits of the dead. For this he is able to cite abundant parallels in other religions. Von Gall traces the title of "King" as applied to Yahweh and finds it to be Canaanite in origin. The Canaanite cities had kings, as we know, long before Israel adopted the monarchy. To them it was natural to designate the tutelary deity as king—Melkarth of Tyre is the familiar example. It is not improbable, therefore, that the Jebusite divinity who was displaced by Yahweh (Zedek may have been his proper name) was called King of Jerusalem and that his title passed to his successor. Lods presents us with an ingenious theory concerning the Angel of Yahweh who appears in some of the early narratives as the mysterious double of Yahweh himself. He finds the explanation of the puzzling phenomenon in the well-known belief in the external soul. The demonstration is not quite convincing, but the article is extremely suggestive. Marti, besides editing the volume and compiling the index, presents us with an article on some passages in Zechariah. Steuernagel discusses the divine name "Yahweh God of Israel," of which he finds traces in early documents. Rahlfs contributes the bibliography of Wellhausen's works.

This notice gives a very imperfect idea of the richness of the volume. No Old Testament scholar can safely neglect it.

UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY
NEW YORK, N.Y.

HENRY PRESERVED SMITH

A COMMENTARY ON THE PSALMS

Those of us whose "helps" for the study of the Psalms included only Perowne, Franz Delitzsch, and Hupfeld congratulate younger scholars on the literature at their command. Within the last fifteen years we have received the commentaries of Baethgen, Duhm, and Briggs, the translations of Gunkel, Kautzsch, and Staerk, and a number of monographs on special topics. Now comes Professor Kittel with an extended commentary, including a new translation.¹ The series of which it is a part is apparently intended to present a somewhat conservative view of the Old Testament and to form a counterpart to Zahn's *Commentary on the New Testament*.

Professor Kittel is well known to biblical scholars in this country, and it will sufficiently characterize the present work to say that it displays the author's usual careful scholarship and cautious judgment. His plan is, after an introduction treating of the composition of the Psalter, to give a translation of each psalm with brief critical notes and to follow it with a somewhat extended exposition of the thought of the writer. The only question which the reviewer is inclined to raise is whether there is not too much matter. A good deal of what is here said ought to be obvious to the student; homiletical material has no place in a commentary; in a book of devotion there is no need of the critical remarks. However, the publisher probably knows his constituency, and it may be a little ungracious to complain that we have too much of a good thing.

The mediating position of the author is indicated in the preface, where he says that neither the late date assigned the Psalter by one scholar (evidently Duhm) nor the resolution of the pious emotions of the Psalmists into feelings of the community which characterizes another

¹ *Die Psalmen übersetzt und erklärt*. Von D. Rudolf Kittel, Professor der Theologie in Leipzig. Erste und zweite Auflage. Leipzig: A. Deichertsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1914. The book forms Band XIII of the *Kommentar zum Alten Testament*, herausgegeben von Professor D. Ernst Sellin. Pp. lx+522, royal 8vo. Unbound, M. 12; bound, M. 14.

(Baethgen) seems to him to advance the true understanding of the book. But that he is far from being a tenacious defender of tradition is evident from his whole treatise. Although he quotes with disapproval Wellhausen's dictum: "It is no longer a question how many psalms are pre-exilic, but the question is whether any are pre-exilic," yet he admits that the bulk of the book is postexilic. He does not think that Ps. 18 (long obstinately asserted by conservative scholars to be Davidic) is of early date, and he has no hesitation in dating some of the compositions in the Maccabean period. On the other hand he argues from Babylonian and Egyptian parallels that religious lyrics were used in the public worship in Israel from very early times. The possibility cannot be denied, but the scattered hints in the earlier literature do not warrant us in supposing either that the music to which David danced so excitedly was composed to express the calm and elevated sentiments of our Psalter or that the songs at the sanctuaries which Amos denounced were such as the Jewish church canonized in this book.

Professor Kittel uses commendable freedom in his treatment of the text. Almost every psalm shows emendations based either on the ancient versions or on conjecture. If he shows less originality than Duhm—less boldness, some would say—this will hardly be imputed as a fault. In cases where the text is hopelessly corrupt he does not hesitate to confess the fact. The amount of emendation is considerably more than is given in his edition of the Hebrew Bible. Conjectural emendation is confessedly a matter of taste, and not all the corrections here made will command general approval. For example, the enigmatical *נשקו בר נשקו* of Ps. 2:12 is made into *נשקו בגליו* (the *גילו* being taken from vs. 11). But is there any other instance in the Old Testament where men kiss Yahweh's feet?

The author has no hesitation in dividing some of the Psalms between two writers, though rather curiously he does not think that Pss. 9 and 10 are one composition. He follows others in making Ps. 19 two separate lyrics, finds two in Ps. 27 and also in Ps. 127. As a matter of course he unites Pss. 42 and 43 in one. The Royal Psalm (20) he dates in the time of the Deuteronomic movement, that is, between Hezekiah and Josiah. The messianic reference of Ps. 72 is not admitted, and the poem is supposed to be a coronation ode of Josiah. In Ps. 2 "the messianic must be united with the historical exposition," which I understand to mean that the primary reference is to a king of Judah (Josiah probably), but with a secondary prophetic or typical meaning under the surface. The date of Ps. 110 is supposed to be the time when the priestly preroga-

tives of the king were contested by the hierarchy—say during the reign of Uzziah. How precarious such a hypothesis is I need hardly point out.

Particular topics of interest are discussed in *excursus* scattered through the book, one on alphabetic psalms, one on the frequent protestations of innocence, one on the eschatological psalms, which includes those generally classed as messianic, one on the opposition of parties, and others. An appendix contains an extended exposition of the doctrine of retribution in the Psalter, and prints *in extenso* Babylonian and Egyptian parallels.

In spite of its too great diffuseness the book is likely to be useful to students and pastors.

HENRY PRESERVED SMITH

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RECENT BOOKS ON JESUS

The latest works dealing with Jesus are either new editions of already well-known books or discussions of some special topic connected with his career and teaching. The third edition of Wernle's compact and excellent brochure on the sources of information for a study of the life of Jesus¹ is an unaltered reproduction of the previous edition. Heitmüller's *Jesus*² is an expansion of the same author's article "Jesus Christus" in the third volume of the encyclopaedia *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*. The larger works of Schweitzer³ and Weinel are also well known, though the latter now appears for the first time in an English translation.⁴

As compared with the previous edition, Schweitzer's book contains two hundred and forty additional pages. The first sixteen chapters of the earlier work are reproduced without any important alterations. Chap. xvii, treating "Aramäisches, Rabbinisches, Buddhistisches," has received extensive additions. Chap. xviii has been slightly expanded by references to M. Friedländer and to psychiatric studies regarding Jesus.

¹ *Die Quellen des Lebens Jesu*. Von Paul Wernle. 3. Aufl. Tübingen: Mohr, 1913. 76 pages. M. 0.80.

² *Jesus*. Von W. Heitmüller. Tübingen: Mohr, 1913. vii+184 pages. M. 2.

³ *Geschichte der Leben-Jesu-Forschung*. Von Albert Schweitzer. Zweite, neu bearbeitete und vermehrte Auflage des Werkes "Von Reimarus zu Wrede." Tübingen: Mohr, 1913. xii+659 pages. M. 13.60.

⁴ *Jesus in the Nineteenth Century and After*. By Heinrich Weinel and Alban G. Widgery. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1914. x+458 pages.

Chap. xix has been broken up and enlarged to form three chapters, though in substance their content is the same as before. Then follow three wholly new chapters: "The Latest Criticism of Jesus' Historicity"; "Discussions about Jesus' Historicity"; and "1907-1912." The concluding section is former chap. xx expanded from six to twelve pages. Schweitzer's method and point of view are the same as before, consequently the value of his new volume lies mainly in the three new chapters which summarize the literature—more particularly German works—relating to Jesus and the Gospels appearing between the years 1906 and 1912.

Schweitzer has also issued separately a monograph dealing with the question of Jesus' sanity.¹ Attention is devoted mainly to the writings of De Loosten, Hirsch, and Binet-Sanglé, who accuse Jesus of mental derangement in one form or another. A statement of the position of the alienists is followed by a criticism of their method and results. Schweitzer is confident that Jesus, though holding to an emphatically eschatological and apocalyptic interpretation of his own messiahship, cannot be charged with suffering from any mental disorder.

The volume by Weinel and Widgery is essentially an English rendering of the former's well-known *Jesus im neunzehnten Jahrhundert*, to which the translator has added an Introduction and several paragraphs treating more fully the writings of English, American, French, and Italian scholars. While the book is a survey of opinion upon the life of Jesus, it is a work of a distinctly different type from Schweitzer's. It is much less full in statistical matters, and the points selected for emphasis are quite different. Weinel has no sympathy with Schweitzer's representation of Jesus as an apocalyptic visionary. On the contrary, Jesus was "a prophet, inspired with love for his race, and with anger against its seducers; he was not a man occupied with speculations concerning an approaching end. To fail to recognize what in him was the first, the inspiring, the really creative, is to look at things upside down" (p. 104). Accordingly less stress is laid upon Jesus' own consciousness, and more attention is given to the position which various types of thinking have taken with respect to Jesus' significance for the religion of mankind. Although the discussion aims to present Jesus as a historical figure rather than as an object of theological speculation, the writers are not so much interested in the details of his life as in the significance of his religious personality. This is estimated in terms of modern

¹ *Die psychiatrische Beurteilung Jesu: Darstellung und Kritik.* Von Albert Schweitzer. Tübingen: Mohr, 1913. vii+46 pages. M. 1.50.

Ritschlianism, which gives us the so-called "liberal" Jesus who "speaks as 'the last and highest' and is the guide of ages and peoples to God" (p. 360).

Heitmüller's book contains, first, the reprint of his encyclopaedia article dealing with the purely historical question of what can be known about Jesus on the basis of critical research, and, secondly, an address on "Jesus of Nazareth and the Way to God," delivered at the seventeenth session of the Swiss Christian Students' Conference, March 11, 1913. A few weeks later (April 5), at a meeting of the Prussian Chamber of Deputies, the president of the Consistory of Cassel, which includes Marburg (where Heitmüller is a teacher) under its jurisdiction, read some sentences from Heitmüller's article and alleged that the Marburg professor's statements were so radical as to make him almost liable to trial for blasphemy. Heitmüller defends himself by placing before the public in this more easily accessible form the full text of his article and his address to the Swiss students. There is nothing startlingly novel in either part of his book. The dictionary article has been generally recognized as an excellent summary of critical results from the standpoint of historical research as represented by the "liberal" school. The problem of Jesus' significance for faith is also treated in the usual way. It is Jesus' own personal religion phrased in terms of communion with the Father that is said to make him supremely helpful as an aid to men in their search after God.

Another book which may be mentioned in this connection is Martin's *Life of Jesus*.¹ It is, however, more truly an estimate of Jesus than a "life." It is popular in character, having originally been prepared as a series of addresses for the New York Society for Ethical Culture. The author is familiar with the general results of critical study upon the Gospels. While accepting these results he is not an iconoclast, but aims at a constructive estimate of Jesus' worth in terms of a strictly ethical evaluation.

Some slight discussion still revolves about the question of Jesus' historicity. The most extended recent treatment of this subject is by Conybeare.² This, however, is not a comprehensive discussion of the whole problem, but a trenchant criticism of the views of the three

¹ *The Life of Jesus in the Light of Higher Criticism*. By Alfred W. Martin. New York: Appleton, 1913. vii+280 pages. \$1.50.

² *The Historical Christ: or, An Investigation of the Views of Mr. J. M. Robertson, Dr. A. Drews, and Professor W. B. Smith*. By Fred C. Conybeare. Chicago: Open Court, 1914. xi+235 pages.

persons mentioned in the title. He deals most unmercifully with their vagaries, subjecting their contentions to scientific criticism and not infrequently holding them up to ridicule. The author merely aims to show that his opponents have not proved their case, and he concludes that their hypothesis "offends every principle of philology, of comparative mythology, and of textual criticism; it bristles with difficulties; and, if no better demonstration of it can be offered, it deserves to be summarily dismissed" (p. 223).

The pamphlets of Klostermann¹ and Hammer² need only a passing notice. The former is a statement and criticism of the views of Kalthoff, Jensen, and Drews. Hammer is a Jewish writer who defends Jesus' existence, but would reconstruct the history of his career to read very differently from the accounts given in the Gospels. He was really the Samaritan instigator of sedition mentioned by Josephus, *Antiquities*, XVIII, iv, 1. The Romans suppressed the disturbance by putting the leader to death, but the Jews had no part in the proceedings. Hammer's reconstruction is too purely hypothetical to have any scientific value.

The eschatology of Jesus is newly treated in a volume by Jackson.³ After some introductory remarks, recent opinion as to the sources of information for the life of Jesus is summarized. Adopting as a working basis the so-called two-document theory, the author proceeds to expound the content of Jesus' eschatological teaching. Jesus is found to have interpreted his mission in terms of the apocalyptic hope, identifying himself with the Son of Man to come upon the clouds in glory. But Jesus also had a "spiritual" conception of his mission; he believed himself to stand in a filial relation to God which was unique in degree and probably also unique in kind. The author next examines the eschatological teaching of the Old Testament, of the Apocalyptic Literature, and of Judaism in Jesus' day. These teachings are then compared with Jesus' ideas. He is found to agree with his contemporaries in advocating the notion of the apocalyptic Son of Man, but he differed from them in identifying himself with this Son of Man and in his teaching that the Messiah was to suffer. The discussion closes with three brief chap-

¹ *Die neuesten Angriffe auf die Geschichtlichkeit Jesu.* Von E. Klostermann. Tübingen: Mohr, 1912. 52 pages. M. 1.40.

² *Traktat vom Samaritanermessias: Studien zur Frage der Existenz und Abstammung Jesu.* Von Heinrich Hammer. Bonn: Georgi, 1913. 101 pages. M. 2.50.

³ *The Eschatology of Jesus.* By H. Latimer Jackson. New York: Macmillan, 1913. xix+378 pages. \$1.50.

ters treating the person of Jesus, "husk and kernel" in his eschatological teaching, and the eschatological survivals in the creeds. The book is not so much a contribution to the solution of the main problems as it is a summary and reassertion of views held by the representatives of the "both-and" school, as Schweitzer terms it. The crucial question as to the influence exerted upon our gospel records by the evolution in eschatological thinking among the early interpreters of Jesus is scarcely recognized.

The miracles of Jesus are the subject of a work by Davies.¹ In the first part the data are assembled. In the second part the materials are interpreted to show that the evidence in support of the miracles "is sufficient to justify the belief that they happened, speaking generally, as recorded" (p. 234).

Of the two recent books on the parables of Jesus, Browne's² may be termed critical and Murray's³ homiletical. The latter is a series of sermonettes on various parables, classified under five main topics: "Grace in the Individual Life"; "Pharisaism the Foe"; "Fellowship with God the Ideal"; "The Course of the Kingdom"; "Discipline and Judgment." Perhaps the most important phase of Browne's discussion is his criticism of Jülicher's distinction between parable and allegory. Jülicher, it will be remembered, affirmed that Jesus used parables but not allegories, and that his aim always was to clarify rather than to obscure his teaching. Consequently allegorical explanations which have been attached to such parables as that of the Tares, or statements that he used parables to hide his teaching (e.g., Mark 4:11 ff.), come from the early church and not from Jesus. Browne rejects both of these positions, in the first place asserting that Jesus did employ allegory, and, secondly, interpreting the language of passages like Mark 4:11 ff. in a way to take out of them altogether the notion of hidden teaching. The interpretation, particularly on the second point, is very doubtful and approaches dangerously near to special pleading.

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¹ *The Miracles of Jesus: A Study of the Evidence.* By E. O. Davies. New York: Hodder and Stoughton, 1913. xi+240 pages. \$1.25.

² *The Parables of the Gospels in the Light of Modern Criticism.* By Laurence E. Browne. Cambridge: University Press, 1913. vi+91 pages. 2s. 6d.

³ *Jesus and His Parables.* By George Murray. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1914. viii+305 pages. 4s. 6d.

SACRAMENTALISM AND MYSTICISM IN EARLY CHRISTIANITY

Two recent books—one by W. M. Groton,¹ dean of the Divinity School of the Protestant Episcopal Church in Philadelphia, and the other by W. F. Cobb,² rector of St. Ethelburga's in the City of London—deal with certain features of early Christianity in the light of the religious status of the contemporary Greco-Roman world. The former discusses mainly the sacramental phases of the new religion, while the latter is chiefly concerned with its mystical basis.

Groton's main topics are the primitive cult meal, the Gnostic eucharist, the eucharistic rite in the mystery-religions, the eucharist—pagan and Christian, the eucharist in the New Testament, and the eucharist in the primitive church. In contrast with Clemen and others who deny that sacramentalism occupied any large place within the earliest Christianity, Groton finds it prominently present from the start. Nor was it introduced from the pagan cults. The mystery-religions, so he thinks, had no influential existence in the first century A.D., and when they did come into contact with Christianity its sacramental features preserved their own distinctiveness. Ultimately they go back to Jesus himself; they were passed on to Paul by the primitive church, and were perpetuated by the expanding church of the apostolic age. While the Roman church is admitted to have overstressed sacraments, Protestantism is thought to have gravely erred in emphasizing so pre-eminently the individualistic side of religion—"when all recognize that the sacramental side of religion is as essential to its complete efficacy as the individualistic, the hope of Church unity will be bright." The author looks for the realization of his hope in a purified Romanism, which with the advancing light of knowledge is nowadays rapidly sloughing off the elements of paganism which it absorbed in post-apostolic times. As this process nears completion Catholicism becomes once more comprehensive in fact as well as in theory and the term Protestantism will no longer be needed (p. 197). The book throughout is conspicuously lacking in scientific historical method.

For Cobb, mystical experience is the essential thing in religion—this is *life*, while doctrinal postulates and ecclesiastical rites are *form*. He does not wish to reject the form but to make it effective by translating

¹ *The Christian Eucharist and the Pagan Cults*. By W. M. Groton. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1914. xiii+203 pages. \$1.20.

² *Mysticism and the Creed*. By W. F. Cobb. New York: Macmillan, 1914. xxxi+559 pages. \$3.00.

it into terms of the individual's inner experience. From this standpoint he proceeds to estimate the Apostles' Creed: "At the back of this creed and of every creed, at the back of every utterance in the Bible, at the back of all philosophies, and of all religious practices, there reposes a revelation given at first-hand to him who in the last analysis is responsible for the creed or parable or philosophy or ceremony" (pp. 41 f.). But the essence of the "revelation" is the experience, of which the *form* may be a very imperfect or, indeed, a wholly inadequate, expression.

Each article of the Apostles' Creed is taken up in turn and interpreted from this point of view. We may illustrate the procedure from the treatment of the "Third Article"—the Virgin-birth. The author rejects at the start all notion of miracle in the traditional sense of the term. Nobody "with a tincture of modern thought" can any longer believe in the miraculous; the law of causality "rules without exception in the whole field of our experience" (p. vii). Hence the significance of the Virgin-birth is not to be sought in any supposed occurrence of the event, but in the mystic experiential fact which the story of the Virgin-birth symbolizes. The "experiential fact"—even though there never was any corresponding historic event, nor could it have had any truly religious significance had such an event occurred—is widely attested in the stories of divine parentage and Virgin-births among pagans. There is, we are told, a pervasive type of religious experience which is truly symbolized by these narratives, that experience being the supernatural birth of the individual within the inner realm of mystical reality. But the Christian experience is not on a perfect level with that of the pagan—"what in others was a guess, or a foregleam, was in Christianity true" (p. 145). This does not mean "true" in the sense of being historic fact, but ideal mystical experience. Hence "conceived by the Holy Ghost" is only another way of saying that he who is in the kingdom of heaven—and Jesus pre-eminently—has been born from above; and this is a *Virgin-birth*, since "no one can be born from above who does not come with a virgin soul, virgin in the sense of being pure from all self-seeking, at least in desire, and not in the sense of never having tasted of the forbidden fruit" (pp. 150 f.).

In this way the author thinks he can give us the original meaning of the various articles of the Apostles' Creed; this furnishes him the key to the numerous similarities which he recognizes between early Christianity and contemporary pagan faiths; he also finds here not only the true significance of the Apostles' Creed but of other doctrines, as well as the ordinances of the church; and this line of reasoning gives, he thinks, a

sure basis for condemning those who propose to abandon past doctrines or forms as no longer valid. For example, we are told that "the thoughtful mind will view the relegation of the symbol of the Mother and Child to obscurity or contumely as a blunder of the first magnitude on the part of the Protestant world" (p. 153). This is the inevitable conclusion, the author affirms, "if there is any solid ground in Reality" for his interpretation. But that is just the point at which his readers will feel doubtful. He has taken a wholly uncritical attitude toward the problems of the psychology of religious experience; by a process of liberal allegorizing he has read into the thinking of the first-century Christians ideas entirely foreign to their age; and he has affirmed the universality of a type of religious experience and thinking which is by no means universal.

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BRIGGS'S THEOLOGICAL SYMBOLICS

Dr. Briggs's volume,¹ which is introduced by a model preface from the pen of President Francis Brown, appeared shortly after the author's death, but had the benefit of his final corrections. It is one of three volumes produced by the same active brain in recent years in interpretation of the doctrinal differences and agreements of Christendom, the other two being *Christian Unity* (1909) and *Fundamental Christian Faith* (1913). The *Theological Symbolics*, the product of prolonged studies, is divided into three parts of almost equal length, Fundamental, Particular, and Comparative Symbolics. The first takes up the three creeds of the early church and the Chalcedonian statement. In the second part the author treats the symbolic definitions of the church during the Middle Ages and the confessional statements since the outbreak of the Reformation in western Christendom, "in their origin and history," as separate entities. The third part, Comparative Symbolics, sets forth the doctrinal differences in western Christendom.

In general, it is to be said that Dr. Briggs's wide sweep over the symbolic field is that of the thoroughly informed expert; his treasures of learning are evident; his introduction of details imparts life to the discussion; his independence of judgment is everywhere apparent. If the standpoint is that of Catholic Christianity, with some leaning toward

¹ *Theological Symbolics*. By Charles A. Briggs. New York: Scribner, 1914. 429 pages. \$2.50.

un-Protestant opinion, the author's judgment of Luther deserves to be taken in its full meaning as one who "passed through an experience almost identical to that of St. Paul, and understood the apostle better than any other before him except Augustine, and explained Paul's teaching as the great transforming power of the sixteenth century" (p. 157).

On the other hand, from the standpoint of method, the volume is unsatisfactory because it does not fairly and sufficiently state the opposing views, Roman Catholic and Protestant. Protestant positions suffer misrepresentation by failure to present the statements of the Augsburg and other Protestant symbols adequately and with their biblical background; while the Roman positions suffer misrepresentation because of a reduction of their distinctive differentiation through failure to give full force to the language in which they are officially stated and through the omission of the implications usually, if not always, associated with these positions by Catholic authorities. The result is that the Protestant positions at cardinal points appear weak and the Roman Catholic positions more reasonable and biblical than in the opinion of the Protestant world they have seemed to be. It is fair to remember that Dr. Briggs's purpose is more than historical and critical. It has distinctly in view the reunion of Christendom, and the work concludes with a summary bearing on that end. It is irenic and practical. It is fair also to state that Dr. Briggs claims to follow the "best authorities" in interpreting the Roman Catholic symbols. But I fail to find what writers he refers to, and it is notable that there is not even a single mention of Bellarmine's name or his great work on the pages of this volume. Such omission it is difficult to understand unless it be that Dr. Briggs discards as un-Catholic the sharp discriminations of that eminent controversial writer. The volume is dedicated to Father Gennoch, of Rome, "beloved friend and fellow-servant in Jesus Christ," and contains a number of references to conversations with Pius X and Roman ecclesiastics on the very subject of church unity. Whether Dr. Briggs allowed his interpretation of historic symbols and the statement of their contents to be unduly though unconsciously influenced by this irenic Christian purpose it is not for me to say.

In justifying these strictures, it is necessary only to make use of the treatment of Comparative Symbolics. In discussing the ministry, the author says: "It is not true that all Christians are equally priests so as to dispense with a ministering official priesthood . . . the battle of the Reformation was not a battle against the priesthood of the ministry. . . . Luther was careful enough, when he said that all Christians are

truly of the spiritual estate, also to say that there is no difference among them 'save of office only'" (pp. 256 f.). It is made to seem as if the Protestant confessions did not give up the idea of an official priesthood. This, if I understand it (leaving out of account the Book of Common Prayer), was the very thing they did give up, a priesthood involving the mediatorial character of the ministry as a sacerdotium. They held on to official ministry, and Luther's modifying clause, as quoted by Dr. Briggs, was fully elaborated by him in his later writings as setting aside the sacerdotal function in the sense in which it is defined by the mediaeval church.

The difference in regard to the eucharistic presence is represented "as due more to philosophical opinion as to the nature of substance and body than to biblical teaching and experimental use of the sacrament in which all agree in all essential matters" (pp. 288 f.). As I understand it, this is misstating historic fact. The biblical teaching and the observation of experience were the controlling factors in the anti-transsubstantiation views of the Reformers. The doctrine of the ubiquity of Christ's body was consequential and not a basis of their doctrine. In the treatment of the eucharist as a sacrifice (pp. 294 f.), the difference of view is declared to be a strife of words. The statement is made that the Catholic position is not "that it is a repetition of the death of Christ as a sacrifice, as the Reformers believed." And yet the Tridentine symbol expressly declares the mass a true though unbloody sacrifice, "really offered up" and "truly propitiatory," and those denying that "priests do offer up Christ's own body and blood" are anathematized.¹ It is incredible that the Reformers did not know what they were talking about and the difference between the mediaeval and Tridentine ideas and the commemorative idea (not the Zwinglian only).

The first decree of the Vatican Council bearing on the Catholic faith is declared, after Dr. Briggs has made qualifications of his own (pp. 227 f.), to be such that "no Protestant can make any valid objection to the decree." Yet the decree expressly reasserts the authority of tradition as co-ordinate with Scripture and the authority of the "ancient Latin edition of the Vulgate," and it denies the right of the individual to interpret Scripture "contrary to the true sense held by Holy Mother Church and to the unanimous consent of the Fathers."² These requirements are of the essence of the decree and when the text is read in its entirety one gets the opposite impression from that which Dr. Briggs's interpretation gives.

¹ Schaff, *Creeds*, II, 179, 184.

² *Ibid.*, 240 ff.

The second Vatican decree concerns the dogma of papal infallibility, and the volume professes to give its meaning "according to the best authorities of the Roman Catholic Church, oral and written" (pp. 230 ff.). Protestants and Old Catholics have "overshot the mark" because of failure to take into consideration the limitations put upon the infallible function, and a list of these limitations is given. Suppose this list is justified as it stands, Dr. Briggs's statement that the case of Pope Honorius I is not pertinent as an argument against papal infallibility should surely be supported. To Hefele and Döllinger, who took the contrary view, the thing, we are told, was "more of an academic than a vital question." Most strange that Döllinger and other learned Catholic professors of Germany submitted to being cut off from the church, which they had defended all their lives, for an academic formulation! In setting aside by one stroke of the pen the crucial case of Honorius, the old historical facts are withheld from the reader—Honorius' hereticon by the Sixth Œcumenical Council and the oaths of mediæval popes condemning his heresy. The statement is also made that no other pope has been a heretic. Therefore, as many of the incumbents of the sees of Antioch, Constantinople, and Alexandria have been heretics, the "presumption is that Jesus' words to Peter have been fulfilled: 'I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not.'" The point is not that an author writing on Comparative Symbolics should not make a statement in favor of papal infallibility, but that the reader has the right to expect some adequate statement of the other side, other interpretation of the Lord's words if there be any, and some consideration of the historic anti-papal declarations supposedly at the basis of symbolical statements down to the Westminster Confession, and of Protestant critics since 1870.

Fresh doubt is thrown upon the exact meaning of papal infallibility by Dr. Briggs's assurance that "Protestant scholars make a great mistake in regarding Pius IX's *Syllabus of Errors* (1854) as symbolical." The assertion is based upon "the authority of the best Roman theologians and canonists and of Pius X himself" (pp. 14, 226). It would certainly be most helpful to the church historian and also, I should think, to the faithful Catholic, if popes henceforth would label each of their deliverances as fallible or infallible. And it would save a great deal more trouble if a commission were appointed by the pope to look up the greater papal deliverances of the past and catalogue them as infallible and fallible, such for example as Innocent III's establishment of the papal Inquisition and Sixtus IV's sanction of the Spanish Inquisition, Clement V's deliverances multiplying the wood of the cross and com-

manding angels to release certain souls from purgatory, Pius V's blast against Elizabeth, Boniface' *Unam sanctam* making it "altogether necessary to salvation that every soul be subject to the pope," and Leo XIII's rehabilitation of I John 5:7 as genuine. Such a list, had it been made before Pastor wrote, would have saved that good historian the pains he is at to reconcile Innocent VIII's bull against witches with the dogma of 1870. As for that troublesome recent pronouncement of the orders of the Church of England as invalid, Dr. Briggs says "as Pius X said to me, it cannot be classed as infallible and symbolical" (p. 234). Leo XIII did not issue the decree hastily or unadvisedly. In fact the matter had been up for well-nigh four hundred years. Pius X now puts us at sea again. After all, the English orders may be apostolical and far better than our poor Presbyterian orders, not only in degree but in primal quality. But whatever may be the truth, it is most confusing to be assured that on matters so important as the sacred ministry, and after a prolonged examination has been made, a pope—no less a one than Leo XIII—should make a mistake. One might well suppose that, in a matter that involves the very life of the church—for *ecclesia est in episcopo*—and the validity of all sacramental exercises, except perhaps baptism, the pope would assuredly be infallible, if anywhere. But Pius X, it would seem, says not. This means the revival of the hope that some pope yet to come will positively declare English orders valid and so legitimize all the ministerial acts of four hundred years more or less, since Latimer and Ridley were burnt at Oxford.

But the confusion is made still worse by the suggestion that not only Leo XIII's deliverances may be set aside but also the deliverances of Pius X himself. Pius' encyclical against Modernism is certainly sufficiently long and deliberate, but Dr. Briggs tells us: "This encyclical and syllabus cannot be regarded as any more symbolical and infallible than those of Pius IX which Pius X himself declared not to be infallible" (p. 234). This is unfortunate for all syllabi. It is also confusing in regard to Pius X, for not only does he infallibly declare his revered predecessor's syllabus not infallible but he is in danger of having his own elaborate syllabus declared not infallible. A syllabus is, at least, an important declaration, for Pius X in accordance with his syllabus discharged the destructive blasts of pontifical authority against Schnitzer and other representatives of Modernism. The worst of it all is that some future pontiff may take it into his head to declare both Dr. Briggs and Pius X mistaken and put them—if we may say so reverently—into the company of the rest of us mortal men.

In sections of less importance, as those on the invocation of saints and the veneration of relics, on indulgences and perfection (pp. 305, 308, 319, 335), the author follows the same method of not giving the Protestant positions a chance to be heard before the bar of Scripture or history or reason while a judgment leaning in the direction of the Roman Catholic position seems to be expressed. When the reader is left with the impression that the Bible favors supererogatory merit (p. 326), he has not been put in possession of the evidence, and when he is told that the doctrine of attrition as defined by the Council of Trent is "just" he should read what Harnack says, though too brusquely, about that doctrine.

The weakness of this volume is, as I have been trying to say, one of method, and not one of scholarship or high purpose or sincerity of conviction. To become an authority in Comparative Symbolics it will have to be supplemented, for, where there is to be a just comparison, there must be a clear and adequate presentation of both sides. As with other attempts of Dr. Briggs's pen to promote Christian unity, so this one will do good service. It proceeds from a heart beating with longings for the coming of Christ's kingdom. And there is something saddening in the author's concluding summary (p. 411) that his study of Christian Symbolics seemed to show the impossibility of bringing about the reunion of Christendom "so far as faith is concerned," or as we might say, doctrine. And further, Dr. Briggs says, the difficulty will be found to be increased by a study of Christian institutions. His final hope is that the ultimate solution may be in a "supreme jurisdiction on the basis of the fundamental faith and institutions of the church" (p. 412). We honor the suggestion, but we think that such a realization, if it were possible, is not at all necessary to the freest and fullest advance of Christ's kingdom. To many of us, human jurisdiction—or church government, if you please—is of altogether subordinate importance; unless indeed Christ in Matt. 16:18 made Peter his vicegerent on earth and appointed also that Peter's successors should be vicegerents after him. If that is the case, then we must all, in all honesty, throw up our hands and yield to the one supreme authority on the earth. But there is another way to effect reunion and that is obedience in heart and life to Him who by plain apostolic statement is the Head of the church and to whom by His own statement all power is given on earth, and who has promised to those who receive Him the guidance of the Holy Spirit. The concluding words of this volume by the Christian scholar to whom the commonwealth of American Christianity owes so much—words whose

origin he did so much to clear up—seem to me to embody far better the condition upon which Christian fellowship and co-operation are now so widely maintained and are to be increased: *in necessariis unitas, in variis libertas, in utrisque caritas*.

The tract by Goetz on the Apostles' Creed¹ seeks to determine "without prepossession" the origin and meaning of the symbol, its reception at different periods, and also how far its use today is to be encouraged. It is meant for popular enlightenment. It quotes Professor Foster and Professor Hoskins but not Dr. McGiffert. The Creed goes back in its essential parts to 130, but the last word has not been said. The birth-place of the Roman form was Lyons, or more particularly Vienne. The original clause on Mary's conception contained not a syllable about the miraculous physical birth. The immediate passage from this clause to the clause concerning the passion under Pilate is due to the Pauline gospel. The use of the Creed should be optional, *facultativ*. Baumgarten is commended for saying that "the blackest day in modern Prussian church history" was the day in 1892 when the act was passed enforcing its use in the Prussian service. The use, so the author says, is optional in many of the German-Protestant churches of North America, and he concludes that "in matters of religion the blessing of freedom is greater than the gain arising from compulsion." The compulsory use of the Creed at confirmation and in the church service is a question over which the Germans have been doing a good deal of fighting. It would seem that the discussion would encourage the growth of the free-church principle.

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CHRISTIAN FAITH AND MODERN THOUGHT

Apologetics in these days is the object of very opposite judgments. On the one hand it is claimed by men like Harnack and McGiffert that systematic theology should be transmuted into apologetics, since the latter represents the sum and substance of the theologian's task today. On the other hand it is contended that in the reorganization of theology apologetics drops out. We need, it is said, a science of the Christian faith, and we need a philosophy of religion, but these two subjects cover

¹ *Das apostolische Glaubensbekenntnis*. Von Pfarrer Goetz. Tübingen: Mohr, 1913. 64 pages. M. o. 50.

the ground and render apologetics a supernumerary. But by whatever name it may be called, the relation between Christian faith and modern thought is a subject of lively present interest, which is constantly calling forth fresh treatments, and in these treatments the apologetic motive is apt to be present in some degree.

It is interesting to note how severely the apologetic motive is held in check by Professor Stange¹ of Göttingen in the introductory part of his discussion of Christianity and the modern view of the world, inasmuch as this author must be ranked as one of the most important representatives of the new scientific positive tendency in Germany. The immediate theme of this introductory part is "the problem of religion," and for the treatment of this problem Stange gets his basis, as might be expected of him were he not of the "positive" school, in Kant. He defends an epistemological interpretation of religion as over against that which the history of religion furnishes. But he emphasizes that we are to go to Kant for guidance, not about religion, but only about the *science* of religion. Moreover, he does not make use of Kant after the manner of the Ritschlians, but rather in the reverse way. Instead of pointing out a great gulf between science in general and the interpretation of religion, he emphasizes the close relation between the two. His motive for this course is that he finds the antithesis between Christianity and the modern view of the world to be sharp already—so sharp that the existence of Christianity is threatened. But this sharp antithesis is by no means necessary. It grows out of the fact that we have allowed the special processes of natural science to determine our sense of reality, instead of letting it be determined by experience in its wholeness. Both the interpretation of Christianity through the history of religion and the emphasis upon the contrast between the theoretical and the practical reason foster this situation.

But how does Stange find support in Kant for a different procedure? Kant leads us to see (1) that religion is a unique type of experience; (2) that it is accompanied by a unique type of certainty; and that in the critical method we have a standard well adapted for estimating religion's claim to truth. This last point, however, can be established only as Kant's thought is extended beyond his own intention, and for accomplishing this Stange makes appeal to Schleiermacher. He finds that Schleiermacher's teaching in regard to the sense of absolute dependence has epistemological value. The real meaning of this teaching is that,

¹ *Christentum und moderne Weltanschauung: I, Das Problem der Religion*. Zweite Aufl. Von Carl Stange. Leipzig: Deichert, 1913. xx+118 pages. M. 3.50.

in connection with our empirical consciousness, it establishes a realm of actuality the contents of which cannot be defined by our concept of the world. In fact it justifies us in affirming that "the existence of God is inseparably linked with the fact of our consciousness in the same way as is the existence of the world" (p. 48).

But Schleiermacher too needs correction. In order to do justice to the facts of religion we must add to the feeling of absolute dependence the feeling of absolute obligation and the feeling of absolute blessedness. And further, though Schleiermacher gave religious experience like value with sense experience, yet he derived the religious experience simply from the subjective constitution of the individual. This must be corrected.

The final solution of the matter Stange works out in a chapter on "the problem of reality." There are two criteria of reality: immediate beholding or intuition (*Anschauung*), and the unity of self-consciousness. Now there is an inner intuition or beholding as well as that of the senses. The fact of self-consciousness establishes this. And further, the world of sense experience, taken by itself, is incomplete, all attempts to present it as a self-explanatory whole having broken down. Completeness of experience, therefore, is possible only through the recognition of a supersensible realm. Thus the argument that religious experience presents us with objective reality involves three points: the recognition of religion as a permanent and integrating factor in experience; the acknowledgment of an inner intuition, which gives the element of concreteness essential to reality; and the appeal to the need for completeness of experience, which gives the final test of reality.

After this argument Stange proceeds to consider whether in fact the intuition of the supersensible is the peculiar characteristic of all religion. Considering first the experience of the individual, he points out that there are three concepts by which we organize our experience—nature, life, and personal being. Taking these concepts as guides Stange finds that all religion in its essence is faith in a supersensible power; faith in an infinite spirit; faith in an unconditioned will.

Passing to religion in the life of the race, Stange protests against the merely historical estimate of religion, because it is so apt to be simply a repetition of the scheme of ideas in the history of culture. Over against such an estimate he places his epistemological interpretation. This, he insists, renders the application of the idea of evolution to the history of religion impossible. We must turn from the cultural factors of religion to the consciousness of God as the real substratum of religion.

But the historical understanding of religion will be of service, if the idea of evolution is abandoned, in the way of presenting to us the differing types of religion. These types are to be worked out according to the way in which the three essential elements of our consciousness of God—supersensible power, infinite spirit, unconditioned will—have related themselves in religious history. The most important result of such a quest for types will be the recognition of two different sorts of religion: one which rests upon the natural organization of human thought, and another which rests upon revelation. The latter is the higher type—provided only that revelation be tested according to content and not according to external form—because it most really leads to completeness of experience. But the religion of revelation has found its typical embodiment in biblical religion. Hence here sets in the task of theology.

Stange has aimed to show that the relation of the modern view of the world to Christianity is by no means necessarily one of skeptical indifference, though that is the relation which actually prevails. This is indeed a task to which all who are occupied with the philosophy of religion should address themselves. Stange has rendered important service in pushing this task to the front, and in dealing with it so clearly and vigorously. Also, by meeting the comparative religion school and the Ritschlians fairly on the level of the scientific method, he has been able to make valuable criticism of those points of view. The question must be raised, however, whether it should be assumed that any philosophy of religion which is consistently derived from Kant is brought, by that very fact, into true relation with science. In other words, should we continue to assume that Kant has given us the final theory of scientific knowledge? Does not Kant belong to the history of philosophy as much as Leibnitz or Locke? Should our procedure still be to start with Kant and then make corrections, rather than to try to solve our present philosophical problems in the light of the general history of philosophy? But apart from these queries, it should be recognized that Stange has given us a treatment of both Kant and Schleiermacher which is fresh, ingenious, and suggestive.

A more serious objection relates to Stange's veto upon the use of the idea of evolution in the history of religion. Why should this idea be abandoned to an interpretation which leaves out ethical and spiritual forces? Does the present philosophical situation demand this? And if this be done, can one possibly remove from the modern view of the world "the character of skeptical indifference" toward Christianity?

The suggestion, however, that the idea of evolution must be a part of our means of adjusting Christianity to the modern view of the world is not meant in the sense of C. Dillmann's¹ attempt to show that Christianity is the goal of world-evolution. This posthumous volume, "the letters of a theological investigator of nature," was completed in 1899. It was composed under the influence both of the speculative philosophy and of the dominance of natural science which belong to the last century. The author's own work is almost wholly of the speculative order. The whole world-process is derived from the concept of Being. The transition to Becoming is what gives us the right to give to Being the name God. The idea of the personality of God has historical value, but ultimately it is not applicable. Our personalities fall under the head of Becoming and so are not immortal. There is a "geological incarnation of God," culminating in man, and a psychological incarnation, culminating in Christ. Christianity, stripped of miracle and traditional dogma, is the goal of world-evolution because of the ethical perfection and the love of Christ. The book is almost entirely lacking in contact with the modern historical interpretation of religion, and so misses the most important means for realizing its object. But as the work of one who in his youth left the Protestant ministry for the study of mathematics and natural science, it is a human document of interest.

In Garvie's *Apologetics*² it is not so much the modern view of the world as a whole which receives discussion as it is the series of points of issue raised in regard to Christianity by modern movements of thought. As a philosophical background the conception of personalism is selected, but the questions involved are not much discussed. The book is mainly concerned with the several Christian doctrines. In fact, it is a brief system of theology written with an apologetic emphasis.

The religious-historical method is given a certain value, but is characterized as "ever seeking to deny the uniqueness of Christianity." Much prominence is given to "Christian experience as the basis of Christian certainty," but the effort is made also to recognize "the just rights of reason." Working on the theory that philosophy must recognize spontaneity in the world-process, Garvie holds not only to the virgin-birth and the bodily resurrection of Jesus, but to practically all the New Testament miracles. Accepting even the withering of the fig tree, he

¹ *Das Christentum das Ziel der Weltentwicklung. Briefe eines theologischen Naturforschers.* Von C. Dillmann. Tübingen: Laupp, 1913. 255 pages. M. 6.

² *A Handbook of Christian Apologetics.* In the "Studies in Theology" series. By A. E. Garvie. New York: Scribner, 1913. xii+241 pages. 75 cents.

suspends judgment upon only three miracles—turning water into wine, multiplying the loaves, and walking on the water.

The denial of Jesus' existence and the eschatological view of his teachings are criticized adversely, and also the "anti-supernatural view of the person of Jesus" as represented by Harnack. Garvie holds that the datum for our thought of Christ is his moral and religious sonship, but that this makes necessary a metaphysical explanation of his person. But what that metaphysical explanation is remains only vaguely defined. It is not the personal pre-existence of Jesus. Perhaps it is most fully stated in the tentative question: "May not the perfect organic society of Father, Son, and Spirit be thought of as the perfect social personality of the one God?" (p. 160). For the Fourth Gospel Garvie claims a high degree of credibility, but not direct Johannine authorship.

This handbook is a conscientious, comprehensive survey of the special questions in apologetics at the present time. It is too compendious to make a real contribution to theological thought, and doubtless it was written more especially for the non-theological reader. Even such a reader may feel at times that, after the statement of contrasting positions, he is given the indorsement of one of them or the statement of the author's own position, without a real reasoning-out of the conclusion. Nevertheless this little book will be of real service to the non-technical reader by putting him abreast of the times on the questions of apologetics, and by supplying him with well-considered judgments upon them from the liberal-conservative point of view.

C. E. Rolt,¹ in *The World's Redemption*, attempts to adjust the realm of brute force and the facts of evil to the theology of the ecclesiastical creeds. He repudiates the thought that the omnipotence of God has anything to do with brute force. God's omnipotence is that of love and so cannot be coercive. We may, then, attribute to brute force all forms of calamity and evil without implicating God. How does the brute force get there? It is not eternal, for the Holy Trinity is the Absolute Being, outside of whom there is nothing. But love is harmony, and that implies discord or evil. God forbids evil instead of permitting it, but for that very reason it exists. Evil is "attracted into being" by the forbidding of God, and then it must be patiently overcome by suffering love working out through the world process. The author sets aside certain traditional doctrines and introduces the idea of evolution, but his method is too speculative and dogmatic to enable him to contribute

¹ *The World's Redemption*. By C. E. Rolt. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1913. 336 pages. \$2.25 net.

toward adjusting Christian faith and modern thought. One, however, can sympathize with his resolution to reconstruct the doctrine of providence.

A thoroughly popular type of apologetics has been put out by P. Carnegie Simpson¹ in *The Facts of Life*, which forms a kind of sequel to his widely read book, *The Fact of Christ*. On the side of philosophy this book gives evidence of the influence of James, Eucken, and Bergson. In respect to theological position the author aims to present "the creed of experience," and at the same time he wishes to go beyond Harnack's conception of Christ by carrying that conception a certain way into the speculative realm. Just what result the author would arrive at is not clear, but apparently he would retain in some manner Paul's thought of the cosmic Christ.

The problems of mechanism in the universe, of pain, of sin, of the future life, and the movements of the working classes and of feminism, all come up for brief discussion. Perhaps the most interesting chapter is "The Claim of Humanism," in which the author deals with the "feeling that there is a larger life to be lived than the Christian." The book is well adapted to help the average serious reader who realizes the need, created by modern movements of thought, for thinking through afresh the great questions of life and of society.

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THE FUNCTION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

The great extent to which critical and historical studies have been carried in the discussion of questions of religion has reacted in a call for renewed emphasis on the supreme worth of the inner life of religion as a matter of personal experience. The interest in mysticism and modernism as expressions of the desire to secure an abiding foundation for faith is an evidence that the more "spiritual" side of our human life is coming to its own in the work of the thinker. The appearance of numerous works on the doctrine of the Holy Spirit is to be expected.

The Holy Spirit of God, by Professor Thomas,² is written from the point of view of a low churchman of the Episcopal church, the work

¹ *The Facts of Life in Relation to Faith*. By P. Carnegie Simpson. New York: Doran, 1913. 294 pages. \$1.25 net.

² *The Holy Spirit of God*. By W. H. Griffith Thomas. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1913. xiv+303 pages. \$1.75.

being substantially an exposition of the article of faith on the subject, though he views the creeds as "only landmarks, not goals, and not complete rules of faith." Critical studies are appreciated, but the author shows but little first-hand acquaintance with them. The tone of the book is devout and it frequently expresses a yearning for a deepening of spiritual life among Christians, but it is at the same time deeply tinged with a pessimistic view of present-day Christianity. He says, "There does not seem much doubt of the fact that the Church of God is not making proper progress. This is the conviction of thoughtful men in almost every part of the Christian world. The unconverted are not being won, the young people are not being kept, and even the children are not being gathered in. The churches of all denominations are bewailing loss in the decrease of membership and the decline of conversions. . . . It is unutterably sad to see how little influence Churches have on the neighborhoods in which they are situated" (pp. 267 f.). If it is this situation the author seeks to meet he ought to write a very stimulating book to justify publication. His aim in writing is doubtless to point out the remedy to the unhappy condition in which he finds Christendom. He finds it in a renewed emphasis on the inherited doctrine of the Holy Spirit and a recognition of his essential place in the work of salvation. "The emphasis on the Holy Spirit and on his direct relationship to the soul in Christ is the supreme need rather than any form of ecclesiastical mediation, which almost inevitably tends to set God aside. . . . The supreme need today is that of the evangelist and the prophet. . . . We must make the Holy Spirit dominant in our life" (pp. 269 ff.). Can the book be counted a factor to this end?

The range the work attempts to cover is wide. It is divisible into three portions: history, theological exposition, and application to present conditions. In the first of these there is a very brief study of "The Holy Spirit in the Old Testament" (pp. 9-17), a still briefer treatment of "The Holy Spirit in the Apocrypha" (pp. 18-22), a more extended study of the New Testament works in the order: Paul's Epistles, Acts, the Synoptic Gospels, the Fourth Gospel, other books (pp. 23-74). The discussion is disappointingly brief, and, it must be added, superficial. Then follow chapters on the Ante-Nicene period, and the period from Nicaea to Chalcedon. These periods the author surveys with considerable pleasure, saying, "In spite of much that saddens us as we read the story of personal and synodical antipathies, we must not lose sight of the fact that all through there was a deep underlying spiritual experience of the realities of Divine redemption in the Person of Christ

mediated by the Holy Spirit" (p. 90). When one recalls the character of those early theological controversies, the influence of political interests in them, and the cruel measures by which the decisions were carried out it is difficult to understand this commendation. "Chalcedon to the Reformation" and "The Reformation" are given six pages each, "The Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," five pages, and "The Nineteenth Century," six. It need scarcely be said that the historical sketch gives but little idea of the inner character of the religious life in Christendom in those periods. It resembles a succession of notes such as would be used in the lectures of the classroom. The historical study also suffers from the want of an insight into the meaning of history. Events are viewed as the outcome of formal dispensations, of which he thinks there are three, representing the divine program (see, e.g., pp. 48 and 70). The author does not seem to be able to put himself within a spiritual movement and interpret by living through it, as it were, but looks upon events as external happenings to be placed in a sort of prearranged order.

In the "theological formulation" of the doctrine, after a brief chapter on "The Idea of Theology," the subject is discussed under the following heads: "The Spirit of God," "The Spirit of Christ," "The Spirit of Truth," "The Holy Spirit and the Individual," "The Holy Spirit and the Church," "The Holy Spirit and the World." The chapter on "The Spirit of Truth" reflects the author's concern to preserve the view that the truth which the Spirit gives is doctrine and that the contents of the doctrinal truth given are just the truths of the New Testament. Inspiration comes in for discussion and is described as "a special influence, differing not only in degree but in kind from the ordinary spiritual influence of the Holy Spirit." The statement is made, "We argue that the very dates of the New Testament books are evidences of a special activity of the Holy Spirit, and of a limitation of this activity to these dates." The scholastic distinction between inspiration and illumination is retained and the sweeping statement is made, "Since the New Testament times the Holy Spirit has illuminated truth, but has not revealed anything new."

It is pleasing, on the other hand, to find that the church is carefully distinguished from the ecclesiastical organization, and the main stress is laid on spiritual grace. But again we are disappointed to find Thomas carefully distinguishing the work of the Spirit from the strivings of the heathen conscience and all moral work going on in the human race, though he says it comes from God, and the confusing statement is made,

"It is better to connect it with the general work of the Logos than with the specific work of the Holy Spirit."

It ought to be said, however, to the credit of the author that he never loses sight of the reality of a heart-experience which the believing soul views confidently as the gracious gift of God the Spirit, and that the worth of the Christian life as distinct from the non-Christian is that in this he is a participant in the Divine Life that was revealed in Jesus Christ.

The Supreme Need by Professor Denio¹ is of a different character as respects its scope and, partly, its aim. It is non-theological, but attempts to bring home to the heart of the average Christian the need of mastering the "conditions of power on the spiritual side of our lives as well as on the physical side." There is an attempt to draw a knowledge of the law of the Spirit's working from the New Testament. While we may doubt that any definite directions that can be given on this subject will avail much, there is no doubt that many people who have no special interest in the doctrinal discussions that gather about the question of the Spirit of God will gain much encouragement and strength from such a wholesome book as this.

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POPULAR INTERPRETATIONS OF NEW TESTAMENT LITERATURE

The old-fashioned type of biblical commentary is fast losing its hold on the interest of the religious teacher. At the same time there is a demand for books which shall combine the results of sound scholarship with a talent for practical interpretation, suitable for the use of busy pastors and for lay teachers of religion who lack technical and specialized training. Unfortunately the popular writer is likely to sin against the facts of history, and the technical specialist is likely to fail of reaching the understanding and the interest of the average mind.

Dr. Strong's lectures on the books of the New Testament² are an attempt by a vigorous teacher of the older school to interest the layman

¹ *The Supreme Need*. By Francis B. Denio. New York: Revell, 1913. 238 pages. \$1.00.

² *Popular Lectures on the Books of the New Testament*. By Augustus H. Strong. Philadelphia: Griffith & Rowland Press, 1914. xxiii+398 pages. \$1.00.

in the problems and the practical values of New Testament history and exegesis. These lectures were delivered to a large Sunday-school class; and while they were intended to be popular the author expresses the hope that "this has not prevented them from being fairly representative of the results of modern scholarship." A reading of the first two chapters, however, immediately reveals the fact that the author's treatment of the New Testament literature is based on a distinctly doctrinal preconception. The Bible is viewed as a product of divine inspiration in a sense which limits the application of human reason to the problems which it presents. The New Testament is held to be the final revelation of an Absolute Purpose. While there was growth and selection, "the New Testament, at least, became one organic whole, through the power of the Holy Spirit, which worked in and through these writings and their writers." If the writers worked under human limitations, there are nevertheless no imperfections which are inconsistent with perfect truth. Naturally, the "results of modern scholarship" must yield the first place to these doctrinal preconceptions. On the other hand, the author has a homiletical sense which is productive of many fine and stimulating interpretations. The details of New Testament introduction and exegesis are sketched with a vigor of style, a wealth of imagination and an enthusiasm of spirit which evidently proved contagious to a large group of lay students.

In Niebergall's *Praktische Auslegung* we have a different treatment of the same subject.¹ There is an introduction of some length which explains the principles by which the author is guided. The purpose is to examine the records of the Christian religion contained in the New Testament with the object of finding the factors which may influence the religious and moral life of the present generation. The book is written mainly for clergymen and for teachers of religion in the schools of Germany. The biblical writings are viewed in the light of their growth as conditioned by the environment in which they originated. They are treated, not as the revelation of an Absolute Mind, but as a transcription of man's life as he stands in the presence of God. The New Testament is not considered as an "organic whole" whose unity is the product of an inspired logic. It is treated as the product of the religious experience of vigorous souls living under the influence of the inspiring personality of Jesus; and the bond of its unity is found in the loyalty and sincerity of the disciples of the one Master—disciples who discovered

¹ *Praktische Auslegung des Neuen Testaments*. By Friedrich Niebergall. 2. Aufl. Tübingen: Mohr, 1914. viii+608 pages. M. 13.50.

through him a common faith and ideal in a world of perplexing experiences and struggles.

Under the guidance of these principles, the author leads the pastor and the lay teacher into the study of the New Testament books. In the Introduction there is an admirable analysis of the relation of Jesus to the faith and the literature created by his spirit. As the waters of the ocean are seasoned with salt, so are the records of Christian history and experience permeated by the spirit of Jesus. Jesus is to be viewed, therefore, both as a figure in history and as the creator of values of enduring worth and significance. In conformity with this, the records of primitive Christianity have a double aspect, both sides of which must be vividly realized in order to avoid, on the one hand, an unhistorical radicalism, and, on the other, a hard-and-fast conservatism which begins by giving hostages to tradition and ends by losing all hold on actual facts.

In his treatment of the individual books, Niebergall shows a rare gift of sensing the concrete situation and making it real to the imagination of the reader. The problems of criticism are not unduly emphasized, but they are squarely faced when occasion requires; and these very problems sometimes suggest materials of real homiletical and pedagogical value. The exegetical interpretations are exceptionally free from threadbare platitudes and moralizings, while they are often rich in their suggestions of present-day applications. The book is the ripe product of a man who has served both as a successful pastor and a distinguished university teacher.

O. C. HELMING

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WESTERN SOCIAL IDEALISM INTERPRETED TO THE ORIENT

The Orient has had an oversupply of dogmatic missionaries from Christian lands. Christianity, as infallible dogma, has been presented to Hindus, Japanese, and Chinese by zealous apostles who have had more regard for theological propriety than for anthropology and social psychology. And of late years, the whole Christian propaganda in heathendom has increasingly felt the pressure for leaders who are more sympathetic with the native standpoints.

Accordingly, a new sort of missionary message to the non-Christian world is represented by Dr. Henderson's lectures in the Far East

which are now issued in book form.¹ In contrast with most teachers who have felt called to labor in the oriental field, Dr. Henderson stands for the non-dogmatic type of religion which is now linking itself up with the new social idealism of the West. He moves out from a center of gravity to which, even yet, the modern religious world is not fully adjusted.

The book consists of six lectures outlining western practice in reference to dependents, defectives, criminals, public health, education, morality, and wage-earners. The main body of the work deals with information which is more or less familiar to all who are likely to read the present notice, and it calls for no special comment here. The dominant conception of "social programmes" in these lectures is that of a method which undertakes to regulate the details of civilization without making organic, or essential, changes in the social *system* of civilization. This, of course, is the position of the new Progressive party, which is indorsed by implication in the closing pages of the book, where the author speaks as follows: "We can easily see what is before us. It is not a bloody revolution in which the 'Have-nots' will take violent possession of the property of the rich; it will be simply and quietly the increasing control and direction of corporations, in the interest of all, by the legal representatives of all" (p. 174).

This is probably the wisest way of introducing to oriental minds the social awakening of the West. Dr. Henderson was aware of the character of the audiences to which his lectures were to be addressed. He knew that his hearers were to be from the "higher" classes, and that an exposition of the more radical sociology of the West would have a tendency to close the minds of his auditors. As a piece of pedagogical strategy, then, these lectures are to be commended.

Considered as a piece of information, hostile and unsympathetic critics will point out that the book omits from the "programme" category all reference to methods which propose, not to "regulate," but to *change* the social system of civilization. Thus, the lecturer tells his oriental audiences nothing about the vast modern movement of socialism, nor the theory of anarchism, nor the rapidly advancing single-tax cause. These things are as truly a part of the social program of the West as are the more conventional movements dealt with by the book. But the treatment of them would undoubtedly be confusing to the oriental, since

¹ *Social Programmes in the West*. Lectures delivered in the Far East by Charles Richmond Henderson, Ph.D. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1913. xxviii + 184 pages. \$1.25.

the exposition of radical movements plunges us into regions which the eastern mind is not yet prepared to enter.

Occidental advice to the Orient will for some time, no doubt, be taken at a discount in view of the vast martial explosion which has rudely interrupted the peaceful progress of all western lands and sent its powerful shocks around the world. Non-Christian peoples will now be quick to say that after nineteen centuries Christianity is unable to control its leading exponents. But in the end, after the smoke of battle has cleared away, both Orient and Occident will see that it is dogmatic Christianity, and *not* ethical Christianity, that has failed. The former has been tried and found wanting. The latter has not really been tried at all. Hence, the war should make Professor Henderson's lectures even more in point than before. And later on, the seed that he has sown will help to prepare the Orient for further expositions of western social programs.

LOUIS WALLIS

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A NEW INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF RELIGIONS

A new volume by Dussaud¹ is the first of a proposed series, entitled a "historic library of religions," under the editorship of the author and Paul Alphandéry. This series is undertaken with the hope of "enlarging the basis of the peculiarly historic method in order to attain, through the comparison of similar phenomena, a deeper and more complete understanding" of the problems of the subject. This volume has for its purpose the introduction of the reader to these problems, and is intended, not as a solution of them, but to induce independent thought and judgment, and the careful observation of the *concrete*.

The conclusion to which this "introduction" leads, takes the form of an addition to the already multitudinous number of definitions of religion, thus: "a religion consists in the organized mass of beliefs and practices which are intended to enlarge and perpetuate the 'life-principle' of the individual, of the group and of the [forces of] nature" (p. 290). The whole of the treatise is devoted to the elaboration of this thesis, and one might almost call it a Bergsonian interpretation of the rites and ceremonies of religion as distinguished from its dogmas.

The study begins with an examination of Animism, and the several explanations of the origin of religion which relates it to this source, among

¹ *Introduction à l'histoire des religions*. By R. Dussaud. Paris: Leroux, 1914. vi+292 pages. Fr. 3.50.

them those of Spencer, Max Müller, Tylor, and Frazer are rejected as being "insufficient," for two reasons: first, they refer all cultus either to the adoration of God (i.e., *the* god, with a capital "G") or to several gods, when in reality there is often no other conception than that of *a* god, and secondly, they content themselves with an abstraction, a vague formula which would never call forth (*évoquer*) the "mechanism" of religion (p. 11). No more can the foundation of religion be discovered in totemism, for on a theory such as that of Durkheim, that the "totem" was originally an "ensign" or mark of social organization, there is no explanation of *why* the moral force which constitutes the clan is conceived of under the form of the *whole* of a species, either animal or vegetable, and on a theory such as Frazer's, which arbitrarily leads him to deny to totemism *any* religious significance, one would be compelled to eliminate Buddhism also from the class of religions. None of the theories of totemism so far advanced are satisfactory, and it must be looked upon as something more than mere "collective impressions" and to have a more profound significance than a mere "standard" or symbol (p. 16).

The third chapter brings forward the conception of the "life-principle" (*principe de vie*) as the most primitive and fundamental concept in the development of the practices of religion. The theory of Durkheim as to the significance of the totem is adopted in so far as it holds that there is *in the totem* a superior force, and this is declared to be the spirit of life which the primitive mind conceived of as animating all things and living creatures alike, though *not in the same degree*. The interesting suggestion is made that the origin of the idea that this superior force was *indwelling*, both in animals and vegetables, is to be found in the fact that man sustains his physical life by eating these things (p. 22). As to the disputed relationship between the zoölatry of Egypt and totemism, the opinion is advanced that while the animal worship of Egypt had its origin, like totemism, in this conception of a universal vital principle, the worship of animals by the Egyptians was *not* totemistic. In summing up his theory of a "life-principle" the author says: "It is in reaching out beyond reality that human thought has led man on in the way of progress. Thus religion has been simply *one* of the ways by which man has sought, not only to live, but to increase his resources of energy, his possibilities (*potentiel*)."

The god-idea is discussed under the two headings, "Gods and Nature" and "Group Gods," and its development is traced from the simplest animistic idea of a vital force dwelling in certain places or certain elements, to the concept of God as the "God of the whole earth." In

the numerous examples of coalescence of nature gods with group gods, or the syncretistic union of several group gods, we are warned against the error of referring all the diverse elements of the combination to one explanation (p. 70). As an example of discrimination, the author considers the God of the Hebrews as originally the Kenite's tutelar deity, introduced to Israel by Moses, but he thinks the "incommunicable name" a mere *jeu de mot* (p. 82, note), and traces the universal sovereignty of Jehovah to the influence of Persian ideas, brought in through the "second Isaiah." The "life-principle" is found to persist in the idea of St. Paul, who, however, makes the Christian God to be the God of the particular group of the faithful (p. 85; cf. Col. 3:4 ff.).

In the discussion of material representations of the spirits of nature and the gods, we are reminded that because the *source* of the power of a fetish is often ignored, we are not forced to conclude that we have nothing but a mere abstraction (p. 88), and here again the application of the theory of "life-principle" is made with telling effect. There is nothing worthy of special notice in the explanation of the "sanctuary and its organization," unless it be the rejection of Frazer's theory that all religion comes from the practice of magic, and the espousal of the counter theory that priesthood has developed from the paternal right of *pontifex domiciliae*. The subsequent restrictions upon the exercise of the office of priesthood are related to tabu, but are all intended to conserve the "life-principle" of the community as a whole. Robertson Smith is commended for his dictum that "one life animates the god and all things [*êtres*] dwelling in the sanctuary" (p. 112; cf. *Religion of the Semites*, 2d ed., p. 159).

Perhaps the most interesting contribution of the book is the discussion of sacrifice, which takes up two chapters. The essential feature of all sacrifice is found in the idea of blood-bond, and the theory of "life-principle" is combined with this fundamental concept of primitive man to explain the rite of sacrificial offerings of all sorts. The argument is largely founded on the observations of Father Jaussen, as set forth in his work, *Coutumes des Arabes au pays de Moab*. The earlier theory of Robertson Smith (*op. cit.*) that "communion" is the "essence" of sacrifice, and the more recent one of Hubert and Maus that "a sacrifice is a religious act which, by the consecration of a victim, modifies the condition of the offerer or of the things in which he is interested" (p. 119) are both deemed inadequate, but significant, and they are combined with the "life-principle" explanation as to *why* sacrifice is considered efficacious. The upshot of the argument is that the union of the offerer with the

recipient of the offering, through the medium of the blood which is shed, and in which is symbolized that life which is common to both, is the essence of sacrifice, or rather its underlying concept and principle. This theory is not limited to bloody sacrifices alone, but also underlies all forms of offering, the "first-fruits" being offered to the *source* of their peculiar existence, and acting, by a sort of purification, to prevent the evils which would surely result to the individual or the group if this ceremony were omitted. Other unbloody sacrifices serve either as a "substitute" for the more correct animal victim or are conceived of, as in the case of fetishes and material representations of the gods, as being animated by their own "life-principle."

Enough has been said to show the method of the author and the thoroughgoing way in which his theory is applied, and further detail would be superfluous. The work contains also a consideration of prayer, of the cult of the dead, of initiations, fêtes, ritual prohibitions, myth and dogma, and the development of moral notions, all of which are related to the thesis which underlies the work. We may close this fragmentary summary with the caution which the author gives to those who would always insist that the cult is *anterior* to the myth, that it is a question of the *kind* of myth. Many myths arise from the desire for an explanation of customs, the reason for which is no longer clear, but there are frequent cases in which the cult has developed from a myth, particularly when there is commemoration of certain events which have become marvelous (p. 271).

A. W. COOK

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BRIEF MENTION

OLD TESTAMENT

KITTEL, GERHARD. *Die Oden Salomo's: überarbeitet oder einheitlich?* (Beiträge zur Wissenschaft vom Alten Testament.) Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1914. 180 pages. M. 5; bound, M. 6.

A son of the veteran Old Testament scholar at Leipzig presents his maiden effort to the scholarly world. Two recent works, J. Rendel Harris, *Odes and Psalms of Solomon from the Syriac Version* (1909), and J. Labourt and P. Batiffol, *Les odes de Solomon* (1911), with some minor treatises were available for his service. The numerous articles and other treatises on the Odes of Solomon during the last five years have discussed nearly every phase of the problems which have been raised. Kittel confines his attention exclusively to the general historical order of the odes. This is his problem. The first part handles the style of these documents with some considerable acumen. With his specifications of the style he plunges into the second

part and deals with various theories of interpolation which advocates have fallen back on to defend their interpretations of the odes. Each ode is examined in its numerical order, with the chief suggestions of writers as to the interpretations which are found therein. The author's conclusions are almost wholly in favor of the unity of each ode, an original oneness of each of them throughout the whole collection.

The treatment throughout is scholarly, comprehensive, and clear, with only a hint now and then that the author is not widely experienced as a writer. This will cure itself in time.

SCHWAAB, EMIL. *Historische Einführung in das Achtzehngebet.* (Beiträge zur Förderung christlicher Theologie, 17. Jahrgang, 5. Heft.) Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1913. 169 pages. M. 3.60.

When Titus took Jerusalem in 70 A.D. he almost stamped out ritual Jewish worship as carried on in the temple. Very soon thereafter there arose in synagogue worship a special prayer, used both in public and private worship, which was regarded as a kind of substitute for the offering which had already passed out of existence. This prayer (תפלה) was called the eighteenth prayer. How much more enlightening it would have been for the lay reader if the author had printed this prayer in full at the opening of his discussion! But he analyzes the elements of the prayer, treats its origin, development, and place in the service of today. Many instructive and interesting facts are recited as to its prime importance in Jewish worship in general.

BEER, G., AND HOLTZMANN, O. *Die Mischna-Text. Uebersetzung und ausführliche Erklärung.* Giessen: Töpelmann, 1914.

The indefatigable editors who are giving us the Mishna in a new and attractive edition are making rapid headway. Each successive part reveals the thoroughness guaranteed by the name and reputation of the individual authors who are doing the real work. Three new parts are now in hand, which are somewhat uneven in value, but still important each in its own sphere.

Ki'ajim (Verbotene Mischgattungen), by Karl Albrecht, is the fourth *Traktat* of I. Seder. Zeraim. The basis of this special Mishna is Deut. 22:9-11: "Thou shalt not sow thy vineyard with two kinds of seed, lest the whole fruit be forfeited, the seed which thou hast sown and the increase of thy vineyard. Thou shalt not plow with an ox and an ass together. Thou shalt not wear a mingled stuff, wool and linen together."

The Hebrew text of this *Traktat* was built up on Lowe's Codex Cambridge University Library Add. 470. 1; Codex Hamburg 18, and Strack's Codex Hebr. Bible Monacensis 95, besides some use of some of the older and first printed texts. Five pages of important textual variants appear in an appendix.

The whole work is divided into three parts: (1) against mixing of seeds, (2) against mixing of draught animals, (3) against wearing garments of mixed materials. The first occupies three times the space of both of the others together. The author rallies to his support in his exposition rabbinical Arabic and Syriac lore and with good effect. While quoting ancient authors he is fully abreast of the times in his use of the latest investigations of rabbinical and Arabic authors.

Rosch ha-schana (Neujahr), by Paul Fiebig, is the eighth *Traktat* of II. Seder. Mo'ed. The Hebrew text is based on several of the most ancient editions, including

Bomberg's (1520-23); on the three modern texts named above under *Kil'ajim*, and also on the Berlin MSS folio and quarto 567; Codex Kaufman in Budapest; and the Munich MS 140. Twelve solid pages of variants between the MSS are given in the Appendix.

To understand the later customs of this feast the author begins his discussion by gathering up the references and hints to the feast of the new moon in pre-exilic times, employing even the most recent discussions in the Babylonian field. In exilic and post-exilic times down to 500 B.C., and in Hellenistic times down to about 100 B.C. there are specific descriptions of this feast. Especially full is the discussion of the feast at the time of Christ, 100 B.C. to 100 A.D. Josephus, Philo, and others in that period render their contributions to the better understanding of the significance of this celebration. About three-fifths of the *Traktat* is given over to a tracing of the history of the New-Year feast from the first to the present.

The treatment of the *Traktat* proper is eminently sane and comprehensive, employing both ancient and modern sources, and giving the reader a dependable commentary.

Horajot (Entscheidungen), by Walter Windfuhr, is the tenth *Traktat* of IV. Seder. Neziqin. This less important section of the Mishna is based on Lowe's Cambridge MS, Strack's Munich MS No. 95, Goldschmidt's *Der babylonische Talmud*, Vol. VII, and a Bibliotheque Nationale Heb. MS No. 1337. Less than two pages of variants are found at the end of the volume.

This is a theologico-juristical document which deals with erroneous decisions or judgments and their makers, connected in thought with Lev., chap. 4. The commentary is quite linguistic, as it deals with the etymological treatment of words with very meager use of other cognates, and often rather scanty remarks. The real fact is that little attention has been given this section by other writers. The author had to fall back on his own available resources in his exposition.

NEW TESTAMENT

MONNIER, HENRI. *La mission historique de Jésus*. 2d ed. Paris: Fischbacher, 1914. xxxix+381 pages. Fr. 5.

After an introduction dealing with the question of the sources the writer treats his subject under four main topics, setting forth the character and activity of Jesus as "the Man," Revealer, Savior, and Redeemer. The characteristic title for Jesus is found in "the Man," the term commonly rendered "Son of Man." This term is said to denote or imply the pre-existence and the future transcendent Messiahship of Jesus. It follows that the kingdom is future and apocalyptic, though it may be said to be present in the person of Jesus. Redemption is through the voluntary death of Jesus, a death in which by sympathetic identification of himself with the people Jesus carried the full burden of the sins of men. The main value of Jesus for today is the religious value, in that he meets the universal and permanent need for redemption. The method of the book is described as the historical method, combining criticism and intuition. Perhaps intuition and traditional interpretation have had too much influence on the criticism. But critical details are presented with great fullness in the notes, which contain abundant references to the literature on points under discussion.

DOCTRINAL

WERNLE, PAUL. *Evangelisches Christentum in der Gegenwart*. Three lectures. Tübingen: Mohr, 1914. 118 pages. M. 2.50.

The three addresses collected in this little volume were designed for popular audiences, and are written in fresh and striking style. The first, entitled "Christentum und Entwicklungsgedanke," is more *gründlich* in character, setting forth with admirable frankness and clearness the perplexities introduced into theology by the change from the catastrophic to the evolutionary method of interpreting cosmic happenings. Eventually Wernle raises the question whether everything is not so relativized by the evolutionary conception that we must forego the idea of absoluteness in connection with any historical reality. He is not willing to admit this concerning Jesus; but he interprets absoluteness here in terms of the inexhaustible religious and moral content of that which Jesus reveals. In the second address, entitled "Was haben wir heute an der Reformation?" Wernle emphasizes the wholesomeness of the ethical interpretation of religion which found expression in Luther's teachings, and the close connection of religion with the revelation in the historical Jesus. Both of these ideals seem to him especially needed to counteract certain vague and emotional tendencies in modernism. The third address, which is distinctly popular in content, sets forth the various historical interpretations of the Sermon on the Mount, and asks whether it represents a practicable program. In recent developments of social and moral ideals, Wernle sees a growing recognition of the moral demand to reorganize society so as to put into practice the ideals of Jesus. The volume is a very interesting expression of enthusiastic modernist faith.

ALLIER, R., et al. *Morale religieuse et morale laïque. Leçons faites à l'école des hautes études sociales*. Paris: Alcan, 1914. 271 pages. Fr. 6.

This volume contains some of the lectures given in a series at the *École des hautes études sociales* in 1911-12. The series was intended to furnish a platform from which both religious and non-religious men could expound ethical problems, in the hope of defining more closely some of the differences between the religious and the secular points of view. But, as was inevitable, the personal equation entered so largely into each lecture that no sharp distinctions emerged. Belot, who is the main defender of "lay" morals, has no difficulty in showing that the actual content of moral ideas grows out of human experience. He objects to the "extraneous" norms and explanations which religion furnishes. But Allier as easily shows that religious interpretations develop out of human experience, and, properly regarded, are no more extraneous than are moral ideals. It becomes evident that if religious interpretations are admitted to be empirical developments, the chief objections of the "free-thinker" either disappear or lose much of their force. Besides the two lectures to which reference has been made, suggestive popular expositions are furnished by Eug. Ehrhardt on "The Notions of Good and of Duty from the Religious Point of View," by W. Monod on "Resignation," by G. Cantecor on "Suicide," by Pastor Wagner on "Chastity," and by Th. Ruysen on "Temperance."

FUCHS, EMIL. *Monismus*. (Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher, V. Reihe, 10-11. Heft.) Tübingen: Mohr, 1913. 80 pages. M. 1.

The vigor with which the Monistenbund in Germany is pushing its propaganda renders this exposition by Pastor Fuchs timely and welcome. After a brief account of

Haeckel's philosophy, the bulk of the volume is devoted to Ostwald, the present leader of the monistic movement. A few pages in conclusion are devoted to Arthur Drews. The purpose of the series to which this volume belongs is to interpret problems from the point of view of liberalism in Christian theology. Unfortunately for the peace of mind of the disinterested reader, adverse criticism and polemic are so constantly intermingled with historical exposition that one feels as if the representatives of Monism were hardly allowed a fair chance, in spite of the liberal citations from their works. On the whole, however, a sympathetic appreciation of the religious motives in Monism marks the book. But the judgment which appears at the end is that in their zeal to be "scientific" the leaders of Monism have furnished a very superficial account of the great problems of the place and significance of man's spiritual life in the universe.

WENDLAND, JOHANNES. *Die neue Diesseitsreligion*. (Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher, V. Reihe, 13. Heft.) Tübingen: Mohr, 1914. 47 pages. M. o. 50.

In this pamphlet Wendland undertakes to set forth in popular form the main traits of the emotional, monistic, often rhapsodic, "religion" which finds modern expression in so many various forms. He recognizes in it a genuine and praiseworthy revival of religious interest. But he criticizes it adversely on various grounds. It is a romantic outgrowth of philosophizing, a species of poetic interpretation rather than a definite historical religion. It puts the moods of self, the aesthetic aspects of the world, the optimism of monistic idealism in the forefront rather than God and God's revelation. Yet in certain respects it is a truthful expression of genuine modern religious aspiration. It corrects the morbid pessimism of traditional theology, it gives a sense of dignity to humanity, and encourages humanistic endeavor. But it is nevertheless essentially a secondary development of culture, whereas a religion which abides asserts its primary rights over man.

SHAW, J. M. *Christianity as Religion and Life*. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1914. 99 pages. 5s.

This little volume contains four lectures delivered on the Pollok Memorial Foundation in Pine Hill Presbyterian College, Halifax, Nova Scotia. The avowed purpose of the lectures is to give reasons for maintaining the truth of the main doctrines in the orthodox plan of salvation. The tone and content are distinctly popular, and such controverted questions as are raised are summarily dealt with. The book thus represents a theological mood rather than a technical contribution. It is agreeably and clearly written.

MCDOWALL, S. A. *Evolution and the Need of Atonement*. Cambridge: University Press, 1912. xiv+155 pages. 3s.

Mr. McDowall has made an ambitious, though modest, attempt to restate the Anselmic doctrine of atonement for the modern Christian by uniting it with the doctrine of evolution. He has followed lines of thought differing considerably from those laid down by others who have made the same attempt. Beginning the study of human life from the biological aspect he recalls the four essential factors of evolutionary growth—variability, heredity, overcrowding, and apparent impossibility of retrogression. Evolution is described as "adaptation to environment." Environment includes all factors

which can influence the organism. The organism makes a continual effort to reach equilibrium with its environment but complicates the task by making as it advances fresh conditions for itself and other organisms. This is especially manifest in the highest organisms, which never reach stable conditions. Free-will and spirituality finally appear and are to be interpreted as the response to a spiritual environment. The author finds the force outworking in this evolution to be an inward energy, the equivalent of Bergson's *vital impulse*, but which he claims to have arrived at independently of Bergson. This vital impulse or divine unrest produces this continued responsiveness to environmental conditions. In the highest scale of evolution self-consciousness emerges.

At this point is discovered a constant warfare between two principles which are named *katabolism* and *anabolism*, the former representing the degradation or dissipation of energy and the latter representing the resistance by the creative vital impulse. These furnish the basis for pessimism and optimism, respectively. By *katabolism* the individual is conquered, but by *anabolism* the race is preserved. Hereby, indetermination, or the negative side of free-will, is reached. This indetermination becomes a voluntary striving for self-realization, and so personality or the spiritual man is attained. Here is the basis of the possibility of sin—the *katabolic* tendency may be submitted to, and the result of the compromise is death. Man may choose not to progress. He may remain unspiritual. The fundamental nature of sin is found in the voluntary identification with the forces that rule matter and produce death. In this positiveness of the character of sin the author thinks he goes beyond and corrects the well-known views of Tennant on sin. Sin is the voluntary misuse of the experience of the race in its discovery of the way of improvement. Thus far for the evolutionary view of sin.

When we turn to the other side of the discussion, the relation of atonement to sin, we find the author much less suggestive and too intent on preserving an inherited doctrine of atonement without doing much to show what atonement is or how it is accomplished. A brief review of Christian thought on the subject is given. Moberly, Lofthouse, and Hitchcock among recent writers receive special attention. The author sees that his great difficulty is to unite the physical and the ethical. The two chapters on the consequences of sin and the atonement attempt the task. Sin is inherent in the race. Freedom exists in individuals. For the race there are consequences of sin, for the individuals, punishment. By rejecting the ideal that is implicit in the miracle of life (teleological, vital impulse) the individual falls out of sympathy with God and may wander forever from him. The reunion can be only through an act of his own will, but through positive evil this is now impossible. The whole race is forever alienated. Yet there is a reunion accomplished by Christ. How? The only answer we really get is substantially: "The death of Christ is an historic fact: its significance is accepted by all Christian peoples: in some manner it reconciles man with God. For us this is enough." In other words, in the end the author falls back on dogma. The individual is saved by entering into Christ's death in a spiritual manner and thus accepting the underlying altruism of the universe. In some future state those who never heard of Christ may do this.

The weakness of the second part of the book lies in the failure to rise above the metaphysical presuppositions of inherited dogma and face the question of atonement in a squarely historical manner.

FOSDICK, H. E. *The Assurance of Immortality*. New York: Macmillan, 1913. 141 pages. \$1.00.

The purpose of this little work on a large subject is not to produce new arguments for immortality or to reproduce the old arguments, but it is to assure the practical man of the twentieth century, who may feel present realities to be the only certain ones and the question of a future life too remote to claim present attention, that it is precisely in the assurance of a deathless life before men that the present life obtains its worth and seriousness. The work is, of course, popular in its style and method, and admirably suited to the needs of busy and earnest men.

The discussion occupies three chapters. In the first, "The Significance of Immortality," the influences which have discouraged this belief, such as the evolutionary view of life and the intimacy of the union of the soul with a transient material organism, are allowed weight, and the substitutes for personal immortality are given their due. The striking sentence, "The race is not immortal if the individuals are not," gives the effectual answer to those who think a devotion to the race may survive the loss of hope in the immortality of the individual.

The second chapter discusses "The Possibility of Immortality." The substance of the argument is contained in the words, "While immortality may not be proved it certainly has not been disproved." The difficulty of conceiving the nature of the conditions of future life, the mistakes made about it, the lowly origin of the belief, the origin of the human mind and its dependence on matter do not inviolate the belief, for the difficulty of the opposite view is greater.

The author is well aware that the argument up to this point carries us no farther than to a respectful agnosticism, and in his third chapter attempts to offer "The Assurance of Immortality." The assurance is a practical necessity for the present in order to live a right life. Starting with the scientist's faith in the rationality of the universe, he urges that if the facts of life are to be made intelligible, immortality is to be affirmed. The limitless possibilities which inhere in knowledge and character, the actual existence of goodness, the testimony of spiritual seers in all ages, support the faith in immortality. Its truth is an assumption but it is verified in life.

The work is especially calculated to assist awakened but troubled young people. However, too much attention is given to brilliance and the apologetic side and too little effort made to present the positive Christian spiritual basis for the hope of immortality.

COHU, J. R. *Vital Problems of Religion*. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1914. xiv+289 pages.

The progress of scientific studies in the sphere of religion and especially the subjection of Christian tradition to the test of scholastic investigation have opened in many quarters a wide chasm between the views upheld in the schools and popular beliefs. There is a call for men who combine with a thorough knowledge of present theological science an acquaintance and sympathy with the experiences and convictions of the masses of Christian believers and who are thereby qualified to bring to the people the best results of scholarship and at the same time strengthen their faith. Generally speaking, intelligent, wide-awake pastors are the best fitted for this work. It is encouraging to find that in many quarters, particularly of the old countries, this is being done.

Vital Problems of Religion by Rev. J. R. Cohu is an instance of this mediating work. The author makes no claims to originality, but at the same time sets forth convictions

at which he has arrived by personal study and reflection. In the introductory chapter he recalls the futile opposition of ecclesiastics to scientific progress in the past and holds that the presence of "the same reactionary spirit with us today" explains why "theology ever lags behind the best thought of its age and is ever in distress." We all must theologize, but we must distinguish between "a theology which is the outcome of a personal heart-experience" and "a theology which makes assent to the formulas of the fourth and sixteenth centuries the test of a man's acceptance with God." The distinction between religion and theology is made. "Religion is the outcome of the sense of awe in man's heart, prompting him to be on friendly terms with a power which can help or hurt him." "Theology is the attempt to formulate this heart-experience in human language, to express it in words and ideas of the day so that heart may speak to heart for mutual edification and instruction." On the other hand he severely condemns the theologians who "slavishly and literally dissect the word-pictures of the scriptures" and "have squeezed all life out of them with their minute abstract definitions and given us in an Athanasian Creed a series of absolutely incomprehensible and debatable doctrinal propositions to be believed on pain of damnation." They have done the same mystifying work with two natures in Christ. At the same time he says, "Our quarrel is not with the formulas of the Councils, or Reformers, or even with the generation that gave us the Athanasian Creed. It is with our church of today for not catching their spirit and doing what these strong and good men did, and as bravely as they did it." Indeed, the author thinks that every word of the Nicene Creed as distinguished from later creeds may be retained, taking the terms as symbols of truth and not statements of scientific fact.

The "problems" which he discusses are eight: the evolution story, evil, religion and science, personality in man, the freedom of the will, conscience, religion and theology, philosophy's living personal God. The work closes with a projected philosophic creed in popular language. The following extracts indicate its general character: "There is one God Almighty, All-Wise, All-Good, All-Holy; the Source, Life, and Goal of all that is; Life of all life, Light of all light, Soul of every soul." "Man is of God, in God, for God, Spirit of His spirit, and his soul can find no rest till it rest in God." "Evil is an incident in God's world. Essential to man's well-being, evil is here only to be got rid of by good. The Fall was akin to a rise. The principle of good is inwoven into the very core of the world-order, which is arranged to conquer and wipe out evil." "Jesus Christ is Son of Man and Son of God. Essentially one in nature with God and Man, Jesus in His own Self realized the at-one-ment of man with God."

The discussions vary considerably in value, as might be expected. "Through Nature to Nature's God" or "The Evolutionary Story," "Personality in Man," "Religion and Theology" are of special interest. A single quotation from each will serve as a clue to the views presented. "The universe is one scheme and Mind is the meaning of it." "In our own heart, and nowhere else, does God reveal himself to us. To know God, look within. Personality is the one gateway through which we pass to the knowledge of God and the answer to the sphinx-riddle of existence." "Religion is heart-reason not aware of itself that it is Reason. . . . A dogma is a symbolic interpretation of the inner experience."

Cohu does not forget, of course, that he is an Anglican, and perhaps a member of another communion will feel that he is thereby hampered, but the fact that a work of this character can obtain the *imprimatur* of an Anglican bishop and its outspoken

repudiation of subservience to tradition as well as its hearty indorsement of the radical methods of modern research are encouraging to those who hope that ere long the new movements of thought will prove themselves to be the true bearers of saving knowledge to the coming age.

MISCELLANEOUS

PARKS, LEIGHTON. *Moral Leadership*. New York: Scribner, 1914. 188 pages. \$1.25.

This collection of sermons is issued in commemoration of the author's ten years' service as rector of St. Bartholomew's in New York City. It gives a good insight into the mind of a present-day minister who is facing the problems of a metropolitan parish located in a rapidly changing district which is forcing the church to readjust its policy. The influence of the environment is reflected in the sermons, which, while "doctrinally sound," are constrained by the present tendency away from speculative to practical theology.

DORCHESTER, DANIEL, JR. *The Sovereign People*. New York: Eaton & Mains, 1914. 243 pages. \$1.00.

One of many short works in the same category, the book is a popular study of the social problem from the religious point of view. Some of the chapter headings are: "The Shackles of Plutocracy," "The New Socialism," "Rent, the Modern Fate," "Wealth and Welfare." Of special interest, in view of the great European war, is the chapter entitled "How Germany Is Solving Some of Our Social Problems." The author is sympathetic with the Progressive party, and his point of view quite obviously controls the treatment throughout.

PERIODICAL LITERATURE

"Zum Begriff des Wunders und der Natur" (Rudolf Paulus in *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, XXIV, Heft 4 [July, 1914] 200-240).

The past three or four years have witnessed several energetic attempts on the part of German scholars to rehabilitate the conception of miracle. Paulus bases his critique of the problem mainly on Hunziger's exposition, pointing out its merits and its defects. He finds that Hunziger, like Herrmann, is rightly concerned to discover miraculous elements in *present* religious experience, rather than to debate the question of the historicity of past marvels, which, in any case, cannot enter into our experience. Moreover, Hunziger corrects Herrmann's purely mechanistic conception of "Nature," showing that Nature demands aesthetic and religious interpretation as well as causal explanation. But Hunziger relapses finally into the old dualism, instead of keeping clearly in mind that we are dealing with functional differences in interpretation of the one realm of experience rather than with two "realms" of reality. In conclusion Paulus shows that scientific truthfulness admits, indeed, a large element of contingency in the actual course of events; but at the same time it insists on a degree of critical verification which makes most of the traditional miracles highly improbable. In view of this situation, Paulus contends that the word "miracle" is so misleading in connotation that any attempt to establish miracles leads inevitably to confusion; and he suggests that an understanding of the real demands of religion would be furthered by adopting less ambiguous terms in theological discussions.

BOOKS RECEIVED

The more important books in this list will be reviewed at length

OLD TESTAMENT

- Cannon, William Walter. *The Song of Songs*. Cambridge: University Press. vii+158 pages. 7s. 6d. net.
- Cooke, G. A. *The Book of Judges*. Cambridge: University Press, 1913. xlii+204 pages. *The Book of Ruth*, xvii+22 pages. 2s. 6d. net.
- Dahse, Johannes. *Die gegenwärtige Krisis in der alttestamentlichen Kritik*. Giessen: Töpelmann, 1914. 30 pages. M. 0.40.
- Holmes, S. Joshua. *The Hebrew and Greek Texts*. Cambridge: University Press, 1914. 80 pages. 7s. net.
- King, Edwin G. *The Poem of Job*. Cambridge: University Press, 1914. xii+116 pages. 5s.
- Kittel, Rudolf. *Die Psalmen*. Leipzig: Deichert, 1914. lix+521 pages. M. 12.
- König, Eduard. *Die moderne Pentateuchkritik und ihre neueste Bekämpfung*. Leipzig: Deichert, 1914. 106 pages. M. 2.80.
- Pillet, M. L. *Le palais de Darius I^{er} à Suse*. Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1914. 106 pages. Fr. 5.
- Studien zur semitischen Philologie und Religionsgeschichte. Julius Wellhausen zum siebenzigsten Geburtstag am 17. Mai 1914 gewidmet. Von Freunden und Schülern. Herausgegeben von Karl Marti. Mit dem Bildnis von J. Wellhausen. Giessen: Töpelmann, 1914. vii+388 pages. M. 18.
- Wiener, Harold M. *The Pentateuchal Text. A Reply to Dr. Skinner*. London: Elliot Stock, 1914. 218+268 pages. 6d.
- Teubner, 1914. viii+151 pages. M. 5.60.
- Brou, Alexandre. *La spiritualité de Saint Ignace*. Paris: Beauchesne, 1914. 266 pages.
- Browne, Laurence E. *The Parables of the Gospels in the Light of Modern Criticism*. Cambridge: University Press, 1913. vi+91 pages. 2s. 6d.
- Caldecott, W. Shaw. *Herod's Temple. Its New Testament Associations and Its Structure*. London: Charles H. Kelly, 1914. xvi+395 pages. 6s.
- Conybeare, Fred C. *The Historical Christ: or, An Investigation of the Views of Mr. J. M. Robertson, Dr. A. Drews, and Professor W. B. Smith*. Chicago: Open Court, 1914. ix+235 pages. \$1.50.
- Davies, E. O. *The Miracles of Jesus: A Study of the Evidence. Being the Davies Lecture for the year 1913*. New York: Doran, 1913. xi+240 pages. \$1.25 net.
- Groton, William Mansfield. *The Christian Eucharist and the Pagan Cults*. New York: Longmans, Green & Co. xii+203 pages. \$1.20.
- Harnack, Adolph. *Die Entstehung des Neuen Testaments und die wichtigsten Folgen der neuen Schöpfung*. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1914. vii+152 pages. M. 4.
- Jones, Maurice. *The New Testament in the Twentieth Century*. London: Macmillan, 1914. xxiv+467 pages. \$3.00.
- Koehler, Franz. *Die Pastoralbriefe*. Tübingen: Mohr, 1914. 48 pages.
- Murray, George. *Jesus and His Parables*. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1914. viii+305 pages.
- Peeters, Paul. *Évangiles apocryphes. Vol. II*. Paris: Picard, 1914. lix+330 pages. Fr. 3.50.
- Robertson, A. T. *A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the Light of Historical Research*. New York: Doran, 1914. xl+1360 pages. \$5.00.
- Schumacher, Heinrich. *Christus in seiner Präexistenz und Kenose nach*

NEW TESTAMENT AND PATRISTICS

- Böhlig, Hans. *Aus dem Briefe des Paulus nach Rom*. Tübingen: Mohr, 1914. 56 pages.
- Boll, Franz. *Aus der Offenbarung Johannis: Hellenistische Studien zum Weltbild der Apokalypse*. Leipzig:

Phil. 2:5-8. 1. Teil: Historische Untersuchung. Rome: Verlag des päpstl. Bibelinstituts, 1914. (Scripta Pontificii Instituti Biblici.) xxx+236 pages. L. 4.50.

CHURCH HISTORY

Althaus, Paul. Die Prinzipien der deutschen reformierten Dogmatik. Leipzig: Deichert, 1914. vii+273 pages. M. 7.50.

Böhmer, Heinrich. Luthers Romfahrt. Leipzig: Deichert, 1914. iv+183 pages. M. 4.80.

Bonwetsch, Nathanael. Texte zur Geschichte des Montanismus. Bonn: Marcus und Weber, 1914. 32 pages. M. 0.80.

Burnichon, Joseph. La Compagnie de Jésus en France. Histoire d'un siècle, 1814-1914. Paris: Beauchesne, 1914. xlviii+568 pages. Fr. 8.

Cobb, W. F. Mysticism and the Creed. London: Macmillan, 1914. xxxi+559 pages. \$3.00.

D'Herbigny, Michael. Prudens Sexdecim Linguarum Confessarius. Paris: Beauchesne, 1914. 101 pages.

Gabriel, Paul. Die Theologie W. A. Tellers. Geissen: Töpelmann, 1914. 90 pages. M. 2.60.

Jones, Rufus M. Spiritual Reformers in the 16th and 17th Centuries. London: Macmillan, 1914. li+362 pages. \$3.00.

Lietzmann, Hans. Symbole der alten Kirche. Bonn: Marcus und Weber, 1914. 40 pages. M. 0.80.

Loofs, Friedrich. Nestorius, and His Place in the History of Christian Doctrine. Cambridge: University Press, 1914. vii+132 pages. 3s. 6d.

Reuter, Hans. Zu Schleiermachers Idee des "Gesamtlebens." Berlin: Troitzsch, 1914. 31 pages. M. 1.60.

Srawley, J. H. The Early History of the Liturgy. Cambridge: University Press, 1913. xx+251 pages. 6s.

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Bacon, Benjamin Wisner. Christianity Old and New. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1914. xiv+169 pages. \$1.00.

Ihmels, Ludwig. Aus der Kirche, ihrem Lehren und Leben. Leipzig: Deichert, 1914. iv+203 pages. M. 4.

Ten Broeke, James. A Constructive Basis for Theology. London: Macmillan, 1914. vi+400 pages. \$3.00.

Wobbermin, Georg. Die religionspsychologische Methode in Religionswissenschaft und Theologie. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1913. vii+475 pages.

Youtz, Herbert A. The Enlarging Conception of God. New York: Macmillan, 1914. ix+199 pages. \$1.25.

HISTORY OF RELIGIONS

Gennrich, Paul. Moderne buddhistische Propaganda und indische Wiedergeburtstheorie in Deutschland. Leipzig: Deichert, 1914. 52 pages. M. 1.20.

Hartland, Edwin Sidney. Ritual and Belief. New York: Scribner, 1914. xv+352 pages.

Owen, D. C. The Infancy of Religion. Oxford: University Press, 1914. viii+143 pages. \$1.40.

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Beiträge zur Religionswissenschaft. Herausgegeben von der religionswissenschaftlichen Gesellschaft in Stockholm. 1. Jahrgang, 1913-14, Heft 2. Pp. 115-239.

Coit, Stanton. The Soul of America. New York: Macmillan, 1914. x+405 pages. \$2.00.

Elenco Alfabetico delle pubblicazioni periodiche resistenti Nelle Biblioteche di Roma e relative a Scienze morali storiche filologiche belle arti ecc. Rome: Pontificio Instituto Biblico, 1914. xvi+406 pages. L. 6.50.

Hodges, George. The Human Nature of the Saints. New York: Macmillan, 1914. 244 pages. \$1.25.

Hodges, George. The Year of Grace: Advent to Trinity. New York: Macmillan, 1914. 308 pages. \$1.25.

MacNish, George H. The Master of Evolution. Boston: Sherman, French & Co., 1911. 135 pages.

Meyer, Rev. F. B. Through the Bible Day by Day. Philadelphia: American Sunday School Union, 1914. 218 pages. 1s.

Shaw, J. M. Christianity as Religion and Life. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1914. 99 pages.

Streeter, Burnett Hillman. Restatement and Reunion. London: Macmillan, 1914. xxii+194 pages. 2s. 6d.

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